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The European Arrest Warrant (EAW) is the first and most important measure in the field of 
European criminal law for the purpose of implementation of the principle of mutual recognition of 
judicial decisions. The Framework Decision which introduced it was adopted on 13 June 2002 
following point 35 of the Conclusions of the Tampere European Council of 15-16 October 1999 
(aiming at abolishing the formal extradition procedure among the Member States of the European 
Union). The Warrant is a judicial decision issued by a Member State, which requires the arrest and 
surrender of a person by another Member State, for the purposes of conducting a criminal 
prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order. It is issued when the person 
whose return is sought is accused of an offence for which the law establishes a maximum of at 
least one year in prison, or when the person has already been sentenced to a prison term of at 
least four months. 
The research aims at exploring the context in which the EAW was adopted, as part of the mutual 
recognition agenda. This will be done through an analysis of the substantive and procedural legal 
aspects of its implementation. Is mutual recognition correctly implemented? While some authors 
hail it as a giant leap towards a new system of inter-state judicial cooperation, others view it as a 
danger for the traditional principles of criminal law as developed in Europe in the last centuries. 
The thesis will look at the functioning of the EAW in the EU criminal law area and at its 
implications for national sovereignty as well as individual rights, with particular reference to the 
radical modification of the principles of classical extradition law. An evaluation of its effectiveness 
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If a Covenant be made, wherein neither of the 
Parties performe presently, but trust one another; in 
the condition of meer Nature (which is a condition 
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The area of cooperation in criminal matters within the European Union (which 
corresponds to the current Third Pillar) has been one of the most interesting areas of 
European Union (EU) law. One of the reasons is that it incorporates principles and 
mechanisms of international law within a framework which possesses some 
supranational features. This obviously generates tensions and challenges relating for 
instance to the level of democracy, rule of law, human rights and constitutional 
structure. One fundamental principle which lies at the heart of this sui generis system 
is mutual recognition. The purpose of this thesis is to look at the most prominent 
instrument of mutual recognition, the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), and the 
extent to which the new mechanism effectively operates within a non-harmonised 
landscape. It will consider it both as a significant example of implementation of 
mutual recognition (which can serve as a test for all the other measures which have 
been adopted or will soon be adopted) and as an evolution of classic extradition. 
 
After giving an overview of the evolution of cooperation in criminal matters in 
general and of the so-called “European extradition model” in particular (chapter 
one), the principle of mutual recognition will be examined in more detail, tracing its 
birth back at the time when the first examples of cooperation originated within the 
Council of Europe framework (chapter two). An assessment will be carried out firstly 
of its theoretical significance in relation to harmonisation/approximation of 
substantive and procedural criminal law and secondly of its current effectiveness in 
                                                 
1 T. Hobbes, Leviathan ( 9th ed. CUP 2006) 96. 
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light of its gradual development and the non-uniform features which can be 
identified in the various instruments adopted so far. The concept of mutual 
recognition will be analysed further in order to verify whether it is possible to justify 
it and utilise it as a legitimate model for the development of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. In particular, the thesis will explore the possibility of viewing it as 
a constitutionally embedded principle, linked to the rule of law.  
 
Following these introductory chapters, the thesis will then analyse the adoption of the 
Framework Decision on the EAW on the assumption of a high degree of mutual trust 
and as a product of a strong pressure to fight terrorism following 9/11 (chapter 3). It 
will be shown that the initial drafts were very different from the current measure, as 
(for instance) the scope of its applicability was restricted mostly to terrorist crimes, 
the number of grounds for refusal was lower and the purpose of surrender was not 
only prosecuting or sentencing an individual, but also merely carrying out an 
investigation. After 9/11, the removal of the principle of double criminality was 
extended to a “positive” list of thirty-two categories of offences and, on the other 
hand, a higher number of grounds for refusal were provided for. It is maintained that 
the reason is that most of these “categories” can be somehow linked to terrorism or 
organised crime. 
 
One of the main problems of the Framework Decision list is that some of the 
“offences” are vaguely defined or have not been the subject of adequate 
approximation. Following a comparative study of the definitions of some of those 
offences at the national level, it will be argued that: 1) the list should be reduced to 
those “offences” in relation to which agreement can be more easily found and 2) 
more approximation should be pursued in order to identify clearly the constituent 
elements of the offences and penalties at the EU level (chapter four).  
 
The need for approximation is also evident from the procedural point of view, as is 
demonstrated by an analysis of the implementation of the EAW in the United 
Kingdom and Italy (chapter five). Both legislation and case law in those two 
countries (one belonging to the common law tradition, the other to the civil law 
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tradition) show that the transposition of the Framework Decision has diverged and in 
Italy it has even strikingly betrayed the spirit of mutual recognition. The general 
overview of the implementation of the EAW in all twenty-seven Member States as 
well as  interviews carried out with practitioners will confirm that mutual trust has 
not developed uniformly within the EU. An attempt is then made to define the 
concept of mutual trust in the area of cooperation in criminal matters, drawing on the 
social sciences literature as well as anecdotal evidence. 
 
Finally, the thesis will look at the delicate issues of human rights protection and in 
particular the principle of legality and the rights of the defence and will conclude 
that, although the EAW mechanism is generally more effective than traditional 
extradition, it presents less guarantees and should therefore be improved (chapter 
six). Concerns also relate to the relatively weak powers of Eurojust and the lack of 
common rules on conflicts of jurisdiction. The final assessment of the implications of 
the new surrender scheme will entail a general overview of the potential 
developments of European Criminal Law as a whole. This work states the law in this 
area as of 20th February 2009. 
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What does cooperation in criminal matters consist of and by what principles is it 
governed? This chapter offers an historical analysis of the development of extradition 
and cooperation in order to sketch the main features of the broad canvas within 
which the EAW is situated. First, it will give a general overview of the main forms of 
cooperation in criminal matters (section 1.1). Second, it will focus on the evolution 
of the European extradition model, as it is assumed that extradition is not only the 
most ancient but also the paradigmatic form of cooperation, in so far as it is more 
directly related to issues of sovereignty and jurisdiction (section 1.2). Third, it will 
offer an historical account of European cooperation from the earliest, informal 
structures to the legislative framework of the EU (sections 1.3 and 1.4). Some first 
preliminary conclusions will be given at the end (section 1.5).  
 
 
 1.1 Forms of cooperation in criminal matters in Europe 
 
Scholars normally identify four main methods of cooperation in criminal matters: 
mutual assistance in criminal matters, transfer of proceedings, enforcement of 
foreign judgments, extradition1. Concerning the former, the first step was made with 
the European Convention on Mutual Assistance2. This provided for contact between 
the Ministries of Justice of the States Parties, or, in cases of urgency or 
(alternatively) where a bilateral arrangement so provided, directly between the 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, D.McClean- International Co-operation in civil and criminal matters (OUP 2002); 
E. Müller-Rappard, ‘Inter-State Cooperation in Penal Matters Within the Council of Europe 
Framework’, in M.C. Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, Procedural and Enforcement 
Mechanisms (2nd ed. Transnational Publishers 1999) 331.  
2 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 20/04/1959, Strasbourg, ETS n. 30. 
As of 18 February 2009, it has been ratified or acceded to by 47 States, of which 27 are EU Member 
States. See http://conventions.coe.int/ . 
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judicial authorities. Assistance occurred upon request for a wide range of measures, 
in respect of offences the punishment of which, at the time of the request, fell within 
the jurisdiction of the judicial authorities of the requesting State. A request could 
relate to facilitation of the appearance and hearing of witnesses or technical experts 
before a court of the requesting State, exchange of information on judicial records, 
taking of evidence by means of a letter rogatory. Of course, refusal was possible, for 
instance when the requested State reserved the right to make the execution of certain 
letters rogatory dependent on the condition that the offence was an extraditable 
offence under its domestic law and/or met the double criminality requirement, or 
when the execution of the request might, in the view of that State, harm its essential 
interests. The possibility of making reservations was practically unlimited. This is the 
main reason why, following a similar pattern as extradition, a Convention was 
drafted in 2000 within the EU context, as it was believed that cooperation would be 
more effective3. Indeed, this Convention, which is not supposed to replace but 
merely supplement previous instruments adopted in this area, only allows those 
reservations that are expressly provided for. Secondly, it does not allow refusal for 
offences which are not extraditable under the law of the requested State or are not 
defined by its domestic law. Thirdly, the political, military and fiscal offence 
exceptions are excluded. As is evident from the Preamble, the detailed provisions of 
this Convention are all said to stem from the confidence that State Parties have in 
each other’s legal system4. This is why this instrument is very much geared towards 
effective and fast-track procedures, which include innovative provisions such as, for 
instance, interception of terrestrial and satellite communications and hearings of 
witnesses by videoconference or telephone (when they are in another Member State) 
or controlled deliveries. It has been observed that this is necessary, even at the 
expenses of lower standards in the protection of the rights of individuals (both 
                                                 
3 Council Act of 29 May 2000 establishing in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on European 
Union the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the 
European Union, OJ C 197 12/07/2000 as well as Protocol, OJ C 326 16/10/2001 and Explanatory 
Report, OJ C 379, 30/11/2000. It has been ratified by 23 Member States so far (it entered into force on 
23 August 2005).  
4 For a full account of the complex issues related to mutual assistance in criminal matters, see E. 
Denza, ‘The 2000 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters’ (2003) 40 Common Market 
Law Review 1047.  
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suspects and non suspects), as the measures at issue do not involve directly the arrest 
or the detention of the suspect5. 
 
As far as the second and the third form of cooperation are concerned, they have been 
for a long time inspired by an embryonic principle of mutual recognition of judicial 
decisions. The need to fight new types of criminality evolving in the last decades of 
the past century encouraged States to give up part of their national sovereignty in 
order to develop new instruments of cooperation. There are indeed many problems 
connected to the recognition and enforcement of judgments6: some States distinguish 
three types of penalties entailing deprivation of freedom (penal servitude, 
imprisonment and detention), some others two or one; the minimum and maximum 
of a sanction can vary considerably; in some States a judgment may have other 
effects than in another.  
 
The first instruments were adopted within the framework of the Council of Europe7. 
Examples of these are: the European Convention on the Supervision of Conditionally 
Sentenced or Conditionally Released Offenders and the European Convention on the 
Punishment of Road Traffic Offences, both of them of 30 November 19648; the 
European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, agreed at 
The Hague in May 1970; the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in 
Criminal Matters of 15 May 1972; the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced 
Persons of 21 March 1983. However, at the same time some steps were taken within 
the European Communities. An example is the Convention between the Member 
States of the European Communities on the Enforcement of Foreign Criminal 
Sentences of 13 November 1991. All the Conventions mentioned above have 
therefore a regional or sub-regional scope9.  
                                                 
5 E. Denza, ‘The 2000 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters’, supra 1057.  
6 D.McClean, International Co-operation in civil and criminal matters, supra.  
7 See also M. Fichera, ‘Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters from Its Creation to the New 
Developments in the Lisbon Treaty’, UACES Seminar Exchanging Ideas on Europe 2008- Rethinking 
the European Union, Edinburgh, 1-3 September 2008, available at 
http://www.uaces.org/events/conferences/papers/abstract.php?recordID=22 .  
8 ETS n. 51 and n. 52. They entered into force, respectively, on 22/8/1975 and 18/7/1972. 
9 See respectively The Hague, 28/5/1970, ETS n. 70; Strasbourg, 15/5/1972, ETS n. 73; Strasbourg, 
21/3/1983, ETS n. 112, ratified by 11, 13 and 27 EU Member States respectively as of 18 February 
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The first two European Conventions already contain a few provisions aiming at 
speeding up and simplifying the procedure of recognition and enforcement of 
decisions10. They also contain mandatory and optional grounds of refusal (including 
the double criminality requirement11) and ensure the application of a set of common 
rules. 
 
The 1970 European Convention entered into force on 26 July 1974. It goes a step 
forward as it has a more general scope and contains some important definitions. For 
instance, it defines “European criminal judgment” as any final decision delivered by 
a criminal court of a Contracting State as a result of criminal proceedings and 
“sanction” as any punishment or other measure expressly imposed on a person, in 
respect of an offence, in a European criminal judgment, or in an ordonnance pénale. 
It was decided that “considerations of national sovereignty (…) should no longer be 
an obstacle to the recognition of the legal effects of foreign judgments”, due to the 
existing “mutual confidence” between Member States of the Council of Europe12.  
 
Many of these instruments, such as the Additional Protocol to the European 
Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons and the 1991 Convention on the 
Enforcement of Foreign Criminal Sentences, have never entered into force13. The 
reason for this lies probably in the fact that, despite all good intentions, mutual 
confidence between Member States had not developed at that time to a sufficient 
degree. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
2009. See also E. Müller-Rappard, ‘Inter-State Cooperation in Penal Matters Within the Council of 
Europe Framework’ in M. C. Bassiouni (ed.), supra 331.  
10 See, for example, Art. 9 and 30 of the European Convention on the Supervision of Conditionally 
Sentenced or Conditionally Released Offenders and Art. 20 of the European Convention on the 
Punishment of Road Traffic Offences, supra. 
11 See Art. 4 of the European Convention on the Supervision of Conditionally Sentenced or 
Conditionally Released Offenders supra. 
12 European Convention on the international validity of criminal judgments, Explanatory Report, ETS 
n. 070, par. 1.  
13 Additional Protocol to the European Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Strasbourg, 
18/12/1997, ETS n. 167; 1991 Convention on the Enforcement of Foreign Criminal Sentences, supra. 
See also D. McClean, International Co-operation in civil and criminal matters, supra 374. 
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The common points of these Conventions are:  the general rule that enforcement is 
governed by the law of the requested State; the provision of a number of grounds of 
refusal; in some of them, the possibility for the State of enforcement to arrest the 
offender upon request of another State and to seize his assets (subject to conditions 
and limits); the possibility given to the State of enforcement of converting the 
penalty issued in another State into a penalty provided for by its national law for the 
same or comparable offences, provided that the penal situation of the sentenced 
person is not aggravated.  
 
The issue of mutual recognition was at one point moved within the framework of the 
European Union. At the Cardiff European Council in 1998 the Council was asked to 
“identify the scope for greater mutual recognition of decisions of each other’s 
courts”14. As a result, the Tampere European Council one year later introduced this 
principle for the first time in the Third Pillar. However, although mutual recognition 
is considered “the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in both civil and criminal 
matters within the Union”15 in an area of freedom, security and justice, it is not yet 
entirely clear what it means and there is not much related case law16. Mutual 
recognition is therefore at the moment more a political concept than a juridical one. 
 
In the same year as the Cardiff European Council, the Vienna Action Plan17 called 
for the adoption within two years after the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam of measures with a view to facilitating mutual recognition of decisions 
and enforcement of judgments in criminal matters18. It also stressed, on the one hand, 
the connection between Article 31 (e) TEU dealing with prevention and fight against 
                                                 
14 Cardiff European Council (15-16 June 1998) Presidency Conclusions, par. 39, available at 
http://europa.eu/european_council/conclusions/index_en.htm  The UK government was the main 
promoter of mutual recognition. See also infra chapter 3 note 22. 
15 Tampere European Council (15-16 October 1999) Presidency Conclusions, par. 33, see link above. 
16 However, the ECJ held in Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01, Gőzűtok and Brűgge [2003] ECR 
I-01345 that the ne bis in idem principle according to Art. 54 of the 1990 Schengen Convention 
implied that the Member States “have mutual trust in their criminal justice systems and that each of 
them recognises the criminal law in force in the other Member States even when the outcome would 
be different if its own national law were applied” (par.33). 
17 Council and  Commission Action Plan on How to Best Implement the Provisions of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam on an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, OJ C 19/01 3/12/2001. 
18 Ibid. point 45 (f).  
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crime and Article 61 (a) TEC dealing with free movement of persons19 and, on the 
other, the need to establish minimum rules relating to the constituent elements and to 
penalties in the field of organised crime, terrorism and drug trafficking, as well as 
other crimes specifically mentioned20. A report on the first steps of this agenda is 
contained in the Communication from the Commission on the Mutual Recognition of 
Final Decisions in Criminal Matters in July 200021. This document pointed out that 
none of the previous international instruments would be sufficient to establish a full 
regime of mutual recognition and that traditional judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, based on the “request” principle, was slow and cumbersome and led to 
uncertain results. Indeed, common rules on jurisdiction were necessary and the 
number of grounds for refusal was too high. Hence the need for a European registry 
of criminal sentences and of criminal proceedings, which would avoid problems 
connected to the ne bis in idem principle and conflicts of jurisdiction, ensuring at the 
same time data protection22. The Commission also suggested that a set of common 
rules on jurisdiction, identifying only one Member State as having competence, 
could be agreed, similarly to what already exists in the area of civil and commercial 
matters.  In this context, however, the Commission recognised that mutual 
recognition cannot be understood in absolute terms, as a system with no form of 
exequatur procedure at all is not feasible. Minimum rules should at least provide for 
a translation of the text and a control as to whether the decision had been issued by a 
competent authority. We can therefore summarise the main features of this new form 
of international cooperation: more rapidity, more certainty, less discretion.  
  
A Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of 
decisions in criminal matters was then issued by the European Council in November 
200023. In this Programme priority rating 1 was accorded to the need to draw up an 
instrument on mutual recognition of decisions on the freezing of evidence and of an 
                                                 
19 Ibid. points 5 and 25. 
20 Ibid. points 18 and 46 (a) and (b).  
21 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament- Mutual 
Recognition of Final Decisions in Criminal Matters, COM(2000) 495 final. 
22 The Vienna Action Plan, point 49(e), already required, as one of the measures to be taken within 
five years of the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, an examination of the possibility to create 
a register of pending cases.  
23 Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal 
matters, OJ C 12/02 15/01/2001. 
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instrument on mutual recognition of orders to freeze assets. The need to introduce an 
arrest warrant was only accorded priority rating 2 and was limited to the most serious 
offences in Art. 29 TEU, i.e. terrorism, trafficking in persons and offences against 
children, illicit drugs trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, corruption and fraud24.  
 
Specific measures implementing the principle at issue were then adopted, but, 
following the events of 9/11, the Council Framework Decision on the EAW was 
adopted first and quite rapidly25. This was followed by the Council Framework 
Decisions on the freezing of assets, on confiscation of crime-related proceeds and on 
the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties: these 
measures will be examined in detail in the following chapter, but it should be pointed 
out here that, as far as the arrest warrant is concerned, its applicability is not 
restricted to a few serious crimes, but extends to all those punishable by the law of 
the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or detention order for a maximum 
period of at least 12 months or, where a sentence has been passed or a detention 
order has been made, for sentences of at least four months. 
 
In order to fix priorities and assess the implementation of the measures in the field of 
freedom, security and justice, the idea of a multiannual programme, which had been 
inaugurated with the Tampere Programme, was further developed with the Hague 
Programme, at the European Council of 4-5 November 2004. This programme 
identifies the objectives of strengthening freedom, security and justice as well as ten 
priorities for the period 2005-2009. According to Priority n. 9, “(…) Approximation 
will be pursued, in particular through the adoption of rules ensuring a high degree of 
protection of persons, with a view to building mutual trust and strengthening mutual 
recognition, which remains the cornerstone of judicial cooperation”26.  A more 
                                                 
24 The Programme also refers to recommendation N. 28 of the European Union’s Strategy for the 
beginning of the new millennium, which envisaged the possibility to create a single European legal 
area for extradition. 
25 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and 
the surrender procedure between Member States, OJ L 190 18/07/2002. 
26 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament- The Hague 
Programme: Ten Priorities for the next five years- COM (2005) 184 final. 
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detailed list of measures is provided for in the Action Plan27, which is considered as 
part of a framework including the Drugs Action Plan, the Action Plan on Combating 
Terrorism and the Strategy on the external aspects of the area of freedom, security 
and justice.  An annual report on the implementation of the Hague Programme 
(called “Scoreboard plus”) is required, in order to evaluate the progress achieved in 
the adoption of the legislative acts and in the implementation of the measures at the 
national level. The first “Scoreboard plus” was presented in 200628. 
 
The debate on the essence and functioning of mutual recognition is still very intense. 
Indeed, the Finnish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, which started 
on 1 July 2006, put as one of the priorities of its agenda the need “to explore ways of 
reinforcing decision-making on criminal law and police cooperation”29. An informal 
JHA Ministerial Meeting was held in Tampere, on 20-22 September 2006. From that 
meeting it emerged that, while the Commission and the Parliament tended to favour 
the use of the “bridging” clause, among the Member States only Finland and France 
clearly supported this view, with Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Slovakia 
more inclined to retain their veto power. The UK was reported to implicitly oppose 
the new proposal30. Some suggested, as a compromise, to apply the so-called 
“emergency brake” procedure, already provided for by Art. III-270 and 271 of the 
European Constitution, which (prior to the signing of the Lisbon Treaty) would have 
allowed Member States to opt out of those proposals which affect the nature of their 
national penal systems31.  
 
                                                 
27 Council and Commission Action Plan implementing the Hague Programme on strengthening 
freedom, security and justice in the European Union, OJ C 198/01 12/8/2005. 
28 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Implementing 
the Hague Programme: the way forward COM (2006) 331 final; Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Evaluation of EU Policies on Freedom, 
Security and Justice COM (2006) 332 final; Communication from the Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament COM (2006) 333 final. 
29 Finnish Prime Minister’s Office Press Release - 30 June 2006- 
http://www.eu2006.fi/news_and_documents/press_releases/vko26_/en_GB/162650/?u4.highlight 
30 Assemblée Nationale, Rapport d’information n. 2829 sur les consequences de l’arrêt de la Cour de 
Justice 13 septembre 2005, 25 janvier 2006; House of Lords European Union Committee, 42nd Report, 
Session 2005-06, 28 July 2006,  35; EU wants more powers in criminal matters, EUObserver.com, 8 
May 2006; EU to clash on national justice vetoes, EUPolitix.com, 20 September 2006 
31 Interview with F. Frattini, EUPolitix.com, 26 June 2006; Drive to give European court a role in 
settling asylum cases, Financial Times, 28 June 2006. See also Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe, OJ C 310 16/12/2004.  
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While an in-depth analysis of the implications of mutual recognition will be carried 
out in the next chapter, the following section will focus on the most significant form 
of cooperation, which is represented by extradition. One of the reasons is that the 
EAW represents a point of convergence of both mutual recognition and extradition, 
which confirms its importance in the broader context of the Third Pillar. 
 
 
 1.2 The European Extradition Model 
 
 
Extradition is a mechanism of international cooperation by which one or more States 
agree to assist each other in criminal matters32. Extraditing means surrendering an 
individual to the requesting State so that he or she can be prosecuted or a sentence 
can be served. This can occur either on the basis of a multilateral or bilateral Treaty 
or without a previous arrangement. Most common law countries allow extradition 
only on the basis of a Treaty33. Where an agreement already exists, it normally 
imposes upon the requested State an obligation to extradite the criminal or, in 
alternative, to prosecute him/her (aut dedere aut judicare principle34). Otherwise, no 
such duty can be identified in international law: the procedure relies exclusively on 
reciprocity and (as some argue) comity35. 
 
Extradition starts with a request formally transmitted through diplomatic or 
governmental channels: all the necessary documents are indicated by the Treaty or 
                                                 
32 M.C. Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice (5th ed., Oceana 
Publications Inc. 2007); M.C. Bassiouni, ‘Reforming International Extradition: Lessons of the Past for 
a Radical New Approach’ (2003) 25 Loyola International and Comparative Law Review 389; G. 
Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague-
Boston-London 1998); I. Shearer, Extradition in International Law (Oceana Publications Inc., 
Manchester 1971). 
33 However, the UK allows ad hoc extradition as well. See the UK Extradition Act 2003 (c.41) and 
Explanatory Notes. 
34 M.C.Bassiouni, E. Wise, Aut dedere aut judicare: The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in 
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, London-Dordrecht 1995), who at 22-26 and 51-53 suggest that 
this rule could be considered not only part of customary international law but also a jus cogens norm. 
The expression is a modern version of the maxim aut dedere aut punire, which was used by H. 
Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (Book II, Chapter XXI, par. III and IV 1625) 526-528 (Classics of 
International Law 1925). See M.C. Bassiouni, International Extradition, supra, 5. 
35 See, e.g., M.C. Bassiouni, International Extradition, supra.  
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the national Act of the requested State. Usually Treaties make it possible for a State 
to obtain, pending receipt of a formal request, the provisional arrest of the sought 
person. This can be performed following an exchange of information between the 
competent authorities or through a “red individual notice” issued by Interpol36. Both 
extradition procedure and pre-extradition (provisional) detention measures are 
regulated by the domestic rules of the requested State37. The intervention of the 
executive is therefore decisive: this does not mean however that the judiciary cannot 
exercise any control. There is a general distinction between common law and civil 
law countries: in the latter, surrender needs to be declared admissible by a criminal 
court38; in the former, its lawfulness can be reviewed in habeas corpus 
proceedings39. This is why a reasoned request must be submitted to a local magistrate 
or to the government: however, the extradition hearing does not aim at determining 
the guilt or innocence of the individual40. After this “judicial” phase, an 
“administrative” phase follows, in which the final decision is made by the executive. 
In some countries the negative assessment of a court is binding upon the 
government41.  
 
There are different models of extradition. The European model is particularly 
interesting because it has recently undergone radical changes. This section will 
provide a broad overview of its evolution, in the light of the fundamental principles 
and exemption rules of extradition law (nationality, prima facie evidence, speciality, 
                                                 
36 A “red notice” is based on an arrest warrant (issued when a person is wanted for prosecution) or a 
court order (when the person is wanted for the purpose of serving a sentence). On the basis of the 
information contained in the “red notice”, the competent judicial authority decides whether or not to 
allow for provisional arrest. Following the arrest, the requesting country is notified of the person’s 
detention and starts the formal extradition proceedings. See www.interpol.int .  
37 These rules have been elaborated in different ways from State to State. For instance, some States 
(e.g. Austria, Germany) have enacted a comprehensive piece of legislation dealing with all forms of 
cooperation in criminal matters. Some others (e.g. Italy) have devoted to such issues a specific section 
of the code of criminal procedure. Yet others (e.g. UK) have enacted separate legislation for each 
form of international cooperation in criminal matters. 
38 See e.g. G. Vermeulen, T. Vander Beken, ‘Extradition in the European Union: State of the Art and 
Perspectives’ (1996) 4 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 200. 
39 See, e.g., I. A. Shearer, Extradition in International Law, supra. 
40 M.C. Bassiouni, International Extradition, supra. 
41 For general information on national extradition procedures, see European Committee on Crime 
Problems, European Convention on Extradition- A Guide to Procedures, 2 October 2003, PC-OC INF 
4 at www.coe.int. 
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double criminality, territoriality, extraditable offences, military, fiscal and political 
offence exceptions, ne bis in idem, death penalty, fair trial or asylum clause).  
 
The first steps were taken within the framework of the Council of Europe. The 1957 
European Convention42 was the result of the growing legal and political homogeneity 
of the European States43. It was the first example in Europe of a multilateral 
arrangement which gave up some of the features of the old model, in accordance 
with the modern view that the sought person must be considered the subject, rather 
than merely the object of criminal proceedings44. It provided a general scheme which 
each State Party may supplement by way of bilateral or multilateral arrangements45. 
 
Some important changes were introduced. First of all, under this Convention 
Member States are not required to provide evidence of a prima facie case of guilt, 
except where the requested State has made a specific reservation46. However, some 
evidence will still be needed in order to assess whether the conduct for which a 
request has been made is an offence punishable by deprivation of liberty or detention 
order for a maximum of at least one year, or (if a sentence or detention order have 
already been issued) for which a punishment of at least four months is awarded. This 
is the “minimum maximum penalty threshold” method (or eliminative method), i.e. a 
traditional mechanism whose purpose is to restrict extradition to the most serious 
                                                 
42 European Convention on Extradition and related Explanatory Memorandum, ETS n. 24, Paris 
13/12/1957.  
43 M. Mackarel, S. Nash, ‘Extradition and the European Union’ (1997) 46 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 948; G. Vermeulen, T. Vander Beken, ‘Extradition in the European 
Union’, supra; H.J. Bartsch, ‘The Western European Approach’ (1991) 62 International Review of 
Penal Law 499.  
44 European Convention Explanatory Memorandum, ETS n. 24, Paris 13/12/1957. Interestingly, 
during the negotiations Scandinavian delegates pointed out the model followed by their countries, 
based on mutual confidence and facilitated by the “great similarity between the penal codes of 
Scandinavian countries in their definition of offences”.  
45 G. Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders in International Law, supra. 
46 This requirement is typical of common law countries, although e.g. by virtue of a reservation made 
on 27 September 1967 Israel still requires the making of a prima facie case. Interestingly, the 1988 
Criminal Justice Act and the 1989 Extradition Act permitted the UK to strike agreements with foreign 
States whose domestic law does not require prima facie evidence. This is why the UK was then able 
to ratify the Convention on 13 February 1991. See D. Poncet, P. Gully-Hart, ‘The European 
Approach’ in M.C. Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, Procedural and Enforcement 
Mechanisms (2nd ed., Transnational Publishers 1999) 277.  
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offences47. This was preferred to the “list” or “enumerative” method, consisting in 
naming those crimes for which extradition applies: the reason was that the former 
system is more flexible and can adapt to changing priorities in the criminal policy of 
the Member States. Of course, a condition for an optimal functioning of the 
eliminative method is that the legal systems which it refers to apply a similar level of 
penalties. The identification of “extraditable offences” goes hand in hand with the 
requirement of double criminality, according to which the alleged conduct must be 
punishable under the laws of both States involved48. This requirement is respected by 
States on the basis of reciprocity and is considered a corollary of the nulla poena sine 
lege principle (no crime without a law).  
 
Secondly, some innovations were introduced in relation to the grounds for refusal. 
Their rationale lies in the need to preserve State sovereignty, although their effect is 
also the protection of the individual against abuse. A secondary effect is that they 
may seriously prevent cooperation in the suppression of criminality. As can be 
argued from the provisions of the Convention, they were clearly the result of a 
compromise between different approaches but did not achieve the objective of 
making the procedure more rapid and effective: instead, they had the opposite 
outcome. Indeed, a major flaw of the 1957 Convention was the abundance of such 
grounds, conferring upon the requested State a very wide discretion when deciding 
whether or not to allow surrender. In particular, concerning nationality, the right to 
refuse extradition is recognised (Article 6), although it is combined with the aut 
dedere aut judicare principle49. In the case of a refusal, the requesting State may 
demand that the case be submitted to the competent authorities, although there is no 
obligation to take legal proceedings if it is not deemed appropriate, i.e. if there are no 
sufficient reasons for trying the individual. A similar combination was included later 
                                                 
47 Two exceptions are provided for in Article 2: first, extradition may be granted below this threshold 
whenever the request includes also offences punishable by at least one year’s imprisonment 
(“accessory extradition”); second, a State Party can exclude specific offences from the application of 
this rule. 
48 M. Plachta, ‘The Role of Double Criminality in International Cooperation in Penal Matters’ in N. 
Jareborg (ed.), Double Criminality Studies in International Criminal Law (Iustus Förlag, Uppsala 
1989). 
49 In the Benelux Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 1962, Moniteur 
Belge, October 24, 1964, there is an obligation, rather than a simple right, not to extradite nationals 
(Article 5) and aut dedere aut judicare does not apply.  
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in the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances50. It is worth mentioning that the drafters of the latter 
Convention considered the option of limiting or excluding this exception, although in 
the end these proposals were rejected51. The mechanism provided for in Articles 6 
(5), 4 (2) (a) as well as 6 (9) of that Convention ensures that, where extradition is 
refused on grounds of nationality, States establish jurisdiction over the offences 
committed by the person concerned and this person may be prosecuted or serve the 
sentence imposed upon him or her. However, these provisions should not be 
considered equivalent to an extradition Convention, creating obligations for the 
Parties: they simply rely on existing and future extradition Treaties. All existing 
extradition Treaties are modified in order to include drug trafficking offences - 
established in Article 3(1)- and the same offences must be included as extraditable 
offences in future Treaties. Inter alia, paragraph 3 (addressed to those States that 
extradite only on the basis of a Treaty) makes it clear that the Convention may be 
used as the legal basis for extradition and not as a Treaty per se52.  
 
Under the European Convention, a State is entitled to reject a request also if it 
believes that the alleged conduct amounts to a crime having a political nature, or is a 
purely military offence, or is a fiscal offence (respectively, Articles 3, 4 and 5). The 
first exception is a remnant of a historical period in which surrender mostly 
concerned those who threatened the political stability of the sovereign State. It is a 
direct derivation of the principles of freedom and democracy, which represented in 
18th century Europe a “weapon” against the oppression of absolutist States53. It is 
here limited by two rules: the so-called “Belgian clause”, excluding its application in 
the case of murder or attempted murder of a Head of State or a member of his family; 
                                                 
50 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf  
51 Commentary on the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, United Nations Publications, New York 1998, 157. 
52 J. Schutte, ‘Extradition for drug offences: new developments under the 1988 UN Convention 
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances’ (1991) 62-1/2 Révue 
International de Droit Penal 137; N. Boister, Penal Aspects of the U8 Drug Conventions (Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague 2001) 260.  
53 M.C. Bassiouni, International Extradition, supra, 33 and 594-676. See also G. Gilbert, 
Transnational Fugitive Offenders, supra, 203-334; C. van den Wyngaert, The Political Offence 
Exception to Extradition: the Delicate Problem of Balancing the Rights of the Individual and the 
International Public Order (Kluwer 1980).  
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the amendment of the First Additional Protocol, removing it in respect of crimes 
against humanity under the UN Genocide Convention and war crimes (both covered 
by the 1949 Geneva Conventions and by customary law)54. Moreover, the above 
mentioned exception is accompanied by the so-called fair trial, non-discrimination or 
asylum clause: refusal is possible also if the requested authorities have substantial 
grounds for believing that a request relating to an ordinary criminal offence has been 
for the purpose of prosecution or punishment by reason of race, religion, nationality 
or political opinion. It is worth noting that, as in most extradition treaties, the 
definition of “political offence” is left to the courts of each State Party (which have 
given diverging interpretations over the years)55. The third exception, which was an 
expression of the traditional approach according to which States are not supposed to 
assist each other in the protection of their finances, is also subject to restrictions. 
According to Article 5, extradition can be granted only if previous arrangements 
have been made. However, the Second Additional Protocol (Article 2)56 allows 
surrender if the act amounts to an offence “of the same nature” under the law of the 
requested Party, i.e. whenever the essential constituent elements are identical. 
Moreover, it prohibits refusal on the mere ground that the law of the requested State 
does not impose the same kind of tax or duty. 
 
A State can also refuse a request when it is clear that the requesting State seeks to 
prosecute and punish an individual for an offence other than that for which he was 
extradited, unless the surrendering State consents. This is the so-called rule of 
speciality (Article 14) and ensures that the person has the opportunity to leave the 
territory of the State to which he has been surrendered within 45 days of his or her 
final discharge. If he or she has not done so, or has returned to that State, the rule 
does not apply. A further consequence is that a person cannot be surrendered by the 
                                                 
54 Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition, Strasbourg, 15/10/1975, ETS n. 86 
and related Explanatory Report (ratified by 17 Member States); Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 UNTS 277, New York 9/12/1948; the Geneva Conventions 
are retrievable at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/intlinst.htm .  
55 See e.g., for the UK, In Re Castioni [1891] 1 QB 149 and T v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [1996] 2 ALL ER 865; for France, In Re Giovanni Gatti [1947] Ann. Dig. 145 (Case n. 
70) and Piperno and Pace [1979] Chambre d’Accusation de Paris; for Switzerland, In Re 8appi 
[1952] 19 Int. L Rep. 375. 
56 Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition, Strasbourg, 17/3/1978, 
ETS n. 98 and related Explanatory Report. It has been ratified by only 21 Member States so far. 
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requesting State to a third Party without the consent of the requested State in respect 
of offences committed prior to his or her surrender (Article 15).  
 
The ne bis in idem or double jeopardy57 rule is contained in Articles 7, 8 and 9. This 
is a general principle of criminal procedure, which allows no more than one 
prosecution for the same offence and is therefore a shield for individual rights.  
Despite this, it is not recognised as an international principle, as sovereign States 
prefer to retain their right to prosecute for offences defined by their domestic legal 
systems. Nevertheless, it applies in the Council of Europe extradition system. The 
provisions mentioned above make it both a mandatory and an optional ground for 
refusal. In particular, it is mandatory if final judgement58 has been passed by the 
competent authorities of the requested Party in respect of the same offence. It is 
optional in two circumstances: a) where the competent authorities of the requested 
Party have decided either not to initiate or to terminate proceedings concerning the 
same offence and the same person (ordonnance de non lieu); b) where they are 
currently proceeding against that person for the same act. Furthermore, a State which 
is about to initiate proceedings for an offence that has been committed in whole or in 
part on its territory, may refuse extradition (as an application of territoriality). A 
mandatory ground for refusal was added by the First Additional Protocol in relation 
to the extradition of persons who are subject to final judgements given by the courts 
of third States Parties to the Convention for the same offence or offences (though 
only in specific cases, such as when the court decides to acquit them).  
 
The 1957 Convention mentions two additional grounds for refusal: capital 
punishment, which allows a State whose law does not provide for death penalty to 
refuse surrender, unless the requesting State gives assurance that the penalty will not 
be carried out (Article 11)59; and lapse of time, granting the sought person immunity 
                                                 
57 See, inter alia, C. van den Wyngaert, G. Stessens, ‘The International Non Bis in Idem Principle: 
Resolving Some of the Unanswered Questions’ (1999) 48 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 779. On this principle, see also infra, chapter 4 p. 131.  
58 A final judgement can be acquittal, conviction or pardon.  
59 The issue of extradition for death penalty was particularly relevant in ECtHR Soering v. UK, 7 July 
1989, Application no. 14038/88, in which the ECtHR stated that a lengthy wait before execution falls 
within the definition of “inhuman and degrading punishment” under Article 3 ECHR, also in the light 
of both age and mental conditions of the sought person. Indeed, capital punishment is not prohibited 
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from prosecution or punishment (Article 10). A further guarantee for the rights of the 
individual was provided for by the Second Additional Protocol (Article 3): a request 
made following judgement in absentia can be rejected if the requested Party believes 
that the minimum rights of defence were not respected in that judgement, unless the 
other Party gives an assurance that a right to a (fair) re-trial will be granted.  
 
The traditional approach that was still visible in the 1957 Convention was, as already 
said, neither effective nor efficient60. As a result, it was repeatedly revisited. Apart 
from the two Additional Protocols, which have been previously mentioned, some 
significant changes were made by the European Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism, concluded in 197761. The Convention attempted to modify the political 
offence exception through a double formula. On the one hand, it listed a number of 
exemptions for some particularly serious terrorism-related offences (such as 
kidnapping, taking of hostages, use of bombs or seizure of aircraft)62. All States that 
have ratified the Convention with no reservation are bound by this provision. On the 
other hand, States that have made a reservation retain the right to qualify those acts 
as political offences, although they undertake to take into account a few criteria 
included in Article 13 when assessing the nature of the offence63. This approach was 
                                                                                                                                          
by Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4/11/1950, ETS n. 5); Protocols n. 6 and 13 later abolished 
the death penalty. Although the ECHR does not grant the fugitive a right not to be extradited, it is 
believed that he or she can rely on Article 3 ECHR to argue that his or her fundamental rights may be 
violated by the requesting country. See W. Schabas, The abolition of the death penalty in 
International Law, (3rd ed. CUP 2002). 
60 In the Recommendation n. R (80) of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
Concerning the Practical Application of the European Convention on Extradition, 27 June 1980, 
www.coe.int it was pointed out that “(…) with a view to expediting extradition (…) consideration 
should be given to the use of a summary procedure enabling the rapid surrender of the person sought 
without following ordinary extradition procedures, provided that the person concerned consent s to it”. 
This would be put into practice only 15 years later with the 1995 and 1996 EU Conventions (see infra 
p. 20-21). 
61 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, and Related Explanatory Report, ETS n. 90,  
Strasbourg, 27/01/1977, ratified by all Member States; Protocol Amending the European Convention 
on the Suppression of Terrorism, ETS n. 190, Strasbourg, 15/05/2003 (which has only been ratified by 
10 Member States and is not in force yet).  
62 Article 1 European Convention, supra. Many of these offences were covered by UN Conventions, 
although these did not directly impact on the scope of the political offence exception, unlike the 
Terrorist Bombing Convention, infra note 64.  
63 At the same time, Article 2 allowed Contracting States to exclude from the scope of this exception 
all other serious offences involving an act of violence against the life, physical integrity or liberty of a 
person, an act against property creating a collective danger against persons as well any attempt to 
commit these offences or participation as an accomplice.  
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criticised as some maintained that keeping the political offence no longer made sense 
among democratic European States bound by the rule of law. Despite this, the 
formula was defended, on humanitarian grounds, by those who argued that fair trial 
should be granted regardless of the character of the offence64. Some went further to 
suggest that, while those committing pure political crimes or serious crimes against 
repressive regimes would be covered by the non-discrimination clause, the exception 
should be abolished (as an initial step) within the European Union (because of the 
relative homogeneity of its legal systems)65. 
 
In the ‘90s, due to the increasing development of transnational organised crime and 
the removal of frontiers both within the EU and between East and West, the need to 
improve the old extradition system was particularly pressing. As a result, two 
Conventions were drawn up. The first was the 1995 Convention on simplified 
extradition procedure; the second was the 1996 Convention relating to extradition 
between the Member States of the EU66. Their declared aim was to supplement the 
1957 and 1977 Conventions (rather than replace them) by making surrender 
procedures more efficient. Indeed, under Article 2 of the 1995 Convention, where the 
person sought consents and the requested State gives its agreement, a simplified 
procedure takes place. Such procedure is linked to the Schengen mechanism67 and 
applies only in so far as special and more favourable agreements have already been 
struck between Member States. If a request for provisional arrest is sent, or a person 
                                                 
64 For more details on this debate, see C. van den Wyngaert, ‘The Political Offence Exception to 
Extradition: How to Plug the ‘Terrorist’s Loophole’ Without Departing from Fundamental Human 
Rights’ (1991) 62 International Review of Penal Law 291. Moreover, the 1997 International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Res. 164 1998, denies the possibility of 
invoking the political offence exception as a ground for refusal for a number of offences related to 
terrorist bombings (see Articles 2 and 11). 
65 J. Dugard, C. Van Den Wyngaert , Report of the Committee on Extradition and Human Rights to 
the International Law Association, Helsinki, 1996, 142-170.  
66 Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K 3 of the Treaty on European Union, on simplified 
extradition procedure between the Member States of the European Union, OJ C 78, 30/03/1995 and 
related Explanatory Report, OJ C 375 12/12/1996; Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K 3 of 
the Treaty on European Union, relating to extradition between the Member States of the European 
Union, OJ C 313 23/10/1996 and related Explanatory Report, OJ C 191 23/06/1997. 
67 Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux 
Economic union, the federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition 
of check at their common borders and Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, OJ L 
239/11 and 19 respectively, 22/09/2000 (the Convention was signed in 1990, but came into force in 
1995). Articles 59-66 (Chapter 4) contain some provisions on extradition supplementing the 1957 
Convention. 
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is reported in the Schengen Information System (SIS), this must be accompanied by 
adequate information on the identity of the individual and on the elements of the 
offence. The purpose is to enable the requested State to consider the case having 
sufficient knowledge of its essential aspects as well as to allow the individual to give 
consent to extradition. If consent is given, this can be coupled with renunciation to 
the speciality rule (Article 7). The whole procedure must be fair and occur before the 
competent authorities: for this purpose, the right to legal counsel is ensured.  
 
The 1996 Convention provides for a few innovations, of which the most important is 
the exception to double criminality included in Article 3. An extradition request may 
not be refused on this ground for two specific categories of offences, namely: a) 
conspiracy or association to commit the crimes referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the 
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, and b) any other serious 
offence punishable by deprivation of liberty or detention order of a maximum of at 
least 12 months, provided that it is included in the area of drug trafficking or other 
forms of organised crime or other acts against the life, physical integrity or liberty of 
a person, or creating a collective danger for persons. The provision’s attempt to lift 
the traditional requirement of dual criminality was a positive step forward but had 
two flaws: first, it made it possible for Member States to reserve their right not to 
apply this exception or to apply it under certain conditions; second, the lack of a 
clear legal definition of “organised crime” and “conspiracy” made cooperation 
between common law and civil law countries more problematic68.  
 
The right to make a reservation was somewhat limited by paragraph 4, which 
imposed on the Member State a duty to extradite where the conduct consists of a 
contribution by one person to the commission by a group of other persons acting 
with a common purpose of the offences mentioned above. This applies even where 
the individual does not actually participate in the execution of the offence, provided 
that the contribution is intentional and made having knowledge either of the purpose 
and the general criminal activity of the group or of the intention of the group to 
commit the offence. The partial abolition of dual criminality is not the only relevant 
                                                 
68 V. Mitsilegas, ‘Defining Organised Crime in the European Union: The Limits of European Criminal 
Law in an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (2001) 26 European Law Review 565.  
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change contained in the 1996 Convention. Concerning extraditable offences, Article 
2 lowers the threshold established by the 1957 Convention: the term of imprisonment 
can be of a maximum of at least six months under the law of the requested State (at 
the same time, the one-year threshold was kept for the requesting State).  
 
Concerning the political offence exception, Article 5(1) eliminates it tout court. The 
potential of this innovative step is not however fully exploited, as paragraph 2 
entitles each Member State to declare by way of reservation that paragraph 1 only 
applies to the offences mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 of the European Convention on 
the Suppression of Terrorism as well as conspiracy or association to commit offences 
referred to in those Articles. Nevertheless, this was a sign that the political offence 
exception had lost its appeal. As has been observed, “[t]he political offence 
exception is a double-edged sword. While it is intended to protect individual rights 
and personal freedom, it imposes national standards and values on other states”69. Its 
use makes little sense among Member States sharing a common history and common 
legal and political values. 
 
A similar pattern can be found in two other provisions. The first is Article 7, which 
abolishes the ground for refusal based on nationality. The second is Article 6, 
relating to fiscal offences, which continues along the path which was begun by 
Article 5 of the 1957 Convention (as amended by the Second Additional Protocol). If 
the offence corresponds to a similar offence under the law of the requested Member 
State, the latter must extradite: no refusal is admissible on the ground that its own 
law does not impose the same type of taxes or duties as the law of the requesting 
State. Unfortunately, both Articles allow Member States to enter a reservation 
excluding or limiting the applicability of these provisions70. Despite this, the ground 
was ready at that time for a new approach on these issues. There are in fact many 
                                                 
69 M.C. Bassiouni, International Extradition, supra 674.  
70 In particular, according to Article 6 (3), any Member State may declare that it will grant extradition 
for fiscal offences only for acts or omissions which may constitute an offence in connection with 
excise, value-added tax or customs; according to Article 7 (2), any Member State may declare that it 
will not grant extradition of its nationals or will authorise it only under certain conditions. 
 23
arguments in favour of the nationality exception71: an individual should not be 
withdrawn from his natural judges and a State should protect its own citizens; a 
foreign State’s criminal system should not be entirely trusted; a national should not 
be prosecuted in a foreign environment, where cultural and language difficulties may 
arise and gathering sufficient evidence may prove costly and hard72. Moreover, the 
need for social rehabilitation and reintegration of the offender in the society where he 
belongs to should be considered73. However, the real rationale behind it is, as 
previously pointed out, the need for the State to preserve its own sovereignty. By 
way of this exception, each State claims the right to judge its nationals for acts 
committed within its own territory. It is a perfectly understandable argument, 
connected to the desire to maintain the judicial integrity of a legal system, with its 
own guarantees and its own methods of punishment. This reasoning however is less 
justifiable if this need is balanced with the political pressure towards intensifying 
efforts against transnational crime in the EU (and it is even less justifiable in light of 
the common culture and geographical proximity of the Member States). In the same 
context, keeping the fiscal offence exception is in sharp contrast with the increasing 
cooperation between Member States in fiscal and financial matters (e.g. against tax 
evasion, in which case a non-cooperative behaviour evidently risks to create safe 
havens for those criminals who are able to exploit such legal loopholes).  
 
The speciality rule is also applied differently in the 1996 Convention. Under Article 
10, the accused person may be prosecuted for offences other than those for which 
extradition is requested even without the consent of the requested State. This is 
possible only for offences which are not punishable by deprivation of liberty; where 
this punishment is provided for, the person extradited may waive the speciality rule, 
                                                 
71 On the nationality exception in general, see inter alia I.A. Shearer, Extradition in International 
Law, supra, 94-132; M.C. Bassiouni, International Extradition, supra 682-689. 
72 Z. Deen-Racsmány, R. Blekxtoon, ‘The Decline of the Nationality Exception in European 
Extradition?’ (2005) 13 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 317; I.A. 
Shearer, Extradition in International Law, supra, 98. They both cite a Report of the British Royal 
Commission on Extradition, Parliamentary Papers, 1878, vol. 24, 907-17. The chair was Lord 
Cockburn. 
73 See e.g. Article 19 (2) European Convention on extradition, supra, which allows for conditional 
extradition (i.e. extradition on the condition that a person who is serving a sentence in the requested 
State is returned there). According to Article 18 (3) of the Benelux Treaty, supra the time spent in 
detention in the territory of the requesting State must be deducted from the sentence to be served in 
the requested State. 
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provided that this is done before the competent judicial authorities and in such a way 
as to show that the person has given it voluntarily and in full awareness of the 
consequences.  
 
Despite their sincere effort to improve the extradition procedures among the EU 
Member States, the 1995 and 1996 Conventions entered into force between only 
some Member States and after a slow process of ratification74 75. This proved that the 
attempt to transfer them from the Council of Europe system into the framework of 
the EU was doomed to fail without a common project that could serve as basis for a 
better functioning of inter-State cooperation in criminal matters. This common basis 
needed a political input as well as some form of legitimacy that were missing at that 
time. The European Parliament was well aware of this: in a Resolution drawn up in 
relation to the 1996 Convention it recognised that the traditional system of 
extradition should be abandoned: 
 
                                                 
74http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/criminal/extradition/doc_criminal_extradition_en.htm. 
The 1996 Convention entered into force between 12 Member States on 29 June 2005. As of 18 August 
2005, the 1995 Convention was also applied by only 12 of them. Although replaced by the Council 
Framework Decision on the EAW since 1 January 2004 (see infra, chapter 3), they can be utilised 
whenever the latter is not applicable. Most of those States that have ratified the Convention have also 
entered reservations. Council Decision 2003/169/JHA of 27 February 2003 established which provisions 
of the two Conventions constitute developments of the Schengen acquis in accordance with the 
Agreement concerning the Republic of Iceland’s and the Kingdom of Norway’s association with the 
implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 67 12 /03/2003). This 
clarifies the relationship between the two Conventions on the one hand and on the other, first of all, 
the Schengen agreement (see supra, note 67) and, secondly, the Agreement with the Republic of 
Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the association of those two States with the 
implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 176 10/07/1999). 
75 ECJ C-296/08 PPU Ignacio Pedro Santesteban Goicoechea 12 August 2008 dealt with the case of a 
Spanish citizen, living in France, who was sought from Spanish authorities for acts committed in 
Spain. One of the requests was based on the 1996 Convention. This Convention is included by Article 
31 (1) of the Framework Decision on the EAW in the list of international instruments that have been 
replaced by the EAW as of 1 January 2004 (i.e. the date by which all States should have enacted the 
corresponding legislation), although under par. 2 of the same Article Member States can continue to 
apply bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements, as long as these permit to extend or enlarge 
the objectives of the Framework Decision and they are notified to the Council and Commission. 
Under this provision, the Spanish request could not be acceded to, as Spain had not notified the 
Convention. However, the ECJ held that, because the acts were committed in 1992, Article 32 of the 
Framework Decision would apply instead, because France had made a declaration specifying that, 
concerning acts committed before 1 November 1993, it would continue to rely on the extradition 
system applicable before 1 January 2004. Article 32 therefore allows an executing State to apply the 
1996 Convention even when this has entered into force in this State after 1 January 2004. Concluding, 
while Article 31 regulates the relationship between the Framework Decision and existing extradition 
agreements, Article 32 deals with cases where the EAW regime does not apply. 
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(…) the system of extradition seems to have less and less justification 
and raison d’être within a Union of States governed by the rule of law 
and equally respectful of human rights(…), in which internal borders 
seem to be gradually losing their significance and whereas this system 
should ultimately be abandoned in favour of an automatic extradition 
procedure or the simple handing over of the person sought, subject to 
respect for fundamental rights and the judicial nature of the 
procedure(…)”76 
 
In the same Resolution the Parliament regretted that the Convention had been 
concluded by the Presidency of the Council without any prior consultation or 
information, which was in contrast with what is required by Article K 6 of the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU)77. It also regretted that, unlike what had been established 
by the new Article K 7 TEU, as introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty78, the 
Convention did not provide for any form of control by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ). In the light of these evident flaws and of the evolution of the cooperation 
mechanisms in the EU, it is now all the more significant what the Parliament called 
for in paragraph 19 of the Resolution: namely, the creation of an “area of freedom, 
security and justice” with a view to the elimination of the disparities between legal 
systems in the Member States. The next section will attempt to briefly describe the 








                                                 
76 European Parliament Resolution on the Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K 3 of the 
Treaty on European Union, relating to extradition between the Member States of the European Union 
(C4-0640/96). 
77 Treaty of Maastricht, original version, OJ C 191, 29/07/1992. 
78 Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, Amsterdam, OJ C 340, 2/10/1997. As will be seen later in this chapter, the Court of 
Justice had under this provision (which corresponds to current Article 35 TEU) a role of supervision 
over the Conventions. 
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1.3 The evolution of European cooperation in criminal 
matters until the Maastricht Treaty  
 
 
In order to understand the historical background behind the adoption of the EAW, it 
is necessary to give a brief overview of the gradual development in Europe of a 
unique framework of cooperation in criminal matters. Two phases can be 
distinguished: from the beginning to the Maastricht Treaty (current section) and from 
the Maastricht Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty (next section). 
 
Concerning the first phase, it is essential to understand what is meant by justice and 
home affairs (JHA). The area of JHA is traditionally probably the most sensitive area 
of State’s sovereignty. It covers such disparate policies as customs cooperation, 
external boundaries, immigration, visas, asylum and treatment of refugees, 
cooperation in civil matters and in criminal matters. This list gives an idea of what 
issues may emerge when it comes to implementing measures and how deeply they 
can be entrenched in the culture and in the identity of a State. Despite this, the 
Member States of the European Community felt almost since the beginning the need 
to strike agreements and set up mechanisms of cooperation, as these were perceived 
as the most effective tool to face the enormous challenges deriving from the new 
globalised world.  
 
European States started cooperating in these fields through Conventions, Resolutions 
or Recommendations as early as the ‘60s (in the case of judicial cooperation in civil 
matters79 or customs cooperation80) and the ‘70s (as regards police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters). As far as the latter is concerned81, cooperation took 
                                                 
79 Brussels Convention on the jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, OJ C 27 26/01/1998 (consolidated version). The original Convention was agreed in 1968. 
Other Conventions followed in the fields of asylum and conflict of law. On the evolution of JHA see 
S. Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (2nd ed. OUP 2006) 4. 
80 In 1968 the Customs Union was achieved in the European Economic Community. 
81 For an overview of the development of EU cooperation in criminal matters, see S. Douglas- Scott, 
‘The rule of law in the European Union-putting the security into the “area of freedom, security and 
justice”’ (2004) 29 European Law Review; P.J. Kuijper, ‘The evolution of the Third Pillar from 
Maastricht to the European Constitution: Institutional aspects’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law 
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place also through informal committees that flourished outside the framework of the 
European Communities: the most important was the Trevi Group, created in Rome in 
1975 (based on a Dutch proposal) after a special meeting of the European ministers 
of justice and home affairs. The committee was initially supposed to develop 
cooperation in the fight against terrorism and later against organised crime, and was 
of a purely intergovernmental nature82. The fundamental flaw of these informal 
mechanisms was that they did not have stable structures and sufficient resources to 
deal with the increasing phenomenon of cross-border crime. No clear strategy had 
been conceived and no legal basis within the EC framework had been established. 
Two years later the idea of setting up a “European judicial space” was put forward by 
the French President Giscard d’Estaing. He had in mind a system of judicial 
cooperation in which a new type of extradition should take place. The new 
extradition would be different from the old one, provided for by the Council of 
Europe Convention, as it would operate independently of the nature of the crime, 
with a minimum penalty threshold of five years and a judicial control over whether 
the crime has been materially committed. This “convention d’extradition 
automatique” would therefore apply not only to terrorism but to all particularly 
serious offences83.  
 
Interestingly, the broad areas of internal market, judicial cooperation in civil matters 
and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters developed almost 
simultaneously, albeit at a different pace. In 1986, the Single European Act84 
formally introduced the objective of the internal market. This implied abolition of the 
controls at the internal borders of the Member States and therefore the need to 
enhance measures aimed at reducing the flow of illegal migrants and the increase in 
criminality. This is why, in the same period, the Schengen Agreement on the gradual 
                                                                                                                                          
Review 609; M. Jimeno-Bulnes, ‘European Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters’ (2003) 9 
European Law Journal 614. 
82 M. Anderson et al., Policing the European Union (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995) 53. Four Trevi 
groups were actually established over the years : Trevi I and II (1975), Trevi III (1985) and Trevi ’92 
(1988). See J. Peek, ‘International Police Cooperation within Justified Political and Juridical 
Frameworks : Five Theses on Trevi’ in J. Monar, R. Morgan (eds.), The Third Pillar of the European 
Union : cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs (EIP Brussels 1995) 85.   
83 Conseil Européen, Proposition de M. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing concernant l’espace judiciaire 
européen, Bruxelles, 5/12/1977,and Conférence de presse du président Giscard d'Estaing à l'issue du 
Conseil , available at http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr. 
84 Single European Act, OJ L 169 29/06/1987 
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abolition of checks at common borders was concluded (1985), followed by the 
implementing Convention (1990)85. As far as cooperation in criminal matters is 
concerned, the Convention provided for common rules on transborder surveillance, 
hot pursuit, the fight against drug trafficking and ne bis in idem.  
 
In 1992, after the objective of the internal market had been mostly achieved, the 
newly born European Union (as it was named by the Maastricht Treaty86) set itself a 
further, very ambitious target: creating an area of justice and home affairs (or, better, 
developing “close cooperation in justice and home affairs”87). The input had been 
given by the Rhodes European Council, which observed that the development of the 
internal market, and in particular the free movement of persons, was to be necessarily 
linked with strengthening inter-governmental cooperation in the fight against 
terrorism, international crime, drug trafficking and trafficking of all kinds88. 
Following these guidelines, a coordinators’ group on the free movement of persons89, 
composed of representatives of each Member State, met on several occasions 
between February and June in Brussels and in Palma de Mallorca (Spain). The 
purpose of those meetings was to replace the informal committees such as Trevi with 
a structured approach to a range of issues, from immigration, asylum and visa to 
cooperation in criminal matters, including both law enforcement and judicial aspects. 
The latter focused, once again, on drug trafficking and terrorism (and other forms of 
illicit trafficking). As a result, a report to the European Council was elaborated by the 
coordinators’ group (the Palma Document90), which, while acknowledging the 
existence of diverging views as to what legal and political framework should be 
adopted, attempted to suggest practical measures and set priorities for the Member 
States. The report also mentioned, perhaps for the first time, the possibility of 
harmonising certain provisions regarding judicial cooperation and of approximating 
                                                 
85 Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, supra  note 67. 
86 Treaty of Maastricht, OJ C 191 29/07/1992. See also consolidated versions of the Treaty on  
European Union (TEU) and of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC), OJ C 325 
24/12/2002.  
87 Article B Treaty of Maastricht, original version, supra. 
88 Rhodes European Council (2-3 December 1988) Presidency Conclusions, available at 
http://europa.eu/european_council/conclusions/index_en.htm.  
89 This group was afterwards replaced by the “K4 Committee”, a committee of senior civil servants 
assisting the Council and created by the Maastricht Treaty.  
90 The report is available at www.statewatch.org .  
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national laws with a view to achieving an area without internal frontiers. On the other 
hand, that document was far from having the legal strength necessary to commit 
Member States to more than wishful thinking.  
 
The implications of this important step were well known, as is demonstrated by the 
cautious wording of Article F of the 1992 Treaty, which made it clear that it was up 
to the Union, on one hand,  to “respect the national identities of its Member States” 
and, on the other, to “respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”(1950)91 
as well as those deriving from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States. A specific Pillar, the Third, was to embrace the new policy areas. 
 
This was seen as a first stage towards an “ever closer Union among the peoples of 
Europe”, in which decisions should be taken as closely as possible to the citizen 
(Article A). One can easily spot here the classical tension between the federalist ideal 
and more sceptical views of the EU model of cooperation. It is remarkable that the 
very wording of Article A could be used as a weapon for a general critique of the 
functioning of the Third Pillar: since it was created, it has been characterised by a 
high number of decisions taken without consulting or even informing the citizens (as 
will be better seen later92).  
 
The result of the aforementioned tension and of the development described above 
was that the new Pillar93 (along with the Second one, which is devoted to Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP) had an intergovernmental nature, closer to the 
mechanisms of decision-making of international law than the First Pillar (i.e. the 
Community Pillar) is. The main features were: the requirement of unanimity at the 
Council (which adopts all acts except Conventions, as they are only recommended to 
Member States for adoption); a weak right of initiative of the Commission (which 
shared it with the Member States or was in some cases deprived of it); the restricted 
                                                 
91 ETS n. 5, Rome, 4 November 1950 and subsequent amendments 
92 See infra, Chapter 2. 
93 Articles K to K9 (Title VI) Treaty of Maastricht, original version, supra.  
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role of the European Parliament94; the absence of control by national parliaments; a 
very limited jurisdiction of the Court of Justice95; the adoption of binding 
instruments (joint positions, joint actions, Conventions, common positions)96 that can 
be seen more as the result of a “horizontal” relationship between sovereign States, 
rather than of a “vertical” relationship between the supranational institutions and the 
national authorities.  
 
Two points need to be stressed: the distribution of “legislative powers” and the type 
of instruments adopted. Concerning the “legislative powers”, Member States retained 
their monopoly of initiative in the fields of customs cooperation and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation for the purposes of preventing 
and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of 
international crime (Articles K1 (7-9) and K3). One may wonder whether the latter 
category of crimes could be connected to those that would later be included in the 
1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court, or ICC (genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, crime of aggression)97 or in the Statutes of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY, 1993) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR, 1994)98. Be that as it may, these crimes were 
considered to be so important that a common approach should be identified in the 
newly born European Union, since Member States found themselves unable to cope 
with them in the most effective way.  
 
Concerning the type of instruments, a few Conventions were adopted, such as the 
1995 Convention on the protection of EC financial interests or the 1997 Convention 
                                                 
94 The only requirement for the Presidency of the Council and the Commission was that they informed 
the Parliament regularly about their meetings and consulted it on the principal aspects of their 
activities. On the other hand, the Parliament could ask questions and make recommendations to the 
Council and hold an annual debate (Article K 6 Treaty of Maastricht). 
95 Article K(3)(2)(c) Treaty of Maastricht established that provisions could be included in a 
Convention attributing competence to the ECJ to make an interpretation of them and to decide 
disputes arising from their application. 
96 Article K 3 Treaty of Maastricht for the first three; Article K 5 for the common positions. Other 
(non-binding) instruments were Resolutions and Recommendations (already existing beforehand). 
97 Article 5 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, Rome (17/07/1998) UN Doc. A/CONF. 
183/9*, 37 ILM 999 (1998), amended  by UN Doc, PCNICC/1999/INF/3*.  
98 For the constitutive documents, see UN Doc. S/RES/808 (1993) and UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), as 
well as Annex and S/RES/955 (1994) and subsequent amendments UN Doc. S/RES/1329 (2000) and 
S/RES/1503 (2003).  
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on the fight against corruption involving officials of the EC or officials of the 
Member States of the EU99. However, the adoption of these Conventions proved to 
be a slow and cumbersome exercise, as both unanimity at the Council and ratification 
by all Member States in accordance with their own constitutional requirements were 
necessary. On the other hand, some important joint actions were also adopted, for 
instance on the fight against organised crime100. 
 
The existence of this new intergovernmental structure made all informal groups 
created in the previous years superfluous and they were suppressed.  
 
 
1.4 Freedom, Security and Justice: the new agenda 
 
 
The second phase of evolution of cooperation in criminal matters (as identified in the 
previous section) is marked by the “freedom, security and justice” motto. This 
concept is relatively new in the EU. It is the expression of an intense effort to 
consolidate the rule of law and achieve a political rather than only an economic 
union.  It is not by chance that, in the context of what was once called European 
Political Cooperation101, when the need to promote Western values against the East 
was particularly felt, the Member States were (already in 1988) “(…) determined to 
make full use of the provisions of the Single European Act in order to strengthen 
solidarity among them, coordination on the political and economic aspects of 
                                                 
99 Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the 
protection of the European Communities' financial interests, OJ C 316 27/11/1995; Convention drawn 
up on the basis of Article K.3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on European Union on the fight against corruption 
involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European 
Union, OJ C 195 25/6/1997. 
100 Joint Action 97/827/JHA of 5 December 1997 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 
of the Treaty on European Union, establishing a mechanism for evaluating the application and 
implementation at national level of international undertakings in the fight against organized crime, OJ 
L 344 15/12/1997; Joint Action 98/733/JHA of 21 December 1998 on making it a criminal offence to 
participate in a criminal organisation in the Member States of the European Union, OJ L 351 
29/12/1998.  
101 The European Political Cooperation (EPC) was created as an informal cooperation structure in the 
‘70s: it was later reformed and became Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
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security, and consistency between the external policies of the European Community 
and the policies agreed in the framework of the European Political Cooperation”. 
This was to be put into practice by protecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and the “free circulation of people and ideas”, as well as “the establishment 
of a secure and stable balance of conventional forces in Europe at a lower level” and 
“the strengthening of mutual confidence”. This was a long-term (some would say 
today “global”) political project pursued as an essential feature of the external 
relations of the EU for the following decade. The traditional geo-political balance of 
power of the 20th century was about to shift radically and new policies were therefore 
urgently needed. It was an optimistic project. This is why the European Council 
invited all countries “(…) to embark with the European Community as world partner 
on an historic effort to leave to the next generation a Continent and a world more 
secure, more just and more free”(emphasis added)102.  Only a few years later the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992) 103 would have set up the Second Pillar for the Common 
and Foreign Security Policy and the Third Pillar for Justice and Home Affairs.  
 
As a result of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU acquired indeed its first modest 
competences in criminal matters. Some years earlier however two important 
instruments had been concluded by the Benelux, France and Germany: the Schengen 
Agreement (1985) and the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement 
(CISA, 1990), which were in 1997 integrated in the Amsterdam Treaty by means of a 
Protocol104 . The Schengen acquis provided the participating Member States with 
mutual assistance tools for national police and judicial authorities.  
 
                                                 
102 For all this, see the Rhodes Declaration on the International Role of the European Community, 
attached to the Rhodes European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, supra.  
103 Treaty of Maastricht, OJ C 191 29/07/1992. See also consolidated versions of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) and of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC), OJ C 325 
24/12/2002. 
104 Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common 
borders; Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, OJ L 239  22/09/2000; Treaty of 
Amsterdam, OJ C 340 10/11/1997. Benelux, Germany and France were the first countries in 1985, but 
more countries (including the new Member States) joined thereafter. On this, see e.g. J. Monar- ‘The 
Impact of Schengen and Home Affairs in the European Union: An Assessment on the Threshold to its 
Incorporation’ in M. Den Boer (ed.) Schengen Still Going Strong: Evaluation and Update (EIPA 
Maastricht 2000) 21; M. Den Boer (ed.) The implementation of Schengen, Maastricht (EIPA 
Maastricht 1997). 
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In the period between Maastricht and Amsterdam, a great number of criminal law 
instruments were approved, but due to the absence of a coherent European criminal 
policy and rather weak Third Pillar instruments, the qualitative outcome was rather 
modest105. Nevertheless, some clear signs were given that the European Union was 
heading towards more integrated judicial cooperation instead of a purely political 
inter-state cooperation.  
 
The Amsterdam Treaty’s106 goal of creating an Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice resulted in the sharpening of judicial cooperation tools and in general a 
strengthening of the competences of the European institutions in criminal justice 
cooperation. More powerful Third Pillar legal instruments were created, in particular 
the Framework Decisions, which, together with the Decisions, were to be legally 
binding. 
 
The entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 therefore represented a 
fundamental step in the evolution of the Third Pillar. The creation of an area of 
“freedom, security and justice”107 was perhaps even more important than the 
introduction of the Third Pillar itself. Indeed, from 1999 onwards the structure and 
functioning of this intergovernmental pillar were no longer a mere auxiliary tool for 
the achievement of the internal market (with the specific aim of dealing with some of 
the consequences of the removal of frontiers within the Community). “Freedom, 
security and justice” became a goal in itself, although its proclamation constantly 
runs the risk of raising excessively the expectations of the citizens or of hiding a 
conceptual vacuum behind which lay striking contradictions. We shall see later what 
this involves. Suffice it to say, at the moment, that a large part of the measures 
                                                 
105 See e.g. Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the 
protection of the European Communities’ financial interests OJ C 316 27/11/1995; Joint Action 
96/750/JHA of 17 December 1996 concerning the approximation of the law and practices of the 
Member States of the European Union to combat drug addiction and to prevent and combat illegal 
drug trafficking, OJ L 342 31/12/1996.  
106 Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, supra. 
107 The Treaty of Amsterdam turned Article B, which listed as objectives of the EU that of developing 
close cooperation on justice and home affairs (supra, note 78), into Article 2, which aims at 
maintaining and developing “(…) the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the 
free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external 
border control, asylum, immigration and the preventing and combating of crime”.  
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adopted under the new framework betrayed an inherently repressive nature, with 
little or no focus on the rights of the victim or of the suspected or condemned person. 
From a constitutional perspective, the purpose of the Amsterdam Treaty was to 
improve the decision-making and clarify the objectives of the Third Pillar as well as 
strengthen the legal effect of the measures adopted within it. 
 
A first major change brought about by the Amsterdam Treaty was the 
“communautarisation” of a substantial part of the Third Pillar, namely asylum, 
migration policy, external borders’ control, the status of third country nationals and 
judicial cooperation in civil matters. These areas were all transferred to the First 
Pillar (Title IV, Articles 61-69 TEC, entitled “Visas, Asylum, Immigration and other 
policies related to free movement of persons”)108. As a result, on one hand they were 
placed under the full control of the European Court of Justice; on the other, the 
adoption of more effective instruments (EC directives and regulations) and decision-
making procedures was made possible (although some intergovernmental features 
were retained)109. At the same time, the Schengen acquis was incorporated into the 
framework of the European Union110. Concerning, more in particular, what remained 
of the Third Pillar, Title VI of the TEU (Articles 29-42) was entirely devoted to 
“Provisions on Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters”. The 
intergovernmental structure was maintained, although it acquired some 
“Community” elements: more precisely, the Commission gained a right of initiative 
in this field (together with the Member States, Article 34 TEU) and the competence 
of the Court of Justice was established, although with some limitations (Article 
35)111. However, this was not intended to be a rigid structure. Indeed, under the 
“passerelle” procedure, the whole area could be at any time “communautarised” by 
the Council, acting upon impulse by the Commission or a Member State according to 
                                                 
108 This phenomenon was particularly successful especially in the area of civil cooperation, in which 
many Third Pillar instruments were translated into Community instruments, such as EC Regulation 
44/2001, OJ L 12/1 16/1/2001 (the “Brussels I Regulation”) or EC Regulation 1347/2000 OJ L 160/19 
replaced by EC Regulation 2201/2003, OJ L 338/1 23/12/2003 (the “Brussels II Regulation”).  
109 Art. 61-69 TEC. 
110 Protocol incorporating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union, annexed to 
the Treaty of Amsterdam ("the Schengen Protocol").  
111 On this, see infra, Chapter 2. 
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the mechanism provided for by Article 42 TEU112. This left some room for 
manoeuvre in the event of a global policy change in the European Union: however, 
when an intense debate started on the possibility of using this tool as an alternative 
option to compensate for the failed ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, many 
States were reluctant and plans were dropped113. Similarly, the ideas of using 
“implied powers” under Article 308 TEC or enhanced cooperation as provided for by 
new Title VII (Articles 43-45), Articles 40-41 TEU and Article 11 TEC were never 
really put into practice in this area. 
 
While giving considerable impetus towards European integration, the Amsterdam 
Treaty also included some opt-in/opt-out clauses for Ireland, the UK and Denmark, 
which decided not to participate in the communautarisation of justice and home 
affairs and in the incorporation of the Schengen acquis114.  As will be seen later, this 
differentiation would characterise this area and would even be intensified in the 
subsequent amending treaties, which highlights the underlying issue of how to 
strengthen cooperation while at the same time respecting profound cultural and 
legal/political divergence.  
 
The second major change was the introduction of two new binding instruments, 
replacing the joint actions: Framework Decisions and Decisions (Article 34)115. 
While the former can be adopted for the purpose of approximation of the laws and 
regulations of the Member States, the latter pursue any other objective in accordance 
with the provisions of Title VI. Neither is directly effective, although both are 
binding: in particular, Framework Decisions, similar to the Directives of the First 
Pillar, leave to the national authorities the choice of forms and methods. A major 
                                                 
112 Under Article 42 TEU “The Council, acting unanimously on the initiative of the Commission or a 
Member State, and after consulting the European Parliament, may decide that action in areas referred 
to in Article 29 shall fall under Title IV of the Treaty establishing the European Community, and at 
the same time determine the relevant voting conditions relating to it. It shall recommend the Member 
States to adopt that decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements”. 
113 Brussels European Council (15-16 June 2006) Presidency Conclusions, available at 
http://europa.eu/european_council/conclusions/index_en.htm. 
114 See Protocol on the position of UK and Ireland and on the position of Denmark annexed to the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. 
115 “Article 36 Committee” replaced the “Article K 4 Committee” in the task of contributing to the 
preparation of the Council’s discussions in the areas referred to in Article 29 TEU, including inter alia 
cooperation in criminal matters and substantive criminal law. 
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difference between these instruments and the old joint actions is that the former are 
directed at the same time to national Governments and parliaments. The other 
instruments provided for by Article 34 are common positions (defining the approach 
of the Union to a particular matter) and conventions. The need for common action is 
stressed by Article 31, inter alia in order to facilitate extradition between Member 
States, ensure compatibility in rules applicable in the Member States (as may be 
necessary to improve their cooperation) and progressively adopt measures 
establishing minimum rules relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts and 
to penalties in the fields of organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking. 
This provision laid down the basis for the approximation of criminal laws. 
 
A third major amendment produced by the Amsterdam Treaty in the Third Pillar was 
the strengthening of the role of the Court of Justice. Article 35 enabled the ECJ to 
give preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of Framework Decisions 
and Decisions, on the interpretation of conventions and on the validity and 
interpretation of the measures implementing them. However, the jurisdiction of the 
ECJ was made dependent on a declaration by the Member States, specifying whether 
they accept the Court’s jurisdiction and whether the request for a preliminary ruling 
can be sent by any court or tribunal or only a court or tribunal of last instance116. 
While the aforementioned provision recalled the classical Article 234 TEC remedy 
that has been frequently used in the context of the First Pillar, paragraph 6 of the 
same Article introduced a mechanism similar to the action for annulment (or judicial 
review) under Article 230 TEC. More precisely, the ECJ was given the power to 
review the legality of Framework Decisions and Decisions whenever a Member State 
or the Commission brings an action on three grounds:  lack of competence; 
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, of a Treaty provision or of any 
other rule of law relating to its application; misuse of powers. The right to bring 
                                                 
116 Among the pre-2004 Member States, only the UK, Denmark and Ireland have declined the Court’s 
jurisdiction. Concerning the ten new Member States that joined the EU in 2004, only Czech Republic 
and Hungary have accepted the jurisdiction so far. Among all those that have accepted it, Spain and 
Hungary allow only final courts or tribunals to make a reference for preliminary ruling. Nine of them 
have reserved the right to establish in their national law an obligation of the final court or tribunal to 
bring the matter before the ECJ. See Information concerning the date of entry into force of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam, OJ C 120/24 1999 and OJ L 114/56 1999; Declaration by the Czech Republic on 
Article 35 of the EU Treaty, OJ L 236/980 2005 ; and, finally, information on France and Hungary, 
OJ L 327/19 2005.  
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annulment proceedings was in any case restricted to these two applicants: this 
excludes both individuals and other institutions, such as, for instance, the European 
Parliament (which are entitled to promote this action within the First Pillar). 
Moreover, the ECJ was also conferred with jurisdiction over disputes between 
Member States arising from the interpretation or the application of any Third Pillar 
act as well as controversies between the Member States and the Commission on the 
interpretation and the application of Conventions. This was conceived of as a 
residual remedy in cases which failed to be settled by the Council within six months.  
One significant limitation was left: the ECJ was prevented by Article 35 (5) from 
reviewing the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or 
other law enforcement services as well as the exercise of responsibilities by Member 
States concerning the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal 
security.  Finally, Article 46 stated that the provisions of the three Treaties (European 
Community, European Coal and Steel Community and European Atomic Energy 
Community) relating to the powers of the Court and to their concrete exercise could 
be extended to Title VI, subject to the conditions laid down in Article 35.  
 
The Amsterdam Treaty was signed and ratified in a period of intense reform for the 
Third Pillar (as well as for the EU in general). On 1 July, 1999 Europol began its 
activity117, although since 1993 a Europol Drugs Unit had already been in existence. 
Articles 3 and 5 of the Europol Convention list all the activities of this body, such as 
exchange of information (which involves data collection as well118), crime analysis 
and facilitating coordination of investigations. They do not include arresting suspects 
or carrying out autonomous investigations. Europol’s mandate has also been 
extended to all forms of international crime indicated in the Annex to the 
Convention119. These include inter alia drug trafficking and trafficking in human 
                                                 
117 Council Act drawing up the Convention based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on 
the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), OJ C 316 27/11/1995. The 
Convention entered into force in 1998. However, see also, recently, Proposal for a Council Decision 
establishing the European Police Office, Brussels, 20/12/2006, COM (2006) 817 final. 
118 Article 10 of the Europol Convention provides for a wide range of options and has been criticised 
for the dangers that this can bring about. See e.g. S. Douglas-Scott- ‘The rule of law in the European 
Union-putting the security into the “area of freedom, security and justice”’ (2004) 29 European Law 
Review 219.  
119 Council Decision of 6 December 2001 extending Europol’s mandate to deal with the serious forms 
of international crime listed in the Annex to the Europol Convention, C 362 18/12/2001. 
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beings, terrorism, money laundering and fraud against the EU. Soon after the 9/11 
attack, a cooperation agreement was signed between Europol and the US and a 
second one on the exchange of information followed in 2002120. The latter in 
particular was strongly criticised as yet another example of lack of effective 
supervision over the activities of this body121. These considerations are worth 
mentioning, also in the light of what has been said in relation to the lack of judicial 
review of police activities by the ECJ.  
 
Later in the same year as the launch of Europol, the Heads of State gathered in 
Tampere and agreed new policies in this area, which would be further developed in 
the following years (especially with regard to the principle of mutual recognition)122. 
Among other innovations, the Tampere European Council (point 46) also suggested 
the creation of Eurojust, which would be charged with the task of supporting national 
judges and prosecutors as far as cross-border crimes are concerned. One year before, 
the European Judicial Network had been set up123 as a network of “contact points” 
situated in all Member States. The purpose was to enable national authorities to 
inform each other on investigations carried out in one or more countries and, as a 
result, coordinate their activities. However, Eurojust itself started functioning only 
after 9/11, following the adoption of a Council Decision124. A parallel development 
in the First Pillar (once again in 1999) was the creation of OLAF, whose main tasks 
were the fight against fraud, corruption and any other illegal activity adversely 
                                                 
120 Agreement between the USA and Europol, 6 December 2001; Supplemental Agreement between 
Europol and the USA on the Exchange of Personal Data and Related Information, Doc. 13689/02 
Europol 82 and 13689/02 Europol ADD 1, both available at http://www.europol.europa.eu/.  
121 Statewatch, February 2002, The Activities and Development of Europol- Towards an 
Unaccountable FBI in Europe and, more recently, Statewatch, Europol: the Final Step in the Creation 
of and Investigative and Operational European Police Force, January 2007, at 
http://www.statewatch.org/ .  
122 Tampere European Council (15-16 October 1999) Presidency Conclusions, available at 
http://europa.eu/european_council/conclusions/index_en.htm.  See Chapter 2, infra. 
123 Joint Action 98/428/JHA adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K 3 of the Treaty on 
European Union, on the creation of a European Judicial Network, OJ L 191 07/07/1998. See now 
Council Decision 2008/976/JHA of 16 December 2008 on the European Judicial Network, OJ L 348 
24/12/2008.  
124 Council Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against 
serious crime, OJ L 63 6/03/2002; Eurojust Rules of Procedure, OJ C 286/1 22/11/2002. Previously, a 
provisional unit had been created. See Council Decision 2000/799/JHA setting up a Provisional 
Judicial Cooperation Unit, OJ L 324 21/12/2000. See now Council Decision on the strengthening of 
Eurojust and amending Council Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing 
the fight against serious crime, Doc. 5347/09, Brussels, 20 January 2009. 
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affecting the Community’s financial interests125. As the Eurojust Decision pointed 
out in its preamble, the objectives of Eurojust are the same as those indicated in the 
EC Regulation concerning the investigations carried out by OLAF (although the 
same Preamble carefully prevents OLAF from having access to the information 
collected by Eurojust in its activities)126. Interestingly, it was felt that in order to 
contrast serious crimes directly affecting the economic core values of the EU, the 
supranational, rather than the intergovernmental structure would be more 
appropriate.   
 
We shall look in chapter six more in detail at the structure and functioning of 
Eurojust127. What should be borne in mind at the moment is that, while this body 
(composed of a prosecutor, a judge or police officer of equivalent competence from 
each Member State) can neither investigate nor prosecute autonomously, it has legal 
personality and its range of competences is wider than the one Europol has128. In 
particular, apart from the crimes that fall within the remit of the latter under Article 2 
of the Europol Convention, the list covers computer crime, fraud and corruption and 
any criminal offence affecting the Community’s financial interests, money 
laundering, environmental crime, participation in a criminal organisation and other 
offences committed together with those mentioned above (Article 1 of the Eurojust 
Decision). Moreover, Eurojust may be requested to provide assistance by a national 
competent authority in investigating and prosecuting crimes not covered by that list. 
As far as all these crimes are concerned, the main tasks of this body include 
exchange of information and collection of personal data. The future development of 
Eurojust (as, perhaps, the European equivalent of the FBI) is strictly related to the 
                                                 
125 Commission Decision establishing the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), 1999/352/EC, ECSC, 
Euratom, OJ L 136/21 31/05/1999.  
126 Council Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust, supra, Preamble, point 5; Regulation n. 
1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning investigations conducted by the 
European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) OJ L 136 31/05/1999.  
127 See infra chapter 6 p. 209-212. 
128 On the relationship Eurojust-Europol, see e.g. P. Berthelet and C. Chevallier-Govers, ‘Quelle 
rélation entre Europol et Eurojust? Rapport d’égalité ou rapport d’autorité?’ (2001) Revue du Marché 
Commun de l’Union européenne 450. However, see now Article 85 Lisbon Treaty, Consolidated 
version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and of the Treaty on the functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) OJ C 115 09/05/2008.   
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creation of a European Public Prosecutor, as provided for in the failed European 
Constitution (Article III-274) and in the Lisbon Treaty (Article 86 TFEU)129.   
 
The Treaty of Nice130 did not introduce any significant innovation, apart from 
referring to Eurojust and amending the areas of asylum, immigration and cooperation 
in civil matters. However, since then new impetus came from the Member States and 
a Draft Constitutional Treaty was adopted by the European Convention in July 2003 
and, after discussion at the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) agreed in June 2004 
and finally signed in October 2004131. The Constitution intended to radically modify 
the mechanisms of cooperation in criminal matters. Although the project was not 
successful due to the negative referenda in France and the Netherlands (2005), most 
of it has been reproduced in the Lisbon Treaty132. First of all, the Pillar structure is to 
be abolished. This is considered a necessary step in order to reduce frictions and 
uncertainty over the appropriate legal basis, solve most of the problems relating to 
the decision-making in the Third Pillar and simplify the complex and often confusing 
relationship between organs and instruments belonging to different Pillars133. 
However, the merging is not complete: in the area of police and judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters, the Commission still has to share with the Member States its 
right of initiative (Article III-264 Constitution and Article 76 TFEU)134, unanimity 
partly applies and the European Parliament is often only given a consultative role. To 
be sure, the co-decision procedure and qualified majority voting (QMV) are extended 
                                                 
129 Treaty amending the TEU and the TEC, OJ 306 17/12/2007. The Treaty was signed on 13 
December 2007 after the failed approval of the European Constitution. It needs to be ratified by all 27 
Member States before entering into force. Ireland voted ‘no’ in a referendum held in June 2008. See 
also Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), supra. 
130 Treaty of Nice, OJ C 80 10/03/2001. It was signed on 26 February 2001 and entered into force on 1 
February 2003. 
131 Draft Constitutional Treaty, CONV 850/03, July 2003. For the final version, see Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ C 310/1 16/12/2004.  
132 See Lisbon Treaty supra note 129. 
133 On these issues, see D. Thym, ‘The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe’- WHI Paper 12/04; J. Monar, ‘Towards a New Framework of 
Co-operation in EU Justice and Home Affairs? The Results of the European Convention’, 
Contribution to the Conference ‘Plenty of News in the East, Poland and the Union’s Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice’ organised by the Centre for International Relations on 17-18 October 2003, 
Warsaw. 
134 Measures in the areas of judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters and regulations 
ensuring administrative cooperation in the same areas can be adopted either on a proposal from the 
Commission or on the initiative of a quarter of the Member States.  
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to freedom, security and justice, but the exceptions are still numerous as far as 
“delicate” matters are concerned135. A relevant innovation relating to the right of 
initiative is the enhanced role of the European Council, which can define the 
strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning (Article III-258 
Constitution and Article 68 TFEU). Second, an important change is the strengthening 
of the role of the European Parliament and of the national parliaments: for instance, 
they are enabled to take part in the evaluation process of the activities of Europol and 
Eurojust and of the national authorities (in general, Articles III-260, III-273 and III-
276 Constitution; Articles 70, 71 and 88(2) TFEU). Third, the formal protection of 
fundamental rights in this field was to be ensured through the incorporation of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights136 in part II of the Constitution. The Charter will now 
acquire binding value after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, although it will 
not be part of any Treaty. The general objectives of the area of freedom, security and 
justice will include respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and 
traditions of the Member States (Article III-257 Constitution; Article 67 (1) TFEU). 
Also, the EU will be required to accede to the ECHR137. Fourth, the jurisdiction of 
the ECJ is expanded, so that the Court can give preliminary rulings in the context of 
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters: however, the limitation envisaged 
in Article III-377 of the Constitution and Article 35 (5) TEU138 has been retained by 
the Lisbon Treaty (Article 276). Fifth, as already seen both the Constitution and the 
Lisbon Treaty make it possible to establish the office of the European Public 
Prosecutor: its jurisdiction will however only encompass crimes affecting the EU 
financial interests, although the European Council (acting unanimously) may extend 
its powers to include serious cross-border crimes. Sixth, Europol’s remit will be able 
to embrace all serious cross-border crimes and its tasks will include not only 
                                                 
135 Unanimity and mere consent of Parliament apply whenever the Council intends to extend the EU 
competence in substantive and procedural criminal law (Articles III-271 (1) and 270(2)(d) European 
Constitution; 83 (1) and 82 (2) (d) TFEU) or lay down rules relating to the carrying out of operations 
by the competent authorities of one Member State in the territory of another Member State following 
agreement with the latter’s authorities (Articles III-275(3) and III-277 European Constitution; 87 (3) 
and 89 TFEU). The same is required for the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor (Article 
III-274(1) European Constitution; 86 TFEU) and, outside the area of cooperation in criminal matters, 
for family law (Article III-269(3) European Constitution and 81 (3) TFEU).  
136 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 364/1, 18/12/2001. It does not have 
binding legal value at the moment. 
137 Protocol n. 8, Lisbon Treaty supra. 
138 See supra p. 29. 
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collecting, storing, analysing and exchanging data, but also coordinating, organising 
and implementing joint actions of national authorities. This succinct account of the 
constitutional structure of the Third Pillar will serve as basis for our discussion of the 
main challenges facing the implementation of the EAW. In relation to this, the 
following chapter will deal with the innovations introduced in the more specific 
context of mutual recognition of judicial decisions.  
 
 
1.5  First preliminary conclusions 
 
 
This chapter has described the origins and main features of the new inter-State 
system in the post-Amsterdam era. The EAW operates in this cooperative 
framework, in which extradition and mutual assistance play a pivotal role. However, 
as anticipated in a previous section139, the area of freedom, security and justice, 
despite its undeniably innovative nature, hides a few tensions which can potentially 
undermine the objectives that it purports to achieve. A detailed account of the 
numerous concerns stemming from such considerations lies outside the scope of this 
work. Nevertheless, a general overview will be attempted, in order to provide in 
general terms a background for the analysis of the features and the functioning of the 
EAW in the European Union. The tensions which we have referred to above concern, 
first of all, the very notion of freedom, security and justice. Secondly, they relate to 
the need to promote trust. Thirdly, they involve the complex issue of legitimacy 
(which is itself deeply connected to the developing structure of the European Union). 
Finally, and in relation to this last aspect, it is not possible to leave aside the 
relationship and the distinction between the First and the Third Pillar, which are 
supposed to collapse should the Lisbon Treaty enter into force.  
 
The first tension line is represented by the notion of freedom, security and justice. To 
be sure, these concepts are in themselves not very innovative, as they are the 
outcome of a thousand-year reflection (and practice) in the political and legal sphere. 
                                                 
139 See supra, section 1.3, p. 29. 
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What is really innovative is their development outside the traditional structure of the 
sovereign State, through a process of gradual shift that benefits the Community 
institutions at the expenses of the single Member States. The question is therefore if 
‘justice’, for instance, is elaborated and effectively operates in the same “strong” 
meaning as when it is ensured by State authorities. If this were the case, then it 
would be necessary to justify and define the contours of its source or sources.  Can 
measures adopted by the Council or the Commission be considered ‘just’ in terms of 
e.g. equal treatment, correct procedures, respect of minorities? Can these organs be 
considered a democratically justifiable source of law? Following this reasoning, can 
the Court of Justice decide in a ‘just’ manner and would it be legally possible to 
create a “criminal chamber” dealing exclusively with criminal law cases?  One can 
also wonder whether ‘freedom’ is really being pursued, given the very limited 
number of measures adopted for the protection of individual rights, such as fair trial, 
questioning of suspects, treatment of personal information, etc. On the other hand, 
‘security’ measures seem to have been high on the agenda of EU institutions and 
Member States. The notion of ‘security’ often tends to be ambiguous. It can be 
viewed either in negative terms (as a means to justify the adoption of excessively 
repressive measures) or in positive terms (as an individual and/or collective right). 
Some commentators have suggested an alternative positive view, arguing that 
“(…)the good of security is not to be found (…) in a situation in which ‘security’ is 
‘shallow’ and ‘wide’- a precarious, routinely fretted-over effect of the supply and 
presence of (ever-)increasing numbers of policing and crime-control measures. Nor 
is the good of security to be found in a situation where it is ‘deep’ and ‘wide’ – 
where it is reified as the overweening end rather than the modest beginning of social 
policy. (…)The pursuit of security, in other words, is best thought of as ‘deep’ and 
‘narrow’ (…)understood and configured not as a form of perpetual striving, but as a 
state of well being- a state in which we are able to live – and live together- securely 
with risk”140. Unfortunately, the trend of EU criminal policy so far has been towards 
the ‘shallow’ and ‘wide’ meaning of security, with the creation of Europol and 
Eurojust, the adoption of fast-track cooperation mechanisms as well as the 
publication of statistics, surveys and Eurobarometers pointing out the need to fight 
                                                 
140 I. Loader, N. Walker, Civilising Security (Cambridge University Press 2007) 168-169.  
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terrorism and drug trafficking as these are being perceived as pressing needs by 
public opinion. Little or no time at all has been devoted to setting up and agreeing on 
standards of protection of the rights of the defence, and when an attempt has been 
made, this has miserably failed, due to the reluctance of some Member States141. It is, 
of course, primarily a matter of sovereignty. This leads us to a specific area which 
has grown at a very fast pace in the last years: mutual recognition. This principle 
deserves a more detailed analysis and this will be done in the following chapter. 
 
A second issue that needs to be stressed here is trust. The creation of a new structure 
of cooperation in criminal matters can only succeed if this prerequisite exists. This 
must be promoted both at the institutional/governmental level and at the operational 
level, among practitioners and organs of cooperation. It has been observed that trust 
is strictly connected to security and is different from confidence: it “(…)is instead 
viewed as that in which we must invest when we do not – or do not yet - have 
confidence in the workings of institutions or the behaviour of other agents. In other 
words, while confidence is an accomplished state upon which we can more or less 
passively rely; trust is an active way of building confidence or otherwise dealing with 
the absence of confident expectations”142. The main purpose of the following 
chapters is exactly to verify whether mutual trust (rather than simply confidence) 
really exists in the European Union and, if so, to what extent one may claim that it 
effectively operates. The implementation of the EAW may prove to be in this sense a 
very useful template for an enquiry into the concrete possibility of creating a 
European criminal law143. 
 
The third delicate issue that must be considered is legitimacy. If a European criminal 
law area is to be developed, then this can only occur if the actors involved in this 
process can claim some sort of legitimacy. As will be better seen in the following 
chapters, this is surely not the case nowadays, since cooperation in criminal matters 
                                                 
141 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings 
throughout the European Union, Brussels, 28/04/2004, COM (2004) 328 final. 
142 N. Walker, ‘The Problem of Trust in an Enlarged Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A 
Conceptual Analysis’ in M. Anderson, J. Apap (eds.), Police and justice cooperation and the new 
European borders (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2002) 22.  
143 An attempt to elaborate a notion of mutual trust in the area of judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters is made in chapter 5 p.190. 
 45
still falls within the scope of the Third Pillar, which is irremediably flawed from this 
point of view. The conclusion might be different if the constitutional structure of the 
European Union is amended by the Lisbon Treaty. Last but not least, closely 
connected to what has just been mentioned is the fourth issue, i.e. the way the First 
and the Third Pillar interact with each other. There has been a trend towards blurring 
the distinction between these Pillars, outside the classic dichotomy between 
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism144, but this has not prevented (rather, it 
has increased) confusion as to the legal basis of the measures to be applied and 
conflicts between the Commission and the Council145. The question in this context is 
what will be the position of the Framework Decision on the EAW if the new Treaty 
enters into force. A Directive would presumably have to be adopted and this could go 
some way towards reducing the concerns relating to the “democratic deficit” of the 
Third Pillar (although most of the problems highlighted in this work will remain). 
                                                 
144 F. Snyder, ‘Institutional Development in the European Union: Some Implications of the Third 
Pillar’ in J. Monar, R. Morgan (eds.), The Third Pillar of the European Union: cooperation in the 
fields of justice and home affairs (European Interuniversity Press, Brussels 1995) 85. 
145 ECJ C-440/05, Commission v. Council (Ship Source Pollution case) [2007] ECR I-9097; ECJ C-
176/03, Commission v. Council (Environmental Pollution case) [2005] ECR I-7879. 
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2. The principle of mutual recognition in criminal 






This chapter aims at analysing the principle of mutual recognition, giving an 
overview of its evolution in recent years until its incorporation in the Lisbon Treaty, 
signed on 13 December 2007. The analysis will be done in the context of European 
cooperation in criminal matters and the project of a European criminal law. Is this 
project feasible and was it clearly conceived from the beginning? First, an account of 
the mutual recognition measures adopted so far will be given, considering their level 
of implementation and their effectiveness (section 2.1.). Second, mutual recognition 
will be examined both within the structure of the current Third Pillar, in relation to 
harmonisation, and within the more general debate on the development of EU law 
and international law (section 2.2 and 2.3). Finally, a general conclusion will be 
drawn on the essence of this principle and on its relevance for the process of 
European integration (section 2.4). 
 
 
2.1 The current mutual recognition agenda 
 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the beginning of the post-Amsterdam era was 
marked by two strands of development in inter-State cooperation. The first was the 
2000 Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance, which substantially enhanced the role 
of the national judge by stressing the importance of direct contact between judges. 
The Convention also introduced joint investigation teams.1 Furthermore, the forum 
regit actum principle, enshrined in this Convention, enabled the requesting Member 
                                                 
1 Council Act of 29 May 2000 establishing in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on European 
Union the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the 
European Union, OJ C 197 12/07/2000, Protocol, OJ C 326 16/10/2001 and Explanatory Report, OJ C 
379 30/11/2000. It has been ratified by 23 Member States so far (it entered into force on 23 August 
2005).  
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State to specify to the requested Member State how the gathering of evidence should 
be carried out in order to be valid in the requesting Member State2. 
 
The second strand was mutual recognition, i.e. the principle whereby a decision by 
the judicial authority of a Member State is recognised and, if necessary, enforced in 
another Member State. This section will focus on the latter development and will 
give an overview of the current state of affairs. 
 
Indeed, all the legislative measures adopted so far have taken the form of a 
Framework Decision, which is the main instrument within the Third Pillar.3 The first 
instrument of mutual recognition to be created (in 2002) was the European Arrest 
Warrant,4 which is applicable both to final judgments and the pre-trial phase. Other 
instruments within the Mutual Recognition Programme followed afterwards. They 
can all be grouped according to the phase of criminal proceedings to which they 
apply. The execution of orders freezing property or evidence, confiscation orders, 
non-custodial pre-trial supervision measures and the European Evidence Warrant5 all 
belong to the pre-trial phase. A proposal for a Framework Decision on taking 
account of previous convictions in the course of new criminal proceedings is also on 
the table6. Finally, mutual recognition also applies to judgements imposing custodial 
                                                 
2  E. Denza- ‘The 2000 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters’ (2003) 40 Common 
Market Law Review 1047. 
3 The reasons why this instrument was chosen and its many flaws cannot be analysed here. See for 
instance A. Klip and H. van der Wilt (eds.)- Harmonisation and harmonising measures in criminal 
law (Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences Amsterdam 2002). 
4 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and 
the surrender procedure between Member States, OJ L 190 18/07/2002.  
5 Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA of 22 July 2003 on the execution in the European 
Union of orders freezing property or evidence OJ L 196 02/08/2003; Council Framework Decision 
2005/212/JHA of 24 February 2005 on Confiscation of Crime-Related Proceeds, Instrumentalities and 
Property concerning minimum harmonisation of confiscation procedures in Member States, OJ L 68 
15/03/2005; Council Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA of 6 October 2006 on the application of the 
principle of mutual recognition to confiscation orders, OJ L 328 24/11/2006; Proposal for a Council 
Framework Decision on the European supervision order in pre-trial procedures between Member 
States of the European Union, Brussels, 13 December 2007 Doc. 16494/07 COPEN 181; Council 
Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the European evidence warrant for the 
purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in criminal matters, OJ L 350 
30/12/2008. 
6 Draft Framework Decision on taking account of convictions in the Member States of the European 
Union in the course of new criminal proceedings, Brussels, 11 June 2008 Doc. 9960/08 COPEN 103. 
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sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their 
enforcement in their European Union7.  
 
The first of the instruments mentioned above aims at securing evidence, which can 
then be used by the issuing Member State; it can also be issued for the purpose of 
confiscation, which is dealt with by another Framework Decision. Recognition of 
freezing orders must occur without formality and the execution must be ‘immediate’. 
In any case, the judicial authority of the executing State must observe the formalities 
and procedures indicated by the competent judicial authority of the issuing State.8 
The non-custodial pre-trial supervision measures can be applied to persons in their 
country of origin. More specifically, the European supervision order is a decision 
issued by a judicial authority in one Member State that must be recognised by a 
competent authority in another Member State. The purpose is to guarantee the 
suspect a pre-trial supervision measure in his or her natural environment (i.e. his or 
her residence). The European Evidence Warrant can be issued, as mentioned in the 
previous section, for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in 
criminal proceedings. The double criminality requirement is lifted for a list of thirty-
two crimes, just as in the case of the European Arrest Warrant, although Germany 
may reserve its right to maintain it for some offences9.  
 
Concerning final judgments, one of the main instruments is the Framework Decision 
on the mutual recognition of financial penalties.10 It applies to final decisions 
requiring a financial penalty to be paid following a criminal offence. Here again we 
may observe that decisions must be recognised without formality and immediately 
executed. Interestingly, the list of offences for which double criminality is excluded 
                                                 
7 Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the 
principle of mutual recognition to judgements in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or 
measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union, 
OJ L 327 5/12/2008. 
8 Art. 5(1) of the Framework Decision. 
9 See infra, p.51. 
10 Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the application of the principle 
of mutual recognition to financial penalties OJ L 76 22/03/2005.The others are the European Arrest 
Warrant, confiscation orders and the taking account of previous convictions. A proposal on the ne bis 
in idem principle has been dropped. See Initiative of the Hellenic Republic for the adoption of a 
Framework Decision of the Council on the application of the ne bis in idem principle, Council doc. 
6356/03 Brussels 13 February 2003.  
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is broader than in previous Framework Decisions11. Another important measure is 
the Framework Decision on the mutual recognition of judgements and probation 
decisions with a view to the supervision of probation measures and alternative 
sanctions12. It is interesting to observe some wishful thinking in point 17 of the 
Preamble, where it is recommended that refusal on grounds of territoriality should 
occur only in exceptional circumstances after consultation between the competent 
authorities.  
 
It is possible to note some common points in all these measures: the provision of a 
certificate to be completed by the issuing State as well as of a standard form, the 
speeding up of the procedures for recognition and execution of decisions, a limited 
list of mandatory and optional grounds for refusal. The non-inclusion of the 
protection of human rights among the specific grounds for refusal has already built 
up some friction and ambiguities which are likely to continue in the future, perhaps 
until the European Court of Justice intervenes to clarify the scope of protection to 
human rights which Member States can offer.13 
 
As regards the mutual recognition of judgements imposing custodial sentences or 
measures restricting individual liberty, it is designed to allow enforcement of a 
sentence in the executing State instead of the issuing State, whenever this is 
considered to facilitate the social reintegration of the sentenced person. Contrary to 
the 1983 Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Person (and related 1997 
Protocol), the recognition of the judgement and the enforcement of the sentence 
                                                 
11 See Article 5 Framework Decision on the mutual recognition of financial penalties, supra: crimes 
which do not feature in the EAW Framework Decision include criminal damage, smuggling of goods, 
infringement of intellectual property rights, threats and acts of violence against persons, including 
violence during sport events. 
12 Council Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the 
principle of mutual recognition to judgements and probation decisions with a view to the supervision 
of probation measures and alternative sanctions, OJ L 337 16/12/2008. Point 4 of the Preamble points 
out that this instrument is presumed to be more effective than the Council of Europe Convention on 
the Supervision of Conditionally Sentenced or Conditionally Released Offenders (see chapter 1 supra 
p.6-7). 
13 Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision on the EAW for instance specifies that nothing in this 
instrument has the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental 
legal principles under Art. 6 TEU. Recital 12 in the Preamble of the same Framework Decision also 
pays attention to the protection of human rights. However, the problem is that the former, albeit not 
listed among the grounds for refusal, might be given the same effect in practice. 
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delivered in one State is compulsory14. However, this may only occur following the 
consent of the sentenced person given under the law of the issuing State, unless the 
judgement and related certificate are sent to the State of nationality where he lives or 
is deported or the State to which he has fled or otherwise returned15. Moreover, a 
relatively high number of grounds for refusal is provided for, including cases where 
less than six months of the sentence remain to be served or where the sentence 
contains measures of psychiatric or health care or other restricting measures which 
cannot be executed in the legal system of the executing State16. Finally, it is worth 
noting that recital 1 of the preamble to the Framework Decision timidly suggests that 
mutual recognition “(...) should become the cornerstone of judicial cooperation”, 
whereas priority number 9 of the Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament on The Hague Programme17 claimed that the 
principle “(...) has become the cornerstone of judicial cooperation”. 
 
To sum up, the main obstacle facing the implementation of the mutual recognition 
programme at the moment appears to be a growing lack of enthusiasm on the part of 
certain Member States. Whereas the Framework Decision on the European Arrest 
Warrant was approved within a relatively short timeframe, the procedure for the 
approval of all other measures was quite lengthy. 
 
However, even the implementation of the Framework Decision on the EAW has 
faced obstacles and presents some flaws. Amongst others, we can mention the failure 
to bring it into force on time and the inclusion of further grounds of refusal, both 
optional and mandatory, in the Member States’ implementing legislation. Difficulties 
                                                 
14 Framework Decision on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgements in 
criminal matters imposing custodial sentences supra Article 3 (1). For the Convention on the Transfer 
of Sentenced Persons, see chapter 1 supra p. 7. 
15 Framework Decision on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgements in 
criminal matters imposing custodial sentences supra Article 5(1) and 6. When the person is still in the 
issuing State, he must be given the opportunity to state his opinion and this opinion must be taken into 
account. Moreover, the provision not requiring consent when the judgement is sent to the State of 
nationality where the person lives is no applicable to Poland where the judgement has been issued 
within five years of the date by which Member States are required to comply with the Framework 
Decision: see Article 6(5). 
16 Framework Decision on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgements in 
criminal matters imposing custodial sentences supra Article 9.  
17 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament- The Hague 
Programme: Ten Priorities for the next five years- COM (2005) 184 final. 
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were also encountered at the constitutional level in Germany, Poland and Cyprus, 
whose respective Constitutional Courts stated that surrender is unconstitutional when 
it involves nationals of their countries18. In the same period, the Belgian 
Constitutional Court referred to the European Court of Justice the preliminary 
question of the compatibility of the Framework Decision with Article 34(2)(b) TEU 
as well as Article 6(2) TEU (which states the principles of legality, equality and non-
discrimination). The applicant, which had submitted an annulment action of the 
Belgian legislation enacting the EAW before the Belgian Cour d’arbitrage, also 
argued that international cooperation in criminal matters should be regulated by 
Convention and not by Framework Decision19. The European Court of Justice has 
nevertheless decided that the Framework Decision does not violate the principles of 
legality and non-discrimination and that the Council is free to select a Framework 
Decision rather than a Convention as the most appropriate instrument even outside 
the scope defined by Art. 31 (1) (e) TEU20. 
 
The implementation of the Framework Decision on the freezing of assets and 
evidence was also difficult. Although the decision should have been implemented in 
all Member States by August 2005, only a few of them had done it by the end of 
200621. Another example is represented by the European Evidence Warrant (EEW), 
whose text was agreed on 1 June 2006 at the Luxembourg JHA Council, after three 
years of lengthy negotiations22.  
                                                 
18Polish Constitutional Court, Judgment P 1/05 of 27 April 2005; German Constitutional Court 
BVerfG, 2 BvR 2236/04 of  18 July 2005; Cyprus Constitutional Court Judgment of 7 November 
2005. In Germany, a new law was issued in July 2006, taking into account the Court’s decision. See 
Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2006 Teil I n.36, 25 Juli 2006. 
19 See Belgian Cour d’arbitrage, Judgment n. 124/2005 of 13 July 2005.  
20 ECJ C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld v Leden van de Ministerraad, 3 May 2007. See infra 
Chapter 6 p.212. 
21 Council of the European Union General Secretariat, doc. 5937/2/06 REV 2, Brussels, 31 October 
2006. 
22 Justice and Home Affairs Council, Luxembourg, 1-2 June 2006, see Council of the European Union 
Document 10081/06 Presse 168. The negotiations had to face many problems. For instance, the 
Netherlands pushed for a partial application of the territoriality principle, to allow it to refuse to 
comply with an EEW relating to offences committed wholly or partly in its territory. Germany has the 
possibility  by means of a declaration to make execution of an EEW conditional on the verification of 
double criminality for six categories of offences: terrorism, computer-related crime, racism and 
xenophobia, sabotage, racketeering and extortion, swindling. This does not apply when the issuing 
authority has declared that the offence concerned under its own national law is covered by the criteria 
defined in the declaration. See now Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA on the European 
evidence warrant, supra note 5.  
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At the same time, the failed approval of the Framework Decision on procedural 
rights23 is a warning sign: while, on the one hand, the prosecution and enforcement 
side of the Third Pillar has been developed considerably in the last years, much more 
is required to strengthen human rights protection. In addition, the safeguards 
envisaged by the proposal, even in its original version, were still largely 
incomplete24, as they did not include, for instance, rules on the presumption of 
innocence, right to bail, double jeopardy or admission of evidence25.  
 
More generally, the main flaws of mutual recognition in criminal matters can be 
identified in: slow negotiation process; decision-making in the third pillar (which has 
been, inter alia, blamed for lack of transparency); lack of rules on conflicts of 
jurisdiction and ne bis in idem; lack of rules on procedural guarantees, presumption 
of innocence, minimum standards for evidence-gathering; problems in defining the 
grounds for refusal, the requirement of double criminality and the offences to which 
the measures should apply. In addition, it seems that the various instruments of 
mutual recognition present different features in terms, for instance, of dual 
criminality and grounds for refusal. More coherence would be desirable. These issues 
are all connected to the question of the competence of the European Community in 
criminal law. The European Court of Justice, in a conflict of competence between the 
Council and the Commission over the subject of environmental protection, confirmed 
                                                 
23 Draft Framework Decision on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings throughout the 
European Union, Brussels, 28/04/2004, COM (2004) 328 final. See M. Jimeno-Bulnes, ‘The Proposal 
for a Council Framework Decision on Certain Procedural Rights in Criminal Proceedings throughout 
the European Union’ in E. Guild, F. Geyer (eds.), Security versus Justice? Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in the European Union (Ashgate Aldershot 2008).  
24 The original proposal included: right to legal advice, right to free interpretation and translation, 
right to receive appropriate attention if not able to understand or follow the proceedings, right to 
communicate, inter alia, with foreign authorities in the case of foreign suspects, right to be notified of 
one’s own rights by means of a written “Letter of Rights”. Interestingly, during the consultation 
process preceding the adoption of the Green Paper, many more rights were considered. See M. 
Jimeno-Bulnes, ‘The Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Certain Procedural Rights’ supra 
174-175. 
25 The right to bail is supposed to be the subject of a future Green Paper. On the presumption of 
innocence, see European Commission Green Paper: The Presumption of Innocence, Brussels, 
26/04/2006, COM (2006) 174 final. On double jeopardy, see European Commission Green Paper on 
conflicts of jurisdiction and the principle of ne bis in idem in criminal proceedings, Brussels, 
23/12/2005, COM (2005) 696 final. A Green Paper on the handling of evidence and a Proposal on 
minimum standards relating to the taking of evidence were initially envisaged in the Council and 
Commission Action Plan implementing the Hague Programme on strengthening freedom, security and 
justice in the European Union, OJ C 198 12/08/2005.  
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its view that both substantive and procedural criminal law are not included in the 
European Community’s competence. However, measures may still be taken when the 
application of effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties by the competent 
national authorities is necessary in the fight against serious environmental offences26. 
Since the question is general and touches upon the very nature of the European 
Union, disputes in other sectors have been emerging recently27. Do the powers of the 
Community extend to the possibility of prescribing penalties and defining the 
offences and to all other aspects of criminal law or are they limited to the 
identification of cases in which criminal penalties are necessary in order to provide 
an effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanction? While leaving aside the issue of 
competence, the following section will address more in detail the relationship 
between harmonisation and mutual recognition. 
 
 
2.2  Mutual recognition v. harmonisation 
 
 
Long before the European Union acquired some initial competence in criminal law 
areas, many international instruments of criminal law, mainly Conventions, were 
developed within the Council of Europe. As noted earlier28, a few Conventions 
already included mutual recognition elements: the majority of these instruments have 
never entered into force, due to the lack of confidence between the countries which 
were at that time members of the Council of Europe.  
 
Since mutual recognition seems to be viewed by the EU institutions as a principle 
essential for the development of European Criminal Law, it may be useful to look 
more carefully at how we can define it in its modern version and identify its main 
features. To this end, this section will adopt a purely legal viewpoint: it will briefly 
explore the two concepts of mutual recognition and harmonisation both per se and in 
the light of the Treaty provisions. The following section contains a more conceptual 
analysis. 
                                                 
26 ECJ Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council (Environmental Pollution case) [2005] ECR I-7879. 
27 See e.g. Case C-440/05 Commission v. Council (Ship source Pollution case) [2007] ECR I-9097. 
28 See supra chapter 1, p. 6-8. 
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Mutual recognition is different from harmonisation. In a first attempt to define the 
two concepts, we may be tempted to argue that the latter’s aim is to eliminate 
differences and create a homogeneous system possibly with one code and one 
judicial court, while in the former differences are kept within a system of cooperation 
and mutual trust. In the first case there is a common normative standard which is 
agreed by more subjects at the same time, whereas in the second case there are many 
normative standards that co-exist and every subject can impose its own standard 
through a request to another subject that is obliged to incorporate it into its system29. 
 
However, the above-mentioned attempt is bound to fail if we look at the legal 
provisions and at the opinions of the experts. Both terms (harmonisation and mutual 
recognition) seem to be used in different contexts and with different purposes, 
sometimes with a lack of coherence. Harmonisation is sometimes seen more as 
approximation of rules30, in the sense of bringing different laws of different states 
closer to each other. Sometimes it only refers to substantive criminal law, some other 
times to procedural criminal law. Some authors do not consider harmonisation as 
elimination of differences, but rather as elimination of conflicts between different 
legal systems31. However, it is reasonable to believe that once a common model of 
law is created, at least some of the disparities need to disappear in order for it to 
function properly. In order to have a clearer concept of harmonisation, we may 
therefore distinguish different degrees, from the lowest, i.e. approximation, to the 
highest, i.e. unification, which is the one we have referred to above.  
 
Mutual recognition applies to both final decisions and decisions taken before them.  
As far as the former are concerned, the definition of “final decision” has been 
worked out on the basis of already established texts, as, for instance, the provisions 
                                                 
29 On this, see, inter alia, I. Bantekas, ‘The Principle of Mutual Recognition in EU Criminal Law’ 
(2007) 32  European Law Review 365. 
30 A. Weyembergh, ‘Approximation of Criminal Laws, the Constitutional Treaty and the Hague 
Programme’ (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review 1567. 
31 F. M. Tadić- ‘How harmonious can harmonisation be? A theoretical approach towards 
harmonisation of (criminal) law’- in A. Klip and H. van der Wilt (eds.)- supra 1.  
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of the 1968 Brussels Convention32. A “final decision” is therefore to be considered as 
an act that resolves a matter with a binding effect and against which no appeal is 
possible or, if possible, has no suspensive effect. Such a decision may be adopted not 
only by a court, but also by other organs and it may also be an extra-judicial 
agreement between the accused person and the prosecution authorities33.  
 
As far as the other types of decisions are concerned, they are mostly adopted in the 
so-called pre-trial phase. They include such investigation measures as questioning 
suspects or witnesses or other methods of evidence-gathering (e.g. through wire-
tapping or monitoring of bank accounts) as well as other measures such as freezing 
of assets, home detention during the investigation stage (so-called “house arrest”) or 
non-custodial supervision measures.  
 
Another problem is the distinction between criminal and non-criminal matters, which 
has for a long time been under debate. Some legislative instruments only consider the 
substance of the matter and include decisions of a non-criminal nature. This is the 
option chosen by the 1970 Hague Convention on the International Validity of 
Foreign Criminal Sentences and the 1991 Convention on the Enforcement of Foreign 
Criminal Sentences. Indeed, Art. 1(b) and 1(1)(a) respectively of these two 
Conventions refer to decisions taken by administrative authorities, provided that the 
right of (fair) trial is granted to the accused person34.   
 
Harmonisation and mutual recognition in criminal law matters represent two options 
that are often seen as alternatives. Those who oppose harmonisation argue that 
criminal law can only be dealt with properly at the national level, as it is rooted in the 
culture of a nation. Harmonisation as such leads to a repressive approach, as it 
involves the application of the same level of punishment to all States, regardless of 
how each crime is qualified in each legal system. They also believe that the 
institutional framework of the European Union in the Third Pillar lacks democratic 
                                                 
32 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters OJ C 27 26/1/1998 (consolidated version). 
33 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament- Mutual 
Recognition of Final Decisions in Criminal Matters, Brussels, COM(2000) 495 final. 
34 See supra chapter 1 p. 6-8.  
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legitimacy. In the context of co-operation in criminal matters, therefore, once mutual 
recognition is established, a system of harmonisation at all levels is not the best 
solution35. On the other hand, those who support harmonisation consider it as the 
most effective instrument to fight against transnational or “globalised” crime (as a 
single corpus iuris would be easier to apply) but they also believe it is able to 
provide better safeguards for human rights. According to this view, mutual 
recognition does not allow evaluation of the fairness of a trial, in particular as to the 
evidence gathered abroad36.  
 
If we look at the structure of the Third Pillar, in which some harmonisation and 
mutual recognition measures have taken place through Framework Decisions, we can 
easily notice relevant differences to the structure and functioning of the First Pillar. 
Most of the legislative power is attributed to the Council of the European Union, 
while the European Parliament only has a limited consultative role: there is therefore 
nothing comparable to the co-decision procedure in the First Pillar. The Commission 
shares its right of initiative with the Member States. The European Court of Justice, 
whose powers have been increased by the Maastricht Treaty, cannot verify the 
validity and proportionality of police or law enforcement operations and its power to 
take preliminary decisions depends on the consent of Member States37 (moreover, 
there is no infringement procedure). As a result, an executive organ (the Council) has 
the power to deal with criminal matters through acts (the Framework Decisions) that 
do not need to be approved by the citizens of a State or ratified by a national 
                                                 
35 T. Vander Beken- ‘Freedom, security and justice in the European Union. A plea for alternative 
views on harmonisation’, in A.Klip, H. van der Wilt (eds.), supra 95.  
36 A.Klip- ‘European integration and harmonisation and criminal law’, in D.M. Curtin et al (eds.)., 
European Integration and Law (Intersentia METRO, Antwerpen-Oxford 2006) 134; J.R.Spencer- 
‘Why is the harmonisation of penal law necessary?’, in A.Klip, H. van der Wilt (eds.), supra 43.  
Against mutual recognition is B. Schünemann, ‘Alternative Project for a European Criminal Law and 
Procedure’, (2007) 18 Criminal Law Forum 227, who suggests, as an alternative, the application of 
the most favoured treatment principle and of the Swiss model.  See also A. Weyembergh, 
L’harmonisation des législations: condition de l’espace pénal européen et révélateur de ses tensions 
(Institut d’etudes européennes Brussels 2004).  
37 More precisely, Member States can accept the Court’s jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings 
through a declaration. The power to request preliminary ruling can be attributed either to any national 
court or tribunal or only to a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy 
under national law (Article 35 TEU). 
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Parliament. These acts are also deprived of direct effect38. Finally, the unanimity rule 
makes the whole decision-making process lengthy and inefficient. 
 
Harmonisation within Title VI of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) takes 
place only to a certain degree, for limited areas and to the extent that a more effective 
inter-State co-operation is encouraged. This principle is clearly stated by the TEU, 
which in Art. 29 provides that the area of freedom, security and justice shall be 
achieved, where necessary, through approximation of rules on criminal matters, in 
accordance with Art. 31(e)39.   
 
From these provisions we can deduce that in the TEU:  
 
(a) harmonisation is intended as approximation; 
(b) it refers to substantive criminal law more explicitly than procedural criminal 
law- in particular, to the fields of organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug 
trafficking; 
(c) it is aimed at establishing common minimum rules, therefore leaving the 
Member States free to adapt the remaining rules to their own system. 
 
Approximation in the original spirit of the TEU is therefore an instrument to 
eliminate all the most relevant disparities in the criminal law of the Member States40 
and therefore render a foreign judicial decision more “recognisable” and easier to 
accept.  
 
On the other hand, it could be argued that, just as the EC law principle of 
supremacy41 represents a challenge to sovereignty along a vertical line (relating to 
the relationship between EC institutions and single Member States), so the principle 
                                                 
38 Instead, they have indirect effect. See ECJ C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285. 
39 Art. 31(e) encourages the Member States to adopt progressively measures establishing minimum 
rules relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties in the field of organised 
crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking. The legal instrument designed for the approximation of 
the laws and regulations of the Member States is the Framework Decision as established by Art. 
34(2)(b). 
40 F. M. Tadić, ‘How harmonious can harmonisation be? A theoretical approach towards 
harmonisation of (criminal) law’ in A.Klip, H. van der Wilt (eds.), supra 1 et seq. 
41 ECJ Costa v. E8EL Case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585.  
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of mutual recognition, in civil and, all the more so, in criminal matters is a challenge 
along a horizontal line (relating to the relationship between the States).  
 
Both mutual recognition and approximation acquire a more defined status in the new 
Lisbon Treaty42. The new Treaty empowers the European Parliament and the Council 
to establish minimum rules relating to the definition of criminal offences and 
sanctions in the areas of a number of particularly serious cross-border crimes (Article 
83 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), replacing 
Article 31 TEU). The seriousness of these crimes, justifying a stricter cooperation 
between the Member States, is determined through two criteria: the nature and 
impact of the offences and the need to combat them on a common basis. These 
criteria seem to be quite broad, just as the list of offences to which the norm applies. 
This list is indeed made up of categories of crime (including not only terrorism and 
organised crime but also, for instance, trafficking in human beings, money 
laundering, and computer crime). They are more numerous than in the current TEU 
and have all been subject to approximating measures43.   
 
We can therefore conclude that a means/ends relationship exists between 
approximation and mutual recognition. The former is conceived as a tool to promote 
the development of the latter. Their role and functioning are better defined than in the 
current EU legal landscape and lay the groundwork for an embryonic European 
criminal law. In particular, it should be welcomed that, for the first time, the 
principle of mutual recognition acquires a clear legal basis in the Treaty. This 
development is even more important as far as approximation in procedural criminal 
                                                 
42 Treaty amending the TEU and the TEC, OJ 306 17/12/2007. The Treaty was signed on 13 
December 2007 after the failed approval of the European Constitution (see Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, CIG 87/2/04 Rev 2, Brussels 29 October 2004). It needs to be ratified by all 
27 Member States before entering into force. See also Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), OJ C 115 
9/05/2008.  
43 See, for instance, Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating 
terrorism or the new Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight 
against organised crime, OJ L 300 11/11/2008.  It is worth noting that approximation will be pursued 
by way of a new procedure involving the European Parliament and the Council (i.e. the co-decision 
procedure, renamed “ordinary legislative procedure”) as well as new acts (i.e. directives, rather than 
framework decisions). However, only the Council may by unanimity extend the list, although the 
consent of the Parliament is required. Furthermore, the possibility of approximating criminal laws and 
regulations in other areas is ensured (par. 2 of the same Article).  
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law is concerned, as provided for by Article 82 TFEU. Minimum rules may be 
established by the European Parliament and the Council (once again following the 
ordinary legislative procedure)44.  
 
It must be pointed out that what is provided for here is not full harmonisation, but a 
lower degree. This is why Article 82 TFEU carefully requires respect for the 
differences between the legal traditions and systems of the Member States. 
Politically, this reflects the choice of the Heads of State to opt for the combination 
approximation/mutual recognition and create the basis for a “minimum” European 
criminal law, rather than pursue the radical harmonisation approach45. 
 
The question therefore is whether such a system can effectively guarantee a uniform 
development of the “European judicial space” in any case or whether insoluble 
contrasts between the criminal policies of some Member States may pave the way for 
friction and ultimately undermine the project mentioned above. This is not a purely 
theoretical consideration. Examples may be a disagreement between Sweden and the 
Netherlands in establishing an adequate level of penalties for drug trafficking or in 
qualifying possession of illicit drug as an offence (Dutch drug policy being much 
more permissive than the Swedish one); or failure to reach a compromise as to which 
evidence should be admitted in court (for instance, which value should be given to 
the testimony of an accused in a closely connected trial, to what extent the witness 
should be protected, etc.)46. In order to shed some light on the very essence of this 
system, it is necessary to look at mutual recognition in the broad context of EU and 
                                                 
44 These rules will relate to: mutual admissibility of evidence between Member States; the rights of 
individuals in criminal procedure; the rights of victims of crime; any other aspect of criminal 
procedure (in which case, the Council may act by unanimity vote after the consent of the Parliament).  
45 According to Article 84 TFEU, the European Parliament and the Council may establish measures to 
promote and support the action of Member States in the field of crime prevention, excluding any 
harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. 
46 In both types of approximation a “safeguard clause” (“emergency break”) allows any Member State 
that believes that fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system are affected to request that the 
draft directive be referred to the European Council. In this case the procedure is suspended until the 
decision of the European Council and starts again if within four months a consensus is reached. Where 
consensus is not reached, a mechanism of “enhanced cooperation” is supposed to avoid potential 
stalemates: such mechanism can only be triggered by at least nine countries (currently a third), which 
wish to adopt the directive notwithstanding the opposition of one or more other States. 
 60




2.3 Mutual recognition: rationale and context 
 
 
Outside the specific area of criminal law, the concept of mutual recognition is 
relatively old. In Community law, it was first applied in the area of diplomas and 
professional qualifications and then developed in the internal market law and in the 
area of recognition of civil and commercial matters48. As far as the internal market is 
concerned, after attempts to establish free trade through harmonisation failed, the 
European Court of Justice introduced the principle of mutual recognition in the area 
of free movement of goods in its famous judgment Cassis de Dijon49. In this 
judgment the Court held that products lawfully marketed in one Member State could 
in principle be sold in any other Member State. However, no analogy can be found 
between the internal market and criminal law, mainly because “criminal law 
products” are only “a legal fiction that represents no economic value”50.  
 
Despite this, there is a risk that this principle, when applied to the criminal law 
context, is interpreted in the light of a purely economic/functional approach. This 
postulates an equivalence between “products” and “judicial decisions”, without 
                                                 
47 V. Mitsilegas, 'The Constitutional Implications of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters in the 
EU' (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 1277. 
48 In civil and commercial matters, it all started with the Convention of 27 September 1968 on 
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels Convention), 
at http://curia.europa.eu/common/recdoc/convention/en/c-textes/brux-idx.htm . See D. Boytha, ‘La 
libre circulation des jugements dans l’espace judiciaire européen en matière civile et commerciale’ 
(2006) Revue de Droit de l’Union Européenne 629. Concerning diplomas and professional 
qualifications, see inter alia Council Directive 89/48/EEC of 21 December 1988 (the ‘Diplomas 
Directive’), OJ L19 24/01/1989 and Directive 2005/36/EC of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of 
professional qualifications OJ L 255 30/09/2005. 
49 ECJ Case 120/78 Rewe (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649. The approach adopted afterwards, 
however, was a mixture of mutual recognition and harmonisation. See Commission White Paper 
“Completing the Single Market” COM (85) 310.  
50 A.Klip- ‘European integration and harmonisation and criminal law’ supra 133; see also  S. Peers- 
‘Mutual recognition and criminal law in the European Union: has the Council got it wrong?’ (2004) 
41 Common Market Law Review 23.  
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looking at the legal and cultural background from which the latter derive. The 
following analysis will attempt to view mutual recognition from an ontological 
perspective and locate it in the broad context of European integration.  
 
More generally, mutual recognition can be considered in at least four dimensions: a) 
historically, as a form of cooperation; b) as a conflict rule; c) as a policy option or 
form of governance; d) as a legal principle.  
 
The historical perspective looks at the development of inter-State cooperation in the 
last decades of the past century and carries out a critical analysis of the major 
changes that have occurred51. This approach may be useful to identify possible flaws 
in the process and to understand its legal and political implications, but it does not 
grasp its essence and fails to distinguish the functional from the ontological aspects. 
 
Another option is to view mutual recognition as a conflict rule, which can be used to 
establish criteria determining which rule is to apply to a certain case or which 
competence must be exercised. This perspective focuses on the functional benefits of 
mutual recognition, as a mechanism that fosters legal certainty and reliability. 
Nevertheless, it is probably better for the purpose of this work to identify mutual 
recognition as a form of governance, regulating processes and relationships between 
different actors: in this sense it can be linked to sovereignty and similarity issues52. 
These two aspects are particularly important in the context of cooperation in criminal 
matters.  They are inseparable and interdependent. It has been observed that one 
obvious area where this connection emerges is international law and international 
relations53. In this area diplomatic recognition of States can be seen as emblematic of 
a process which is initially based on binding trust (which raises expectation as to 
                                                 
51 This is what has been done in chapter 1 concerning the area of cooperation in criminal matters. See 
also M.Fichera, ‘Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters from its Creation to the New Developments 
in the Lisbon Treaty’, UACES Seminar Exchanging Ideas on Europe 2008- Rethinking the European 
Union, Edinburgh, 1-3 September 2008, at 
http://www.uaces.org/events/conferences/papers/abstract.php?recordID=22 . 
52 In the same sense M.P. Maduro, ‘So close and yet so far: the paradoxes of mutual recognition’ 
(2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy 814, who however admits the possibility of mutual 
recognition even when there is identity and not only similarity. 
53 K. Nicolaidis, ‘Trusting the Poles? Constructing Europe through mutual recognition’ (2007) 14 
Journal of European Public Policy 682.  
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each other’s behaviour) and becomes constitutive and irreversible: such features can 
be seen as generally applicable to other areas as well54. Indeed, concerning the 
sovereignty link, one could say that State A recognises State B when it accepts State 
B as an equal sovereign. In criminal law, State A accepts the effects of State B’s 
monopoly on the use of force within its territory, as long as: a) State A is allowed to 
produce the same effects outside its territory, and b) this does not conflict with its 
basic values. However, it can be argued that a similar pattern can be traced in more 
traditional forms of cooperation, such as extradition. What makes mutual recognition 
distinctive is therefore its link with similarity, which explains why State sovereignty 
is affected more deeply. I recognise you as my similar. As will be better illustrated 
later, this also means that when mutual recognition operates, there is always at least 
one element of diversity. Legal systems are therefore supposed to become porous, 
malleable. To be sure, there has always been some degree of permeability in inter-
State relations. However, in the case of mutual recognition permeability is such that 
it allows for a higher degree of interaction, in the sense of a more intense reciprocal 
exchange of rights and obligations. The potential implications of the social, cultural 
and legal facets of this interaction have not yet been fully acknowledged.  
 
An optimal system of reciprocal exchanges of rights and obligations should also 
allow for a form of approximation “by default”, based on a bottom-top (and not only 
top-bottom) type of relationship. An informal network of bodies, contact points, 
agencies should be developed in order to facilitate mutual learning and 
understanding. This already occurs to some extent in the Third Pillar55 but more 
efforts are needed. Such development is only possible where the differentiation 
between Member States’ policies and legal systems is not too high56. It can also be 
said that a sufficient degree of similarity is necessary to draw a line between 
members and non-members57, as only those that are “inside” can be recognised. 
However, this necessitates a set of core values. Since one of the main principles 
                                                 
54 K. Nicolaidis, ibid. 693. 
55 See e.g. Council Decision 2008/976/JHA of 16 December 2008 on the European Judicial Network, 
OJ L 348 24/12/2008. 
56 M.P. Maduro, ‘So close and yet so far: the paradoxes of mutual recognition’ supra 823. 
57 J. Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory (2000 The MIT Press) 203. 
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laying the foundations of the EU is the protection of human rights, this set of values 
must be constitutionally defined. We shall see in a later chapter what this involves58.  
 
Suffice it to consider here that the system designed in the Third Pillar inevitably 
impacts on how a particular legal/political community is formed at the national 
level59. One may wonder however what right EU institutions or other Member States 
have to affect so deeply the structure and functioning of a community. The 
combination of mutual recognition and approximation could effectively lead, as 
noted in the previous section, to the imposition of a minimum punishment threshold 
to at least a few States, regardless of what their particular policy is. There is therefore 
a problem of legitimacy, which is exacerbated by the concerns relating to the EU 
democratic deficit. One could imagine two patterns of mutual 
recognition/approximation: a “coercive pattern” and an “informal pattern”. The first 
implies the formal establishment of a legal framework within a pre-determined 
system of cooperation; the second is developed “by default”, through the bottom-top 
approach mentioned above. In a context in which it is not (yet) possible to locate one 
single monopoly on the use of force in European Criminal Law, a combination of the 
two patterns is probably the best option. 
 
Indeed the instruments of mutual recognition adopted so far have undermined the 
State’s monopoly of the right to adjudicate and punish. Although this has not led to 
“unregulated competition” (to use a market analogy), there is a growing need for 
clear rules on the conditions for the exercise of these competing powers and parallel 
sovereignties.  It is not only a question of identifying, for instance, rules on conflicts 
of jurisdiction. Since, as indicated above, there is a legitimacy issue, one has to look 
more thoroughly into the essence of mutual recognition. 
 
This is why it is necessary to consider the fourth dimension of mutual recognition, as 
a (constitutionally embedded) legal principle. The reason is that we need grounds for 
upholding the cooperation mechanisms. In this regard, it could be argued that mutual 
recognition cannot be brought to its extreme consequences. What currently happens 
                                                 
58 See infra, chapter 6. 
59 M.P. Maduro, ‘So close and yet so far: the paradoxes of mutual recognition’ supra 819. 
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is that a given system of values is required to recognise as equivalent not merely 
single acts but the values and fundamental features of another system as a whole.60 
However, because no system of values is identical, we can never have full 
recognition. If system X were to recognise the whole of system Y, this would mean 
that they were identical, but in that case there would be no need for recognition, 
because there would be no difference: we would instead have harmonisation. As a 
result, mutual recognition can never be absolute, but can only operate under pre-
defined conditions that presuppose diversity.  
 
The first three dimensions referred to above (form of cooperation, conflict rule, form 
of governance) assume that the actors (which are also seen as beneficiaries) are 
perfectly rational and make choices with a view to achieving a common goal, be it 
more efficient cooperation, implicit harmonisation etc. However, this assertion 
cannot be automatically accepted and must be proved: hence the need for a rational 
justification of their behaviour, which must be found outside that behaviour. 
Furthermore, those three dimensions focus on States, rather than their citizens. This 
is surprising, given the general trend of international law towards attributing to 
individuals the quality of “subject”. This is important also because the EU has been 
recently re-defining its identity as an autonomous legal order in international law, 
based on the rule of law, protection of human rights and effective judicial review61. 
As opposed to those three dimensions, mutual recognition as a legal principle (which 
relies on the liberal assumption that there is no best system) is linked to the principle 
of legality and the rights of the individual vis-à-vis State authority, which can 
provide justification in the area of criminal matters. However, exploring the 
implications of this principle highlights the main flaws of the current system: this 
dimension has not developed as it should have.  
 
Let us suppose that one Member State decides to criminalise participation in some 
environmental groups protesting vehemently against some government measures 
                                                 
60 S. Lavenex, ‘Mutual recognition and the monopoly of force: limits of the single market analogy’ 
(2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy 762, 765.  
61 See e.g. ECJ Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Al Barakaat 
International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities (3 September 2008). 
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(and/or to freeze their assets etc.). The new law is considered compatible with the 
national constitution in view of the need to protect public order or national security. 
Since there is no prosecutorial discretion, the competent authorities must issue an 
EAW for the purposes of prosecution (or a request for assets freezing etc.). Should 
the executing State accept this request? The Framework Decisions on mutual 
recognition do not offer any clear and binding guideline in such cases, since all 
relevant provisions are contained in their Preambles, with the exception of the 
Framework Decision on the EAW, whose Article 1 (3) mentions the need to respect 
fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as established in Article 6 
TEU62. However, although one can refer to the general principles of the EU, 
including the principle of proportionality, there is nothing (even in the text of Article 
1) that can oblige a Member State’s judicial authority to refuse a request in any 
specific circumstance of breach of individual rights. In the case of an EAW, it is 
possible to refer to the classic extradition principles and deny surrender in case of a 
flagrant denial of human rights63, but in borderline cases there is no ultimate 
authority that has the last word. Moreover, there is a risk of “politicising” some 
delicate issues, which should be taken into account. This potentially leads to 
differential treatment in the EU as well as accountability concerns: how can EU 
institutions and national governments justify the implementation of mutual 






Concluding, one may wonder whether mutual recognition both as a form of 
governance and as a legal principle is the way forward for building up the project of 
a European criminal law. Certainly, cooperation in criminal matters as shaped by 
new pieces of legislation and case law (not only at the European, but also at the 
national level), is far from featuring the classic elements of national criminal law, in 
                                                 
62 See infra, chapter 6. 
63 Ibid.  
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particular sufficient safeguards of individual rights and monopoly on the use of force 
originating from a single, well-defined source64. While this second aspect may be 
appropriately adapted to the EU entity (whether or not in line with a federalising 
aim), and is therefore open to derogations and flexible solutions, the first aspect 
needs to be handled with much more care. One of the main reasons is that a lack of 
adequate provisions for instance on the rights of the defence risks undermining 
mutual trust, thus triggering a self-destructive vicious circle. 
 
The consolidation of mutual recognition in its “new” form, while imposing a pure 
obligation to execute upon the States, still has to cope with problems of definition 
and a variable number of grounds for refusal, which highlights a limit to smooth 
cooperation and mutual trust. This does not mean that mutual recognition should 
operate in the same way at all times. Rather, it will need to adapt to the specific 
features of each single instrument. 
 
More fundamentally, there is a problem of legitimacy and coherence that will still be 
evident in the Lisbon Treaty scenario, in which the Third Pillar and the First Pillar 
will be merged. However, leaving aside the question of EU competence in criminal 
law, it emerges from the analysis carried out above that there is a pressing need for 
more approximation both from the substantive and procedural point of view and that 
the approach through which mutual recognition has been conceived and implemented 
is far from uniform. 
 
The way EU criminal policy will be shaped in the future will determine the way the 
EU wants to view itself and appear to its citizens. What is therefore the added value 
of mutual recognition in this context? It could certainly be considered as a move 
from a notion of legal and social order based on vertical, hierarchical structures to a 
horizontal, network-like order, which is generated by interactions and mutual 
exchanges. One may wonder whether or not this needs an over-arching authority. As 
repeatedly mentioned, one of the consequences of such a move is that sovereignty 
tends to be increasingly diffused. There has indeed been a trend in some regions of 
                                                 
64 One could talk more about a coordination of national systems rather than a distinct system per se. 
See M. Fletcher, R. Lööf, B. Gilmore, EU Criminal Law and Justice (Edward Elgar 2008) 108. 
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the world to shift the source of decisions away from single entities (States) and 
national legislative bodies towards executive or quasi-executive bodies which are 
located at a considerable distance from the people. This phenomenon should be 
examined more carefully in the area of criminal law in the EU and a process of 
intense constitutionalisation should be carried out more decisively. This does not 
necessarily include a debate on the federalisation of the EU, but may involve an 
analysis of what type of “behavioural expectations”65 are stabilised by the 
redistribution of sovereignty on the premise of mutual trust.  
 
The following chapters will use the EAW experience as evidence that much still 
needs to be done in the direction of coherence, legitimacy and effectiveness of the 
new system.  
 
It is to be hoped that the legal framework provided by the Lisbon Treaty will be the 
starting point in a common effort to re-adjust European cooperation in penal matters.
                                                 
65 J. Habermas, The Divided West (Polity Press, Cambridge 2006) 130.  
 68







The purpose of this chapter is to explain the political and legal reasons for the 
adoption of the Framework Decision on the EAW. It will demonstrate that this 
instruments was not conceived out of the blue, but is the product of some reflection 
within the European institutions. However, it will also show that the current version 
of the EAW has been strongly influenced by the anti-terrorism agenda of the Western 
governments at the beginning of the 21st century. 
 
 
3.1  The trend towards simplified forms of extradition 
 
 
The simplification of extradition has been a constant feature in the development of 
judicial cooperation mechanisms across the world.  Regional and sub-regional 
arrangements have been concluded since the 1950s: some of them are characterised 
by the relaxation of one or more of the main principles of classic extradition law. 
This is particularly evident in the Nordic Extradition Scheme as well as in the 
Australia-New Zealand and Ireland-UK backing of warrants systems1. These cases 
                                                 
1 On the Nordic Extradition Agreement, see the website of the Swedish Government: 
www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/2710/a/15435;jsessionid=aJiWcTLGMrY ; on the Australia-New Zealand 
backing of warrants, see A new extradition system. A review of Australia’s extradition law and 
practice- Federal Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth of Australia, 2005; on the Ireland-
UK backing of warrants, see J.R. Spencer, ‘The European Arrest Warrant’ (2003) 6 The Cambridge 
Yearbook of European legal studies 201; P. Jackson, ‘Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 
1965’ (1966) 29/2 The Modern Law Review 186. Another form of surrender is “interstate rendition” or 
“interstate extradition”, which is internal to some federal systems, such as Australia or the United 
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present some embryonic elements of what now is the EAW (and its Nordic 
counterpart, the Nordic Arrest Warrant). The first one operated without the 
requirement of dual criminality: it was enough that the act was punishable in the 
requesting State; moreover, no assessment of guilt was made by the requested State, 
although the decision on the basis of which the extradition was sought (indicating the 
existence of probable cause for suspicion) was to be sent to the competent authority. 
All these schemes are mostly based on direct contact between the judicial authorities 
(or the police authorities in the Australia-New Zealand backing of warrants) and the 
reduction of the role of the executive. The geographical proximity and the deep 
legal/political similarities of these countries were the background that made it 
possible to create these “heterodox” examples of surrender. 
 
In Europe, back in 1989 the Member States had already agreed to simplify the forms 
of transmission with the so-called “Fax Agreement”: that was a first step towards the 
right direction2. However, after the failure of the 1995 and 1996 Conventions (which 
attempted to simplify extradition procedures) and the proclamation of the principle of 
mutual recognition of judicial decisions at Tampere3, new (bilateral) agreements 
were struck as the expression of a general effort to go beyond classic extradition and 
its main shortcomings. There was indeed a pressing need to contrast the new forms 
of crime that were quickly developing together with technological, economic and 
also cultural progress.  
 
These agreements were the Treaty between the Italian Republic and the Kingdom of 
Spain on the prosecution of serious offences (the Italy-Spain Treaty) and the 
analogous Treaty between the Kingdom of Spain and United Kingdom (the UK-
                                                                                                                                          
States. See e.g. section 51 (xxiv) of the Australian Constitution as well as (inter alia) sections 82 and 
83 of the Service and Execution of Act 1992; Article 4 (2) US Constitution. 
2 Acuerdo entre los Estados Miembros de las Comunidades Europeas relativo a la simplificación y a la 
modernización de las formas de transmisión de las solicitudes de extradición, Donostia-San Sebastián, 
Spain, 26 May 1989- Boletín Oficial del Estado 17/05/1995. The agreement introduced a system of 
transmission of requests for extradition by fax.  
3 Tampere European Council (15-16 October 1999) Presidency Conclusions, available at 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/tam_en.htm.  
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Spain Treaty)4. It is interesting to observe that the first one was concluded before the 
events of 9/11, while the second one dates back to just after5.  
 
The Italy-Spain Treaty is based on the two States’ “confidence in the structure and 
functioning of their respective judicial systems and in their ability to ensure a fair 
trial”, as mentioned in the Preamble. In a Joint Declaration of the Ministers for 
Justice of the two countries, signed in Madrid on 20 July 2000, Italy and Spain had 
already expressed their intention to create “(…) a common area of freedom, security 
and justice between the two countries to guarantee, through mutual assistance, the 
exercise of the rights and freedoms of citizens, with the removal of any obstacles or 
impediments that might give rise to areas of impunity within their territory”6. The 
main reason behind the ratification of this Treaty was the need to facilitate 
extradition from Spain to Italy of Italian citizens charged in absentia, in particular 
with crimes connected to mafia-related activities.7 
 
The Parties declare they are both inspired by the principles laid down by the 
European Convention for the Protection on Human Rights, refer explicitly to the 
Tampere European Council and fix as their objective the creation of an area of 
freedom, security and justice, in line with Article 29 TEU. All this makes it clear that 
the Treaty anticipates the measures on mutual recognition that the European Union 
would start implementing in the following years. The Treaty is thus the first clear 
example of the application of mutual recognition as imagined in Tampere. Its scope 
is restricted to some critical areas, as the Parties agree to eliminate extradition 
                                                 
4 Treaty between the Italian Republic and the Kingdom of Spain on the prosecution of serious 
offences without the need for extradition in a common area of justice, Brussels, 15 December 2000, 
Council Document 14643/00 COPEN 85; Tratado entre el Reino de España y el Reino Unido de Gran 
Bretaña e Irlanda del Norte relativo a la entrega judicial acelerada para delitos graves en un espacio 
común de justicia, Madrid, 23 November 2001, in Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales, Serie A, N. 
313 7 junio de 2002.  
5 A similar agreement was in the process of being struck between Spain and France in the same 
period. See España pide a Francia un acuerdo para la entrega de terroristas sin extradición- El País, 
01/02/2001.  
6 Italy-Spain Treaty, supra, Preamble.  
7 See Relazione del Ministero della Giustizia sul Disegno di legge recante: "Ratifica ed esecuzione del 
Trattato tra la Repubblica italiana e il Regno di Spagna per il perseguimento di gravi reati attraverso il 
superamento dell'estradizione in uno spazio di giustizia comune, fatto a Roma il 28 novembre 2000, 
nonché norme di adeguamento interno",  available at 
http://www.giustizia.it/dis_legge/relazioni/trat_Italia_spagna_relazione.htm                                       
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procedures “ (…) for the serious offences of terrorism, organised crime, drug 
trafficking, trafficking in human beings, sexual abuse of minors and illegal arms 
trafficking”8. This list reflects the areas of crime which were felt as more urgent to 
tackle as both countries are at the centre of the main trafficking routes where 
European and non-European organised criminal groups operate9.  
 
The UK-Spain Treaty follows a similar pattern and the Preamble is identical. 
However, the scope of application seems to be broader. First of all, Article 2 refers to 
judicial decisions, a term which includes something more than “criminal convictions 
and court orders”. Indeed, Article 2 (2) specifies that by judicial decision it is meant 
any detention order, criminal sentence, enforcement decision or any other decision 
having the same effect and issued in the requested State with the purpose of 
detaining the sought person and surrendering him or her to the requesting State. 
 
Secondly, there is no limitation to specific areas of crime. Potentially, the Treaty 








As has been observed, “Surely the uncertainty of the danger belongs to the essence of 
terrorism. (…) In Israel people at least know what can happen to them if they take a 
bus, go into a department store, discotheque, or any open area—and how frequently it 
happens. In the U.S.A. or Europe one cannot circumscribe the risk; there is no 
                                                 
8 Italy-Spain Treaty, supra, Preamble. 
9 See e.g. G. Turone, Il delitto di associazione mafiosa (2nd ed. Giuffré Milano 2008); J. L. De la 
Cuesta, ‘Organised Crime Control Policies in Spain: A Disorganised Criminal Policy for Organised 
Crime’, in C. Fijnaut, L. Paoli (eds.) Organised Crime in Europe: concepts, patterns and control 
policies in the European Union and beyond (Springer, Dordrecht 2004) 795.  
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realistic way to estimate the type, magnitude, or probability of the risk, nor any way 
to narrow down the potentially affected regions”10.  
The 9/11 attacks to the Twin Towers were followed by an unprecedented political 
pressure for new and effective measures in the fight against the terrorist threat. To be 
sure, the need to forge new mechanisms of cooperation had already convinced 
European countries to initiate a Programme of mutual recognition since the end of 
the 90s11. It is not surprising in this context that global action against terrorism was 
considered a priority. The European Union expressed its solidarity with the US 
population and the first emotional reactions turned soon into a common sense of 
unity and the urgency to act promptly12.  
 
It should be pointed out that, at least at the beginning, the very purpose of the 
drafters of the first documents of the mutual recognition agenda was not clear. As 
mentioned in a previous chapter, in the 2000 Programme on Mutual Recognition13, 
priority rating 1 was accorded to two instruments: one on mutual recognition of 
decisions on the freezing of evidence and another on mutual recognition of orders to 
freeze assets; the adoption of an arrest warrant was only given priority rating 2 and 
was only limited to the most serious offences mentioned in Art. 29 TEU, i.e. 
terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings and offences against children, 
trafficking in weapons, corruption and fraud14. Other draft documents in the same 
year show uncertainty as to which approach should be followed.  
 
                                                 
10 G. Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques 
Derrida (University of Chicago Press 2003) 27 (Interview with J. Habermas).  
11 See supra chapter 1 p.8 et seq. 
12 On the implications of this see M. Byers, ‘Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law After 
11 September’, (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 401. See also B. Gilmore, 
‘The Twin Towers and the Third Pillar: Some Security Agenda Developments’, EUI Working Paper 
n. 2003/7.  
13 Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal 
matters, OJ C 12/02 15/01/2001. 
14 On this, see also European Union Strategy for the Beginning of the New Millennium, OJ C 124, 
03/05/2000, whose recommendation n.28 specified that consideration should be given to the long-
term (rather than short-term) possibility of the creation of a single European legal area for extradition. 
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The main options were: “pure” or “absolute” mutual recognition (which was 
supported mainly by the UK government15), including only formal grounds for non-
execution and/or applied to a limited number of “serious” offences; approximation 
through the “minimum maximum” method and mutual recognition beyond this 
threshold. The option of complete harmonisation was rejected because it was not 
considered realistic in the short term. There were a considerable number of problems 
concerning the definition of “serious” offences, the scope of mutual recognition, the 
list of offences to which mutual recognition was to be applied, and the grounds for 
refusal. The first was dealt with by using a parameter to define the “seriousness” of 
an offence: the “minimum maximum” penalty threshold. Sometimes the list of 
offences included drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, money laundering, 
fraud and participation in a criminal organisation (therefore excluding terrorism- 
which confirms that political priorities were quite different at that time), some other 
times it included counterfeiting of the euro and corruption rather than participation in 
a criminal organisation.  
 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack on the Twin Towers, political pressure 
changed direction and, as a result, the adoption of the European Arrest Warrant was 
prioritised over any other measure. At the same time, a remarkably different list of 
offences was elaborated in the mutual recognition documents. This list was much 
broader than the previous ones and included not only offences for which an 
approximation measure had already been adopted16, but also a number of offences 
for which there was (and there is) no common definition at the European level17. In 
order to partly deal with this “anomaly”, a double-track approach was adopted: the 
double criminality requirement was lifted for those offences, but it was kept for all 
the crimes falling outside the list (although this list is not exhaustive and may be 
                                                 
15 The very idea of mutual recognition came from a British proposal (which opposed complete 
harmonisation). See Cardiff European Council (15-16 June 1998) Presidency Conclusions, at 
http://europa.eu/european_council/conclusions/index_en.htm  and also H. Nilsson, ‘Mutual Trust and 
Mutual Recognition of Our Differences, a Personal View’, in G. de Kerchove, A. Weyembergh (eds.) 
La reconnaissance mutuelle des décisions judiciaires pénales dans l'Union européenne (Brussels 
Editions ULB 2001) 155. 
16 In particular terrorism (the corresponding Framework Decision was adopted on the same day as the 
EAW: see Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, OJ L 
164, 22/06/2002), but also drug trafficking, money laundering, counterfeiting of euro, trafficking in 
human beings, fraud against the European Communities, organised crime. 
17 Examples include murder, extortion and racketeering, swindling. 
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extended by the Council); more grounds for refusal were included than in the 
previous drafts18. Thus the combination of mutual recognition and approximation 
through the “minimum maximum” method seems to be the result of a compromise 
between the different approaches that Member States intended to pursue19.  It is 
interesting to observe that a similar yet reduced version of the list can be found in 
Articles 40 and 41 of the Schengen Convention (CISA)20 in the chapter on police 
cooperation, which provide for special rules on surveillance and hot pursuit without 
the need for prior authorisation in urgent cases. Some categories of offences can only 
be found in this list (as in the case of aggravated burglary or illicit transportation of 
toxic and hazardous waste), some others are missing (as in the case of organised 
crime or terrorism). A similar list is also contained in Article 2 of the 1995 Europol 
Convention and related Annex. No reference is made to organised crime as such. 
However, the new proposal reproduces exactly the list to which the EAW applies21.  
 
The idea that extradition should be replaced by an arrest warrant, characterised by 
the elimination of the double criminality requirement, came (once again) from the 
                                                 
18 On these drafts, see inter alia Council Document 6522/00 of 2 March 2000; Doc. 5126/01 of 2 
February 2001; OJ C 075 07/03/2001; Doc. 6552/02 of 22 February 2002. 
19 On the birth of the European Arrest Warrant and, more in general, of mutual recognition 
instruments, see also N.Keijzer, ‘The European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision between Past and 
Future’, in E.Guild (ed.)- Constitutional Challenges to the European Arrest Warrant, (Wolf Legal 
Publishers Nijmegen 2006) (hereinafter N. Keijzer A); V. Mitsilegas, ‘The Constitutional Implications 
of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters in the EU’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 1277; 
S. Peers, ‘Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law in the European Union: Has the Council Got it 
Wrong?’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 5; S. Alegre, M.Leaf, ‘Mutual Recognition in 
European Judicial Cooperation: A Step Too Far Too Soon? Case Study- The European Arrest 
Warrant’ (2004) 10 European Law Journal 200; W.Gilmore, The EU Framework Decision on the 
European Arrest Warrant (2002) 3 ERA-FORUM 144.  
20 Convention of 19 June 1990 implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the 
governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, OJ L 239 22/09/2000 as 
amended by EC Regulation n. 1160/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 191 
22/07/2003. The list includes the following offences: murder, manslaughter, rape, arson, forgery of 
money, aggravated burglary and robbery and receiving stolen goods, extortion, kidnapping and 
hostage taking, trafficking in human beings, illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances, breach of the laws on arms and explosives, wilful damage through the use of explosives, 
illicit transportation of toxic and hazardous waste. 
21 Convention based on Article K3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the Establishment of a 
European Police Office OJ C 316 27/11/1995; Proposal for a Council Decision establishing the 
European Police Office, Brussels, 20/12/2006, COM (2006) 817 final; consolidated text, Brussels, 10 
April 2008 Doc. 8296/08. 
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UK government22. On 21 September 2001, the members of the European Council 
gathered at an extraordinary session to stress once and for all their intention to 
cooperate with the US and to set out the guidelines of an action plan against 
terrorism23.  Key elements of this action plan were the introduction of the EAW and 
the adoption of a common definition of terrorism. As the Conclusions of the Meeting 
pointed out, it was felt that extradition procedures did not “(…) reflect the level of 
integration and confidence between Member States of the European Union”.  
The proposal for the Framework Decision had in fact been prepared by the European 
Commission and presented on 19 September, together with the other proposal for a 
Framework Decision on combating terrorism24. This occurred – it is worth 
mentioning - only 8 days after the attack on the US.  It seems that before this attack it 
was anyway planned that the proposal should be adopted on 26 September25.   
The European Council also called upon the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council 
to refine the proposal on the EAW “as a matter of urgency and at the latest at its 
meeting on 6 and 7 December 2001”. At the same time, it urged it to implement “as 
quickly as possible” the Tampere measures on mutual recognition. The JHA Council 
had already identified these priorities on 20 September26. It is interesting to observe 
that the Conclusions of the JHA Council focused very much on the “handing over” 
of “perpetrators of terrorist attacks” and “the need to overcome the requirement of 
double criminality in terrorist cases”; the entry into force of the two Conventions on 
extradition was still considered possible by 1 January 2002. The initial goal had in 
fact been to make use of a specific fast-track surrender procedure (following the 
model of the previous bilateral Treaties) and to eliminate “traditional” extradition 
                                                 
22 Note from UK Delegation to K4 Committee, 7090/99 29 March 1999. Indeed, the UK has 
experience of a similar mechanism: the “backing of warrants”. See supra p.68.  
23 Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 September 
2001, SN 140/01.  
24 Draft Framework Decision on combating terrorism, Brussels, 19/9/2001, COM (2001) 521 final ; 
Draft Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between the 
Member States, Brussels, 19/9/2001, COM (2001) 522 final (although a slightly revised version is 
dated 25/9/2001). 
25 Information obtained by interviews with EU officials. 
26 Conclusions adopted by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs), Brussels, 20 September 2001, Doc. 
12156/01, 25/9/2001.  
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only in the long term27. This was in line with the initial idea of applying this 
procedure only to convicted criminals, and not also suspects28. By way of contrast, 
the Conclusions of the European Council the day after referred to the handing over of 
“wanted persons” (i.e. a broader term), and to the replacement of the whole system of 
extradition. It was therefore a more ambitious project that pushed for a radical 
change. That is why at the same time the need to protect fundamental rights and 
freedoms was carefully stressed. This different approach was to be stressed again at 
an informal meeting of the European Council in Ghent on 16 October, where the 
Heads of State and Government declared their determination to abolish double 
criminality “for a wide range of actions”29.  
The proposal of the European Commission drew on the previous Conventions on 
extradition and mutual assistance and the bilateral Treaties (both Italy-Spain and UK-
Spain). However, it proposed the creation of an instrument which was both complex 
and innovative. Although it was not yet the final version, it already featured the main 
elements of the EAW as we now know it. The EAW was defined in Article 3 as a 
“request, issued by a judicial authority of a Member State, and addressed to any other 
Member States, for assistance in searching, arresting, detaining and obtaining the 
surrender of a person, who has been subject to a judgement or a judicial decision 
(…)”. This was a somewhat broader definition than the one contained in the final 
version and even in the Italy-Spain and UK-Spain Treaties. It was conceived not as a 
judicial decision but as a request for assistance (which recalls the language of the 
2000 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters: indeed, surrender for 
investigative purposes was included). The purpose was to merge the two phases of 
the traditional extradition procedure: the provisional arrest warrant and the request 
for extradition. More precisely, the actual EAW was split up into four actions 
(search, arrest, detention and surrender), the first three of which characterised the 
classical arrest warrant in the extradition Conventions. What is more, search and 
                                                 
27 See e.g. European Union Strategy for the Beginning of the New Millennium, supra, note 14. 
28 According to point 35 of the Tampere Conclusions, supra chapter 1 p.8, extradition should be 
abolished “(…) as far as persons are concerned who are fleeing from justice after having been finally 
sentenced.”  
29 Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of the European Union and the President of the 
Commission, Follow-up to the September 11 attacks and the fight against terrorism, Brussels, 19 
October 2001, SN 4296/2/01.  
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arrest could not be refused on grounds of double criminality, extraterritoriality, 
amnesty and immunity30. On the other hand, detention was the object of an 
autonomous decision (Article 14): the executing judicial authority could in such case 
provisionally release the arrested person if it believed that he or she would not 
escape, continue to commit offences or destroy evidence, and if the person undertook 
to remain available for the execution of the EAW. 
Both the requirement of double criminality and the speciality principle were 
eliminated. However, the change was not complete. Concerning double criminality, 
each Member State had the option of setting up a “negative list” for which it declared 
in advance its intention to refuse execution on the grounds that it would be contrary 
to fundamental principles of its legal system (Article 27). In addition, where the 
issuing State exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction (i.e. for offences which did not 
occur, at least in part, on its territory), the executing State could still apply double 
criminality (Article 28). The “negative list” mechanism was created in order to allow 
Member States to exclude from the new system those offences which they 
considered appropriate to decriminalise. Examples include drug possession and use, 
euthanasia and abortion. It also made it possible to take into account the minimum 
age for criminal liability31. As far as speciality was concerned, Article 41 still 
maintained the principle for the offences included in the “negative list”, as well as for 
cases of extraterritoriality or amnesty.  
Direct contact was established between judicial authorities (Article 7) and provisions 
were included on the use of the Schengen Information System (SIS, Articles 8-9). 
Strict time limits were provided for. The 90-day limit on the decision to execute was 
taken from the Italy-Spain Treaty (Article 20). The date for the surrender could be 
agreed upon by the authorities, although it was 20 days in specific cases, e.g. when 
the arrested person gives his consent (Article 23).  
The Proposal distinguished between grounds for non-execution of the arrest warrant 
and grounds for refusal to surrender (thus following the two-phase procedure 
                                                 
30 See Draft Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant, supra note 24, Explanatory 
Memorandum.  
31 Ibid.  
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mentioned above). They were limited, although more numerous than in the Italy-
Spain and UK-Spain Treaties. Grounds for non-execution (Articles 26-32) included, 
apart from the exceptional cases in which dual criminality could be used: ne bis in 
idem, amnesty, immunity and lack of necessary information. The first applied in two 
cases: where the executive judicial authority passed final judgement and where it 
decided either not to institute or to terminate proceedings in respect of the offence 
which the EAW referred to. The second applied whenever the executing Member 
State was competent to prosecute the offence under its own criminal law. Limitation 
periods (which were a ground for refusal under the 1996 Convention on extradition) 
were not considered. Immunity was included as a result of the “judicialisation” of the 
surrender, as in the conventional extradition procedure this was a matter for the 
executive. The provision was taken from the Italy-Spain Treaty. Finally, execution 
could be refused if the EAW did not contain important information such as the 
identity of the requested person, the issuing judicial authority, the nature of the 
judgement, the nature and legal classification of the offence and the description of 
the circumstances in which the offence was committed. Concerning the grounds for 
refusal, Articles 33-34 referred to the principle of integration and the system of 
videoconference. The executing authority was allowed to refuse execution if the 
requested person was believed to have better possibilities of reintegration in the 
executing Member State and he or she consented to serve the sentence there. 
Similarly, surrender for the purpose of trial could become superfluous if a 
videoconference mechanism could be used and both States accepted it. The 2000 
Convention on Mutual Assistance clearly served as a model in this case.  
Among the so-called “special cases”, apart from situations in which EAWs were 
issued on the basis of judgements in absentia (which required a new hearing of the 
case) and of execution conditional on return to the executing Member State, the 
Proposal included the possibility to request assurance by the issuing State that the 
sentence of life imprisonment would not be carried out (Article 37). Indeed, Portugal 
had attached a declaration in this sense to the 1996 Convention. Curiously, no trace 
of this Article can be found in the final version of the proposal. Another special case 
was the deferment of execution on humanitarian grounds, if it was believed that the 
person’s life or health were in danger for age, health or other humanitarian reasons 
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(Article 38). This provision too would not survive the negotiations. Deferment of 
surrender and multiple requests were also regulated (Article 39-40).  
As already mentioned, agreement on the number of offences to be considered and, 
more generally, on the scope of application of mutual recognition was not easy to 
obtain. Regarding more specifically the EAW, the negotiation was mainly focused on 
the issues of double criminality, nationality exception, rule of speciality, grounds for 
refusal, time limits and rights of the defence32. The elimination tout court of double 
criminality, proposed by the Commission and supported by, among others, Spain and 
the UK, was considered to be too extreme by a number of other Member States. This 
is the reason why, on 31 October, the Belgian Presidency came up with a 
compromise: a list of offences for which double criminality was excluded and a list 
of other offences for which it still applied (i.e. offences against public decency and 
sexuality, offences against the freedom of expression and association, abortion and 
euthanasia)33. The Italian Government pushed for a restricted list of six offences, 
reproducing those mentioned in the Italy-Spain Treaty. It is worth noting that it was 
decided to focus on categories of offences, rather than specific crimes, in order to 
leave to Member States some discretion at the moment of the transposition of the 
Framework Decision in their national legal systems. As will be seen later in this 
work, this is exactly one of the main objections to the EAW. 
Some important changes were ultimately made to the Commission proposal, also as a 
consequence of amendments by the European Parliament34. The number of grounds 
for refusal was increased and speciality was reintroduced. The purposes of the EAW 
were restricted to conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial 
sentence or detention order. The videoconferencing mechanism was eliminated. As 
we will see later, the abolition of nationality as a ground for refusal was in the end 
not complete. The rights to free assistance of legal counsel and of an interpreter (in 
case of lack of adequate means to pay them) were not retained.  
                                                 
32 For more details on this, see N. Keijzer A, supra 20-23.  
33 See Document 13425/01, 31 October 2001.  
34 See e.g. European Parliament Report on the Commission proposal for a Council Framework 
Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between the Member States 
(COM(2001) 522 – C5-0453/2001 – 2001/0215(CNS)), 14 November 2001 (‘Watson Report’).  
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On 6 and 7 December the proposal was submitted to the JHA Council and political 
agreement on the Framework Decision was in the end reached before the Laeken 
European Council35. The Italian Government backed down on 11 December 2001, 
after having initially stated it would not support the proposal36. On 13 June 2002, the 
Framework Decision was formally adopted by the EU Council of Ministers, just nine 
months after the terrorist attack planned by Al-Qaeda. 
 
3.3 General features of the European Arrest Warrant. A new 
creature or a hybrid?  
 
The EAW as it is currently understood is a judicial decision by which one Member 
State (i.e. the State of issue37) requests another (i.e. the State of execution) for the 
arrest and surrender of a person who is permanently or temporarily in the latter. The 
reasons for the adoption of this measure are either the prosecution of the person 
concerned or the execution of a custodial sentence or a detention order. It is issued 
when the person whose return is sought is accused of an offence for which the law 
establishes a maximum of at least one year in prison, or when the person has already 
been sentenced to a prison term of at least four months38.   
The EAW is regarded as the first and most important measure in the field of 
European criminal law for the purpose of implementation of the principle of mutual 
recognition of judicial decisions and pre-trial orders39. It was introduced in the 
European Union in 2002 following point 35 of the Conclusions of the Tampere 
                                                 
35 Laeken European Council (14-15 December 2001) Presidency Conclusions, at 
http://europa.eu/european_council/conclusions/index_en.htm  in particular point 17, which hails the 
EAW as a decisive step in the fight against terrorism. 
36 Berlusconi urged to support Europe-wide arrest warrant, The Observer, 9 December 2001; Italy U-
turn on arrest warrant, BBC News, 11 December 2001 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1704168.stm. See also infra, chapter 5 p.147 et seq. 
37 The expressions “State of issue”, “issuing State” or “requesting State” and, correspondingly, “State 
of execution”, “executing State” or “requested State” will be used indifferently hereinafter.  
38 Article 2 (1) Council Framework Decision, supra.  
39 G. De Kerchove and A. Weyembergh (eds), La Reconnaissance Mutuelle des Décisions Judiciaires 
Pénales dans l’Union Européenne, (Brussels Editions ULB 2001). 
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European Council of 15-16 October 199940 (aiming at abolishing the formal 
extradition procedure among the Member States of the European Union). 
The purpose underlying the adoption of the EAW was (as explicitly mentioned in 
recital 5 of the Preamble) the abolition of the extradition procedure and its 
replacement by “a system of surrender between judicial authorities”, in the name of 
free movement of judicial decisions in criminal matters. This statement suggests that 
the traditional principles of extradition no longer apply. True, the EAW can still be 
viewed in the context of the evolution of the European model. It certainly is not a 
simple surrender41, but, in its very substance and purpose, is not extradition either.  
 
The European model42 is indeed an interesting example of how the political, cultural 
and geographical ties among certain countries can forge long-established extradition 
procedures so as to adapt them to the specific needs of a regional or sub-regional 
area. The ever closer relationships of European countries determined a gradual 
abolition of traditional bars and caveat and a parallel simplification of procedures, as 
an effect of the growing Member States’ confidence in each other’s legal system43 - a 
concept that has now been developed into “mutual trust” as a precondition to mutual 
recognition.  
 
The EAW is situated at the end of this process of transformation. However, as 
already mentioned, its applicability is restricted to acts punishable by the law of the 
State of issue by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at 
                                                 
40 See supra note 3. 
41 Some authors believe that the “surrender” as a form of international cooperation in criminal matters 
differs from “extradition” mainly because it operates between a State and an international criminal 
tribunal, rather than between States. See M.Plachta., ‘European Arrest Warrant: revolution in 
extradition?’ (2003) 11 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 178. 
However, other forms of surrender between States do exist: see supra p.77-78. See also Z. Deen-
Racsmany, ‘The European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender of Nationals Revisited: The Lessons of 
Constitutional Challenges’ (2006) 14 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice, 2006 271; O. Lagodny, ‘Extradition without a granting procedure: the concept of surrender’, 
in R. Blextoon, W. van Ballegooij (eds.), Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant (The Hague 
2005) 39. 
42 M.Mackarel, S.Nash, ‘Extradition and the European Union’ (1997) 46 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 948.  
43 See to this regard Preamble to the 1996 Convention relating to extradition between the Member 
States of the EU, OJ C 313 , 23/10/1996: “The High Contracting Parties (…)EXPRESSING their 
confidence in the structure and operation of their judicial systems and in the ability of all Member 
States to ensure a fair trial (…)”. 
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least 12 months or, where a sentence has been passed or a detention order has been 
made, for sentences of at least 4 months. It is doubted whether aggravating 
circumstances or statutory reductions (for instance, where only an attempt is 
committed) should be counted44. We can observe that the rules on, inter alia, the 
nationality exception, the human rights clause and double criminality show 
independent features from classical extradition. It has been observed that the 
centralisation of the role of the judge might lead to a “politicisation” of the 
judiciary45. It surely is an expression of a presumption of a high degree of trust. As 
established in recital 10 of the Preamble of the Framework Decision, such 
presumption is so strong that the implementation of the EAW may be suspended only 
when human rights have been seriously and persistently violated46. 
 
 
3.3.1 General principles 
A first major change produced by mutual trust is the removal of the nationality 
exception. No Member State of the European Union can in principle refuse the 
surrender of a suspected or a convicted person on grounds of nationality. This 
classical ban of extradition can be found in a considerable number of bilateral or 
multilateral arrangements and is normally an option for the State Party47. The reason 
is that most civil law countries include it in their domestic law, sometimes at a 
constitutional level, as an expression of a State’s sovereignty and guarantee of the 
fundamental rights of the individual; common law countries generally ignore this 
ground for non-execution, although they often provide for other (functionally 
                                                 
44 Article 7 of the Italian Implementing law does not consider these circumstances. See F. Impalà Le 
mandat d’arrêt européen et la loi italienne d’implementation  (2005 Fondazione Giovanni e Francesca 
Falcone), available at http://www.eurowarrant.net . 
45 E. Guild, ‘Drawing the Conclusions: Constitutional Concerns regarding the European Arrest 
Warrant’, in E. Guild (ed.), supra, 267-272. 
46 See infra chapter 5 p. 156 and 169 and chapter 6 p. 196.  
47 For instance, it is an option under Article 6 European Convention on Extradition and related 
Explanatory Memorandum, ETS n. 24, Paris 13/12/1957 and Article 4 UN Model Treaty on 
Extradition, A/RES/45/116, 14 December 1990, amended by A/RES/52/88, 12 December 1997. 
However, refusal on this ground is mandatory under Article 5 Benelux Treaty on Extradition and 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, signed at Brussels on 27 June 1962, UNTS n. 8893, 120. On 
the other hand, refusal is not allowed under Article 4 Extradition Treaty between United States and 
Italy, signed at Rome on 13 October 1983 991 UNTS 285. 
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equivalent) requirements which cannot be found in civil law systems, such as the 
need for prima facie evidence of guilt. 
The nationality exception has not been done away with entirely. A residual 
possibility for the Member State to avail itself of such requirement is left in Articles 
5 (3), 4 (6) and 25 (1). The first provision refers to nationality as a guarantee: where 
a request for surrender has been made for the purposes of prosecution in the 
requesting State, the requested State may make execution conditional on the 
assurance that, upon conviction, the individual is returned to the State of nationality 
or of residence to serve the sentence there. The second provision qualifies nationality 
as a ground for optional non-execution. It enables the Member State to refuse 
execution where a EAW has been issued for the purposes of execution of a custodial 
sentence or detention order in respect of a national, a resident or a person “staying” 
in the requested State and this State undertakes to execute the sentence or detention 
order in accordance with its domestic law. Finally, Article 25 (1) uses nationality for 
a “conditional transit”: where a EAW has been issued for the purposes of 
prosecution and the person who is sought is a national or resident of the State of 
transit, this State may subject transit to the condition that the person, after being 
heard, is returned there in order to serve the custodial sentence or detention order. It 
has already been pointed out48 that these provisions may cause some problems in 
connection to double criminality. Under a number of international conventions49, the 
transfer of a sentenced person is only possible where the act or omission for which 
the sentence has been imposed is punishable by the law of the administering State 
(i.e. in this case the requested State): whenever dual criminality is lifted, this makes it 
impossible to guarantee return under Article 5 (3) and serve a sentence for an act 
which is not considered a crime in the State of nationality or residence. In a similar 
situation, execution of a custodial sentence or detention order as provided for by 
                                                 
48 Z. Deen-Racsmany, R. Blextoon, ‘The Decline of the Nationality Exception in European 
Extradition?’ (2005) 13 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 337 et seq; 
N.Keijzer A, supra, 43.  
49 Art. 3 (1) (e) Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Strasbourg, 21/03/1983 ETS n. 112; 
Art. 4 European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgements, The Hague, 
28/05/1970 ETS n.70; Art. 5 (b) Convention between the Member States of the European 
Communities on the Enforcement on Foreign Criminal Sentences. Only the first two are in force. 
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Article 4 (6) is not possible. As a result, potential sources of conflict remain with 
regard to the residual elements of nationality still present in the Framework Decision. 
Double criminality is still an optional ground for refusal under Articles 2 (4) and 4 
(1) of the Framework Decision50. It applies both in its simple and in its qualified 
version. More precisely, it can still be required: for all acts included in the list under 
Article 2 (2) and punishable by the law of the issuing Member State by a custodial 
sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of less than three years; for all 
acts not included in the list (i.e. any type of offence, including minor criminal 
offences or those subject only to administrative or pecuniary sanctions), within the 
boundaries of applicability set out by par. 1 of the same Article. The wording of 
Article 2 (4) does not entirely solve the problems connected to the temporal element 
of dual criminality as pointed out by Pinochet 351. The provision states that for 
offences falling outside the Framework list, surrender may still be subject to the 
condition that the acts referred to in the EAW “constitute” an offence under the law 
of the executing Member State. It remains unclear whether this expression relates to 
the time of the request or to the time in which the act was committed. 
 
As far as Article 4 (1) is concerned, dual criminality does not apply to cases in which 
the law of the requested State does not impose the same type of tax or duty or does 
not contain the same type of rules as regards taxes, duties and customs and exchange 
regulations as the law of the State of issue (therefore, the fiscal offence exception is 
excluded). It does apply in all cases where differences exist in the way an act (e.g. 
participation or inchoate crimes) or an attempt is qualified and punished in the 
Member States52. 
 
The verification of double criminality is not required for the list of 32 categories of 
offences mentioned in Article 2 (2), as long as they are punishable in the State of 
issue by a custodial sentence or detention order for a maximum period of at least 
                                                 
50 N. Keijzer, ‘The double criminality requirement’, in R. Blextoon, W. van Ballegooij, supra 137-163 
(hereinafter N. Keijzer B). 
51 Regina v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (8o.3) [1999] 2 WLR 827. 
See C. Warbrick, ‘Extradition law aspects of Pinochet 3’ (1999) 48 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 958.  
52 For all this, see N.Keijzer A, supra, 33-34. 
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three years. In principle, as confirmed by the Court of Justice53, only the definition 
given by the domestic law of the issuing State should count. However, there are a 
number of acts included in the list which are not qualified as crimes in every Member 
State. The problems connected to this “disharmony” will be dealt with in a 
subsequent chapter54. 
 
The Framework Decision deals with the ne bis in idem (or double jeopardy) principle 
in Articles 3 (2) and 4(2), (3) and (5). First of all, it is a ground for mandatory non-
execution when the judicial authority is informed that the person against which the 
EAW has been issued has been finally judged by a Member State in respect of the 
same act, provided that, where there has been sentence, the sentence has been passed 
or is currently being served or may no longer be executed under the law of the 
sentencing Member State. This wording includes judgements from third Member 
States. Secondly, it is a ground for optional non-execution in three cases: a) where 
the requested person is being prosecuted in the executing Member State for the same 
act as that on which the EAW is based; b) where the judicial authorities of the 
executing Member State have decided either not to prosecute for the offence or to 
halt proceedings, or where a final judgement has been passed upon the requested 
person in a Member State, in respect of the same acts, which prevents further 
proceedings;  c) where the requested authority is informed that the person has been 
finally judged by a third non-Member State in respect of the same acts, provided that, 
where there has been a sentence, the sentence has been served or is currently being 
served or may no longer be executed under the law of the sentencing country. 
 
A further effect of the proclamation of mutual trust is the abolition of the political 
offence exception, although the fair trial or asylum clause is maintained in recital 12 
of the Preamble. However, at the same time Article 1 (3) takes into account the 
obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles under 
Article 6 TEU. Recital 13 contains a reference to the cases where there is a serious 
risk that the person sought would be subject to the death penalty, torture or other 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Two options for interpretation can 
                                                 
53 ECJ C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld v Leden van de Ministerraad, 3 May 2007.  
54 See for more details infra, chapter 5.  
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be considered: a) the combination of these articles should be read in light of the 
Soering judgement55, so that the obligation to extradite and the obligation to respect 
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR)56, will have to be weighed against each other on a case-by-case basis and the 
standard of proof that human rights have been violated will be very high; or b) the 
Framework Decision provides for a human rights exception. The second option has 
been chosen by eleven Member States in their implementing laws, although the 
above mentioned provision and recitals 10, 12 and 13 have not always been 
explicitly included in domestic implementing laws 57. Once again, the effective 
degree of mutual trust existing among the Member States is put on trial. The more 
human rights are used as a ground of refusal, the less one can legitimately presume 
that the EAW fosters mutual confidence. It is reasonable to expect that on at least a 
few occasions surrender will be refused on this ground. It follows that this is one of 
the main parameters to evaluate the effective functioning of the EAW. The risk of a 
high number of cases of refusal (be it legitimate or not) is obviously a serious danger 
for the building of mutual trust in the European Union. 
 
The EAW restricts considerably one of the classic principles of extradition law: the 
rule of speciality58. Significantly, this change is not radical. As previously pointed 
out59, this rule had been almost eliminated in the previous version of the Framework 
Decision, but was at the end reintroduced. The current Article 27 qualifies it first of 
all as a general principle. Paragraph 2 clarifies that the surrendered person may not 
be prosecuted, sentenced or otherwise be subject to deprivation of liberty for an 
offence which he or she committed before surrender and which is different to the one 
that the EAW refers to. This general statement is limited by two categories of 
exceptions. The first category of exception is the effect of a sort of reciprocity. 
Member States that have notified the General Secretariat of the Council that consent 
                                                 
55 ECtHR 7 July 1989, Soering v. UK  7 July 1989, Application no. 14038/88. 
56 See Article 6 (2) TEU. 
57 The eleven States are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Slovenia, United Kingdom. See for other details Report from the Commission on the 
implementation of the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States 
in 2005, 2006 and 2007, COM (2007) 407 final and Annex to the Report, SEC (2007) 979. See also 
infra, chapter 5. 
58 See supra chapter 1 p.17. 
59 See supra p. 77-79.  
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is presumed to have been given for the abolition of the rule can put in place a special 
regime (paragraph 1). This regime would only operate for these States, unless the 
executing judicial authority decides otherwise in a particular case. Thus speciality is 
excluded as a result of political will, although a judicial authority can still retain it.  
 
The second category of exceptions operates, as it were, “automatically”. There are a 
number of cases in which the principle does not apply, i.e. it is possible to prosecute 
and convict a person for an offence “other”. They are listed in paragraph 3: when the 
person having had the opportunity to leave the territory of the Member State to 
which he or she has been surrendered has not done so within forty-five days of his or 
her final discharge, or has returned to that territory after leaving it; when the offence 
is not punishable by a custodial sentence or detention order; when the criminal 
proceedings do not give rise to the application of a measure restricting personal 
liberty; when the person could be liable to a penalty or a measure not involving the 
deprivation of liberty, in particular a financial penalty or a measure in lieu thereof, 
even if the penalty or measure may give rise to a restriction of his or her personal 
liberty. Another exception operates when the executing judicial authority which 
surrendered the person gives its consent in accordance with paragraph 4. According 
to this paragraph, consent must be requested to the executing judicial authority, 
including the same documentation required for an EAW. The judicial authority 
decides within thirty days of the receipt if the request: it gives its consent when the 
offence is itself subject to surrender; it refuses it on one of the mandatory or optional 
grounds mentioned in Article 3 and 4. Member States are obliged to provide the 
guarantees mentioned in Article 5.  
 
The surrender person can expressly waive entitlement to speciality. He or she must 
do so before the competent authority of the issuing Member State and this decision 
must be recorded following the rules of that State’s legal system. As a minimum 
requirement, the person has the right to legal counsel and the procedure must 
guarantee that he or she has expressed consent voluntarily and in full awareness of 
the consequences.  
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The exact scope of application and implications of the rule of speciality have been 
examined by the Court of Justice in Leymann and Pustovarov60.  First of all, the 
Court clarified that, in order to identify an offence “other” than that for which the 
person was surrendered, it is necessary to look at the constitutive elements of the 
offence and verify whether the information contained in the warrant and those 
mentioned in the later procedural measure correspond61. In this context, time and 
place can be modified, as long as they emerge from the data collected during the 
investigations in the issuing State, the nature of the offence is not altered and there 
are no grounds for refusal62. Secondly, it held that a modification in the description 
of the offence, merely concerning the type of drugs, is not sufficient to determine an 
offence “other” as indicated in Article 27 (1)63. Thirdly, the Court interpreted the 
exception to speciality provided for by Article 27 (3) (c) (when the criminal 
proceedings do not give rise to the application of a measure restricting personal 
liberty) as meaning that, where a coercive measure is not applied, the person may be 
prosecuted and convicted for an offence “other” before the consent following the 
procedure described in paragraph 4 is given. However, even where a coercive 
measure is applied, the person can be subjected to such measure before the consent is 







                                                 
60 ECJ C-388/08 PPU Leymann and Pustovarov, 1 December 2008. Two cases where dealt with by the 
Court. In the first, the request sent by a Finnish prosecutor to Poland for the surrender of Mr. 
Leymann, referred to the offence of illegally introducing in Finland a considerable quantity of 
amphetamines with the purpose of selling it: however, Mr. Leymann was thereafter prosecuted in 
Helsinki for illegally introducing haschisch, following consultation with the Polish representative in 
Eurojust. In the second, two different requests were sent by Finland to Spain for the surrender of Mr. 
Pustovarov. The later request sought the Spanish authorities’ consent in order to prosecute him for the 
offence of haschisch trafficking instead of amphetamines trafficking. However, he was convicted 
before the consent was actually received. 
61 ECJ Leymann and Pustovarov, par. 59.  
62 Ibid.  
63 ECJ Leymann and Pustovarov, par. 63. 




It is curious that Article 1 (2), according to which the EAW must be executed on the 
basis of the principle of mutual recognition, has only been explicitly mentioned by 
six Member States65. An EAW is issued and executed by judicial authorities (Article 
6). A list of the competent authorities designated according to domestic law is sent 
by each Member State to the General Secretariat of the Council. As opposed to 
traditional extradition, the role of the executive is limited to mere assistance (as 
repeated in recital 9 of the Preamble). Article 7 allows Member States to designate 
one or more central authorities to assist the competent judicial authorities: all 
indications thereof must be communicated to the Council. Central authorities can 
also be made responsible for the administrative transmission and reception of an 
EAW or any relating correspondence.  
 
We may split up the whole procedure regulated by the Framework Decision66 into 
four phases: issuing of the EAW; transmission of the EAW to the competent 
authorities of the executing State; decision to execute; surrender. Each of these 
phases is considered by the Framework Decision autonomously, with its own rules 
and exceptions. The same will be done in the following paragraphs.  
 
 
a) Issuing of the EAW 
 
The mechanism comes to life with a judicial decision issued by a judge or a public 
prosecutor in accordance with the procedural law of his own State. The decision is 
“judicial”, therefore it cannot emanate from a police body (as occurs, for instance, in 
the Australia-New Zealand backing of warrants system). It cannot emanate from a 
political or diplomatic authority either (as was the case in previous extradition 
models in Europe). The definition of “judicial authority” is taken over directly from 
the 1957 Convention on Extradition, which itself referred to the Bilateral Convention 
                                                 
65 Annex to the Report from the Commission, supra 4. 
66 As will be seen later, the scheme delineated in the Framework Decision does not always correspond 
to the actual procedure applied in the domestic law of each Member State. 
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concluded between France and Germany in 1951. The ratio of the decision to request 
surrender is the need to initiate a criminal trial against a suspected person or execute 
a custodial sentence or detention order. By the latter is meant “any order involving 
deprivation of liberty which has been made by a criminal court in addition to or instead 
of a prison sentence”67. However, the competent authority can only avail itself of 
such an instrument for acts which are punishable by its national law by a custodial 
sentence or detention order for a maximum of at least one year or, in case the 
sentence has already been passed or the detention order made, for sentences of a 
minimum of four months.  
 
 
b) Transmission of the EAW 
 
The transmission of the EAW from the issuing authority to the executing authority 
(Articles 9 and 10) follows different rules depending on whether or not it knows 
where the sought person is. In the first case, the EAW is sent directly. In the second 
case, an alert is issued in the Schengen Information System (SIS)68: such alert has the 
same effect as an EAW and is in line with the provisions of the CISA69. However, 
since the SIS is not yet capable of transmitting all the information required, the alert 
is considered equivalent to an EAW only until the original is received “in due and 
proper form” by the executing judicial authority. If it is not possible to make use of 
the SIS, transmission may occur indirectly through Interpol. Alternatively, the 
issuing authority may choose to use the telecommunications system of the European 
Judicial Network. 
 
The issuing authority may face problems. For instance, it is possible that it does not 
know what the competent executive authority is. In this case, it will need to start 
appropriate enquiries and here too the contact points of the European Judicial 
                                                 
67 Definition taken from Article 25 of the 1957 Convention on Extradition, which repeated Article 21 
of the Bilateral Convention between France and Germany. See European Convention on Extradition, 
Explanatory Memorandum, ETS n. 24.  
68 The option of using the SIS is available in any case, even when the location of the person is known. 
69 See, in particular, Article 95 of the Convention of 19 June 1990 Implementing the Schengen 
Agreement of 14 June 1985, supra note 20.  
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Network may prove useful. It may of course happen that a request is erroneously sent 
to an authority which is not competent: the latter is under a duty to forward the EAW 
to the competent authority of its own State and to inform the issuing authority of this 
mistake. It is equally possible that the authenticity of one or more documents sent 
together with the request is questioned. The general principle is that such problems 
should be dealt with either by direct contact between the judicial authorities or 
through the central authorities70.  
 
The content and form of the EAW are specified in Article 8. More precisely, an 
EAW must contain: the identity and nationality of the requested person; the name, 
address, telephone and fax numbers and e-mail address of the issuing judicial 
authority; evidence of an enforceable judgement, an arrest warrant or any other 
enforceable judicial decision having the same effect; the nature and legal 
classification of the offence; a description of the circumstances in which the offence 
was committed, including the time, place and degree of participation in the offence 
by the requested person; the penalty imposed, if there is a final judgement, or the 
prescribed scale of penalties for the offence under the law of the issuing Member 
State; if possible, other consequences of the offence.  
 
Translation of the warrant into the official language(s) of the requested State is 
compulsory; Member States may in any case deposit a declaration with the General 
Secretariat of the Council accepting a translation in one or more other official 
languages of the European Union71.  
 
 
c) Decision to execute 
 
Once a request for surrender has been received by the executing judicial authority, 
the first action is (wherever this is possible) the arrest of the requested person. Such 
person has the right to be assisted by a legal counsel and by an interpreter in 
accordance with the national law of the executing Member State. He or she must be 
                                                 
70 Article 10 (5) of the Framework Decision. 
71 Article 8 (2) of the Framework Decision. 
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informed of the EAW and its contents (Article 11). The executing authority may 
decide, if it deems it necessary, to keep the arrested person in detention. Otherwise, it 
may release him or her provisionally at any time, provided that all appropriate 
measures are taken to prevent the person from fleeing (Article 12).  
 
The arrested person must also be informed of the possibility of consenting to 
surrender. If consent is not expressed, then a hearing is arranged, in accordance with 
the law of the executing Member State (Article 14). If consent is expressed before 
the competent judicial authority, then Article 13 applies. The necessary measures 
must be adopted in order to make it possible that the person has done so voluntarily 
and in full awareness of the consequences. Renunciation of the speciality rule is 
possible at the same time as consent to surrender, following the same procedure. 
Both must be recorded. Although they cannot be revoked as a general rule, Member 
States which wish to provide exceptions must inform the General Secretariat of the 
Council of their intention at the moment of the adoption of the Framework Decision. 
The period between the date of consent and that of its revocation are not to be 
considered for the purpose of establishing the time limits for the decision to execute.  
 
 
d) Decision to surrender 
 
The surrender phase takes place within very strict time limits. The purpose of this 
urgency is twofold. On the one hand, it reflects the need to speed up the proceedings 
and allow for an efficient cooperation between States. In a way, this reinforces 
mutual trust, as the requesting State will be satisfied with a prompt handing over of 
the suspect or sentenced person. On the other hand, a quick surrender guarantees also 
the person who is subject to the EAW, as he or she will not go through long and 
unreasonable detention pending a decision of the court.  
 
According to Article 17 (which repeats that an EAW must be executed “as a matter 
of urgency”), the decision to execute the EAW must be taken within 60 days of the 
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arrest. However, if the person consents to his surrender, the time limits are even 
shorter: 10 days after consent has been given. 
 
An EAW may be partially or totally incomplete. This is why the Framework 
Decision provides that, if the executing judicial authority believes that the 
information communicated by the issuing State is insufficient, it may request 
additional information. The most important “gaps” to be filled are, in this case, those 
relating to the existence of mandatory or optional grounds for refusal, the guarantees 
established by Article 5, or one or more of the essential elements of an EAW, as 
indicated by Article 8. Where these inconveniences occur, the request needs to be 
satisfied “as a matter of urgency”. Indeed, Article 15 gives the executing judicial 
authority the power to fix a time limit for the receipt of the information, taking into 
account the general time limits of the whole procedure. 
 
More generally, where, for any reason, the time limits cannot be observed, the 
executing judicial authority is required to immediately inform the issuing judicial 
authority and give the reasons for such delay. As a result, the time limits may be 
extended for a further thirty days. In addition, the Member State must inform 
Eurojust. It may also occur that a particularly negligent State will repeatedly breach 
these provisions. In such cases it is up to the issuing State to report it to the Council. 
However, no other legal consequences seem to be provided for: Article 17 (7) simply 
states that this will be taken into account for the purposes of the evaluation of the 
implementation of the EAW.  
 
The actual surrender must take place “as soon as possible” on a date which has been 
previously agreed by the States involved. As a general criterion, a term of ten days 
from the final decision on the execution of the EAW is established by Article 23. 
Once again, the provision is flexible and states that, where circumstances beyond the 
control of the Member States prevent them from respecting the time limit, they must 
contact each other and agree on a new date: however, the person must be surrendered 
within ten days of this new date. If this does not occur, he or she must be 
immediately released, with only one exception, stated in Article 23 (4). This 
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paragraph states that surrender may in extraordinary cases be postponed for serious 
humanitarian reasons.  One example is mentioned: where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that the operation would manifestly endanger the life or health 
of the sought person. Once the reasons for the delay cease to exist, the executing 
judicial authority must inform immediately the issuing authority and agree on a new 
date: in such a case, surrender will have to be performed within ten days. Again, 
there are no legal remedies where these provisions are not respected. One can 
wonder whether Pinochet72 could here be repeated, postponing the surrender several 
times. The procedure could theoretically involve a political interference, although 
one could argue that its “judicialisation” should guarantee a fair balance between the 
need to secure justice and the safeguards of the individual. Moreover, it is possible 
that the provision of Article 23 (5), providing for immediate release in case of expiry 
of any of these time limits, is utilised to escape prosecution and/or imprisonment.  
 
Article 24 mentions another possibility of postponing surrender, which is provided 
where the decision to execute has already been made. The executing judicial 
authority may do so either in order to allow for prosecution of the requested person 
in the executing Member State or to permit that he or she serve a sentence there for 
another act not included in the EAW. It may also decide a temporary or conditional 
surrender, after concluding an agreement in writing with the issuing judicial 
authority.  
 
One of the main effects of surrender is that it is up to the issuing State to deduct all 
periods of detention deriving from the execution of an EAW from the total period of 
detention that is supposed to be served in that State after a custodial sentence or 
detention order have been passed (Article 26). All information on the duration of the 
detention on the basis of the EAW must be transmitted by the executing authority (or 
the central authority, if this has been created) to the issuing authority at the time of 
the surrender.  
                                                 
72 Regina v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (8o.3) [1999] 2 WLR 827. 
Note that that case is slightly different, as extradition was refused rather than postponed and the 
decision was taken by the executive rather than the judiciary (i.e. the UK Home Secretary) by using 
the “serious humanitarian reasons argument”. See also supra p.84. 
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A special mechanism is regulated by Article 28 for cases in which Member States 
notify the General Secretariat of the Council that, in relation with other Member 
States which have given the same notification, the consent for the surrender of a 
person to a State other than the executing State is presumed to have been given, 
unless stated otherwise in the decision to surrender. This applies to EAWs issued for 
offences which have been committed prior to surrender. However, extradition to a 
third (non-Member) State can only occur with the previous consent of the competent 
authority of the executing State, in accordance with the provisions of its domestic 
law as well as the related Conventions.  
 
In exceptional circumstances, a person who has already been surrendered to the 
issuing State may be handed over (pursuant to an EAW) to a third Member State 
without the consent of the executing State. This applies in three cases: a) if the sought 
person has had the opportunity to leave the territory of the Member State to which he 
or she has been surrendered but has not exploited it within 45 days of the final 
discharge, or has returned to that territory after leaving it; b) if the sought person 
consents to being further surrendered. Obviously, the right to legal counsel is 
guaranteed. It is also necessary that consent is given before the competent judicial 
authorities of the issuing Member State and recorded following that Stare’s domestic 
law. It must be clear that consent has been given voluntarily and in full awareness of 
the consequences; c) if the speciality rule does not apply, and more precisely in the 
cases mentioned in Article 27 (3) (a), (e), (f) and (g).  
 
The consent of the executing judicial authority to another Member State is subject to 
specific rules. The request for consent must be transmitted following Articles 8 and 
9. The decision must be taken within 30 days of receipt of the request. The grounds 
for refusal and the guarantees relating to the EAW may be utilised. In one case 







As can be deduced from this chapter, the EAW is not an entirely new creature in the 
area of cooperation in criminal matters. There is some continuity between traditional 
extradition, the forms of surrender which were bilaterally agreed upon at the 
beginning of this century and the EAW proper. It is a fact however that in some 
respects the Italy-Spain Treaty and the UK-Spain Treaty were at the same time more 
innovative (as, for instance, the grounds for refusal were considerably restricted in 
contrast to classic extradition) and incomplete (as they did not contain provisions on 
speciality, territoriality or ne bis in idem).  The initial Commission project for the 
identification of a surrender scheme for the countries of the EU was also to some 
extent rather audacious, as it conceived the new mechanism as a powerful tool 
involving at the same time the search, arrest, detention and surrender of a person. 
The requirement of an effective and quick procedure was met by the provisions 
imposing strict time limits and establishing direct contact between judicial 
authorities. One of the most remarkable achievements was the removal of dual 
criminality, although the Commission draft attempted to balance this daring step with 
some leeway left for the Member States. As has been shown earlier, this draft was 
soon to be dropped and a rather different approach prevailed. 
 
The final outcome was a somewhat bizarre compromise between the guidelines 
identified by the European Council, which overtly promoted cooperation with the 
US, in particular in the fight against terrorism, and the conditions imposed by the 
European Parliament, which inter alia limited the application of the EAW to 
prosecution or execution of a sentence (or detention order) and increased the number 
of grounds for refusal. This outcome took the form of a Third Pillar instrument 
(which as we know has a weaker binding force than the classic First Pillar acts). 
 
Most notably, dual criminality was removed for a considerable number of categories 
of offences. As will be seen in another chapter, this clearly contradicts the earlier 
proposals on the application of mutual recognition, which referred to a much smaller 
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list of crimes73. It is submitted here that confusion and political pressure prevented 
adopting a rational and balanced measure and no proper reflection was made on the 
consequences and risks of such strategy. 
 
The EAW is different from extradition and its main features can all be explained at 
least theoretically in terms of mutual trust in foreign legal systems. Nevertheless, its 
internal structure and functioning as well as the context in which it operates (i.e. 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters) have not been developed coherently. The 
move from the inter-governmental level (which extradition belongs to) to the judicial 
level has not been complete, because the EAW has been generated within a 
framework (the Third Pillar) which is itself flawed and subject to criticism from 
many points of view. Some of the problems of the EAW relate to the substantive law, 
which will be analysed in the next chapter.
                                                 
73 See infra chapter 4 p. 131. 
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4.  Defining crimes in the European Union: a Sisyphean 






One of the main concerns deriving from the adoption of the EAW is its relationship 
with the substantive and procedural features of EU legal systems. While the latter 
will be looked at in the following chapter, the aim of this chapter will be to reflect on 
some of the potential obstacles that might arise from the definition of the categories 
of offences which the EAW applies to. Some solutions to overcome them will be 
suggested. Finally, an overview of the problems relating to the implementation of the 
principle of double jeopardy will be given. 
 
 




The partial elimination of the double criminality requirement is certainly a 
remarkable achievement of the Framework Decision on the EAW. As has been noted 
in chapter three, this means that surrender may occur for an act defined as a crime by 
the requesting State’s legal system, regardless of whether the same act is criminalised 
in the requested State. This is limited to a few categories of offences, provided that 
the required penalty threshold is respected1. It is maintained in this chapter that this 
system may only operate effectively if a sufficient degree of approximation is 
ensured at the European level for a number of clearly identified offences. Moreover, 
it is argued that double criminality should have been removed for a shorter list of 
categorised offences for which common minimum denominators can be more easily 
found. These arguments will be exposed by analysing the main problems deriving 
from the suppression of double criminality.  
 
                                                 
1 See supra, chapter 3 p.84. 
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First of all, it should be noted that the emergence of a European criminal law is not 
an entirely new phenomenon. The need for harmonisation of European States’ legal 
systems has been stressed by many scholars and practitioners2. Already in the sixties 
the general choice between a theoretical approach and a more pragmatic approach 
was at the centre of the debate. It was already evident that this is not a purely legal 
matter, as it involves consideration of sociological and cultural aspects. As was 
pointed out, “(…) if we adopted criminological parameters rather than follow 
metaphysical parameters, we would agree more easily on common concepts which 
would very much facilitate, I believe, international cooperation” 3. 
 
Secondly, the principles constituting the basis of legal systems in Europe are, in their 
essential features, similar to each other. For instance, the notion of criminal 
responsibility is normally defined in the light of a prohibited conduct and a mental 
element. However, the approaches diverge as to where these two concepts need to be 
allocated. Thus, common law and some civil law countries maintain a distinction 
between the two4. Some other civil law countries elaborate, aside from a legal 
description of the crime (Tatbestand), a further division between the wrongful 
character of a conduct or unlawfulness (Rechtswidrigkeit) and culpability or 
blameworthiness (Schuld)5. The twofold distinction between actus reus and mens rea 
separates the definitional elements of the crime (marked by their unlawfulness or 
absence of grounds of justification) and the psychological or subjective elements: 
                                                 
2 See e.g. A. Weyembergh, L’harmonisation des législations: condition de l’espace pénal européen et 
révélateur de ses tensions (Institut d’etudes européennes Brussels 2004) and supra chapter 2 p. 55. 
3 Droit pénal européen, Congrès organisé les 7, 8 et 9 Novembre 1968 par l’Institut d’Etudes 
Européennes (ULB Brussels 1970) 629 (my translation. The original reads as follows: si nous 
admettions des paramètres criminologiques plutôt que de suivre et de continuer à suivre des 
paramètres métaphysiques, nous arriverions plus aisément à de grandes notions communes qui 
faciliteraient beaucoup, je pense, la collaboration internationale”). 
4 In England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Ireland, actus reus is the “physical” element, 
while mens rea (including intention, knowledge, recklessness, negligence) is the “fault” element of an 
offence (actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea). See, e.g. Smith and Hogan, Criminal law (11th ed 
OUP 2005); A.P.Simester, G.R.Sullivan, Criminal law: theory and doctrine (2nd ed. Hart Publishing 
Oxford 2003). An analogous (albeit not identical) distinction (between the material/objective elements 
and the psychological/subjective elements) can be found in some civil law countries, such as France 
and Italy. See, e.g. B.Bouloc, G. Stefani, G. Levasseur, Droit pénal général (20th ed. Dalloz Paris 
2007); F. Carrara, Programma del corso di diritto criminale, Vol. 1 Parte generale (5th ed. Giusti 
1877); F. Mantovani, Diritto penale. Parte generale (5th ed. CEDAM Padova 2007). 
5 This is the case in Germany, Austria, Spain and Portugal. See e.g. H. Jescheck, T. Weigend, 
Lehrbuch des Strafrechts: Allgemeiner Teil (6th ed. Dunker & Humblot Berlin 1998); C. Blanco 
Lozano, Tratado de derecho penal español: El sistema de la Parte general: la estructura del delito 
(JM Bosch Barcelona 2005). 
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this distinction is rigid and no exception is admitted6. On the other hand, the tripartite 
distinction mentioned above incorporates intention within the concept of criminal act 
and identifies mens rea with a reproach of the wrongdoer for his act, based on two 
grounds: awareness of the unlawfulness and criminal capacity7. One consequence of 
adopting this latter theory, developed in Germany, is that, for example, unavoidable 
mistake of law constitutes a defence (whereas in English law ignorance of the law is 
normally no defence8).  On the other hand, a feature that we find in similar terms in 
civil and common law systems (albeit with nuances and with no formal status in the 
second case) is the distinction between justification (qualifying as lawful an act that 
is otherwise unlawful) and excuse (qualifying the act as unlawful but exculpating its 
perpetrator)9. 
 
None of these general theories is immune from criticism. On the one hand, the actus 
reus/mens rea distinction has sometimes been considered simplistic, as it would not 
take into account relevant differences between the various doctrines that are grouped 
within them10. On the other hand, the tripartite structure has also been criticised as 
incapable of dealing with some specific issues11. Other more detailed remarks attack 
the volitional element of the civil law notion of dolus eventualis (which is very 
                                                 
6 However, in some countries, such as Italy, some authors have argued that some subjective elements 
can be included in the actus reus. See e.g. G. Fiandaca, E. Musco, Diritto penale, Parte generale (5th 
ed. Zanichelli Bologna 2007). This is due to the influence of German doctrine. A variation of the 
bipartite doctrine is the quadripartite doctrine, adopted in many former Communist countries: see 
more recently G. Fletcher, The Grammar of Criminal Law Vol. I (OUP 2007) 47.  
7 This distinction (in its modern form) was elaborated by the German finalist doctrine or teleological 
theory of action (so-called finale Handlungslehre), which argued that all human acts are purpose-
orientated, as opposed to the previous classical theory based on causation (kausaler 
Handlungsbegriff), which distinguished only between the objective and the subjective side of criminal 
liability. See H. Welzel, Das Deutsche Strafrecht, (11th ed. de Gruyter Berlin 1969), also reported in 
G.Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (OUP Oxford-New York 2000) 434.  
8 See section 17 of the German Criminal Code. Concerning English law, see R. v. Bailey (1800), 
Russell & Ryan 1, 168 ER 651.  
9 See J. Pradel, Droit pénal comparé (2nd ed. Dalloz Paris 2002) 325. The distinction is not approved 
by A.P.Simester, G.R.Sullivan, Criminal law: theory and doctrine, supra 541; it is supported by 
G.Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (OUP Oxford-New York 2000) 759. R. A. Duff, Answering for 
Crime (Hart Publishing Oxford-Portland 2007) 263 argues that a different distinction should be 
utilised. 
10 See e.g. P.H.Robinson, ‘Should the Criminal Law Abandon the Actus Reus-Mens Rea Distinction?’ 
in S.Shute, J. Gardner, J. Horder (eds.) Action and Value in Criminal Law (Clarendon Press Oxford 
1993) 187. 
11 R.L.Christopher, ‘Tripartite structures of criminal law in Germany and other civil law jurisdictions’ 
(2007) 28 Cardozo Law Review 2675. 
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similar to the common law notion of subjective recklessness) as fictitious and 
difficult to prove12. 
 
This necessarily brief survey does not take into account the various categorisations 
that have been elaborated by the doctrine and jurisprudence of each country. 
However, it hints at the number of issues that potentially stem from an analysis of the 
divergent approaches.  At the source of all difficulties lies however the risk of 
referring to concepts and mechanisms that are intimately connected to the legal 
system in which they have been generated. This has been recognised, at the 
international level, by the ad hoc Tribunals, which had to apply analogous notions in 
their case law13. Despite this, a common understanding has been found on the 
definition of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide and this has 
constituted the basis for the work of all international criminal Tribunals, including 
the International Criminal Court14. This is so because the prohibition of the conducts 
corresponding to those crimes reflects the need to protect a set of core values that are 
seen as identical in all legal systems as part of the international community.  
 
                                                 
12 G. Taylor, ‘Concepts of intention in German criminal law’ (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 99. According to German law, dolus eventualis (bedingter Vorsatz) is established when a 
person foresees the forbidden consequence of his conduct as a not entirely remote possibility, but 
despite this he performs the conduct, by internally approving such consequence or reconciling himself 
with it. By contrast, in order to establish (subjective) recklessness, common law does not inquire into 
the defendant’s attitude to the risk and is normally satisfied with the cognitive element, i.e. foresight 
of an unreasonable risk which has nonetheless been taken (i.e. the accused is not considered reckless 
when he fails to consider an obvious risk or knows that there might be some risk). For an overview, 
see e.g. A.P.Simester, G.R.Sullivan, Criminal law: theory and doctrine, supra 139, who nevertheless 
believe there is still some scope for objective recklessness. For discussions on dolus eventualis by 
various legal writers, see e.g. H. Jescheck, T. Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, supra 299; 
G.Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, supra, 445; C. Elliott, French criminal law (Willan Publishing 
2001) 71; G. Fiandaca, E. Musco, Diritto penale, Parte generale, supra 321. 
13 For instance, in Prosecutor v. Delaliĉ et al. (Case n. IT-96-21-T), Judgement, 16 November 1998 
(1999) 38 ILM 57, the ICTY, in relation to the issue of establishing the mens rea for the offences of 
“wilful killing” and “murder” (in the context of war crimes), observed that “…In any national legal 
system, terms are utilised in a specific legal context and are attributed their own specific connotations 
by the jurisprudence of that system. Such connotations may not necessarily be relevant when these 
terms are applied in an international jurisdiction” (par. 431). The Tribunal however was clearly 
inspired in its judgement by both common law and civil law approaches. For the Statutes of the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993) and the one for Rwanda (1994), see UN Doc. 
S/RES/808 (1993) and UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), as well as Annex and S/RES/955 (1994) and 
subsequent amendments UN Doc. S/RES/1329 (2000) and S/RES/1503 (2003).  
14 Statute of the International Criminal Court, Rome, (17/07/1998) UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9*, 37 
ILM 999 (1998), amended  by UN Doc, PCNICC/1999/INF/3*. 
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The context in which the EAW list (the “Article 2 list”) operates is different. 
Although crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court are 
mentioned, there are another 31 categories ranging from crimes against property to 
crimes against the person to typically transnational offences15. While the number of 
unlawful conducts covered by the list is impressive, they have not been systematised 
with an apparent ratio. However, there is a further, more important remark on this 
legislative choice: what we have here is not a description of specific offences 
(Tatbestände, as seen before) which should constitute the basis for prosecution. The 
Framework Decision rather identifies “empty boxes” which have no legal value per 
se. The mere use of  expressions such as “corruption”, “terrorism”, “rape”, 
“sabotage” is not intrinsically legal, as these are common words used daily by 
ordinary people. It is up to the requesting State to fill the “empty box” with the 
corresponding definition deriving from its own system. The purpose is to provide 
States with a minimum basis to facilitate mutual recognition not only of judgements 
but also of offences. Steps in this direction had already been taken in a certain sense 
when double criminality was applied. First of all, this requirement was in most cases 
in practice not viewed in abstracto (i.e. referring only to the definition of a crime) 
but in concreto (i.e. referring to justification, excuses and any other circumstances 
excluding punishability as well in order to assess whether the offender would have 
been punishable in the requested State, had the offence been committed there): thus, 
for instance, an act of taking someone else’s property fulfils in abstracto the criteria 
of theft, but the perpetrator might be convinced it is his own property (therefore 
                                                 
15 They are the following: participation in a criminal organisation; terrorism; trafficking in human 
beings; sexual exploitation of children and child pornography; illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances; illicit trafficking in weapons, munitions and explosives; corruption; fraud; 
laundering of the proceeds of crime; counterfeiting currency, including of the euro; computer-related 
crime; environmental crime, including illicit trafficking in endangered animal species and in 
endangered plant species and varieties; facilitation of unauthorised entry and residence; murder, 
grievous bodily injury; illicit trade in human organs and tissue; kidnapping, illegal restraint and 
hostage-taking; racism and xenophobia; organised or armed robbery; illicit trafficking in cultural 
goods, including antiques and works of art; swindling; racketeering and extortion; counterfeiting and 
piracy of products; forgery of administrative documents and trafficking therein; forgery of means of 
payment; illicit trafficking in hormonal substances and other growth promoters; illicit trafficking in 
nuclear and other radioactive materials; trafficking in stolen vehicles; rape; arson; unlawful seizure of 
aircraft/ships; sabotage. 
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lacking mens rea)16. Secondly, in an extradition request the nomen iuris (i.e. the 
qualification of the act) is normally irrelevant. As a result, double criminality was 
based on “acts”, rather than “offences”: surrender took place even if the same 
behaviour was qualified as, say, embezzlement in State A and theft in State B, or 
robbery in the first and aggravated theft in the second17. The elimination of dual 
criminality goes further, as, at least in theory, the court is no longer required to look 
at the material act, as long as this is identified by the requesting authority as one of 
the “Article 2 list” offences. The question is therefore: does this achieve the objective 
of simplifying cooperation? 
 
If we look more closely at the listed categories of offences, it is possible to highlight 
significant legal as well as extra-legal issues deriving from the practice. The main 
problem is that the list offences are couched in vague terms. While this may provide 
them with a higher degree of flexibility, it is also a source of potential conflicts. In 
most cases the way a crime definition is conceived and relied upon by courts and 
legislators is peculiar to the society in which that definition operates. The following 
sections offer a concise overview of some of the list crimes from a comparative 
perspective and attempt to explore both converging and diverging points. The terms 
“harmonisation” and “approximation” will be used indistinctly, although, as clarified 
in chapter two18, the former should be stricto sensu intended as the creation of a 
homogeneous system with no differences between legal systems, whereas the latter 
consists in the setting up of common minimum elements relating to offences and 
penalties. Third Pillar measures have focused so far on approximation as a tool to 
facilitate the implementation of mutual recognition, thus leaving Member States free 
to pursue their own policies beyond the minimum standard agreed at the EU level. 
This chapter aims to show that, while full harmonisation is currently unworkable, the 
approximation path should be followed more decisively, by adopting at the same 
time a more careful approach on the complex issues related to double criminality. 
                                                 
16 On double criminality in general, see M. Plachta, ‘The Role of Double Criminality in International 
Cooperation in Penal Matters’ in N. Jareborg (ed.), Double Criminality Studies in International 
Criminal Law (Iustus Förlag, Uppsala 1989).  
17 S. Gafner D’Aumerie, Le principe de la double incrimination. En particulier dans le rapport 
d’entraide judiciaire internationale en matière pénale entre la Suisse et les Etats-Unis (Helbing and 
Lichtenhahn Basle 1992).  
18 See supra chapter 2, p. 55-57. 
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4.1.1 Crimes not subject to harmonisation 
 
A first group embraces crimes that have not been harmonised. Examples are: theft, 
organised or armed robbery, arson, all the “trafficking offences” except those related 
to drugs (in stolen vehicles, weapons, nuclear or other material, hormonal substances, 
human organs, cultural goods, fake administrative documents).  While most of these 
crimes do not pose significant definitional problems, some delicate issues might 
emerge in relation to two groups of offences: on the one hand, murder and rape and, 
on the other, a “special” group including racism and xenophobia, racketeering and 
extortion, swindling, sabotage and trafficking in stolen vehicles. In the latter case 
some obstacles can be identified to a proper functioning of the EAW. 
 
 
4.1.1.1 Murder and rape 
 
Murder and rape are often labelled as “crimes against the person”. It will be shown in 
this section that, although they qualify as mala in se, they have peculiar features 
depending on the legal system in which they are conceived. Nevertheless, this does 
not constitute a major problem in most cases.  
 
The first of the two offences appears on the EAW list as “murder, grievous bodily 
injury”. Normally legal systems distinguish (according to the degree) between two or 
more forms of homicide: for instance, UK law has murder and manslaughter 
(culpable homicide in Scotland)19; French law has meurtre (roughly equivalent to 
voluntary manslaughter) and assassinat (murder with premeditation)20; German law 
has Totschlag (again, voluntary manslaughter) and Mord (murder)21; Italian law has 
omicidio volontario and omicidio colposo, respectively the more and the less serious 
form of crime22. In general terms, the actus reus is the same: the killing of a person 
by another person. However, the categorisations within each system differ. For 
                                                 
19 A.P.Simester, G.R.Sullivan, Criminal law: theory and doctrine, supra 323. 
20 See Article 221-1 and 221-3 respectively of the Code pénal. 
21 See section 212 and section 211 respectively of the Strafgesetzbuch (StGB). 
22 See Article 575 and 589 respectively of the Codice penale.  
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instance, German law has additional forms of voluntary homicide: “less serious case 
of manslaughter” (minder schwerer Fall des Totschlags) and “killing on demand” 
(Tőtung auf Verlangen)23; Italy too has a series of autonomous crimes, such as 
“killing on demand” (omicidio del consenziente) or “injury resulting in death” 
(omicidio preterintenzionale), apart from specific aggravating circumstances24; 
France does not have “killing on demand” but has a series of aggravated forms and a 
separate offence of “poisoning”25. Regarding the mens rea, the intention in murder is 
elaborated in various ways. On the one hand, in France, differently from England and 
Wales, “murder” only includes acts committed with the intention of causing death26 
and all general defences may apply in principle27. On the other hand, intention in 
German and Italian law is wider than in English or French law, as it embraces dolus 
eventualis28. This may determine different results and in fact it has been pointed out 
that there are cases in either of these jurisdictions in which a person would be 
convicted of wounding or intentionally causing physical injury rather than murder or 
attempted murder29. Arguably cases like this could fall within the EAW label 
“serious bodily injury”, which certainly recalls the English requirement of an 
intention to kill or intention to cause grievous bodily harm to any person30. However, 
it should be observed that the penalties vary considerably: to give some examples, in 
France, unlike England/Wales and Germany, “murder” does not involve a mandatory 
                                                 
23 See section 213 and section 216 respectively of the StGB. 
24 See Article 579 and 584 respectively, as well as 576 et seq. of the Codice penale. 
25 See Articles 221-2 et seq. of the Code pénal.  
26 All acts intended to cause harm but not death are covered by one of the aggravated forms provided 
for by the French code.  
27 J. Spencer, ‘Intentional Killings in French Law’ in J.Horder (ed.), Homicide Law in Comparative 
Perspective (Hart Publishing Oxford 2007) 39, 42. The author (ibid. 48) also points out that in France, 
in a case equivalent to the English Martin [2001] EWCA Crim 2245 [2003] QB 1 (where a farmer 
who shot a burglar in the back when he was escaping saw his conviction reduced from murder to 
manslaughter not on the grounds of “legitimate defence”, but of the partial defence called  
“diminished responsibility”), the perpetrator would be more likely to be acquitted by using self-
defence, unless the prosecution could prove that he is not acting for the safety of himself or of his 
family. 
28 For German law, see A. du Bois-Pedain, ‘Intentional Killings: The German law’ in J.Horder (ed.), 
supra 55, 57; R. Maurach, F.C. Schroeder, M. Maiwald, Strafrecht, Besonderer Teil 1 (3rd ed. C.F. 
Műller Heidelberg 2003) 11. For Italian law, see e.g. Cassaz. Sez. I 27 February 1998 n. 2587 (1999) 
Cassazione penale  1111 and also G. Fiandaca, E. Musco, Diritto penale, Parte speciale Vol. 2 t. 1(2nd 
ed. Zanichelli Bologna 2007) 10. In Scotland, it is not necessary that the death of the victim is 
intended (although “wicked intent” seems to be required), as “wicked recklessness” is sufficient: see 
V. Tadros, ‘The Scots Law of Murder’ in J.Horder (ed.), supra 187, 189. 
29 A. du Bois-Pedain, ‘Intentional Killings: The German law’ in J.Horder (ed.), supra 55, 57-58. 
30 On this requirement Smith and Hogan, Criminal law (supra note 4) 349. 
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life sentence; the German offence of “killing on demand” carries a punishment of 
imprisonment between six months and five years, while the Italian equivalent carries 
a minimum of six years and a maximum of fifteen years’ imprisonment, but a higher 
punishment, including life sentence, may apply due to aggravating circumstances31. 
It follows that where, for instance, a German authority issues an EAW for the 
purposes of prosecuting B, a British citizen accused of killing G, a German citizen 
for an act of murder which would not be qualified as such under UK law, the request 
should of course be satisfied. Although, from a “Euro-phile” perspective, purists in 
favour of full harmonisation might find it an unjust and non-uniform treatment32, one 
could argue here that the disparities are not significant and that the offence is so 
serious as to render them irrelevant in practical terms. The ratio is indeed to punish 
the perpetrator under the law of the place where the crime was committed, no matter 
how this is done. However, why should there be such diverse penalties? 
 
Another issue is related to those acts that are not included in the definition of murder 
by some States, such as abortion and euthanasia. The question of whether or not the 
State should criminalise these acts invades a number of extra-legal fields and is 
certainly topical. Regarding euthanasia, as is well known, within the European Union 
two countries in particular have been in the spotlight recently: Belgium and the 
Netherlands, which allow it in specific circumstances from 2002 and 2001 
                                                 
31 See for “murder” Article 221-1 of the Code penal, section 211 of the StGB, Murder (Abolition of 
death penalty) Act 1965 c. 71; for “killing on demand”, section 216 of the StGB and Article 579 of the 
Codice penale. 
32 Interestingly, there has been a debate in England and Wales about the possibility of modifying the 
law of murder and some suggestions have been put forward: see e.g. A. Pedain, ‘Intention and the 
Terrorist Example’ [2003] Criminal Law Review 579. The UK Law Commission, after analysing other 
jurisdictions, has proposed to replace the distinction murder/manslaughter with first degree 
murder/second degree murder/manslaughter. The first would carry a mandatory life sentence and 
would include intentional killing as well as killing with an intention to do serious injury in the 
awareness that there is a serious risk of causing death; the second would include killing with an 
intention to do serious injury or to cause injury or a fear or risk of injury, in the awareness that there is 
a serious risk of causing death, as well as cases where a partial defence has been recognised. One of 
the reasons is that, since the use of the term “intention” now prevails over the previous “malice 
aforethought”, this has led to a very narrow definition of murder and, by contrast, a very broad 
definition of manslaughter. See Law Commission for England and Wales, Murder, Manslaughter and 
Infanticide, Law Com No 304 (London 2006) and J. Horder, ‘The Changing Face of the Law of 
Homicide’ in J.Horder (ed.), supra 19. 
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respectively33. Regarding abortion, it is equally well known that Ireland prohibits it 
at the constitutional level, unless the medical practitioner reasonably believes that it 
is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial risk of loss of the woman’s 
life34. These delicate issues were considered by the drafters of the EAW, who 
intended initially to apply the “negative list system”, allowing each country to 
establish of list of offences for which a request for surrender would always be 
refused35. The system now is different (being based on a “positive” list), but the issue 
stays the same: would Dutch authorities be prepared to surrender a doctor practising 
an “intentional destruction of unborn human life after implantation in the womb of a 
woman” to Ireland? It must be added that the contours of what is meant by 
euthanasia and the circumstances in which it is allowed are not always clear36. For 
instance, in the UK “active euthanasia”, meaning taking active steps to hasten 
another person’s death, is criminalised37, but cases of “passive euthanasia” may be 
tolerated38. The Ms Pretty case brought the issue to the public’s attention (although 
“assisted suicide” should be as a matter of principle different from “murder”). The 
applicant, paralysed and terminally ill, requested that her husband be allowed to help 
her to commit suicide, arguing, inter alia, that human dignity and freedom as 
                                                 
33 Loi du 28 mai 2002 relative à l’euthanasie, Moniteur Belge, 22 juin 2002; The Termination of Life 
on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act , 10 April 2001, available at 
http://www.nvve.nl/assets/nvve/english/euthlawenglish.pdf.  
34 Twenty-fifth Amendment of the Constitution (Protection of Human Life in Pregnancy) Bill, 2001. 
35 Draft Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between 
the Member States, Brussels, 25/09/2001, COM (2001) 522 final/2 16.  
36 An overview of the legislation on euthanasia in Belgium and the Netherlands is given by a Report 
of the French Senate (since in France a similar reform was considered by Parliament): 
www.senat.fr/lc/lc109/lc109.html. For an overview of the legislation of other countries, see 
http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc49/lc49.html. For discussions on euthanasia, see e.g. C. André, ‘Euthanasie et 
droit pénal: la loi peut-elle definir l’exception?’ (2004) 1 Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal 
comparé 43, who argues inter alia that euthanasia should be viewed as an autonomous justification. 
37 In R v. Cox [1992] 12 BMLR 38 a terminally ill patient repeated requested her doctor to terminate 
her life. The doctor decided to inject a lethal dose of potassium chloride and was eventually convicted 
of attempted murder.  
38 In England and Wales, since the Suicide Act 1961 (section 1) suicide has no longer been a crime, 
although aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the suicide of another is punishable by up to 
fourteen years’ imprisonment; helping someone to die may also be punishable under the common law 
of murder by a mandatory life sentence. In Scotland attempting suicide is not a crime. In this broad 
context, the case law has evolved considerably. In Airedale 8HS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 the 
Lords (referring to the “best interest test”) recognised that withholding life sustaining treatment is not 
unlawful when the patient has been in a persistent vegetative state for a long time. In B v. an 8HS 
Hospital Trust, B (Adult: refusal of medical treatment) 2002 EWHC 429 AER 499 it was held that a 
patient has the right to refuse treatment (in that case, the right to ask that the ventilator keeping her 
alive be switched off) knowing that this would result in death. The courts tend to distinguish between 
passively allowing death and active assistance in suicide (which is unlawful). It is important to note 
that in B it was the patient herself, rather than a hospital trust or relatives, who refused treatment.  
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protected by the ECHR should include the right to self-determination in deciding 
how and when to die. However, neither the House of Lords nor the European Court 
on Human Rights, to which she turned, recognised such a right39. The debate has 
since intensified and a recent Bill (inspired by Oregon legislation) was put forward to 
allow in some circumstances physician-assisted suicide for competent adult patients 
who suffer unbearably from a terminal illness40. Similar debates continue in other 
European countries. In Italy, in a case similar to the British B v. an 8HS Hospital 
Trust, it was held that a doctor could not be prosecuted for the crime of “killing on 
demand” because, although both the material and the psychological elements were 
deemed to exist, the defence named “performing a duty” excluded punishability (the 
patient asked the doctor to switch off the ventilator that allowed him to live)41. In a 
recent case the Italian Supreme Court held that a life-support system may be 
discontinued when there is no doubt about the patient’s persistent vegetative state 
and as long as there is clear evidence (deduced from his lifestyle, personality, past 
opinions, etc.) that had he been conscious he would have requested it42.   
 
Concern for these issues is confirmed by the Belgian implementing law, which 
explicitly states that the offences of abortion and euthanasia are not considered to be 
covered by the concept of voluntary homicide43. 
 
The degree of ambiguity and the lack of a common view on what exactly murder is, 
at least in some borderline cases, urge us to question both the coherence and the 
                                                 
39 Pretty v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2001] UKHL 61; ECtHR Pretty v. United Kingdom 
(Application no. 2346/02). Ms. Pretty claimed before the ECtHR that Articles 2 (right to life), 3 
(prohibition on inhuman and degrading treatment), 8 (right to private life), 9 (freedom of conscience) 
and 14 (prohibition on discrimination) of the Convention had been violated. 
40 See the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill (10/11/2005) HL, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldbills/017/2004017.htm.  
41 Tribunale di Roma, sentenza GIP n. 2049/07 23 July 2007 (“Welby case”). See also Article 51 of 
the Codice penale. The court held on that occasion that the act could not be defined as “euthanasia” or 
“assisted suicide”. It must be observed that euthanasia is still forbidden by Italian law. The Supreme 
Court has held in the past that extenuating circumstances having a social or moral value (normally 
applicable under Italian law when a conduct is performed out of purely altruistic reasons) cannot 
apply in the case of “killing on demand” when this takes the form of euthanasia, as the latter does not 
represent a conduct generally approved by Italian society. See e.g. Cassaz. sez. I pen. n. 2501/90 7 
April 1989 in Cassazione penale (1991) 1778. 
42 Cassaz. sez. I civ. n. 21748/07 16 October 2007 (“Eluana case”). See also Cassaz. S.U. civ. n. 
27145/08 13 November 2008 (idem).  
43 Article 5 (4) Belgian law implementing the European Arrest Warrant, published on 22/12/2003, 
Moniteur Belge, 2nd ed. 
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effectiveness of the EAW procedure as far as this type of offences is concerned. As 
observed earlier, this is due not only to purely legal considerations, but also to a 
broader analysis of social, cultural and moral aspects intimately connected to each 
country’s criminal law system.  
 
The second of our two examples is rape. Definitions of rape throughout Europe have 
varied considerably in the past years, reflecting changes in attitudes and policies. A 
rough distinction could be made between consent-based and force-based definitions. 
The former (mostly belonging to common law systems) focus on the victim’s lack of 
genuine consent as the act in itself is viewed as a deprivation of sexual autonomy: 
this is the case e.g. of England/Wales and Scotland44. The latter (mostly belonging to 
civil law jurisdictions) are based essentially on the concept of force/threat of violence 
(although the will of the victim is to some extent taken into account) and consider the 
act as reflecting unequal relationships of power: this is the case, for instance, in 
Spain45. In practice, this determines differences in the evidentiary requirements, as 
the absence of consent needs to be proved by the presence of a series of 
circumstances (which may include force or threat of force) and this is not always 
easy. To be sure, it is hard to find a catch-all notion of rape. On the one hand, 
consent-based definitions risk encouraging an analysis of the conduct of the victim 
(in particular, the sexual history) which might make it easier for the defence to 
exploit loopholes and ambiguities; moreover, these definitions fail to incorporate the 
element of physical violence and might pose difficulties, for instance whenever the 
victim was not able to communicate with the aggressor during the intercourse46.  On 
                                                 
44 For England and Wales, see the Sexual Offences Act 2003: “A person (A) commits an offence if (a) 
he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person (B) with his penis, (b) does not 
consent to the penetration and (c) does not reasonably believe that B consents”; for Scotland, see Lord 
Advocate’s Reference of 2001, 2002 SLT 466, Lord Justice-General Cullen 475F [39] and 476A [44]. 
45 According to Article 178 of the Código penal: “El que atentare contra la libertad sexual de otra 
persona, con violencia o intimidación, será castigado como responsable de agresión sexual con la pena 
de prisión de uno a cuatro años.” (Whoever commits an assault on another person’s sexual liberty, 
with violence or intimidation, will be punishable for sexual aggression by a penalty of one to four 
years’ imprisonment” [my translation]). Actual rape is defined by Article 179. On the other hand, the 
crime of sexual abuse of minors is defined in terms of lack of consent: see Article 181 et seq. For 
more details, see infra p. 125. 
46 For criticism on the consent-based definitions, see V. Tadros, ‘Rape Without Consent’ (2006) 26 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 515. The author suggests elaborating a single offence of rape, which 
should be differentiated into different parts in order to adapt to different situations and should 
concentrate on the conduct of the defendant. 
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the other hand, force-based definitions do not embrace all cases where neither 
violence nor threats of violence occur (such as where the victim is deceived or is 
unconscious, mentally incapable or under age or simply does nothing to resist)47.  
 
The uncertainty as to the exact qualification of rape is confirmed at the international 
level, where the conduct only matters in the context of war crimes, genocide or 
crimes against humanity48. The first definition was elaborated by the ICTR in 
Akayesu49: “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under 
circumstances which are coercive” and which do not need to be proved but may be 
inferred from the context (e.g. an armed conflict)50. This is clearly a force-based 
approach. However, the ICTY, after initially endorsing it51, developed its own theory 
starting from Furundžija52. The Tribunal, after finding that sometimes the same act 
(in the case at issue, forced oral penetration) is criminalised as sexual assault in some 
States and rape in others, argued that this did not breach the principle of legality, as 
the question was only about how harsh the penalty should be, as opposed to whether 
or not there was a crime53. In the end, the actus reus of rape was defined in rather 
broad terms54. A further step was made in Kunarac55, where the Tribunal argued that 
the common feature of both common law and civil law jurisdictions is the 
                                                 
47 See, among many, Smith and Hogan, Criminal law, supra 455. 
48 See Articles 4 and 5 ICTY as well as Articles 2, 3, and 4 ICTR.  
49 Prosecutor v. Akayesu (Case No. ICTR 96-4-T), Judgement, 2 September 1998 par. 688. 
50 On the other hand “sexual violence” (embracing rape) may include, apart from the physical invasion 
of the human body, “(…) acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact”. Ibid. 
51 Prosecutor v. Delaliĉ et al., supra par. 478-479. 
52 Prosecutor v. Furundžija (Case No. IT-95-17/1-T), Judgement, 10 December 1998 par. 185. 
53 Prosecutor v. Furundžija, supra par. 182-184.  
54 “…(i) the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of 
the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by the 
penis of the perpetrator; (ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third 
person”.  See Prosecutor v. Furundžija, supra par. 185.  
55 Prosecutor v. Kunarac a.o. (Case No. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T), Judgement, 22 February 2001 
par. 457-460. The Trial Chamber also interpreted Rule 96 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
(according to which “consent shall not be allowed as a defence”) as an indication of lack of consent 
rather than as a reference to a defence in technical terms (as this would shift the burden of proof to the 
defendant). Ibid. par. 463. Force is therefore evidence of lack of consent, rather than an element of 
rape: ibid. par. 458. Although in some particularly coercive circumstances (such as when the victims 
are held in special detention centres) lack of consent may be presumed (see Prosecutor v. Kunarac 
a.o. (Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A) Appeals Judgement, 12 June 2002), the consent-based 
approach is still followed by the ICTY: see e.g. Prosecutor v. Zelenović (Case No. IT-96-23/2-S), 
Judgement, 4 April 2007, par. 36 (in this case a series of rapes were committed inter alia to obtain 
information or as a form of punishment or intimidation) and Prosecutor v. Zelenović (Case No. IT-96-
23/2-A), Appeals Judgement, 31 October 2007.  
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criminalisation of the violation of sexual autonomy: as a result, the actus reus would 
necessarily have to be based on lack of consent, whereas the mens rea would consist 
in the intention to commit the act and the knowledge of such lack of consent. The 
ICTR at one point seemed to be following this approach in Semanza56, but thereafter 
tried to combine the two definitions in Muhimana57. This compromise is not 
convincing, as it leaves aside all the evidentiary issues outlined above and does not 
take a clear, explicit stance in favour of either view.  
 
Despite what has been said above, there is certainly, at least in Europe, a trend 
towards widening the scope of this offence. Indeed, in the last twenty years, many 
countries have repeatedly adopted a number of reforms, which shows a form of 
bottom-top approximation (which started with criminalising rape within marriage)58. 
For instance, in Germany the Criminal Code’s force-based definition was amended 
in order to create a gender-neutral offence and to include cases where the victim is 
unprotected and at the mercy of the offender as well as rape in marriage; this 
definition is very broad as the Code refers to a vague term: “sexual acts”59. In Spain 
the whole area of sexual offences has been modified several times, and revolves now 
around the concept of “offences against sexual freedom”, with a basic crime having a 
general scope, called “sexual aggression” (when the victim’s sexual freedom is 
compromised by violence or threat of violence) and an aggravated form, called 
“rape” (including any type of penetration, which can be committed by either a male 
or a female perpetrator)60. However, the distinction between these crimes is blurred 
                                                 
56 Prosecutor v. Semanza (Case No. ICTR 97-20-T), Judgement, 15 May 2001 par. 346. 
57 Prosecutor v. Muhimana (Case No. ICTR 95-1B-T), Judgement, 25 April 2005 Summary par. 32-
35: “(…) the Chamber takes the view that the Akayesu definition and the Kunarac elements are not 
incompatible or substantially different in their application”. 
58 See e.g. Rape Crisis Network Europe ‘Rape: Still a forgotten issue’, September 2003, available at 
www.rcne.com.  
59 “sexuelle Handlungen”. The change surprisingly occurred only in 1997: see section 177 of the StGB 
as amended by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1997. Violence is evidence of lack of consent. See 
also R. Maurach, F.C. Schroeder, M. Maiwald, Strafrecht, Besonderer Teil supra 187.  The minimum 
sentence of imprisonment is one year in less serious cases, and two, three or five years (depending on 
the circumstances) in more serious cases (e.g. when there is sexual intercourse).  
60 See Articles 178 and 179 of the Código penal and the recent laws 11/2003 29 September and 
15/2003 25 November. The aggravated form is punished by six to twelve years’ imprisonment. 
Parallel forms of offence are provided for by Articles 181-183 as “sexual abuses”: they are 
characterised by lack of violence/threats or consent and may be committed against both sexual liberty 
and integrity (which applies to minors below thirteen or persons who are unsound of mind or deaf: for 
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and is criticised by Spanish scholars61. Italy too has a force-based, gender-neutral 
definition, which, like in Germany, encompasses all “sexual acts” and refers to a 
concept of exploitation of physical and psychological inferiority of the victim; 
moreover, deception is included62. However, ambiguities remain63: this legislative 
choice is criticised because it might implicitly require a “duty of resistance” on the 
part of the victim, which is not always present64. In England and Wales the crime has 
been re-defined in 1994 and in 200365: following these changes, it now extends to all 
types of penetration with a penis (including forced oral sex), which means that the 
(principal) offender must be a man or a transsexual. At the same time, consent is now 
defined by statute and it is necessary to prove that the victim does not consent and 
that the perpetrator does not reasonably believe that he or she consents. Recklessness 
as to the fact that the victim was not consenting no longer needs to be proved66. The 
                                                                                                                                          
these categories the presumption of non-consent is non-rebuttable). Cases of deception may only 
occur when the victim is between thirteen and sixteen.  
61 M.G.Tomillo, ‘Derecho Penal Sexual y Reforma Legal’ (2005) Revista Electrónica de Ciencia 
Penal y Criminologia 07-04 at http://criminet.ugr.es/recpc, who also thinks that the mens rea of 
“sexual aggression” should not include a lascivious intention, contrary to what asserted by courts; C. 
Lamarca Pérez, Manual de Derecho Penal. Parte especial (2nd ed. Colex Madrid 2004) 134. 
62 See Article 609bis of the Codice penale (“sexual violence”), as modified by Article 3 law 66/1996 
15 February, which moved the offence from the category of “crimes against sexual liberty” (within the 
so-called “crimes against public morality”) to that of “crimes against the person”, by merging the two 
previous offences of “carnal violence” and “libidinous acts”.  Violence, threats or “abuse of authority” 
are required. The penalty is established between five and ten years’ imprisonment (save aggravating 
or extenuating circumstances). A separate crime of rape committed by a group of people is provided 
for by Article 609octies (six to twelve years’ imprisonment, save aggravating or extenuating 
circumstances).  
63 G. Fiandaca, E. Musco, Diritto penale, Parte speciale supra 207. Case law has considered as 
“sexual violence” even the mere touching of another person’s face with one’s own lips: Cassaz. sez. 
III pen. n. 549/2006 11 January 2006 CED (2006) 233115. Lack of consent is presumed, although it 
does not have to exist from the outset.  
64 G. Fiandaca, E. Musco, Diritto penale, Parte speciale, supra 211-212. According to the Supreme 
Court, when the defendant insists that there was consent, the victim’s statements need to be carefully 
examined (Cassaz. n. 1636/98 10 February 1999 (1999) Cassazione penale 2194, in which the appeal 
was accepted on the grounds that the woman was wearing jeans and it would be normally very 
difficult to take them off without the cooperation of the victim; for a contrary ruling, see Cassaz. n. 
40542/2007 15 November 2007).  
65 See Sexual Offences Act 1956 and Section 142 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994; 
Section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The latter has also re-defined other similar sexual 
offences, such as: “assault by penetration”, which sometimes overlaps with rape; “sexual assault”; 
“causing sexual activity”. Rape and assault by penetration are punishable by imprisonment for life. 
66 Lack of consent may be proved through a series of conclusive or, in alternative, rebuttable 
presumptions. Where this is not possible, a definition of consent is given as a last resort: “a person 
consents if he agrees by choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice”. See sections 
74, 75, 76 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. On the other hand, lack of reasonable belief must be 
ascertained having regard to all the circumstances, including any steps the accused has taken to make 
sure that there was consent. See section 1(2) of the Act.  
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previous approach, relying on the distinction between consent and mere submission67 
was much criticised and in the end rejected68. However, some authors still point out a 
few problems69. In Scotland, the definition of rape is rather narrow, as it only refers 
to a vaginal sexual intercourse between a man and a woman without her consent70. It 
therefore includes recklessness and excludes either anal or oral sex; moreover, 
consent is not formally qualified. This is a modification of a previous more 
restrictive view, requiring evidence of resistance and corresponding force71. Finally, 
in France, as a result of amendments in 1980, the offence of rape has been elaborated 
as penetration committed by violence, constraint, threat or abuse (“surprise”)72. 
Consent can only be argued from the existence of these situations. The new 
definition covers any form of penetration (not only by the penis), although 
sometimes the presence of a sexual motive is required73.  
 
Concluding, despite a few undeniable differences, European countries seem to 
converge towards a “lack of consent” definition and this has been confirmed by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In MC v. Bulgaria (a case concerning 
the alleged rape of a young girl by private individuals) the Court found that States 
have a positive obligation (under Articles 3 and 8 ECHR) to identify as a crime all 
                                                 
67 Olugboja [1981] 3 AER 1382.  
68 A.P.Simester, G.R.Sullivan, Criminal law: theory and doctrine, supra 418.  
69 The new approach is still blamed for not being capable of dealing with some situations, for instance 
where the accused person’s belief in consent is determined by his level of culture or stereotypes: J. 
Temkin, A. Ashworth, ‘The Sexual Offences Act 2003: Rape, Sexual Assaults and the Problems of 
Consent’ [2004] Criminal Law Review 328, 342. It has surprisingly been argued in the past that rape 
by omission can never occur, so that, if the defendant has penetrated the victim with consent and this 
is withdrawn, or he realises there has never been consent, he does not commit rape if he goes on: 
Smith and Hogan, Criminal law, supra 457. For other criticism, see V. Tadros, ‘Rape Without 
Consent’ supra 515. 
70 Lord Advocate’s Reference of 2001, 2002, supra. Male rape is prosecuted as “sodomy”.  
71 T.H. Jones, M.G.A. Christie, Criminal law (3rd ed. W. Green Edinburgh 2003) 253. The previous 
force-based notion dated back to Baron Hume’s 1797 definition. In 2001, Lord Abernethy’s ruling 
was overruled by Lord Advocate’s Reference. The case caused widespread scandal and, as a result, a 
reform towards the consent-based notion is in progress. See ‘The Legal Definition of Rape’ at 
www.scottish.parliament.uk ; Scottish law Commission News Release ‘Justice, Clarity and Consent: 
New Sex Laws for Scotland’, 19 December 2007.  
72 See Article 222-23 of the Code pénal and Law 23 December 1980. A maximum penalty of fifteen 
years’ imprisonment is provided for (save aggravating factors, in which case the penalty may reach a 
maximum of twenty or thirty years, depending on the circumstances; in case of torture or inhumane 
acts the punishment is life imprisonment: Articles 222-24 to 222-26). All other sexual aggressions are 
punished by Article 222-27.  
73 It may therefore be committed by a woman as a principal offender. For more details, see C. Elliott, 
French criminal law supra 174.  
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4.1.1.2 Some special cases 
 
Unlike murder and rape, particularly serious issues emerge with regard to a number 
of non-harmonised offences: racism and xenophobia, racketeering and extortion, 
swindling, sabotage and trafficking in stolen vehicles75.  
 
The first one was the object of a Joint Action in the nineties76, but this did not alter 
the existing landscape, characterised by enormous differences in the Member States’ 
legislation: in some countries either racism or xenophobia are not defined at all, or 
merely constitute aggravating circumstances; conduct may be aimed at groups of 
persons, but sometimes these are described very broadly; some legal systems do not 
provide for incitement to hatred or violence against foreigners77. The classification of 
racism and xenophobia as an offence involves a host of thorny issues related to social 
and moral values, apart from obvious political considerations. It relies on an 
appropriate balance between freedom of expression and criminal punishment. Given 
its complexity, it is surprising that such a category has been inserted in the EAW list. 
The Belgian Constitutional Court recently had to deal with one of these delicate 
issues, when it partially annulled a few provisions of a domestic law, incriminating 
inter alia any individual that proclaims his intention to discriminate or to practice 
hate or violence against another individual based on racial/xenophobic motives, as it 
                                                 
74 ECtHR MC v. Bulgaria, Application no. 39272/98, 4 December 2003, par. 166.  
75 It is particularly significant that, in the course of the negotiations on the Framework Decision on the 
European Evidence Warrant, Germany insisted on an opt-out for a list of 6 types of offences, which 
roughly corresponds to the one mentioned above: racism and xenophobia, computer-related crime, 
sabotage, racketeering and extortion, swindling and terrorism. See Council Framework Decision 
2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the European evidence warrant for the purpose of obtaining 
objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in criminal matters, OJ L 350 30/12/2008. 
76 Joint Action 96/443/JHA of 15 July 1996 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K3 of the 
Treaty on European Union, concerning action to combat racism and xenophobia, OJ L 185 
24/07/1996. 
77 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, ‘Combating racism and xenophobia 
through criminal legislation: the situation in the EU Member States’ Opinion n. 5-2005. Disagreement 
between Member States is also evident in the Annex to the Joint Action, supra. 
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concluded that they were breaching freedom of expression78. Plans for a Framework 
Decision replacing the Joint Action were dropped in 2003 and again in 2005, only to 
be resumed in 2007: a final text was recently agreed upon79. The latest version 
restricts punishment to intentional conduct and criminalises also “publicly 
condoning, denying or grossly trivialising” genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes only insofar as they are likely to incite to violence or hatred80. Despite 
this limitation, this is exactly one of the cases where national approaches vary 
considerably, from not punishing the act at all (e.g. UK, Sweden) to punishing it 
more or less extensively (e.g. Germany, Austria)81. However, a trend must be 
recognised at the international level towards the criminalisation of conducts falling in 
the area of “racism and xenophobia”82. 
 
The other offences mentioned above raise many doubts as to their meaning and legal 
value. “Swindling”, for instance, can hardly be deemed compatible with the German 
or Dutch equivalent83 or indeed with any other version. “To swindle” means “to 
cheat, defraud (a person) out of money or property” and “swindling” is intended as 
“fraud or imposition for purposes of gain”, but this is ordinary language rather than a 
rigorous legal definition84. A corrigendum of the proposed Framework Decision on 
the EAW gives some hints: "The Presidency noted that in the minutes of the Council 
a reference would be made to the offence of swindling indicating some of the 
possible constituent elements it might cover such as using false names, claiming a 
false position or using fraudulent means to abuse people's confidence or credibility in 
                                                 
78 Cour d’Arbitrage arrêt n. 157/2004 6 October 2004.  
79 See inter alia Council doc. 8405/05, 29 April 2005 and doc. 5118/07, 15 January 2007; for the final 
text, see Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain 
forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, OJ L 328 06/12/2008. 
80 See doc. 16771/07, 26 February 2008 and Article 1 Framework Decision, supra.  
81 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, supra 78. In Italy, prosecution of 
“crimes of opinion” is rare, as freedom of speech tends to be interpreted very broadly (Article 21 
Italian Constitution). 
82 See e.g. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of 
acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems, Strasbourg, 28/1/2003, 
ETS n. 189. The European Court of Human Rights tends to exclude protection under Article 10 
ECHR to cases of denial of holocaust: see e.g. Garaudy v. France, Application n. 65831/01; Witzsch 
v. Germany Application n. 7485/03. 
83  N. Keijzer, ‘The Double Criminality Requirement’ in R. Blekxtoon, W. van Ballegooij, Handbook 
on the European Arrest Warrant (TMC Asser Press The Hague 2005) 137, 157. 
84 The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 1989, OED Online, Oxford University Press. 4 Apr. 2000. 
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order to appropriate something belonging to another person"85. However, this is 
clearly insufficient and no further explanation is given. Would it include a conduct of 
circumvention of persons of unsound mind86? Similar concerns arise in relation to 
“racketeering and extortion” or “sabotage”87. In particular, as to the former, the 
relationship between the two terms is not clear cut. Also, what should the scope of 
extortion be? The Italian Criminal Code distinguishes between “extortion” and 
“kidnapping for extortion purposes”: should the second conduct be covered as 
well88? Finally, should “trafficking in stolen vehicles” include parts of them as well? 
 
 
4.1.2 Crimes subject to harmonisation 
 
A second group of crimes in the EAW list consists of those which have been 
harmonised to some extent at the European level. These are offences which are 
deemed as particularly serious from the point of view of the European Union. The 







                                                 
85 Council doc. 14867/1/01, 11 December 2001. 
86 Article 643 of the Italian Codice penale. 
87  N. Keijzer, ‘The Double Criminality Requirement’ supra 150-151 points out that, for instance, 
“racket et extorsion de fonds” (relating to financial items) and “Erpressung und 
Schutzgelderpressung”  (referring to protection money) seem more restrictive than the EAW category. 
On the other hand, “sabotage” is not further specified: should it include only wartime sabotage, or 
peacetime sabotage as well? Should it only refer to public or also private victims? 
88 See Articles 629 and 630 of the Codice penale. Interestingly, these issues were not ignored. In 
Council doc. 9958/02, 16 July 2002, “(...) [t]he Council states that in particular for the following 
offences (…) there is no completely harmonised definition at Union level (...). Member States are 
requested to be guided by the following definitions of acts in order to make the arrest warrant 
operational throughout the Union (...). Racism and xenophobia as defined in the Joint Action (...). 
Sabotage: ’Any person who unlawfully and intentionally causes large-scale damage to a government 
installation, another public installation, a public transport system or other infrastructure which entails 
or is likely to entail considerable economic loss’. Racketeering and extortion: ’Demanding by threats, 
use of force or by any other form of intimidation goods, promises, receipts or the signing of any 
document containing or resulting in an obligation, alienation or discharge’”. Despite their obvious 
lack of legal value, it is curious that no explanatory report mentions these guidelines. 
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4.1.2.1 Terrorism, organised crime, drug trafficking, money laundering, trafficking 
in human beings, facilitation of unauthorised entry and residence 
 
Concerning the crimes of terrorism, organised crime, drug trafficking, money 
laundering, trafficking in human beings and facilitation of unauthorised entry and 
residence. It might be argued that there should not be too many problems in defining 
these offences for two reasons: one is that they are severely punished in all legal 
systems; the other is that a substantial number of international and European 
instruments have already been adopted. This is the case of terrorism. The definition 
of this offence has been subject to debate for a long time and partial solutions have 
been found in a great variety of international Conventions and Resolutions, which 
have grown since 9/1189. Within the European Union, approximation has been 
pursued through a 2002 Framework Decision90. Nevertheless, unanimous agreement 
is far from being reached, as confirmed at the institutional level by recent attempts to 
conclude a further Convention91. The dispute concerns both the objective and the 
subjective elements of the offence. As for the former, the question is whether or not 
(and to what extent) the definition should cover, for instance: armed conflict, acts of 
violence against oppressive or colonialist regimes, State terrorism, use of the internet 
for the purpose of propaganda, activities of organised groups rather than of single 
individuals. As for the latter, the intent is normally to commit an ordinary crime 
(assault, murder, etc.): this is coupled with the “special intent” of terrorising the 
population as well as with a political, ideological or religious motive92. Some authors 
                                                 
89 See, among the most recent: European Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, 16/05/2005, 
ETS n. 196,; International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, GA Res. 
59/290, 13/04/2005 (not yet in force); International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism, GA Res. 54/109, 10/01/2000. See also the European Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism, 27/01/1977, ETS n. 90, which abolished the political offence exception for a few terrorism-
related offences. Among the UN Resolutions, see e.g. UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1373 
(2001). 
90 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism OJ L 164 
22/06/2002.  
91 Draft Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/59/894 App. II, 
which inter alia contains an obligation to exclude any justification of terrorist acts on political, 
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other grounds (Article 6). As has been observed, 
“(…)[t]he world’s uniform opposition to “terrorism” is dependent on its open-endedness, the degree 
to which it allows everyone to fill the category of “terrorist” with one’s preferred adversary”: see M. 
Koskenniemi, ‘International law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration’ (2004) 17 Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 198. 
92 For this, see A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (OUP 2003) 129. 
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maintain that an international definition of terrorism now exists under customary 
law93; some others point out that there is no need to rely on a single statutory 
definition and believe that a more effective way of dealing with this matter is to take 
into account different factors on a case by case basis94; it has even been suggested to 
restrict the subjective element to the mere intent to commit a terrorist act, in order to 
avoid abuse of the terrorist formula95. The Framework Decision attempts to solve 
some of these problems, as it qualifies in Article 1 (1) as terrorist offences a series of 
serious acts that, from an objective point of view, “given their nature or context”, 
“may seriously damage a country or an international organisation” and, from a 
subjective point of view, aim at “i) seriously intimidating a population, ii) unduly 
compelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from 
performing any act, or iii) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental 
political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or international 
organisation”96. It then refers to offences relating to a terrorist group (such as 
directing or participating), offences linked to terrorist activities (i.e. aggravated theft, 
extortion, drawing up fake administrative documents) as well as inciting, aiding or 
abetting, and attempting97. Although some ambiguities are avoided98, some problems 
still remain. Apart from the question of what is meant by “serious acts”, “structured 
group” or “terrorist group” (which may pave the way for abuses)99, doubts may arise 
as to the requirement of liability of legal persons (which is not established in all EU 
                                                 
93 Ibid. 120; A. Cassese, ‘The Multifaceted Notion of Terrorism in International Law’ (2006) 4 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 933. This definition would include, as dolus specialis, 
violence or threat with the aim of intimidating the population or a group of persons and, as a result, 
forcing a public or prominent private authority to do or abstain from doing something; as to the 
motive, the author admits that it is difficult to prove: ibid. 941. 
94 G. Fletcher, ‘The Indefinable Concept of Terrorism’ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 894. The factors should be eight: violence, intentions, victims, perpetrators, just cause, 
organisation, need to publicise the event, lack of guilt or regret. 
95 T. Weigend, ‘The Universal Terrorist’ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 912. 
96 A similar definition was adopted within the Second Pillar. See Council Common Position 
2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism. 
97 Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Framework Decision on combating terrorism, supra. 
98 For instance, actions by armed forces during an armed conflict as well as actions by armed forces in 
the exercise of their official duties are explicitly excluded: see point 11 of the Preamble to the 
Framework Decision, supra. On the controversy surrounding acts of freedom fighters in armed 
conflict, see A. Cassese, ‘The Multifaceted Notion of Terrorism in International Law’ supra 950. 
99 E. Symeonidou-Kastanidou, ‘Defining Terrorism’ (2004) 12 European Journal of Crime, Criminal 
Law and Criminal Justice 14, 28 and 30. 
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countries)100. Moreover, criminalising acts linked to terrorist activities (whenever 
they are performed with a view to committing terrorist offences) as well as 
preparatory acts on purely subjective terms broadens considerably the scope of 
terrorist offences101. This leads to the risk that (as a result of the emphasis put on the 
subjective elements) borderline actions are caught within the net even where the 
purpose of the perpetrator is not clear. In this respect, it is curious that a number of 
ordinary offences that might potentially be qualified as terrorist (as well as organised 
crime) offences are included within the EAW list: murder, arson, illicit trafficking in 
weapons/munitions/explosives, computer-related crime, kidnapping and hostage-
taking, illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials, unlawful seizure 
of aircraft/ships, sabotage. Some of them, i.e. theft, extortion and creating false 
administrative documents, as already seen, may also be identified as linked to 
terrorist activities. One may therefore wonder whether one of the reasons for drawing 
up such a large list of offences for which dual criminality does not need to be 
checked is that many of them may be in some “borderline” cases connected to 
terrorism and even when this is not possible (as sometimes it may be hard to qualify 
a conduct as terrorist or to provide sufficient evidence) they still make it possible to 
trigger the EAW mechanism. The effect is an enlargement of the scope for 
prosecution and punishment: this may be problematic, also in view of the elasticity 
with which the speciality rule may be applied (for instance, speciality is waived 
whenever the executing judicial authority gives its consent102). This area of concern 
extends to cases where membership of a terrorist organisation or any type of direct or 
indirect involvement in its activities cannot be proved clearly. For instance, a few 
issues may arise as to the definition of “supporting”, “recruitment”, “training”, 
“propaganda” or “public provocation to commit a terrorist offence”. Recent German 
                                                 
100 Articles 7 and 8 of the Framework Decision on combating terrorism, supra. On the different 
regimes of liability of legal persons, see J. Clough, ‘Bridging the Theoretical Gap: The Search for a 
Realist Model of Corporate Criminal Liability’ (2007) 18 Criminal Law Forum 267; S. Mir Puig, 
‘Una tercera vía en materia de responsabilidad penal de las personas jurídicas’ (2004) Revista 
Electrónica de Ciencia Penal y Criminologia 06-01 at http://criminet.ugr.es/recpc; J. Pradel, Droit 
penal comparé supra 351. Liability of legal persons was established in the 1997 Second Protocol of 
the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ Financial Interests, OJ 221. Note, 
however, that in all these cases liability may be either criminal or non-criminal, thus leaving the 
choice to domestic legislation (as long as penalties are established in an “effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive manner”).  
101 For instance, neither inciting, aiding, abetting nor attempting are explicitly defined. 
102 Article 27 (3) (g) of the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant. 
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legislation and case law seem to show a trend towards restricting the meaning of 
“lobbying” to recruiting members or supporters and not criminalising the mere 
promotion of the ideology of a terrorist organisation as “supporting” (when it only 
amounts to lobbying for general sympathy)103. The terms mentioned above are not 
contained in the original text of the Framework Decision on combating terrorism: 
this is why an amendment has made public provocation, recruitment and training 
punishable104. It is interesting to observe that, just as with the EAW Framework 
Decision (as will be seen in chapter 6), so the anti-terrorism Framework Decision has 
been challenged (albeit indirectly) in relation to the principles of legality and 
equality. Indeed, a number of Belgian NGOs brought recourse for annulment of the 
domestic implementing law before the Cour d’Arbitrage: although their arguments 
were all rejected, some of them correctly pointed out the lack of precision in the 
description of both the material and the subjective element of the conduct105. 
 
The crime of terrorism is often intimately linked to a number of other serious 
offences. The classic examples are: money laundering, drug trafficking and 
trafficking in human beings. Indeed, the term “serious” is key to the definition of all 
of them and this can be found in the corresponding international and European 
instruments106. More generally, the definitions contained in the most recent 
                                                 
103 As a result, justifying the aims or glorifying the acts of Al-Qaida would not qualify as 
“supporting”. See T. Gut, ‘Case Note on BGH Decision of 16 May 2007, Case No. AK 6/07 and StB 
3/07’ (2007) 72 The Journal of Criminal Law 491.  
104 These offences would be identified as “linked to terrorist activities” under Article 3. See Council 
Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, OJ L 330 09/12/2008. See also UN Security Council 
Resolution S/RES/1624 (2005); UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy A/RES/60/288 8 September 
2006; Decision No. 7/06 “Countering the use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes” of the Ministerial 
Council of the OSCE, 5 December 2006; European Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, supra 
note 89. 
105 For instance, the parties questioned the clarity of such terms as “serious” or “with the aim of 
unduly compelling (…) to perform or abstain from performing”. They express their concern that anti-
global or anti-war demonstrations might be criminalised where acts of vandalism are committed. See 
Cour d’Arbitrage Arrêt n. 125/2005 13 July 2005 available at www.arbitrage.be.  
106 See e.g. Framework Decision on combating terrorism, supra; Council Joint Action 98/733/JHA on 
making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organisation in the Member States of the 
European Union, OJ L351 21/12/1998; Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA of 25 October 
2004 laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in 
the field of illicit drug trafficking, OJ L335 25/10/2004; European Parliament and Council Directive 
2005/60/EC on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering 
and terrorist financing, OJ L309 26/10/2005. See also United Nations Convention Against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances available at 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf.  
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international Conventions have exercised a strong influence over European 
countries’ legislation. This is particularly true of the United Nations Convention on 
Transnational Organised Crime (TOC)107. Such terms as “organised criminal group”, 
“structured group”, “period of time” and so on have been utilised not only in the 
recently adopted Framework Decision on organised crime108, but also, for instance, 
in the Framework Decision on terrorism109. The negotiations of the TOC Convention 
led to a notion which shows a balance between the civil law and the common law 
approach110. To be sure, similar terms were adopted in the 1998 Joint Action on 
organised crime111. Lack of clarity and vagueness to a certain extent had already 
been highlighted with regard to this measure and, not surprisingly, the concerns were 
similar to those relating to the definition of terrorism, as mentioned above (including 
the issue of the liability of legal persons)112. Among the main problems, one can refer 
to: the meaning of “structured group”, which seems rigid and therefore at odd with 
many modern criminal “networks”113, the use of extra-legal terms, which are not 
always easy to prove114 and (just as with the TOC Convention) the combination of 
                                                 
107 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime, adopted by GA Resolution 
55/25 of 15 November 2000, A/RES/55/25 and the three Protocols on Trafficking in Persons, 
Smuggling of Migrants and Trafficking in Firearms. 
108 See Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised 
crime, OJ L 300 11/11/2008, which replaces the Council Joint Action, supra note 106. The Council 
reached a common position on 27 April 2006 (Bulletin EU 4-2006).  
109 See Article 2 of the Framework Decision on combating terrorism, supra. 
110 For a full account, see D. McClean, Transnational Organised Crime, A Commentary on the U8 
Convention and its Protocols (OUP 2007).  
111 Council Joint Action, supra note 106, whose Article 1 defines a criminal organisation as:”A 
structured association, established over a period of time, of more than two persons, acting in concert 
with the view to committing offences which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention 
order of a maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty, whether such offences are an end 
in themselves or a means of obtaining material benefits and, where appropriate, of improperly 
influencing the operation of public authorities”. 
112 V. Mitsilegas, ‘Defining organised crime in the European Union: the limits of European criminal 
law in an area of freedom, security and justice’ (2001) 26 European Law Review 565. Liability of 
legal persons is provided for by Article 3 of the Joint Action. 
113 P. Williams, ‘Organising Transnational Crime: Networks, Markets and Hierarchies’ in P. Williams, 
D. Vlassis (eds.), Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities and Responses, (1998) 4 
Transnational Organised Crime 57. 
114 One of the main models has been the Italian definition of mafia-type association (see Article 416-
bis of the Italian Codice penale). On the limits of this definition, including its difficult application to 
non-classical forms of mafia, see e.g. G. Fiandaca, E. Musco, Diritto penale Parte speciale Vol. 1(4th 
ed. Zanichelli Bologna 2007) 479. 
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the civil law notion of “criminal association” with the common law notion of 
“conspiracy”115.  
 
These divergences have been particularly problematic in extradition law in the past. 
For instance, back in 1984 a high-ranking Sicilian mafia boss, who had been arrested 
in Spain following investigations in the so-called “Pizza Connection” case, was 
extradited to the US rather than to Italy, as a result (inter alia) of the incompatibility 
between the definitions of organised criminal group in the two European countries116. 
After being tried and convicted in the US for drug trafficking conspiracy and 
continuing criminal enterprise, and having served his sentence there, he died just 
before the extradition proceedings back to Italy could be completed117. It may be 
argued that it is in order to avoid such troubles that the Italy-Spain fast-track 
surrender Treaty eliminated dual criminality for cases of organised crime118. 
Apparently problems are still faced by judicial authorities in the implementation of 
the EAW scheme. In this context, to give an example, it is theoretically possible that, 
were an EAW issued in relation to a crime of mere membership of a mafia group (i.e. 
purely on the basis of elements such as intimidation or “criminal silence”), the 
judicial authority would find it difficult to execute the warrant whenever that conduct 
is not identified as an offence under its own criminal law. The United Kingdom case 
law shows examples of this. In La Torre, one of the appellant’s grounds was that the 
request was based on an offence (participation in a camorra-type association) which 
                                                 
115 See Article 2 of the Council Joint Action, supra note 106, criminalising the participation in a 
criminal organisation. The civil law version (relying on active membership) is combined with the 
common law version (relying on mere agreement between two or more persons). See V. Mitsilegas, 
‘Defining organised crime’ supra 571-572. For conspiracy in general, see A.P. Simester, G.R. 
Sullivan, Criminal law: theory and doctrine supra 271; J. Pradel, Droit pénal comparé supra 275. 
116 The case concerned an international heroin trafficking network. The boss was extradited to the US 
on the condition that he would not be re-extradited to Italy. See Mafia: Badalamenti , è ancora in 
carcere negli Stati Uniti, ANSA 20 April 2002; Extraditado a EEUU el mafioso italiano 
Badalamenti, El País  17 November 1984; La policia investiga las conexiones de la delincuencia 
italiana en España, El País 11 April 1984. For an overview of Spanish debate on organised crime, see 
J.L. De la Cuesta, ‘Organised Crime Control Policies in Spain: A ‘Disorganised’ Criminal Policy for 
Organised Crime’ in C. Fijnaut, L. Paoli (eds.), Organised Crime in Europe: concepts, patterns and 
control policies in the European Union and beyond (Springer Dordrecht 2004) 795.  
117 Indeed, the “non re-extradition clause” no longer applied. See ‘Family Affairs’, Time 14 October 
1985. Badalamenti was sentenced to fifteen years for conspiracy to import and distribute narcotics and 
forty-five years for continuing criminal enterprise, although Spain had received the assurance that the 
term of imprisonment would not exceed thirty years. See United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp 
194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) and United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 (2nd Cir. 1989), at 1185. 
118On the Italy-Spain Treaty, see supra chapter 3 p. 70-71. 
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does not exist in Scotland: however, the High Court argued that, in light of the 2003 
Extradition Act, by looking at the substance of the conduct as described in the 
warrant (rather than the legal definition), it was possible to refer to the Scottish 
offence of conspiracy119. The problem is that in this case a number of activities had 
been specified by the requesting authority, such as threatening witnesses, extortion, 
drug trafficking and control and acquisition of public contracts and works. Further 
difficulties could arise if the EAW were simply to mention the offence of “being a 
member” of a mafia group. There is however a trend towards finding better solutions, 
as may be seen in the above-mentioned Framework Decision, although this is not 
immune from criticism120. The same can be said of the recent approximating 
instruments on drug trafficking, money laundering and trafficking in human 
beings121. Here again, the degree of common understanding on minimum standards is 
sufficiently high, although there is some divergence, e.g. as for the classification of 
irregular migration as a crime or as an administrative infringement122. It should be 
observed that the crime of assisting irregular migration is defined in a Directive and 
the corresponding penalties are prescribed in a Framework Decision123. Facilitation 
of unauthorised entry and residence is however included in the EAW list, which 
means that the material act would in any case be covered by either classification. As 
for drug trafficking, Member States’ approaches are substantially similar, although 
some variations may be observed as to the criminalisation of possession, use, 
production, cultivation and consumption, or the type of penalties adopted. As a 
general feature, alternative measures (such as administrative or social measures) 
                                                 
119 Antonio La Torre v. Her Majesty’s Advocate [2006] HCJAC 56, par. 19 and 122-124.  
120 E. Symeonidou-Kastanidou, ‘Towards a New Definition of Organised Crime in the European 
Union’, (2007) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 83, 97. 
121 On the plethora of instruments in this field, see at least V. Mitsilegas, B. Gilmore, ‘The EU 
Legislative Framework Against Money Laundering and Terrorist Finance: A Critical Analysis in the 
Light of Evolving Global Standards’ (2007) 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 119; 
M. Ventrella McCreight, ‘Smuggling of Migrants, Trafficking in Human Beings and Irregular 
Migration in a Comparative Perspective’ (2006) 12 European Law Journal 106. 
122 M. Ventrella McCreight, ‘Smuggling of Migrants’ supra 121. 
123 Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised 
entry, transit and residence, OJ L 328 05/12/2002; Council Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA of 28 
November 2002 on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of 
unauthorized entry, transit and residence, OJ L 328 05/12/2002. 
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apply to personal consumption per se, i.e. not connected to actual trafficking124. 
Indeed, the United Nations Conventions on Drugs, while prohibiting non-medical or 
non-scientific use, do not explicitly outlaw mere drug use and leave States free to do 
so; moreover, they seem to allow States to choose how to punish drug use offences 
(such as possession or cultivation) as long as the only purpose of the conduct is 
personal use125.  
 
Finally, a few differences still exist in the criminalisation of money laundering, for 
instance in relation to negligent money laundering, self-laundering and corporate 
criminal liability for laundering126. 
 
 
4.1.2.2 Corruption, fraud, euro counterfeiting, computer-related crime, sexual 
exploitation of children and child pornography, environmental crime 
 
Fraud and corruption were included in the Corpus Juris project a few years ago127. 
The rationale of this was to elaborate a number of substantive and procedural law 
basic principles which could represent a platform for further steps. Although the 
project was ultimately not put into practice, there is now an impressive amount of 
harmonising measures, covering also euro counterfeiting and including 
                                                 
124 Criminal prosecution tends to be disregarded in most cases, when the conduct merely consists of 
use or possession of small quantities for personal use when no aggravating circumstances can be 
identified. See legal reports at http://eldd.emcdda.europa.eu.  
125 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, at http://www.incb.org/incb/convention_1961.html; UN 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, at 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf . See also the two Commentaries on the 
Conventions, United Nations Publications, New York 1973 and 1998 respectively, and N. Boister, 
Penal Aspects of the U8 Drug Conventions (Kluwer Law 2001). 
126 Italy, Denmark, Spain and Sweden do not prosecute self-laundering (i.e. when the offence of 
money laundering is committed by the author of the predicate offence: in the first two cases non-
prosecution is due to fundamental principles of the domestic legal system – ne bis in idem in Italy and 
the principle according to which no one can be convicted of two crimes concerning the same assets in 
Denmark).  For other examples, see FATF Working Group on Evaluations and Implementation. 
FATF/WGEI (2007) 3; G. Stessens, Money laundering: a 8ew International Law Enforcement Model 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge-New York 2000), esp. 287-298, where he supports the 
abolition of double criminality for money laundering offences. 
127 M. Delmas-Marty, J.A.E. Vervaele (eds.), The Implementation of the Corpus Juris in the Member 
States (Intersentia, Antwerp-Groningen-Oxford 2000). 
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Conventions128. Indeed, approximation has been particularly intense in this area and 
this should not be a surprise, as these are viewed as crimes that seriously affect the 
core interests and values of the European Union. 
 
However, a few substantive law issues stand in the way of effective cooperation in 
the case of computer-related crime, as it is not clear what type of conduct this should 
cover and potential difficulties might arise in relation to language versions and 
identification of different elements of the conduct in the Member States’ legal 
systems. This has been pointed out as far as the Dutch and the French versions are 
concerned, but may of course be generally applicable129. Despite this, a recent 
Framework Decision has attempted to provide a basis for approximation (with useful 
definitions, such as “illegal access to information systems”, “illegal system 
interference” and “illegal data interference”)130. It has also limited the scope for 
prosecution, as the act must be committed “intentionally” and “without right” and 
penalty thresholds have been established; however, further steps are needed to 
complete the approximation process131.  
 
Concerning sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, the corresponding 
Framework Decision has considerably reformed the approach followed by previous 
instruments132. Clear offences have been identified133, broadening the area of 
                                                 
128 See e.g. Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in 
the private sector, OJ L 192 31/07/2003; Council Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA of 28 May 2001 
combating fraud  and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment, OJ  L 149 02/06/2001; Council 
Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA of 29 May 2000 on increasing protection by criminal penalties 
and other sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the introduction of the euro, OJ L 140 
14/06/2000; Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on European Union 
on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of 
Member States of the European Union, OJ C 195 25/06/1997; Convention drawn up on the basis of 
Article K3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the protection of the European Communities’ 
financial interests, OJ C 316 27/11/1995. This list is not exhaustive and does not include United 
Nations or Council of Europe instruments.  
129 N. Keijzer, ‘The Double Criminality Requirement’ supra 155 and, more in general,  P. De Hert, G. 
González Fuster, B. Koops, ‘Fighting Cybercrime in the Two Europes. The Added Value of the EU 
Framework Decision and the Council of Europe Convention’, (2006) 77 International Review of 
Penal Law 503.  
130 Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005 on attacks against information 
systems, OJ L 69 16/03/2005, Articles 2-4. See also Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, 
Budapest, 23/11/2001 ETS n. 185.   
131 P. De Hert, G. González Fuster, B. Koops, ‘Fighting Cybercrime in the Two Europes’ supra. 
132 Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA of 22 December 2003 on combating the sexual 
exploitation of children and child pornography, OJ L 13 20/01/2004. 
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punishability (which includes even “realistic images of a non-existent child” as child 
pornography); a wide range of sanctions is also provided for, affecting legal persons 
as well134. Nevertheless, it has been observed that the use of the term “age of sexual 
consent” (“majorité sexuelle” in French) maintains significant differences in the legal 
value, scope of the offences and age limit in a number of countries135. Finally, rules 
on environmental crime are being re-defined, after the recent famous judgements of 
the Court of Justice136. Two new measures, which add up to the current ship-source 
pollution Directive137, have taken into account the Court’s ruling: the first amends 
the Directive and requires enactment of “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” 
penalties, extending punishment to conduct performed not only with intent, but also 
recklessly or with serious negligence (thus reflecting a particularly repressive 
attitude, as a result of the stigma attached to it); the second adopts a similar view 
with regard to the protection of environment138. Therefore, both refrain from 









                                                                                                                                          
133 Ibid. Article 2-3. The first requires a conduct with “intention”, whereas the second also requires it 
to be performed “without right”. 
134 Ibid. Articles 1 and 5-7 respectively.  
135 Ibid. Articles 3 (2) (b), 5 (2) (b) and 5 (2) (c). See I. Wattier, ‘La lutte contre l’exploitation sexuelle 
des enfant et la pédopornographie et la majorité sexuelle: la consecration d’une disparité’ (2006) 77 
International Review of Penal Law 223, 229. 
136 ECJ C-176/03 Commission v. Council (Environmental Pollution case) [2005] ECR I-7879; ECJ C-
440/05 Commission v. Council (Ship-Source Pollution case) [2007] ECR I-9097. 
137 Directive 2005/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on ship-
source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements, OJ L 255 30/09/2005. 
138 See the two proposals COM (2008) 134 final; COM (2007) 51 final. The second has been recently 
adopted: Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 
on the protection of the environment through criminal law, OJ L 328 06/12/2008.  
139 M. Hedemann-Robinson, ‘The EU and Environmental Crime: The Impact of the ECJ’s Judgment 
on Framework Decision 2005/667 on Ship-Source Pollution’ (2008) Journal of Environmental Law. 
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In light of the brief analysis conducted above in relation to the issues related to the 
definition of crimes in the European Union Member States, a few conclusions may 
be drawn on the innovation contained in Article 2 (2) of the Framework Decision on 
the EAW. These conclusions broadly cover extraterritoriality, the Pinochet case and 
harmonisation. 
 
First of all, as is well known in the practice of extradition, States often extend their 
jurisdiction over crimes committed beyond the boundaries of their territory. More 
generally, jurisdiction is established on the basis of a series of principles: 
territoriality (when the crime is committed on the State’s territory); protection (when 
security or a national interest in general are violated); active personality or 
nationality (when the sought person is a national of the requesting State); passive 
personality (when the victim is a national of the requesting State); universality (when 
the nature of the offence is such that any State may claim criminal jurisdiction)140. 
However, there are further aspects that are not apparent from the mere listing of such 
principles, as for instance floating and aerial territoriality or the law of the flag141. 
Territoriality and extra-territoriality are linked to dual criminality, as both contribute 
to deciding where an individual is going to be prosecuted or punished142. In most 
cases countries that apply the active personality principle refuse extradition of their 
                                                 
140 C. Shachor-Landau, ‘Extra-Territorial Penal Jurisdiction and Extradition’ (1980) 29 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 274.  
141 M. Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice (5th ed. Oceana 
Publications New York 2007) 313. 
142 Under the subjective approach, territorial jurisdiction covers crimes which are commenced within 
the State, but carried out or completed abroad; under the objective approach, territorial jurisdiction is 
exercised where any essential element of the crime is committed on the State’s territory. Territoriality 
is normally applied by the United Kingdom, except for some serious crimes for which 
extraterritoriality applies (e.g murder, bigamy, treason). See e.g. 2001 UK International Criminal 
Court Act (c. 17). See also I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (4th ed. Clarendon 
Press Oxford 1990) 300-301.  
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nationals, whereas Anglo-American countries normally do the opposite143. What are 
then the consequences of the suppression of the dual criminality requirement and of 
the nationality exception in the European context? For instance, let us imagine that 
A, a citizen of State X, working and living in State Y (possibly even a citizen of it), 
is accused of a crime. However, it turns out that this conduct is not punishable under 
the latter State’s law and has been committed in a third State Z. State X (the State of 
nationality) applies active personality but State Y has not implemented Article 4 (7) 
(b) of the Framework Decision (which would allow it to refuse execution if it cannot 
prosecute the sought person for the same offence when committed outside its 
territory)144. Would it be fair to surrender A? Other possible scenarios could be 
imagined. First, what if A ignored, at the time of the commission, that his conduct 
was criminal as he was not aware of a recent piece of legislation enacted in State Z? 
Second, what if that State is a non-Member State? This question touches upon the 
very principle of legality and the way it should be understood in the European Union. 
It therefore relates to the more general issue of the shape and structure of the 
European Union. 
 
The relationship between double criminality and extra-territoriality is expressed also 
in terms of rule/exception. As has been noted, under Article 4 (7) (a) of the 
Framework Decision a State may refuse surrender even where the act may be 
included in one of the list categories, provided that the act has been committed, in 
whole or in part, in the requested State’s territory145. Moreover, the applicability of 
the “conditional return” clause under Article 5 (3) (allowing the requested State to 
subject surrender to the condition that the person is returned to serve the sentence in 
                                                 
143 See G. R. Watson, ‘Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal Jurisdiction’ 
(1992) 17 Yale Journal of International Law 41; C. Shachor-Landau, ‘Extra-Territorial Penal 
Jurisdiction and Extradition’ supra 294 (who both support the nationality principle). 
144 Article 4(7) (b) of the Framework Decision has been transposed by 22 States, but only 9 of them 
have qualified it as a mandatory ground. See Report from the Commission on the implementation of 
the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States in 2005, 2006 and 
2007, Brussels, 11/07/2007, COM (2007) 407 final and Annex to the Report, Brussels, 11/07/2007, 
SEC (2007) 979 final, 13. 
145 N. Keijzer, ‘The Double Criminality Requirement’ supra 161. 
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its territory) depends on the qualification of the act as a crime in both States 
concerned146. 
 
The residual element of the dual criminality requirement in Article 2 (4) provokes 
questions about the relevance of a potential Pinochet-like situation147, in which a 
temporal aspect was also considered, i.e. that the conduct should have constituted a 
crime in England at the time it occurred, rather than at the time of the extradition 
request. The wording of Article 2 (4) (although the verb “constitute” refers to the 
present and not to the past) does not entirely solve these problems. 
 
Concluding, a final evaluation of the impact of the removal of dual criminality is not 
possible, as that would require collection of data from all twenty-seven countries. 
However, a general overview, in light of the analysis carried out above, may help 
outline a few questions. At least with regard to the legal systems that we have taken 
into account, there are certainly many common points but many differences as well. 
This can be easily observed in the case of non-harmonised offences: even those 
having an immediate impact on peoples’ ordinary life (such as murder), despite their 
“instinctive” similarities, present diverging features in some limited circumstances. 
This is due to the fact that each of them reflects social, cultural and political 
perceptions that inevitably vary in space and time. A certain degree of “disharmony” 
may be identified in the group of harmonised offences as well, either because some 
issues have not been clarified (e.g. in the case of terrorism) or because the 
approximation process has not been completed or is flawed (e.g. sexual exploitation 
of children). As will be shown in the next chapter, the influence of socio-economic 
factors in the identification of offences is such that many EAWs have actually been 
issued for facts that are considered “serious” in some Eastern European countries and 
“minor” in Western Europe148. 
 
                                                 
146 N. Keijzer, ibid. 162; Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, 
Strasbourg, 21/03/1983, ETS n. 112; Council of Europe Convention on the Validity of Criminal 
Judgements, The Hague, 28/05/1970, ETS n. 70. 
147 Regina v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (8o.3) [1999] 2 WLR 827. 
See C. Warbrick, ‘Extradition law aspects of Pinochet 3’, (1999) 48 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 958.  
148 See infra chapter 5 p. 190. 
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In this context, the removal of dual criminality might, from a purely theoretical point 
of view, serve as a basis for more effective cooperation. However, this surgical 
operation has been performed without adequate preparation. A correct and rational 
strategy should have included a feasible and “minimal” programme of 
harmonisation. Instead, the EAW has been introduced as a “Trojan horse” of mutual 
recognition, on the wrong presumption that the latter should be viewed as a radical 
alternative to harmonisation. A sufficient degree of harmonisation is essential for a 
uniform perception of fairness and legality among European Union citizens. 
Furthermore, the mutual recognition agenda has been developed on the basis of a not 
properly defined mutual trust, without any normative grounds and without verifying 
whether this concretely exists. As has been seen, the long-lasting negotiations for the 
adoption of a Framework Decision on racism and xenophobia prove that, at least as 
far as substantive law is concerned, a common ground on which mutual trust can 
truly blossom is still lacking149. The EAW list ignores this reality: the broad 
definitions on which it relies carry the risk of conferring too many discretionary 
powers to the judicial authorities, without taking into account the importance of clear 
legal standards. 
 
Mutual trust appears therefore to be more like a declaration of intent, i.e. the result of 
a top-bottom approach while the opposite should be the case. As the Hague 
Programme confirms, mutual trust still needs to be “built” or “strengthened”150.  In 
light of these considerations, it is suggested here that the list of crimes contained in 
Article 2 (2) be reduced to a few core offences, i.e. those for which common criteria 
for definition and punishment can be more easily found. It is more likely that the 
                                                 
149 See the recent case of Mr. Töben, a German citizen who was accused of holocaust denial by 
publishing anti-Semitic material on the Internet. The act was considered to have been committed in 
Germany, where it is qualified as an offence (section 130 of the German criminal code) and an EAW 
request was sent to the UK, where the accused was. However, the British authorities rejected the 
request as the warrant was considered vague and imprecise. The German prosecutors initially 
appealed to the High Court but then withdrew their request. See Holocaust denier Fredrick Töben 
wins German extradition fight, The Times, 20 November 2008. 
150 European Council Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 4-5 November 2004- Annex I, The Hague 
Programme, Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union, par. 3.2; 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, The Hague 
Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years, COM (2005) 184 final, par. 2.3; Communication 
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Implementing the Hague 
Programme: the way forward, COM (2006) 331 final, par. 2.5. 
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application of the surrender procedure to acts such as drug trafficking, terrorism, 
participation in a criminal organisation, trafficking in human beings, fraud, money 
laundering and a few others (including theft and murder with the exception of 
abortion and euthanasia) will prove more effective151. In these cases, the seriousness 
of the offences and (for some of them) their cross-border character, the violation of 
shared common values and the existing degree of harmonisation will all encourage 
(rather than threaten) cooperation at the EU level. This does not exclude frictions in 
residual cases, but arguably the strengthening of the procedural guarantees and the 
use of a clear human rights exception would provide an adequate safety net. In this 
regard, it is worth mentioning that this view was reflected in the initial mutual 
recognition project prior to 9/11, which limited approximation of the constituent 
elements and penalties to a few areas of crime152. 
 
A last remark involves an assessment of the harmonisation process as a whole. As 
can be observed, this process has taken place through non-EU Conventions which are 
considered to be part of the EU acquis in the JHA field. As a result, they establish 
criteria for the determination of both penalties and constituent elements of offences 
which have often been diluted and do not reflect the degree of mutual trust that 
should exist between the Member States.  
 
 
4.3 e bis in idem and mutual trust 
 
The issues of crime definition and mutual trust lead us to the analysis of ne bis in 
idem (or double jeopardy). As pointed out earlier in this work, this principle aims to 
protect individual rights, as it forbids prosecuting and/or punishing the same person 
                                                 
151 This amendment will be possible pursuant Article 2 (3) FD, which confers such power on the 
Council. After all, this would be more in line with the categories for which approximation is 
encouraged under Article 31 (e) TEU. Furthermore, Article III-271 of the Draft EU Constitution 
clarifies that  European framework laws may establish minimum rules on the definition of criminal 
offences and sanctions in areas of serious crime having a cross-border dimension, such as terrorism, 
organised crime, money laundering and drug trafficking. 
152 See e.g. ‘Mutual recognition of judicial decisions and judgements in criminal matters’, Paper 
submitted by the United Kingdom Delegation to K4 Committee, March 1999 (which referred to 
trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation of children, drug trafficking, corruption, computer 
fraud, terrorism, environmental crime, internet crime, money laundering, Euro counterfeiting and 
fraud involving non cash payments). 
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for the same acts153. The Framework Decision left the classical questions of 
interpretation of this principle open to debate. For instance, concerning the “idem” 
(i.e. the same act), the European Court of Justice has rejected the option adopted by 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Protocol number 7 to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (respectively, Articles 14 (7) and 4)154. These international treaties, by 
adopting the term “offence” rather than “act”, refer to the legal classification rather 
than the identity of the material act. However, the first option not being in line with 
the notions of mutual trust and mutual recognition as elaborated by the Court155, 
“idem” in the sense of Article 54 of the Schengen Convention156 is to be intended as 
the existence of a set of facts or concrete circumstances inextricably linked together, 
irrespective of the legal classification given to them or the legal interest protected 
(so-called Van Straaten principle)157. In this sense, prosecution against e.g. ancillary 
acts in another Member State may be barred, even if they were not initially known, 
or were not taken into account in the course of the proceedings. The building of 
mutual trust in the “European judicial space” presupposes that national courts follow 
these guidelines when issuing or executing an EAW; on the other hand, they must be 
free to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether the links among the facts effectively 
exist as to time, space and subject-matter158. The reason is that a rigid application of 
the Van Straaten principle could dismantle that very mutual trust: were criminal 
proceedings in one Member State to be stopped for an “inextricably linked” ancillary 
act of drug trafficking, despite a much larger quantity being traded or totally different 
accomplices being involved, the feeling of cooperation in the prosecution and in 
enforcement of sentences would risk to fade away. A common intention may of 
course serve as an element of connection of the various acts, but should not be used 
                                                 
153 See supra chapter 1 p.18.  
154 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 23/03/1976, 999 UNTS 171; Protocol n. 7 to 
the ECHR, 22/11/1984, as amended by Protocol n. 11, ETS n. 155. 
155 ECJ Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01, Gőzűtok and Brűgge [2003] ECR I-01345, par. 33. 
156 Article 54 Schengen Convention reads: “A person whose trial has been finally disposed of in one 
Contracting Party may not be prosecuted in another Contracting Party for the same acts provided that, 
if a penalty has been imposed, it has been enforced, is actually in the process of being enforced or can 
no longer be enforced under the laws of the sentencing Contracting Party.” 
157 ECJ C-436/04 Van Esbroeck, [2006] ECR I-2333 par. 42, confirmed by C-150/05 Van Straaten 
ECR I-9327 and C-467/04 Gasparini and others ECR I-9199. 
158 Van Esbroeck, supra, par. 38.  
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as the sole criterion to determine the “idem”159. Concerning, more in particular, drug 
trafficking offences, the Court of Justice correctly excluded from the scope of ne bis 
in idem the application of the general obligation to punish all these acts as distinct 
offences, whenever they are committed in different countries160. In all its cases, the 
Court expressed an analogous view: disparities between the criminal law systems of 
the Member States regarding the definition of drug trafficking crimes (Van Esbroek, 
Van Straaten) or regarding prescription periods (Gasparini) cannot preclude the 
principle of mutual recognition from playing its role161.  
 
Another question has arisen as to the interpretation of “finally judged”. Again, the 
case-law of the European Court of Justice provides useful guidelines. One might 
expect that national criminal sovereignty prevails as long as Member States have not 
harmonised their national laws in this respect. Such a view does not fit into the 
Courts’ integration policy, thus the Court rejected it by arguing that nowhere in Title 
VI of the EU Treaty nor in the Schengen Agreement nor in the Schengen Convention 
itself, is the application of Article 54 made conditional upon harmonisation, or at 
least approximation, of the criminal laws of the Member States relating to procedures 
whereby further prosecution is barred.162 The Court deduced that this necessarily 
implies that the Member States have mutual trust in their criminal justice systems 
and that each of them recognises the criminal law in force in the other Member States 
even when the outcome would be different if its own national law were applied.163. 
As a result, the ne bis in idem rule does not require the issuing of a formal judicial 
decision: the trial is finally disposed of even in the case of an out-of-court settlement 
with the public prosecutor. However, the relationship between Article 54 and the 
Framework Decision is not entirely solved. The question whether “finally judged” is 
                                                 
159 In this sense, I agree with the Opinion of Advocate-General Sharpston, 5 December 2006 Case C-
288/05 Kretzinger, par. 39 and Case C-367/05 Kraaijenbrink, par. 28 and 36. It is to be pointed out 
that in these Opinions the principle of “set-off” has been for the first time mentioned in this area. 
According to this principle, periods of detention pending trial or in police custody are to be taken into 
account when enforcing the custodial sentence for the same offence.  
160 Van Esbroeck, supra, par. 40. 
161 Van Esbroeck, supra, par. 29-31; Van Straaten, supra, par. 44; Gasparini and others, par. 29-30. 
For other cases on ne bis in idem, see ECJ C-288/05 Kretzinger, [2007] ECR I-6441 ECJ C-367/05 
Kraaijenbrink [2007] ECR I-6619, ECJ C-297/07 Bourquain, 11 December 2008, ECJ C-491/07 
Turanský, 22 December 2008. 
162 Gözütok and Brügge,  supra, par. 32. 
163 Gözütok and  Brügge, supra, par. 33. 
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equivalent to “finally disposed of” as interpreted by the Court is open. This is further 
complicated by the former expression being repeated in different contexts: Article 3 
(2), Article 4 (3) and Article 4 (5). While a formal interpretation would perhaps make 
more sense in the third case (as mutual trust only applies within the EU), problems 
remain in the first two cases. If Article 3 (2) only covers formal judicial decisions, 
one should conclude that mutual trust is limited in this specific situation (which is 
not necessarily negative; furthermore, it would not make sense to have such wording 
repeated in Article 4 (3)). In this context, if a person requested by one Member State 
for importing a certain amount of hashish has reached a settlement with the public 
prosecution of another Member State concerning the offence of exporting the drug 
(which would amount to an “idem”), then the latter State may still execute the EAW 
(since ne bis in idem would function in this case only as an optional ground of 
refusal). A reasonable conclusion is that it is up to the national court to decide how to 
apply double jeopardy, in the balance between “freedom”, “security” and “justice”. 
Indeed, free movement should not always prevail and mutual recognition should be 
applied in a reasonable way. In the same line of thought the Court underlined in 
Miraglia that the purpose of Article 2 TEU, namely to maintain and develop the 
Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of 
persons is assured, must be worked out in conjunction with appropriate measures 
with respect to prevention and combating of crime.164Other questions left open to 
debate are whether acquittal at first instance can work as a bar or decisions taken by 
administrative authorities having a punitive character may also prevent further 
prosecution.  
 
The condition for the applicability of the mandatory ground of refusal under Article 3 
(2) is that, where there has been sentence, this sentence has been served or is 
currently being served or may no longer be executed under the law of the sentencing 
Member State. This wording covers cases where the statute of limitation prevents a 
sentence from being executed or the requested person has been freed on probation or 
                                                 
164 ECJ C-469/03, Miraglia, par. 34. 
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parole, has been pardoned or has been subject to a suspended custodial sentence165. 
Periods of detention arising from the execution of a EAW must be deducted from the 
total period of detention to be served in the issuing Member State as a result of a 
custodial sentence or detention order being passed (Article 26): this is a specific 
application of the principle of “taking into account” (also known as 
“Anrechnungsprinzip” or “set-off”).  
 
The relationship between Article 54 and the Framework Decision, mentioned above, 
concerns also the enforcement condition under the former: it may be argued that, if a 
EAW is issued for the purpose of enforcing a sentence, then “the enforcement 
condition in Article 54 of the CISA is, by definition, not met”, as underlined by 






This chapter has shown that the partial elimination of dual criminality, despite being 
one of the most important innovations of the Framework Decision on the EAW, has 
not been properly conceived both in itself and within the more general context of the 
mutual recognition policy. It seems that certain fundamental features of national 
legal systems have been neglected or underestimated. The potential disputes arising 
from this considerable fallacy have perhaps been underestimated as well. It is argued 
that the reason for these flaws is the rush in the adoption of the Framework Decision 
as a result of the international pressure towards stepping up the fight against 
terrorism (and organised crime). This has prompted Member States to remove dual 
criminality in relation to a long list of categories of offences, which are often closely 
                                                 
165 H. van der Wilt, ‘The European Arrest Warrant and the Principle Ne bis in idem’, in R. Blextoon, 
W. van Ballegooij (eds.), supra, 99; Opinion of Advocate-General Sharpston, Kretzinger, supra par. 
43. 
166 Opinion of Advocate-General Sharpston, Kretzinger, supra par. 88. For more on double jeopardy, 
see R. Lööf, ’54 CISA and the Principles of ne bis in idem’ (2007) European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 309.  
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related to terrorism and organised crime, without reflecting on the consequences 
deriving from using some of these categories (due to their vagueness and 
imprecision). One necessary change would therefore be to expunge from the list the 
most controversial offences (such as racism and xenophobia) and define some 
exceptions (such as in the case of abortion and euthanasia in relation to murder) and 
to pursue an appropriate approximation of the other offences and related penalties167. 
 
Issues of definition also involve the application of ne bis in idem to EAW cases, 
although the Court of Justice has provided some guidelines in this field. 
 
Finally, it should be observed that the problems connected to the Framework 
Decision list and the definition of crimes are all the more significant in light of the 
diverging implementation in the domestic systems and the pressing need to 
strengthen the protection of human rights, as will be seen in the following two 
chapters.
                                                 
167 It should be borne in mind that some offences can be punished by a criminal sanction in one State 
and by an administrative sanction in another State. 
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5. The implementation of the European Arrest Warrant 







Many Member States did not consider it necessary to amend their Constitution in 
order to allow the surrender of nationals1. This did not create problems at the 
constitutional level. An analysis of the degree of implementation of the Framework 
Decision in the Member States however stresses some limits of the EAW at a lower 
level, i.e. the different statutes adopted across Europe.  
 
This chapter will single out the somewhat bizarre contradiction lying in the fact that 
the same Member States that agreed to adopt an instrument modifying substantially 
the traditional principles of judicial cooperation failed to transpose it correctly or to 
amend their national legal systems accordingly beforehand. This occurred at all 
levels in the domestic legal systems hierarchy of norms.  First of all, the 
Constitutional Courts in Germany, Poland, Cyprus, Czech Republic and a few other 
countries were called upon to rule on the conformity of the Framework Decision 
and/or the implementing statute with the national Constitution. Secondly, many of 
the domestic “versions” diverge considerably from the model approved by the 
Council and this results in a patchy and non-uniform system. The purpose of this 
chapter is to examine the extent to which the existing disharmony may lead to 
ineffective implementation of the EAW from a practical point of view. As it is not 
possible to analyse in detail the procedural and constitutional hurdles faced by all 
Member States, this work will first of all touch upon the judgements of the 
Constitutional Courts mentioned above (seen as a “physiological” reaction to the 
removal of the nationality exception and as a test of mutual trust) and will then focus 
on two countries: United Kingdom and Italy. Finally, a non-legal notion of mutual 
trust will be elaborated within the peculiar context of cooperation in criminal matters. 
                                                 
1 See for instance, regarding France,  Avis du Conseil d’Etat n. 368-282 26 September 2002. 
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5.1 The removal of the nationality exception and the reaction of 
the national Constitutional Courts 
 
 
This section will demonstrate that there is no real rational consideration on the basis 
of which a State can deny the surrender of a national. As observed elsewhere in this 
work2, many arguments may be put forward in favour of the nationality exception. 
We shall reflect on them more in detail below3. Of course, the risk is that citizens 
may use their own country as a “refuge”. This is why there are some safeguards. 
States refusing extradition of their nationals often (but not always) leave to their 
domestic courts the task to prosecute or convict the individual (principle of aut 
dedere aut judicare) and establish extraterritorial, personal jurisdiction over acts 
committed by their nationals in another country4. On the other hand, generally those 
countries that allow for the extradition of their citizens apply territorial jurisdiction5. 
Non-extradition of nationals is therefore justified on the grounds of the principle of 
active personality (according to which a State has jurisdiction over its citizens)6, 
which makes it more likely that the offender goes unpunished. This can be illustrated 
by way of a (perhaps extreme) example. 
 
Let us suppose that X has dual nationality (State A and State B). He has lived in 
State A for a substantial number of years. He then participates in a criminal 
organisation together with other people. Thereafter he flees to State B, which only 
recognises one single nationality. Following a request for extradition, State B denies 
surrender because of the nationality rule. However, it turns out that it is not possible 
to prosecute X because the act he has committed in State A cannot be qualified as 
“organised crime” or any other offence in State B; furthermore, let us assume that for 
practical reasons the collection and analysis of evidence proves an impossible task in 
                                                 
2 See supra, chapter 1 p. 23. On the history of the nationality exception, see e.g. I.A. Shearer, 
Extradition in International Law (Oceana Publications, Manchester University Press 1971) 94-131. 
3 See infra, p. 1139-141. 
4 See supra, chapter 1 p. 12. 
5 I.A. Shearer, Extradition in International Law (Oceana Publications Inc., Manchester University 
Press 1971) 96-97; C. Shachor-Landau, ‘Extra-territorial Penal jurisdiction and extradition’ (1980) 29 
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 274-295. 
6 For a critique of the active personality principle, see M. Plachta, ‘(Non-)Extradition of Nationals: A 
Neverending Story?’, (1999) 13 Emory Int’l Law Rev 121-123. 
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a State other than the locus commissi delicti (i.e. the State where the offence has been 
committed)7.  
 
Despite the risks that the application of the nationality exception implies, the latter 
has had a “sentimental” or “patriotic” value in many civil law countries. For instance, 
the Benelux Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
contains an absolute prohibition on the extradition of nationals (Article 5) and aut 
dedere aut judicare does not apply8. In Italy the exception was formally adopted as 
early as 18899.  
 
We may observe that the nationality exception can be seen in general terms as an 
expression of both State sovereignty and individual rights.  On the one hand, State 
authorities claim the right to judge their citizens for acts committed by them. On the 
other hand, an individual is entitled not to be removed from his natural judge (ius de 
non evocando) but he also has the right to be protected from the over-reaching 
jurisdiction of another State, especially for acts the criminal nature of which he 
ignored at the time of their commission10. Common law countries which do not apply 
this rule traditionally have imposed other guarantees, such as the need to make a 
prima facie case of guilt (i.e. the need to provide sufficient evidence to support the 
request for extradition)11. 
 
Concerning more in particular the association of non-extradition of nationals with 
individual rights, it is possible to distinguish different approaches. While the 
                                                 
7 It is interesting to observe that nationality is not a ground for refusal in the field of mutual legal 
assistance. See European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Strasbourg, 
20/04/1959, ETS n. 030; Convention established by the Council in accordance with Article 34 of the 
Treaty on European Union, on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of 
the European Union, OJ C 197, 12/07/2000. 
8 Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 1962, Moniteur Belge, October 
24, 1964. 
9 C. Ghisalberti, La codificazione del diritto in Italia 1865/1942 (Laterza Roma-Bari 2000). See 
Article 9 Italian Criminal Code R.d. 30 giugno 1889, n. 6133. 
10 Z. Deen-Racsmány, R. Blekxtoon, ‘The Decline of the Nationality Exception in European 
Extradition?’ (2005) 3 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 317, 319, 
citing other authorities; M. Plachta, supra, 77-158; I.A. Shearer, supra, 98 and 105, where he clarifies 
that this is an application by German scholars of the principle of Treupflicht (i.e. the duty of the State 
to protect all its citizens). See also infra, p. 143 on the German Constitutional Court’s decision. 
11 I.A. Shearer, supra. 
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application to extradition of any justification of refusal on grounds of the freedom of 
movement in the European Community (Articles 39, 43 and 49 TEC) has been 
rightly denied in some national case law, as doing otherwise “would emasculate the 
entire process of extradition”12, a few authors have suggested in the past to rely on 
Article 3(1) of Protocol 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights13. Indeed, 
this provision refers to the notion of expulsion of nationals, which, if interpreted 
broadly, might include extradition. This is why the Explanatory Report specifies that 
“(…) it was understood that extradition was outside the scope of this paragraph”14. 
Despite this clarification, some authors still raise doubts as to the correct 
interpretation of Article 3(1). They believe that the clear and unambiguous wording 
of this Article precludes the use of the Explanatory Report as interpretative tool, in 
application of the general principles under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of the Treaties; as a result, extradition of nationals would not be permitted15. 
Others argue more reasonably that, although the reference to expulsion of nationals is 
unclear, the interpretation given by the Explanatory Report should be taken into 
account: therefore the approach of the 1957 European Convention (which does not 
prohibit extradition of nationals but allows State Parties to refuse it) should be 
preferred16. 
 
As far as the duty of protection owed by the State is concerned, this seems to be 
more a political than a legal principle17, hardly justifiable if only applied to nationals 
and not lawful residents. Similarly, the case for the right not to be withdrawn from 
one’s own natural judge and all similar arguments make little sense in a world in 
                                                 
12 See Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Launder [1997] 1 W.L.R. 839; 
and also, e.g., Regina v. Governor of Pentonville Prison ex parte Budlong [1980] W.L.R. 1110. These 
cases referred to pre-Amsterdam Articles 48, 52 and 59 TEC. 
13 Protocol 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS 
n. 46, available at http://conventions.coe.int/ . Article 3 (1) states that “No one shall be expelled, by 
means either of an individual or of a collective measure, from the territory of the State of which he is a 
national”. 
14 Explanatory Report to Protocol n. 4, ibid. 
15 F. Jacobs, R. White, European Convention on Human Rights ( 3rd ed. OUP 2002) 343; Vienna 
Convention on the Law of the Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 
1155 UNTS 331. 
16 J. Merrills, A. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe (Manchester 2001) 256; P. van Dijk, G. van 
Hoof et al., Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (4th ed. Intersentia 
Antwerpen-Oxford 2006) 947; for the 1957 European Convention, see supra, chapter 1 p.14. 
17 I.A. Shearer, supra 119. 
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which moving from one territory to another (and committing a crime there) is far 
easier than in the past. We can conclude that a more pragmatic solution is therefore 
that of prosecuting and punishing an individual in the place where the crime was 
committed, because the values of that society have been violated. 
 
The 1996 EU Convention attempted to adopt a flexible approach18. While leaving to 
the Member States the choice of whether or not to authorise the surrender of a 
national under certain conditions, it established a number of limits to the period of 
validity, the renewal and the expiration of the prohibition to surrender. The idea was 
to “keep the door open” and pave the way for a slow removal of this old-fashioned 
requirement. Although that “soft” approach failed, as we have seen19, only a few 
years later the ground was ready for a more courageous step, with the Framework 
Decision on the EAW20. 
 
The nationality rule, when applied, has traditionally been coupled with an extension 
of States’ jurisdiction to a large number of extraterritorial offences committed by 
their nationals. It is therefore interesting to verify whether Member States that 
previously refused to surrender their nationals will still exercise that jurisdiction to 
the same extent. Leaving this aside at the moment, signs of change were already 
visible in 2000, when the German Basic Law was amended in order to comply with 
the obligations deriving from the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)21. 
The general prohibition of extradition of nationals was replaced with a system 
providing for an exception in case of extradition to a Member State of the EU or to 
an international Court of Justice, “as long as constitutional principles are 
respected”22. Therefore, the new system was tailored not only to the ICC surrender 
scheme, but also to the new cooperation mechanisms within the EU. These include 
                                                 
18 Article 7 (3) Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K 3 of the Treaty on European Union, 
relating to extradition between the Member States of the European Union, OJ C 313 23/10/1996. 
19 See supra, chapter 1 p. 24-25.  
20 See supra, chapter 3. 
21 Statute of the International Criminal Court, Rome, (17/07/1998) UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9*, 37 
ILM 999 (1998), amended  by UN Doc, PCNICC/1999/INF/3*. See also the obligation to surrender as 
established by the Rwanda and former Yugoslavia courts, UN Doc. S/RES/808 (1993) and UN Doc. 
S/RES/827 (1993), as well as Annex and S/RES/955 (1994) and subsequent amendments UN Doc. 
S/RES/1329 (2000) and S/RES/1503 (2003). 
22 “soweit rechsstaatliche Grundsätze gewahrt sind”, Article 16 (2) sentence 2 German Constitution 
(Grundgesetz). 
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the EAW, which to German eyes is a form of extradition. On the other hand, the 
French Conseil d’ Etat did not believe it would be necessary to modify the 
Constitution in order to allow the surrender of nationals (although the EAW was still 
to be regarded as extradition)23. 
 
Soon after the Framework Decision entered into force, three Constitutional Courts in 
Europe, in Poland, Germany and Cyprus respectively, challenged the compatibility 
of this measure with national constitutions. This is evidence of some degree of 
ambiguity in the relationship between State sovereignty and mutual 
recognition/mutual trust. On the one hand, Member States approve by unanimity a 
Framework Decision with some important changes to their system of judicial 
cooperation; on the other, at the moment of testing it against their own Constitutions 
or (as will be better seen later in this chapter) when implementing it, they show 
reluctance and uncertainty.  
 
The Polish Court was called upon to decide whether the surrender of a Polish citizen 
to the Netherlands for the purposes of prosecution (under Article 607t of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure) was in line with the provision of the national constitution 
prohibiting extradition of nationals24. It concluded that “extradition” and “surrender”, 
involving the handing over of a prosecuted or convicted person to a foreign country, 
should not be understood as distinct categories in their substance and, as a result, 
surrender is also prohibited25; the obligation of Poland to interpret domestic law in a 
manner consistent with EU law is limited by cases where this may determine the 
introduction or aggravation of criminal liability; moreover, EU citizenship cannot 
result in the diminishment of the guarantee functions of the provisions of the 
Constitution concerning the rights and freedoms of the individual. The consequence 
                                                 
23 Avis du Conseil d’Etat, supra.  
24 Judgement of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, P 01/05 27 April 2005. The provision is Article 55 
(1) of the Polish Constitution. See K. Benı, ‘The European Arrest Warrant and the Polish 
Constitutional Court Decision of 27 April 2005’, in E. Guild (ed.) Constitutional Challenges to the 
European Arrest Warrant (Wolf Legal Publishers Nijmegen 2006) 125-139; K. Kowalik-Bańczyk, 
‘Should We Polish it Up? The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the Idea of Supremacy of EU Law’, 
(2005) 6 German Law Journal 1355-1366.  
25 The distinction between the two concepts was one of the arguments used before the judgement by 
those who believed that an amendment of the constitution was not necessary. See K. Kowalik-
Bańczyk, supra, 1359. 
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of this was that Article 607t(1) of the Polish Code of Criminal procedure was 
declared incompatible with the Polish constitution. However, the legal force of this 
provision was extended for eighteen months: in light of the obligations of Poland 
towards the EU, an appropriate amendment of the constitution was suggested by the 
Court in order to allow a correct implementation of the Framework Decision. A new 
law was finally approved in November 2006 and entered into force in December, 
although in the meantime the new constitutional provision was directly applied26.  
 
The German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) declared the 
whole German implementing law incompatible with Article 16 (2) of the German 
constitution (despite the amendment mentioned above)27. The Court argued that 
extradition of a German would run counter the principles of legality enshrined in the 
constitution, as citizens cannot be handed over against their will to a legal system 
which they are not familiar with and do not have confidence in. The Court stressed 
that the German implementing law had not, inter alia, incorporated Article 4 (7) (a) 
and (b). Article 4 indeed contains a number of optional grounds for refusal and its 
paragraph 7 deals with the territoriality and extraterritoriality principles. A new law 
was issued in July 2006, taking into account this decision28. According to this law, 
German citizens can only be extradited for the purposes of prosecution if the criminal 
act shows a genuine link (“maβgeblicher Bezug”) to the territory of the requesting 
Member State. Where a national link to the German territory exists, a mandatory 
ground for refusal is provided for; where a foreign link exists, surrender is 
mandatory. In “mixed cases” the law requires that a check is made of double 
criminality and that the court weigh up the effectiveness of the prosecution, the 
alleged offence and the guarantee of fundamental rights. In any case, return after 
sentence must be guaranteed. This reflects some concerns of the Court in relation to 
the principle of non-retroactivity: it may occur that an act committed in another EU 
                                                 
26 The constitutional amendment occurred on 7 November 2006 and entered into force on 26 
December 2006. See Report from the Commission on the implementation of the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States in 2005, 2006 and 2007, Brussels, 
11/07/2007, COM (2007) 407 final and Annex to the Report, SEC (2007) 979 final.  
27 BVerfG, 18 July 2005 2 BvR 2236/04. See F. Geyer, ‘The European Arrest Warrant in Germany- 
Constitutional Mistrust towards the Concept of Mutual Trust’, in E. Guild (ed.) supra 101-123; S. 
Mölders, ‘European Arrest Warrant is Void- The Decision of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court of 18 July 2005’, (2005) 7 German Law Journal 45-58. 
28 Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2006 Teil I 8r.36 p.1721, 25 Juli 2006. 
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Member State by a German citizen is criminalised by way of a subsequent 
amendment of the law of that State. In such cases it seems absurd to the Court to 
consent to surrender if the act in question was not considered a crime in Germany at 
the time of its commission and if there is no relevant link to the foreign territory. It is 
worth pointing out that reference in the decision was made to “extradition” 
(Auslieferung) rather than “surrender” (Űbergabe)29.  
 
The Supreme Court of Cyprus also stated that the surrender of a Cypriot citizen is 
unconstitutional30. However, although Article 14 of the constitution prescribes that 
no citizen shall be banished or excluded from the Republic under any circumstance, 
there was no direct decision on the compatibility of the Cypriot implementing statute 
with this provision. Rather, the Court argued that the constitution only allows the 
arrest of a Cypriot citizen on the grounds mentioned by Article 11 (2), which 
prescribes that a person can be deprived of his liberty only in a limited set of 
circumstances, such as detention following conviction or on reasonable suspicion of 
having committed an offence31. An amendment occurred in June 2006, although 
surrender of nationals is only possible for acts committed after the accession to the 
EU, i.e. on 1 May 200432.  
 
One of the main points stressed by these constitutional decisions is the lack of 
certainty of law as an effect of the application of the EAW: as observed by some 
scholars, since within the EU it is not possible to make use of common procedural 
and substantive standards and the division of powers is rather unclear, the very 
confidence in the functioning of the EAW is undermined33. The German Court relied 
                                                 
29 The same occurs in the implementing law. Austria too adopts the first term and reserved until 31 
December 2008 the right to refuse execution of an EAW if the requested person is an Austrian citizen 
and if the act for which the EAW has been issued is not punishable under Austrian law (Article 33 of 
the Framework Decision). 
30 Judgement of the Supreme Court of Cyprus n. 295/2005, Council Document n. 14281/05, 
11/11/2005. 
31 Art. 11 Cypriot Constitution, at http://servat.unibe.ch/icl/cy00t___.html (last visited on 5 November 
2008). On the EAW implementation in Cyprus, see E.A. Stefanou, A. Kapardis, ‘The First Two Years 
of Fiddling with the Implementation of the European Arrest Warrant in Cyprus’, in E.Guild (ed.), 
supra 75-88. 
32 Cypriot Law 18 June 2006 amending Article 11 of the Constitution. See Report from the 
Commission, supra. 
33 E. Guild, ‘Introduction’, in E.Guild (ed.), supra. 
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more on legality and non-retroactivity, arguing that they are applicable to extradition 
because this, despite its procedural features, has a punitive nature34. However, 
curiously enough it decided to restrict its limitation of mutual recognition to cases 
concerning nationals, excluding long-term residents. Its approach is very traditional 
and partly recalls the Solange jurisprudence35. Contrary to what may appear 
superficially, by tying the notion of citizenship to that of nationality and by 
endowing them with a special protection, the Court defines the boundaries of judicial 
cooperation in terms of State sovereignty, rather than in terms of defence rights. The 
Polish Court took a less radical approach and paid tribute to the principle of 
supremacy of EC law, although it did not go as far as proclaiming the prevalence of 
Third Pillar law over national law (a move left to the European Court of Justice, 
which decided Pupino36 shortly afterwards). 
 
However, other constitutional challenges to the Framework Decision, brought in 
Greece and Czech Republic, did not create obstacles to its implementation37. The 
Czech judgement is particularly interesting as it developed in detail the concept of 
mutual trust, explicitly relying on Gözütok and Brügge38, and made use of it in its 
arguments. The Court rejected the proposal put forward by a group of 
parliamentarians to annul the Czech implementing statute. There were two main 
complaints. The first was the incompatibility of the statute with Article 14 (4) of the 
Czech constitution, which prescribes that no citizen can be forced to leave his 
homeland; the second was the lack of clear definitions of the offence for which 
double criminality is lifted (which, it was asserted, would violate the principle 
nullum crimen sine poena). The reasoning of the Court was based on a teleological 
interpretation of the constitutional provisions. It argued that traditional extradition 
and surrender under the EAW are substantially different and it is therefore essential 
                                                 
34 BVerfG, 18 July 2005 2 BvR 2236/04, par. 97. 
35 Starting from BVerfG  29 May 1974 (Solange I) 37 BvR 271. See also infra, note 54. 
36 ECJ C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285. 
37 (inter alia) Decision n.591/2005 of the Areios Pagos, Council Document n. 11858/05, 09/09/2005; 
Decision of the Czech Constitutional Court, 3 May 2006, No.Pl.ÚS 66/04, available at 
http://www.law.uj.edu.pl/~kpk/eaw  
38 ECJ Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 Gözütok and Brügge [2003] ECR I-01345. 
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to make a distinction between them39. In particular, while the former had its ratio in 
the mutual distrust between European countries (which justified the non-extradition 
of nationals as an expression of the sovereignty of the State over its citizens), 
nowadays this is no longer the case, in times of high mobility of European people 
across the EU and increasing inter-state cooperation. As far as the “right of citizens 
not to be forced to leave their homeland” under Article 14 (4) is concerned, it simply 
reflects experience with the Communist regime, which often expelled “undesired” 
people against their will and for purely political reasons. This provision has therefore 
a different meaning if viewed in the light of contemporary society. Moreover, the 
Czech Court did not restrict the scope of its judgement only to citizens of its country, 
as “(…) the Czech constitution does not protect only the trust of Czech citizens in the 
Czech law, but also protects the trust and the legal certainty of other persons that are 
lawfully residing in the Czech Republic (e.g. foreign nationals who are permanently 
resident in the Czech Republic)”40. Concerning the exclusion of double criminality 
for the list of offences mentioned by the Framework Decision, the Court held that the 
principle of legality is not violated because the degree of proximity reached by the 
EU Member States is so high that they all share the same values and are bound by the 
“rule of law”. The Court also established that territoriality applies in this context. 
Indeed, although Article 4 (7) of the Framework Decision was not incorporated by 
the Czech implementing statute, Section 377 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was 
interpreted by the judges in the light of that provision: as a result, a Czech citizen 
will not be surrendered to another Member State if he is suspected of a crime 
committed in his own country, unless, in view of the special circumstances in which 
the crime was committed, it is necessary to give priority to conducting the criminal 





                                                 
39 Decision of the Czech Constitutional Court, supra, par. 48. Here too, the problem of the distinction 
between extradition and surrender is analysed. See supra, p.161. 
40  Decision of the Czech Constitutional Court, supra, par. 113. 
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As will be better seen in the last section of this chapter, the implementation of the 
Framework Decision is fragmented: sometimes incomplete, some other times beyond 
the boundaries set out by the European instrument. The following sections will look 
in detail at two legal systems in particular: Italy and the United Kingdom. While the 
analysis below does not claim to be indicative of the multi-faceted reception of the 
EAW in all of the twenty-seven Member States, it is nonetheless an attempt to give 
an idea of how the new system is being applied in a civil law-type and in a common 
law-type of jurisdiction. This will be done by an overview of both legislation (current 
section) and case law (following section). 
 
 
5.2.2 The Italian system 
 
The surrender procedure as applied in Italy presents some peculiarities in respect of 
all other countries. This is due both to a very critical and sceptical attitude that a 
number of experts showed from the outset and to an uncertain and cumbersome 
approval of the national Act. The next sections offer an account of the main issues 
and of the rather ambiguous “creature” that was born following this criticism. 
 
 
5.2.2.1 The transposition of the Framework Decision in the Italian system 
 
As mentioned earlier in this work41, the transposition of the Framework Decision in 
Italy proved to be very problematic. The Italian Government initially refused any 
support to the proposal of introducing the Article 2(2) list42, unless the offences were 
reduced to six, namely terrorism, organised crime, drug trafficking, trafficking in 
                                                 
41 See supra, chapter 3 p.71.  
42 This occurred at the JHA Council in December: see JHA Conclusions 6-7 December 2001 and L. 
Salazar, ‘Il mandato d’arresto europeo: un primo passo verso il mutuo riconoscimento delle decisioni 
penali’ (2002) 8 Diritto penale e processo 1042. 
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human beings, sexual abuse of minors and illegal arms trafficking: certainly 
corruption, money laundering and fraud would have to be left out43. The Italian 
representatives eventually had a change of mind on 11 December 2001, following 
intense negotiations with the Belgian Presidency (in particular, the Belgian Prime 
Minister)44. However, a statement was made at the Laeken European Council on 14-
15 December, in which Italy specified that the implementation of the Framework 
Decision would make it necessary to adapt it to the fundamental principles of the 
Italian Constitution, while at the same time modifying the domestic legal system to 
bring it closer to the European models45.  
 
The ambiguity of Italy in relation to the EAW persisted after political agreement was 
reached at the EU level. During the phase of transposition of the Framework 
Decision a number of draft Bills were proposed by different parliamentary groups, 
while the Government refrained from any legislative initiative46. In particular, three 
draft Bills were initially proposed by the opposition: one of them contained a limited 
number of grounds for refusal and did not create obstacles to the removal of double 
criminality47. The other two were more restrictive, as they mentioned a series of 
conditions for the surrender to take place. For instance, the requesting State’s 
legislation had to provide for maximum terms of custodial detention, and surrender 
for a political crime could not be performed (save for a few exceptions, including e.g. 
cases of terrorism provided for by Article 1 of the 1977 Convention and Article 11 of 
                                                 
43 The reduced list corresponds to that included in the Italy-Spain Treaty on extradition, see supra, 
chapter 3 p.80. See e.g. V. Grevi, ‘Il mandato d’arresto europeo tra ambiguita’ politiche e attuazione 
legislative’ (2002) Il Mulino 122. 
44 L. Salazar, supra 1043. See also Berlusconi urged to support Europe-wide arrest warrant, The 
Observer, 9 December 2001; Italy U-turn on arrest warrant, BBC News, 11 December 2001 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1704168.stm. The Italian Government backed down gradually, 
first by accepting a list of 16 instead of 6 categories, then by agreeing on all 32, provided that half of 
them would be applicable immediately and the other half from 2007 onwards. See La Repubblica, 8 
December 2001, interview with A. Vitorino. 
45 Laeken European Council (14-15 December 2001) Presidency Conclusions, at 
http://europa.eu/european_council/conclusions/index_en.htm . See e.g. E. Selvaggi, ‘Il mandato 
d’arresto europeo alla prova dei fatti’ (2002) 10 Cassazione penale 2979; E. Bruti Liberati, I.Juan 
Patrone, ‘Sul mandato di arresto europeo’ (2002) Questione giustizia,  at www.forumcostituzionale.it . 
They both question the legal value of such statement, included in the minutes of the meeting. 
46 For a detailed analysis see A. Mastromattei, ‘ La decisione quadro dell’Ue relative al mandato 
d’arresto europeo davanti al Parlamento italiano’ (2004) 3 I Diritti dell’Uomo, cronache e battaglie 
60-66; A. Mastromattei, ‘La fase finale dei lavori parlamentari per l’attuazione in Italia della decisione 
quadro sul mandato d’arresto europeo’ (2005) 2 I Diritti dell’Uomo, cronache e battaglie 34-43.  
47 Proposta di legge n. 4246 (Kessler), 30 July 2003. See www.camera.it . 
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the 1997 Convention)48. In addition, EAWs for crimes included in the Article 2(2) 
list had to comply with a few minimum requirements established by Italian 
legislation49. In the end a new draft Bill was introduced, merging the previous ones50. 
This limited considerably the application of the principle of mutual recognition, as it 
can be clearly argued from its Article 2 (1) (b), according to which Italy would 
comply with surrender requests only from those Member States that respected “(…) 
the principles and the provisions of the Constitution, including those referring to the 
judiciary as an autonomous and independent power (…)”. However, this and other 
rather paradoxical restrictions were abolished in the final version of the law, which 
was approved in April 2005 in the final debate in the lower House with 191 votes in 
favour, 13 against and 185 abstentions51. Italy was the last country to introduce the 
EAW in its legal system, sixteen months after the deadline52. 
 
There are many political reasons why the implementing procedure was so long. From 
a legal viewpoint, the difficulties were due to the intense debate which started in Italy 
following the approval of the Framework Decision. Many academics and 
practitioners strongly criticised the new instrument53. Their objections stemmed from 
a deep concern for the respect of the principle of legality and other fundamental 
principles. Such concern is due to the specific features of the Italian constitutional 
and penal system (which explains the past reluctance of the Italian Constitutional 
                                                 
48 Proposta di delega al Governo n. 4431 (Buemi), 28 October 2003 and n. 4436 (Pisapia), 29 October 
2003, at www.camera.it . These two Bills were different from the previous one in that they related to a 
delegating statute which would only list general principles and guidelines to be followed by the 
Government. On the terrorist Conventions, see supra chapter 1 p. 19-20. 
49 Ibid.  
50 Proposta di legge n. 4246-4431-4436-A (Pecorella). 
51 A. Mastromattei, ‘La fase finale dei lavori parlamentari’, supra 43. See Italian law 22 April 2005, 
n.69 (hereinafter Italian law), published in Gazzetta Ufficiale 29 April 2005 n. 98. 
52 The Italian law was notified to the Commission on 14 June 2005, while the deadline for the 
transposition was 1 January 2004. See for this the revised first Report from the Commission on the 
implementation of the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States 
as well as its Annex, COM (2006) 8 and SEC (2006) 79. 
53 See, e.g., V. Caianiello, G. Vassalli, ‘Parere sulla proposta di decisione-quadro sul mandato di 
arresto europeo’ (2002) 2 Cassazione penale 462, whose legal opinion was requested by the Italian 
Prime Minister on 11 December 2001. They are former presidents of the Constitutional Court. 
Concerns were also expressed by the Committee for Constitutional Affairs of the Parliament: see e.g. 
E. Marzaduri, sub Article 1-2, in M. Chiavario et al. (ed.) Il mandato d’arresto europeo. Commento 
alla l. 22 aprile 2005 n. 69 (UTET Milano 2006). 
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Court to accept the supremacy of EC law54). Indeed, their main arguments were two: 
first, a few provisions in the Italian Constitution set out clear guarantees for 
individual liberty, which can only be limited by law; second, any measure restricting 
individual liberty must be reasoned and can always be appealed against before the 
Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) on points of law55. On the one hand, no one 
can be withdrawn from his natural judge and can be punished by a law which has 
entered into force after the commission of the offence56. On the other hand, the 
Constitution forbids extradition of foreigners and citizens for political offences and, 
in general, allows extradition of the latter only where this is expressly provided for in 
international Conventions: this is why it was suggested that the political offence 
exception should still apply57.  
 
Some authors expressed their concern that one particular aspect of the principle of 
legality, namely the principle of specificity, would be violated. More precisely, they 
argued that, from the substantive law point of view, the categories of offences listed 
in Article 2 (2) were too generic and vague. Their abstract formulation would not 
take into account the variety of models which can be identified in each Member 
State; moreover, the long list would not comply with Article 31 (e) TEU, which 
limits the adoption of minimum rules to the fields of organised crime, terrorism and 
illicit drug trafficking58. From the procedural point of view, the Framework Decision 
would harm both the constitutional principle that makes prosecution compulsory and 
the rights of the defence, as the accused person would have to face an imprecise and 
                                                 
54 The Italian Constitutional Court recognised explicitly the principle of supremacy of EC law only in 
1973 (Corte Cost. Case 183/73, Frontini) although this was limited by the respect for human rights 
and fundamental constitutional principles (“dottrina dei controlimiti” or theory of counterlimits). See 
also inter alia Corte cost. Case 170/84 Granital; Case 117/94 Giurisprudenza costituzionale 994; 
Case 73/01 Giurisprudenza costituzionale 428. A similar approach is followed in Germany: see 
BVerfG  29 May 1974 (Solange I) 37 BvR 271; 22 October 1986, (Solange II) 73 BvR 339; 12 
October 1993 (Maastricht) 89 BvR 155; 7 June 2000 (Banana Dispute/Bananen-Entscheidung) 102 
BvR 147. 
55 See Articles 13, 104 and 111 of the Italian Constitution. 
56 See Article 25 of the Italian Constitution.  
57 See Articles 10 (4) and 26 (1) and (2) of the Italian Constitution, as well as Article 698 Italian Code 
of Criminal Procedure; see for this opinion P. Gualtieri, ‘Mandato d’arresto europeo: davvero superato 
(e superabile) il principio di doppia incriminazione?’ (2004) 1 Diritto penale e processo 115, 121. 
58 V. Caianiello, G. Vassalli, supra; N. Bartone, Mandato d’arresto europeo e tipicita’ nazionale del 
reato (Giuffre’ Milano 2003); P. Gualtieri, supra 117 suggested that the implementing law should 
confer upon the judge the power to check whether an EAW could be executed in line with the 
principles of legality and fair trial. 
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ambiguous accusation59. Finally, the principle of equality would be breached because 
the implementation of the EAW would discriminate between Italian citizens who 
have committed a crime in Italy and those who have committed it in the territory of 
another Member State, as the latter would have to be surrendered even where the 
special conditions justifying a restriction of individual liberty do not exist (i.e. the 
possibility that the sought person flees, destroys the evidence or commits another 
crime) or where the penalty threshold justifying detention is lower than in Italy60. In 
light of all these objections, it was suggested that, where refusal had to be motivated 
by diplomatic reasons, a communication should be sent to the requesting authority; 
moreover, a ground for refusal to States applying the death penalty should be 
explicitly introduced61. It must be pointed out here that these opinions clearly 
contradict the spirit of the Framework Decision and of the “European legal area” as a 
whole.  
 
Some authors objected to this negative approaches and, in relation to the issue of 
double criminality, argued that, although the executing judicial authority is not 
required to verify if the material conduct corresponds to one of the thirty-two 
categories as defined in the domestic legislation, it still has to make sure that such 
conduct has been correctly identified in light of the nomen iuris included in the list 
(in other words, if the right box has been ticked). This opinion is based on the 
interpretation of the expression “The following offences (…) as they are defined by 
the law of the issuing Member State” in Article 2 (2) of the Framework Decision as 
referring to the conduct as qualified in the EAW, rather than in the list. This would 
be confirmed by Article 8 of the Framework Decision, which requires the issuing 
authority to include in the request a description of the circumstances in which the 
offence was committed, including the time, place and degree of participation in the 
same offence, as well as the nature and legal classification of the offence, 
                                                 
59 V. Caianiello, G. Vassalli, supra; See Articles 112 and 24 of the Italian Constitution. The Italian 
public prosecutor cannot refuse to put before the judge any allegations of which he is informed, 
whenever they refer to the commission of an offence as defined in the Criminal Code. 
60 G. Vassalli, ‘Il mandato d’arresto europeo viola il principio di uguaglianza’, (2002) 28 Dir. e  giust. 
8; G. Vassalli, ‘Mandato d’arresto e principio di uguaglianza’ (2002) Il Giusto Processo 129; G. 
Frigo, ‘Uno strumento senza efficacia diretta’ (2005) 19 Guida al Diritto 69; T. E. Frosini, ‘Subito 
una procedura penale comune’ (2005) 19 Guida al Diritto 74. 
61 See, e.g., M. Chiavario, ‘Appunti “a prima lettura” sul mandato di arresto europeo’ (2003)  
Questione giustizia, supra. 
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particularly in respect of Article 2. It follows that, for instance, an Italian judge 
would still be able to refuse to surrender a person accused of homicide, where it 
could be argued from the description of the circumstances that the conduct actually 
amounted to abortion; or, similarly, a Dutch colleague would deny execution of an 
EAW if it were evident that the fugitive “merely” assisted the suicide of an Italian 
citizen (euthanasia not being punishable under Dutch law)62. This is not entirely 
convincing, as it is not in keeping with the essence of mutual recognition as 
conceived by the Commission: this principle clearly requires a radical abolition of 
dual criminality in respect of a limited number of cases and its application does not 
seem to admit exceptions. Moreover, this risks being counter-productive and could 
undermine smooth cooperation between the Member States unless explicit 
derogations are established in the Framework Decision. 
 
Other authors insisted that the Framework Decision list was not too problematic, as 
the majority of the categories of offences are not unknown to Italian criminal law or 
have already been harmonised at the European and international level; in any case 
fair trial and protection of human rights are ensured by point 12 of the Preamble63. 
As to the offences which still need to be harmonised, the Council of the European 
Union has already pledged to adopt the necessary measures64. Moreover, the 
principles of cooperation in criminal matters imply that Italian authorities should not 
refrain from surrendering fugitives for offences committed in another State, as long 
as this is not the result of an arbitrary measure65. Concerning the fears of a 
discriminatory treatment, it was rightly pointed out that the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) provides for guarantees in cases of arrest or detention which 
                                                 
62 E. Selvaggi, O. Villoni, ‘Questioni reali e non sul mandato d’arresto europeo’ (2002) 2 Cassazione 
penale 445; E. Selvaggi, ‘Il mandato europeo di arresto alla prova dei fatti’ (2002) 10 Cassazione 
penale 2978; A. Mambriani, ‘Il mandato di arresto europeo. Adeguamento dell’ordinamento italiano e 
diritti della persona.’, in M. Pedrazzi (ed.), Mandato d’arresto europeo e garanzie della persona 
(Milano, 2004) 69. 
63 L. Salazar, supra 1048; V. Grevi, ‘Mandato d’arresto europeo, ecco i vantaggi e le garanzie’, 
Corriere della Sera 7 August 2002; M. Bargis, ‘Analisi della decisione quadro sul mandato d’arresto 
europeo: aspetti processuali e garanzie fondamentali’, (2004) Diritti e giustizia 8. 
64 See Doc.9958/02 ADD1 REV1 JAI 138, in which the Council stated that it would “continue, in 
accordance with Article 31(e) TEU, the work on approximation of the offences contained in Article 
2(2)” , e.g. in the fields of counterfeiting, illicit arms trafficking, fraud, especially tax fraud and 
identity theft, environmental crime, racketeering and extortion. On the issue of double criminality, see 
supra, chapter 4. 
65 A. Cassese, ‘Mandato d’arresto europeo e Costituzione’ (2004)  Questione giustizia, supra. 
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can be considered substantially similar to those established by Italian law; in any 
case, an Italian national committing a crime in another country violates the values of 
that society and should therefore be punished according to that country’s law66. 
Finally, as regards the prohibition of extradition for political offences, since all 
Member States’ legal systems are based on the rule of law, there should be no 




5.2.2.2 The EAW in Italy: the main features  
 
The Italian transposing legislation presents a number of remarkable differences with 
the model forged by the Framework Decision. This largely reflects the criticisms 
outlined in the previous section. 
 
Some interesting peculiarities can be traced first of all in Articles 1 and 2, which 
recall a series of general principles inspiring the operation of the surrender 
mechanism, i.e. those established by the ECHR and by the Italian Constitution, with 
particular emphasis to personal freedom, equality, defence rights and criminal 
liability. Therefore, even if Article 6 TEU and point 12 of the Preamble of the 
Framework Decision are mentioned68, the explicit reference to the national principles 
and fundamental rights confers upon them a particular significance as a tool of 
                                                 
66 A. Cassese, supra.  Article 5 ECHR states that “no one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the 
following cases (…) c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing 
him before the competent legal authority of reasonable suspicion of having committed and offence or 
when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after 
having done so”. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR, as amended), Rome, 4/11/1950, ETS n. 5. 
67 A. Cassese, supra, who points out the difference between the constitutional provisions (which were 
inspired by a concern for personal freedom) and Article 8 (3) of the Italian Criminal Code (elaborated 
during the period of Fascism), whose definition of political offence had a repressive purpose and was 
broad enough to encompass common offences committed for political reasons and, in general, 
offences committed abroad.  
68 Article 6 (1) TEU states that “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the 
Member States”. The following paragraphs subordinate the EU action to the respect of the ECHR and 
of the national identities of the member States. Point 12 of the Framework Decision refers to both this 
Article and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (OJ C 303 14/12/2007) and contains the so-called 
non-discrimination clause. 
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interpretation guiding the judicial authorities69. Although some authors believe that 
this is necessary, as the ECHR framework does not ensure a uniform protection of 
human rights throughout Europe70, this excessive concern must be viewed as an 
obstacle to the promotion of mutual trust.  
 
In addition, and more importantly, Article 1 (3) makes it clear that surrender to 
another State for the purpose of prosecution is subject to the condition that the 
custodial measure on which the EAW is based is reasoned and has been signed by a 
judge. One may wonder whether the term “judge” can be interpreted as covering 
cases where the issuing authority is a public prosecutor. Moreover, where the EAW 
has been issued for the purpose of executing a custodial sentence the same Article 
requires that the latter be final. This may create problems as it could potentially 
constitute a ground for refusal in the event that the issuing State’s legal system 
considers even non-final judgements as enforceable. 
 
The domestic legislation lists a very high number of grounds for refusal71. All of 
them (including those provided for by Article 3 and 4 of the Framework Decision) 
are mandatory. They can be divided in categories and sub-categories. First of all, 20 
of them are contained in Article 18. Within this provision, a further distinction can be 
drawn between those that roughly reflect the original list and those that have been 
inserted in addition to it or modify it significantly. 
 
The latter apply: where there are objective reasons to believe that a EAW has been 
issued for discriminatory purposes (so-called non-discrimination clause), where the 
act has been committed exercising freedom of association, freedom of the press as 
well as of expression in other media, or where the EAW is based on a final decision 
which has been issued without respecting the rules relating to due process72; where 
there is a serious risk that the sought person may be subject to death penalty, torture 
                                                 
69 See in general M. Chiavario et al. (ed.) supra.  
70 See e.g. G. Frigo, ‘Uno strumento senza efficacia diretta’, supra. 
71 A table of grounds for refusal can be consulted in the Appendix, infra p. 235. 
72 See Article 18 (1) (a), (d) and (g) of the Italian law. These grounds reproduce point 12 of the 
Preamble of the Framework Decision: their inclusion in this provision reflects in our view a deep 
mistrust of the Italian legislative authorities towards the other States’ legal systems. 
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or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment73; where the victim has given 
his/her consent to the act or where the facts relate to the exercise of a right or a duty 
or if the offence was committed as a result of fortuitous events or force majeure 
(“caso fortuito” or “forza maggiore”)74; in cases of non lieu decided by an Italian 
judge or where the requested person is pregnant or is the mother of a child less than 3 
years old, except when the trial is still pending and there are serious reasons 
justifying detention75; where the suspect or the accused was less than 14 when he 
committed the offence or less than 18 and the maximum penalty is less than 9 years 
of imprisonment; where the issuing State’s legal system does not provide for special 
treatment for minors or for special means to verify whether the fugitive is fit to plead 
or in any case where the person cannot be held criminally responsible under Italian 
law76; where the request concerns a political offence (save for crimes of terrorism 
under Article 11 of the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings and Article 1 of the European Convention for the Suppression of 
Terrorism)77 or where immunity applies78; finally, where the requesting State’s legal 
system does not provide for maximum terms of preventive custody or where the 
custodial measure on which the EAW is based is not reasoned79.  
 
In relation to such detailed description of circumstances requiring refusal, it can be 
easily seen the extent to which the domestic system differs from the EU system. For 
instance, the requirement of maximum terms of preventive custody, which is 
perfectly understandable to an Italian lawyer (as it is in line with the general 
provisions under Article 13 (5) and 27 (2) of the Constitution) sounds unfamiliar if 
not unfriendly to the lawyers of most Member States80. 
 
                                                 
73 See Article 18 (1) (h) of the Italian law, which reproduces point 13 of the Preamble. 
74 See Article 18 (1) (b) and (c) of the Italian law, which reproduce typical defences in Italian criminal 
law (Articles 50, 51 and 54 of the Criminal Code). 
75 See Article 18 (1) (q) and (s) of the Italian law. 
76 These cases of non-surrender are provided for by Article 18 (1) (i) and broaden considerably the 
scope of application of Article 3 (3) of the Framework Decision 
77 See Article 18 (1) (f) of the Italian law as well as UN 1998 Convention for the Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombings  389 U.N. GA Res. 164 and 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism, Strasbourg, 27/01/1977 ETS n. 90. 
78 See Article 18 (1) (u) of the Italian law. 
79 See Article 18 (1) (e) and (t) respectively of the Italian law. 
80 However, on the interpretation of this requirement by the Italian courts, see infra, p. 173-174. 
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In addition to the grounds mentioned above, Article 18 mentions all those that have 
been included in the Framework Decision, namely amnesty (provided that the State 
has jurisdiction to prosecute the offence under its own criminal law)81, ne bis in idem 
(which is however made mandatory not only in relation to final judgements –as it is 
in the EU provisions-  but also when the EAW is issued pending trial in the 
executing State)82, statute of limitation (i.e. where the criminal prosecution or 
punishment of the requested person is statute-barred and the acts fall within the 
Italian jurisdiction)83, as well as the principles of territoriality and extra-
territoriality84.  
 
This “personalised” list ends with a somewhat pleonastic “safeguard clause”, 
forbidding surrender whenever the sentence on which the request is based contains 
provisions which are deemed contrary to the fundamental principles of the Italian 
legal system, which interestingly reintroduces an expression used in Article 27 of the 
draft Framework Decision (subsequently amended)85.  
 
Another category of cases of mandatory non-execution is provided for by the Italian 
law. They relate to both substantive and procedural aspects. First of all, a judicial 
authority is allowed to deny surrender where the Council of the European Union has 
verified a serious and persistent breach by the requesting Member State of one of the 
principles set out in the ECHR, and in particular Articles 5 (right to freedom and 
security) and 6 (right to fair trial)86. The need for such provision may be questioned, 
as it reproduces point 10 of the Preamble to the Framework Decision. Furthermore, 
the latter allows the application of the procedure that the Council may follow under 
                                                 
81 See Article 18 (1) (l) of the Italian law and Article 3 (1) of the Framework Decision (which makes it 
a mandatory ground for refusal). 
82 See Article 18 (1) (m) and (o) of the Italian law as well as Articles 3 (2) and 4 (2) (3) and (5) of the 
Framework Decision. On ne bis in idem, see more in detail supra, chapter 4 p. 131. 
83 See Article 18 (1) (n) of the Italian law and Article 4 (4) of the Framework Decision. Under the 
territoriality principle, the requested State may refuse execution if the offence is regarded by its law as 
having been committed in whole or in part in its territory or in a place treated as such; under the extra-
territoriality principle, the same occurs when the offence has been committed outside the territory of 
the requesting State and the requested State cannot prosecute that offence under its domestic law when 
it is committed outside its territory. 
84 See Article 18 (1) (p) of the Italian law and Article 4 (7) (a) and (b) of the Framework Decision. 
85 See Article 18 (1) (v) of the Italian law and Article 27 of the Proposal, supra chapter 3 p. 77. 
86 See Article 2 (3) of the Italian law. 
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Article 7 (1) and (2) TEU whenever Article 6 (1) TEU is violated and does not 
mention Article 6 (2) TEU (referring to the ECHR). Point 10 of the Preamble is 
based on the presumption that these principles are common to the Member States, 
and therefore contemplates the violation thereof as an exceptional event87. This is 
why no explicit mention of this is made within the actual text of the Framework 
Decision. Elaborating a further ground for refusal is a clear sign of misunderstanding 
of its ratio. 
 
A second form of refusal is due to the complex procedure provided for by Article 6 
(6) and 16 (1). As we will see later, Article 6 requires a series of documents to be 
attached to the EAW. The Italian Court of Appeal may ask for additional information 
where it believes that the documents sent by the issuing authority are not sufficient 
and establish a time limit of no more than thirty days for the request to be satisfied. 
As a result, Article 6 (6) allows it to refuse surrender where the time limit is not 
respected. 
 
A third group of grounds for non-execution follows from the application of dual 
criminality, which applies to both non-listed offences (Article 7 (1)) and, to a certain 
extent, listed offences as well (Article 8). Concerning the former, an exception is 
provided for in Article 7 (2) in relation to offences having a fiscal nature, where 
domestic law does not impose the same kind of taxes or duties, customs or exchange 
or does not contain the same type of rules as the law of the issuing State. However, it 
is required for this exception to apply that taxes and duties be comparable by analogy 
to taxes and duties for which the law provides, in case of violation, a penalty of a 
maximum of at least three years’ detention (with the exclusion of aggravating 
circumstances). This can be considered a remnant of the fiscal offence exception, a 
classical case of refusal in extradition law88. 
 
Concerning the listed offences, Article 8 (1), while recalling the general provision of 
Article 2 (2) of the Framework Decision, adapts it to the domestic features and in so 
doing alters its essence. Firstly, aggravating circumstances are not taken into account 
                                                 
87 See also infra chapter 6 p. 175-176. 
88 See e.g. Article 5 of the European Convention on Extradition ETS n. 24, Paris 13/12/1957.  
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when considering the penalty threshold of three years (something which is not 
mentioned in the Framework Decision). Secondly, while for some offences (such as 
organised crime, corruption or murder) the Italian list corresponds to Article 2 (2), 
this is not the case from a substantive point of view for a number of other offences 
(such as various types of fraud and falsification of documents or slavery). More 
generally, the EU categories of offences are converted into concrete offences, with a 
detailed description of their constituent elements. The Italian judge is required to 
verify if the act as defined in the request corresponds to any of those crimes89. In 
addition, where a EAW is issued against a citizen for an act which does not 
constitute an offence under Italian law, surrender can be refused if the defendant can 
prove that he ignored without fault that he had committed an offence under the law 
of the issuing State90. Finally, an aspect of dual criminality can also be found in 
Article 17 (4), which permits surrender of the suspect (for the purpose of 
prosecution) only where there is adequate evidence of the crime. The term “serious 
evidence of guilt” replaced the previous “sufficient evidence of guilt” in the draft 
Bill, as it was believed to avoid abuse of process91.  
 
It can observed here that, although a similar requirement of dual criminality is set out 
in both the Italian Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code92, there is no 
mention in the Constitution, contrary to other principles in the area of extradition. Its 
reintroduction in the implementing Act is rather curious, if one takes into account 
Italy’s most recent bilateral extradition arrangements, in which this requirement has 
been abolished93. It must be added that Article 705 (1) of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure (referring to extradition) requires the Court of Appeal to assess whether 
there is serious evidence of guilt (which necessarily implies a reference to the 
                                                 
89 See Article 8 (2) of the Italian law. 
90 See Article 8 (3) of the Italian law. 
91 A. Mastromattei, ‘La fase finale dei lavori parlamentari’, supra, 39. Article 17 (4), which applies 
prima facie (or probable cause) to the EAW, has been interpreted more flexibly by the Italian courts: 
see infra, p. 198-199. 
92 See Article 13 (2) of the Criminal Code and Article 705 of the Criminal Procedure Code.  
93 Extradition Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the Republic of Italy (USA-Italy Treaty) Rome 13/10/1983 991 UNTS 285; Treaty between the Italian 
Republic and the Kingdom of Spain on the prosecution of serious offences without the need for 
extradition in a common area of justice, Brussels, 15 December 2000, Council Document 14643/00 
COPEN 85. 
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offence as defined in Italian law) only in the absence of a Convention or where this 
does not provide differently .  
 
The high level of distrust by the Italian system is not only towards foreign legal 
systems, but also (perhaps more reasonably) towards the so-called “democratic 
deficit” of the Third Pillar. Article 2 (3) of the Framework Decision confers upon the 
Council the power to extend or shorten the list, acting unanimously and merely 
consulting the European Parliament: the Italian law shifts the balance back towards 
the legislative, as it obligates the Government to seek the consent of Parliament in 
order to approve any such modification94. 
 
As far as the guarantees mentioned by Article 5 of the Framework Decision are 
concerned, they have been inserted in Article 19 of the Italian Act. Consequently, 
where the EAW is based on an in absentia decision and the person has not been 
summoned in person or otherwise informed of the date and place of the hearing, 
surrender is subject to the condition that the issuing judicial authority gives an 
assurance deemed adequate to guarantee that the person will be allowed to apply for 
a retrial of the case in the issuing Member State and to be present at the judgement. 
Similarly, where the offence at issue is punishable by a custodial life sentence or life-
time detention order, execution is subject to the condition that the issuing Member 
State has provisions in its legal system for a review of the penalty or measure 
imposed, on request or within twenty years, or for the application of measures of 
clemency which the fugitive is entitled to apply for under the law or practice of the 
issuing Member State, in order to allow non-execution of such penalty or measure. 
Finally, where the person concerned is an Italian  national or resident subject to a 
EAW issued for the purpose of prosecution, execution is only possible if there is a 
guarantee that the person, after being heard, will be returned to Italy in order to serve 
the custodial sentence or detention order passed against him. In all these cases, 
however, contrary to what the Framework Decision prescribes, there is no discretion 
in allowing surrender or not, as can be argued by the use of the expression “(…) is 
subject” rather than “(…) may be subject”.  
                                                 
94 See Article 3 of the Italian law. 
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In conclusion, the Italian system creates a very high level of barriers and obstacles 
which seriously impairs the functioning of the new mechanism of surrender. 
Interestingly, this version of EAW is much more restrictive than traditional 
extradition was. As a result, the Italian laws shape a very different procedure, 
depending on whether the request comes from a Member State or from a non-
Member State.  
 
It is interesting to analyse the stages of the surrender.  Concerning passive surrender 
(i.e. when Italy is executing another State’s request), the surrender of an accused or 
convicted person occurs following a decision of the Court of Appeal95. The 
competent judicial authority must verify that the EAW contains all information 
required96. Most of this information is considered essential: where this is missing or 
is not considered adequate, the Court of Appeal may request further details either 
directly or through the Minister of Justice97. However, the Italian authority is not 
obliged to refuse the surrender, for instance where a minimum penalty is not 
indicated (whenever it is an offence which is punished by a custodial sentence or 
detention order for a maximum period of at least twelve months)98. Concerning 
active surrender (i.e. when Italy is the issuing State), the Italian implementing Act 
identifies two competent issuing authorities: the judge that has imposed the pre-trial 
detention or house arrest, where the purpose is to prosecute a fugitive99; the public 
prosecutor that has issued an enforcement order for a custodial measure (for at least 
twelve months) or a detention order, where the purpose is to enforce a final 
                                                 
95 See Article 5 of the Italian law, which reproduces almost entirely Article 701 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, relating to extradition. It is important to observe that the competence of the Court 
of Appeal is determined on the basis of a few criteria, such as the residence of the fugitive at the 
moment of reception of the EAW. Where these criteria are not applicable, the Court of Appeal of 
Rome is competent; where an alert has been inserted in the Schengen Information System (SIS), the 
competence is determined on the basis of the place where the person has been arrested. See E. 
Marzaduri, sub Article 5, in M. Chiavario et al. (ed.) Il mandato d’arresto europeo supra  105. 
96 See Article 6 (1) of the Italian law, reproducing Article 8 (1) of the Framework Decision. 
97 See Article 6 (2) and 16 of the Italian law. 
98 This was established by Cassaz. Sez. VI 21 November 2006 n. 40614 (Arturi) (2007) Cassazione 
penale 2912. 
99 This will be the judge in charge of preliminary investigations (“giudice per le indagini preliminari”) 
in most cases, as well as any other judge, including the Court of Appeal. See minutes of the meeting 
of Procura generale della Repubblica presso la Corte d’Appello di Roma, 5 April 2007 Prot. 124/07 
Prot. Gab. , at www.giustizia.lazio.it. 
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decision100. The defendant may request that the EAW issued by the public prosecutor 
for the enforcement of a custodial measure is revoked, where there are no grounds 
for enforcing the latter. However, if the public prosecutor rejects this request, no 
appeal is allowed101. Interestingly, where the judge in charge of preliminary 
investigations has rejected a request for a precautionary measure and a “Tribunal for 
the re-examination” has instead imposed it, following appeal by the public 
prosecutor, the competence to issue an EAW is conferred upon the Tribunal102. 
 
This work will not deal with the procedural rules in detail103. Suffice it to say that 
different rules apply depending on whether the location of the requested person is 
known or unknown. In the second case, he or she is arrested by police following a 
request sent through the Schengen Information System (SIS)104. This system was set 
up by the Schengen Convention105 in order to facilitate operational cooperation 
between police and judicial authorities in criminal matters. According to Article 9 (3) 
of the Framework Decision, an alert in the SIS, effected in accordance with Article 
95 of the Schengen Convention, is to be considered equivalent to an EAW 
                                                 
100 See Article 28 (1) of the Italian law. It must be observed that, concerning the first type of measures, 
Article 280 of the Code of Criminal Procedure bites. This Article limits the application of all measures 
restricting personal freedom to offences punishable by life sentence or a maximum of at least three 
years of imprisonment. Moreover, pre-trial detention can only refer to offences punishable by a 
maximum of at least four years of imprisonment. This is a much higher threshold than the “minimum 
maximum” penalty threshold provided for by Article 2 (1) of the Framework Decision for these cases. 
In addition, concerning the enforcement order for a custodial measure issued by the public prosecutor, 
Article 28 (1) states that an EAW cannot be issued if a reason for suspending the enforcement order 
exists. 
101 Cassaz. Sez. VI n. 9273 5 February 2007 ( Shirreffs Fasola) CED Cassazione n. 235557.  
102 Cassaz. Sez. I n. 16478 19 April 2006 (Abdelwahab Guerni) CED Cassazione n. 233578. The 
“Tribunal for the re-examination” is competent to decide whenever the decision of a court applying a 
measure restricting liberty is appealed (so-called de libertate appeal) The hearing takes place in 
chambers. See for more information A. Perrodet, ‘The Italian system’, in M. Delmas-Marty, J. 
Spencer (eds.) European Criminal Procedures (Cambridge University Press 2006) 348-412. 
103 For more information, see e.g. A. Scalfati, ‘La procedura passiva di consegna’ (2005) Diritto 
penale e processo 948; G. De Amicis, G. Iuzzolino, ‘Al via in Italia il mandato d’arresto UE’ (2005) 
19 Diritto e Giustizia 11; R. Bricchetti, A. Barazzetta, ‘Misure cautelari: rinvii al rito da decifrare’ 
(2005) 19 Guida al Diritto 84; R. Bricchetti, A. Barazzetta, ‘Procedura passiva con termini da 
ricavare’ (2005) 19 Guida al Diritto 90; M. Bargis, ‘Il mandato d’arresto europeo: aspetti processuali 
problematici della normative di attuazione italiana’ (2005) 2 I Diritti dell’Uomo, cronache e battaglie 
44.  
104 See Article 11 of the Italian law, which reproduces Article 9 (3) of the Framework Decision. 
105 Convention of 19 June 1990 implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the 
governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, OJ L 239 22/09/2000 as 
amended by EC Regulation n. 1160/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 191 
22/07/2003.  
 162
accompanied by the information indicated by Article 8 of the same Decision106. This 
has been confirmed by the recent Council Decision establishing a second generation 
SIS II107, whose Article 31 (1) states that an alert has the same effect as an EAW. 
According to the new system, such alert will include the personal data of the fugitive 
as well as a copy of the original of the EAW, or of its translation in one or more of 




5.2.3 The UK  system 
 
As far as the United Kingdom’s attitude towards the EAW is concerned, it is perhaps 
possible to distinguish two phases. During a first phase, which corresponds to the 
drafting of the proposal at the EU level, the Government showed a considerable 
enthusiasm and was even the principal promoter of mutual recognition among the 
Member States108; in a second phase, i.e. the transposition into national law, a 
number of practical problems arose. The latter will be the focus of our discussion in 




5.2.3.1 The transposition of the Framework Decision in the UK system 
 
The reform of extradition law in the UK109 was not as smooth as the Government 
would have probably preferred. The transposition of the Framework Decision could 
be seen as a gentle tug-of-war between the executive and the legislative power. The 
Government made the first move when it passed an Anti-terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act which gave it inter alia the power to implement Framework Decisions 
by regulation rather than by primary legislation, in much the same way as it is 
                                                 
106 See also similarly Article 13 (3) of the Italian law recalling Article 6 (1) of the same law. 
107 Council Decision 2007/533/JHA of 12 June 2007 on the establishment, operation and use of the 
second generation Schengen Information System OJ L 205 07/08/2007.  
108 See supra chapter 1 p. 8 and chapter 3 p. 74. 
109 Extradition Act 2003 (c. 41) and Explanatory Notes, available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2003/ukpga_20030041_en_1 , replacing Extradition Act 1989 (c. 33). 
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allowed to do when transposing EC Directives into domestic law and this was not 
appreciated by the House of Lords: a further move was the approval of a Draft 
Extradition Bill, which was formally presented in the House of Commons on 14 
November 2002110. The back-and-forth journey between the House of Common and 
the House of Lords took some time until the Royal Assent was given on 20 
November 2003, meeting the established deadline (31 December 2003)111. The 
debate focused considerably on the issue of protection of British citizens112. 
 
More accurately, criticism, both in Parliament and in the civil society at large was 
directed against a number of delicate aspects of the EAW as conceived by the 
European institutions. Even during the negotiations at the EU level, the earlier 
version of the Framework Decision had already come under attack by the House of 
Lords, as it seemed “(…) likely to have a substantial impact on [UK] domestic 
criminal laws and procedure, involving the abandonment of some longstanding 
safeguards for the individual”113. The arguments were many: there was no explicit 
right to refuse execution where a serious and persistent violation of human rights 
occurred; no rule of speciality, except for offences not included in the positive list 
and offences relating to abortion, euthanasia, morals and sexuality and freedom of 
expression and association; a limited availability of bail. In general, there were hints 
that legislation was being strongly pushed by the Government114. A particular 
question related to judgements in absentia. Since UK criminal procedure does not 
recognise them, the House of Lords EU Committee insisted that a right to re-trial in 
                                                 
110 J. Spencer, ‘The European Arrest Warrant’ (2003-4) Cambridge Yearbook of Legal Studies 201. 
111 See Article 34 (1) of the Framework Decision. 
112 S. Alegre, ‘The shifting face of extradition’ (2004) 156 8ew Law Journal 1022; N. Padfield, ‘The 
European Arrest Warrant: England and Wales’ (2007) 3 European Constitutional Law Review 244. 
113 Letter from the Lord Brabazon of Tara to Mr Bob Ainsworth, MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary 
of State, Home Office, in UK House of Lords European Union Committee ‘Counter-Terrorism: The 
European Arrest Warrant’  Report n. 6 HL (2001-02) 34 Appendix 3. 
114 Letter from the Lord Brabazon of Tara supra; see also UK House of Lords European Union 
Committee Report n. 6 supra Examination of Witnesses, in particular Question 4 (Viscount 
Bledisloe): “I confess to a sneaking suspicion that the events of 11th September are being used as an 
excuse for rail-roading us through over-rapidly” and Question 66 (Viscount Bledisloe): “We have 
before us a French text which many of us cannot understand, we are told by Mrs. Taylor that that has 
been revised; we are told by you that there are a number of points which you are minded to improve; 
and there have been put to you by the Committee a number of points which also need to be improved. 
Is this all not a manifest demonstration that this kneejerk haste is wholly undesirable, and that the 
whole matter should be dealt with at a somewhat more measured pace?”. The concern about human 
rights protection, in particular with reference to Articles 5 and 6 ECHR, was repeated in the House of 
Lords EU Committee Report n. 16 HL (2001-2002). 
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the issuing State should be granted for each case and not only where the person has 
not deliberately absented himself from the proceedings115. 
 
Objections came from non-governmental organisations as well. It was observed, for 
instance, that innocent citizens from EU countries would risk being sent to a foreign 
prison for questioning for months116. The “negative list” mechanism as set out in 
Article 27 of the proposed Framework Decision (that is a list of conducts for which a 
State makes it clear that it is not prepared to extradite) was criticised because it 
would have allowed Member States to modify their criminal law (and extend the 
number of exceptions) without the other States knowing it enough in advance117.  
 
Curiously, the removal of dual criminality was opposed even after the “negative list” 
was replaced by the current “positive list”. It was argued for instance that the new 
mechanism would prevent UK newspapers editors criticising the European Union by 
threatening them with prosecution and punishment; according to this view, 
abolishing dual criminality would be particularly dangerous in light of the manifestly 
low quality of continental criminal law and the bad faith and incompetence of 
European public prosecutors, who would issue EAWs without supporting them with 
an adequate amount of evidence118.  
 
This form of legal xenophobia was seen as non sense and narrow-minded by those 
who pointed out that the UK system was not immune from scepticism and irony on 






                                                 
115 UK House of Lords European Union Committee Report n. 6 supra Examination of Witnesses, 
Questions 76-84. The question was examined in the House of Lords EU Committee Report n. 16 HL 
(2001-2002) as well. 
116 Ibid., Submission from Fair Trials Abroad. 
117 Ibid., Submission from Statewatch. 
118 Reported by J. Spencer, supra.  
119 J. Spencer, supra. 
 165
5.2.3.2 The EAW in the UK: the main features 
 
The UK Extradition Act 2003 is made up of five parts, covering: extradition to 
“category one territories”; extradition to “category two territories”; extradition to the 
UK; police powers in relation to extradition requests; miscellaneous and general. It 
strikes immediately that the EAW is treated not separately, but as a special form of 
simplified extradition, operating in the territory of the European Union. More 
precisely, the Member States are defined as “category one territories”. The Act 
replaced the previous 1989 Act120: it is fair to believe that this choice of the 
Government reflects the intention not to present this as a significant evolution of 
extradition law to the public.  
 
Extraditable offences are listed in great detail, depending on whether the person has 
been sentenced for an offence or not. Concerning the latter category121, it covers 
either fugitives who are accused of an offence or those who have been convicted but 
are alleged to be unlawfully at large and have not been sentenced. It includes five 
sub-categories: a) conduct included in the Framework Decision list (therefore not 
subject to double criminality) and punishable under the law of the issuing State by at 
least three years’ imprisonment or another form of detention, provided that they 
occurred in the territory of the issuing State and no part of them occurred in the UK; 
b) conduct which would constitute an offence under UK law if it occurred in the UK 
and which is punishable under the law of the issuing State by at least one year’s 
imprisonment or another form of detention, provided that it occurred in the territory 
of the issuing State; c) conduct which occurred outside the territory of the requesting 
State, is punishable under the law of that State by at least one year’s imprisonment or 
another form of detention, provided that in corresponding circumstances the UK 
would also assume extra-territorial jurisdiction; d) conduct which occurred outside 
the territory of the requesting State, is punishable by at least one year’s imprisonment 
or another form of detention under the law of that State (however described) and 
would constitute an offence under UK law punishable by the same penalty, provided 
that the conduct did not take place in the UK; e) conduct which took place outside 
                                                 
120 UK Extradition Act 1989 (c. 33).  
121 See section 64 of the 2003 UK Act. 
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the territory of the requesting State, is punishable by at least one year’s imprisonment 
or another form of detention under the law of that State (again, however described) 
and constitute certain specific international crimes as listed by the Act (such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes), provided that  the act was not 
committed in the UK. Sub-categories c) and d) seem to introduce a sort of dual 
criminality requirement which is not provided for by the Framework Decision, as it 
is necessary for the conduct to meet some specific criteria which the UK normally 
applies in cases of extraterritoriality. 
 
Concerning the second category of persons122, the Act includes in it those who, 
following conviction in a court of an issuing State, are alleged to be unlawfully at 
large and have been sentenced. The sub-categories listed here are substantially 
similar to those mentioned above, although the conditions are: a sentence of 
imprisonment or another form of detention for at least one year, where a Framework 
list offence has been committed; a similar sentence for at least four months, in the 
other cases. Therefore, the penalty threshold for conviction cases relating to conduct 
not subject to the double criminality test is lower than prescribed by the Framework 
Decision123. 
 
These complex provisions are apparently quite different from the concise 
corresponding provisions of the Framework Decision, and sections 64 and 65 of the 
Act do not correspond exactly to the distinction between EAWs issued for the 
purpose of prosecution and those issued for the purpose of enforcement. However, in 
both of them the fiscal offence exception has been eliminated124. 
 
Another important feature of the UK mechanism is the long list of grounds for 
refusal, defined as “bars to extradition”125. They are: a) double jeopardy or ne bis in 
idem, which applies if, had the conduct taken place in the UK, the person would be 
discharged by reason of a previous acquittal or conviction for the same act; b) 
                                                 
122 See section 65 of the UK Act. 
123 See Article 2 (2) of the Framework Decision. 
124 See section 64(8) and 65 (8) respectively. 
125 See sections 11-21 of the UK Act. A table of grounds for refusal can be consulted in the Appendix, 
infra p. 234. 
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extraneous considerations, i.e. where the EAW has been issued for discriminatory 
purposes or there is a risk that the trial will be biased or the person will be punished, 
detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, 
nationality, gender, sexual orientation or political opinions; c) passage of time, where 
extraditing the person appears unjust or oppressive; d)  age, where the conduct was 
committed by a person who would not be criminally liable under UK law; e) 
hostage-taking considerations, where the conduct constitutes an offence under the 
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages126 as well an offence or an 
attempt to commit such an offence under domestic law127 and the person might, if 
extradited, be prejudiced at his trial because  he would not be allowed to 
communicate with the appropriate authorities; f) speciality, where there are no 
specific arrangement between the UK and the issuing State; g) earlier extradition to 
the UK from another State and consent to re-extradition has not been given by that 
State, as required by specific arrangements; h) the case where the person was 
convicted in absentia, did not deliberately absent himself from the trial and would 
not be entitled to a retrial or a review equivalent to a retrial in which he would be 
granted the right to a legal counsel, to examine or have examined witnesses against 
him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under 
the same conditions as witnesses against him; i) human rights, where the surrender 
would not be compatible with the rights established by the ECHR128. 
 
Two further bars were introduced in 2006. Firstly, if a person has been transferred to 
the UK by the International Criminal Court to serve a sentence imposed by it is 
requested by a Member State, surrender is not permitted where the Presidency of the 
Court has not given his consent, as required by earlier arrangements with the UK 
Government. An exception is provided for where, after serving the sentence, the 
person has remained voluntarily in the UK territory for more than thirty days or 
returned to it129. It is clear that nothing similar can be found in the Framework 
                                                 
126 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979, entered into force 03/06/1983) 
1316 UNTS 205. 
127 Taking of Hostages Act 1982 (c. 28), section 1. 
128 See for this last bar section 21, which also refers to the Human Rights Act 1998. 
129 Sections 11 (1) (i) and 19A of the UK Act as inserted by the Police and Justice Act 2006 (c.48) 
Schedule 13- Extradition. 
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Decision, although the Act has been amended to comply with international 
obligations130. Secondly, refusal may occur in relation to the forum, i.e. where a 
significant part of the conduct is conduct in the UK and, having regard to this and 
other circumstances, surrender to the requesting country would be against the 
interests of justice. A factor relevant for the decision will be the fact that a UK 
prosecuting authority has decided not to take proceedings against the person in 
respect of that offence. However, execution will still be possible where the person is 
alleged to be unlawfully at large following conviction131. This reproduces Article 4 
(7) (a) of the Framework Decision, which had been (oddly) left out in the original 
version. 
 
In addition to this, surrender may also be refused where the offence for which the 
request was made is punishable by death in the issuing State132 as well as where the 
physical or mental condition of the sought person is such that it would be unjust or 
oppressive to surrender him133. 
 
It is noteworthy that the Act does not simply reproduce the grounds for non-
execution as set out by the Framework Decision. On the one hand, it does not limit 
itself to the mandatory grounds, i.e. amnesty, ne bis in idem (in cases in which a final 
judgement has been passed in the issuing State) or age: all other optional grounds are 
included. On the other hand, some of them have been transposed quite broadly. This 
is the case with passage of time134. The ground based on “extraneous considerations” 
recalls point 12 of the Preamble to the Framework Decision, which was not meant to 
be included explicitly among the reasons to refuse surrender. Similarly, the reference 
to the death penalty was only listed in point 13 of the Preamble. Moreover, the case 
of trials in absentia is described as a very strict bar to execution (unless specific 
                                                 
130 Indeed, Article 4 of the Agreement between the UK and the International Criminal Court on the 
enforcement of sentences imposed by the International Criminal Court (adopted 8 November 2007) 
Treaty series n. 1 (2008) prescribes that the Presidency of the ICC may authorise the temporary 
extradition of the sentenced person to a third State for prosecution only if there are assurances that the 
person will be kept in custody there and transferred back to the UK after the trial. 
131 Sections 11 (1) (j) and 19B of the UK Act, as inserted by the Police and Justice Act, supra.  
132 See section 1 (3) of the UK Act. 
133 See section 25 of the UK Act. 
134 See instead Article 4 (4) of the Framework Decision. Clearly, the UK Act instead requires the 
judicial authority to look at the merits of the case. 
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conditions are met), whereas in the European instrument it was listed among the 
guarantees to be given by the issuing Member State in particular circumstances135. 
This obviously reflects the concerns expressed by the Lords during the Parliamentary 
consideration, as mentioned above.  
 
There is a further group of bars that cannot be found at all in the Framework 
Decision: hostage-taking considerations, human rights and physical and mental 
conditions. In the last case, the judge can either adjourn the extradition hearing or 
order the person’s discharge. This is not in line with the corresponding provision of 
the Framework Decision, which does not qualify it as a ground for non-execution 
and allows it even after the extradition hearing. More precisely, it includes such 
circumstances within the “serious humanitarian reasons” permitting the surrender to 
be postponed but only in exceptional cases: where this occurs, execution must take 
place as soon as is practicable and a new surrender date must be agreed136. 
 
While the first of the bars mentioned above is clearly not envisaged by the 
Framework Decision, the second (human rights) might be somewhat reconnected to 
point 12 and Article 1 (3)137. However, the circumstance of breach of human rights is 
not considered an exceptional event which would permit refusal. The judicial 
authority is required to verify on a case by case basis whether or not the surrender is 
compatible with the ECHR. We have therefore an explicit ground for refusal138. It 
follows that the extent to which this clause is applied in practice will also measure 
the degree of trust that UK authorities have towards their colleagues in the other 
European countries. 
  
                                                 
135 See Article 5 (1) of the Framework Decision. 
136 See Article 23 (4) of the Framework Decision. This was provided for by the previous legislative 
regime and was taken into account in the Pinochet case: see House of Commons Hansard Written 
Answers for 2 March 2000.  
137 According to point 12 “This Framework Decision respects fundamental rights and observes the 
principles recognised by Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union and reflected in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular Chapter VI thereof(…)”. Article 1 (3) states 
that “This Framework Decision shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect 
fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on 
European Union”. 
138 See infra, chapter 6 p.  195-197. 
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Another special feature of the UK Act is represented by the “national security 
provisions”. Indeed, the person may be acting for the purpose of assisting in the 
exercise of a function conferred or imposed by or under an enactment (i.e. he is 
acting in the interests of the UK), or may not be liable for his conduct as a result of 
an authorisation given by the Secretary of State. In these cases the person’s discharge 
must be ordered for reasons of national security139. This is a further explicit bar, 
although it might be considered a stricter interpretation of the provision on 
immunities and privileges set out by the Framework Decision140. 
 
The number of grounds for refusal is therefore higher than it should have been. It is 
arguable that the Government attempted to amend the more radical changes 
introduced by the new system in order to make it more acceptable to critics and meet 
the deadline for the implementation of the Framework Decision. 
 
Considering the UK Act as a whole, we may therefore conclude that its main features 
are not diverging significantly from the model EAW as drawn by the Council of the 
European Union. However, some of these features are quite “original” and it is 
remarkable that extradition and EAW have been merged in the same piece of 
legislation.  
 
This can be partly explained by the peculiarities of the UK system. This is the case 
for the additional requirements established in the case of judgements in absentia, as 
mentioned above. In addition, the fact that an EAW relating to extra-territorial 
offences can only be executed if the conduct is punishable by at least one year’s 
imprisonment under UK law is simply due to the circumstance that the UK does not 
                                                 
139 See section 208 of the UK Act. 
140 According to Article 20 (1) of the Framework Decision “Where the requested person enjoys a 
privilege or immunity regarding jurisdiction or execution in the executing Member State, the time 
limits referred to in Article 17 shall not start running unless, and counting from the day when, the 
executing judicial authority is informed of the fact that the privilege or immunity has been waived. 
The executing Member State shall ensure that the material conditions necessary for effective surrender 
are fulfilled when the person no longer enjoys such privilege or immunity.”  
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normally exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction, save for some serious offences141. 
Finally, amnesty is not included among the grounds for refusal. 
 
As already mentioned, the Commission has issued a series of Reports evaluating the 
implementation of the EAW. The 2006 Report (a revised version, following the 
transposition of the Framework Decision in Italy) contained a few remarks to the UK 
authorities142. The Home Office responded on each point by submitting an 
Explanatory Memorandum to the House of Lords143. Thus, it argued that the 
lowering of penalty threshold for conviction cases for Framework offences (one year 
instead of three years) does not violate the provisions of the Framework Decision144; 
section 12 does not require that the conduct be an offence under UK law (i.e. double 
criminality) in order for ne bis in idem to apply, but instead that the judge must verify 
that double jeopardy would apply if the conduct had occurred in the domestic 
territory145; the hostage-taking considerations are necessary in order to comply with 
international obligations146.  
 
The characteristics of the UK penal system are certainly different from those of most 
European countries. This may be a continuous source of friction, even in relation to 
what should be basic and common concepts. It has been observed that the definition 
of “finally judged” in the UK has changed because it is possible to have a retrial 
before a court in England and Wales for serious offences, where new and compelling 
evidence emerges147. 
 
                                                 
141 This feature was present in the 1989 Extradition Act as well. Concerning extra-territorial 
jurisdiction, see supra Chapter 4 p.127-128. 
142 Report from the Commission based on Article 34 of the Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on 
the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (revised version), 
COM (2006) 8 final. 
143 UK House of Lords European Union Committee ‘European Arrest Warrant- Recent Developments’  
Report n. 30 HL (2005-06) 156, Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the Home Office on 20 
February 2006. 
144 Ibid. Explanatory Memorandum 2. 
145 Ibid. The Explanatory Memorandum to the UK Act, supra, seems to confirm this.  
146 Ibid. 3 
147 Section 75 Criminal Justice Act 2003. See M. Mackarel, ‘The European Arrest Warrant- The Early 
Years: Implementing and Using the Warrant’ (2007) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice  37, 53. 
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As was the case for Italy, no analysis of the procedural part will be carried out148. 
However, it is interesting to observe that the traditional distinction between 
extradition from the UK and to the UK applies in the new system as well. There are 
some differences between the four jurisdictions of England, Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland149. 
 
As far as passive surrender is concerned, competence to receive EAWs is conferred 
upon an authority designated by the Home Secretary. The relevant central authorities 
are the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) (the Crown Office in 
Scotland), which replaced the previous National Criminal Intelligence Service 
(NCIS)150, and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), which represents the 
requesting judicial authority before the court151.  
 
Concerning active surrender, the competent judicial authority is: a District Judge 
(Magistrate’s Court), a justice of the peace or a judge entitled to exercise the 
jurisdiction of the Crown Court (in England and Wales); a sheriff (in Scotland); a 







                                                 
148 For an overview of the UK procedure, see e.g. A. Jones, A. Doobay, Extradition and Mutual 
Assistance (3rd ed. Sweet and Maxwell London 2005) as well as the Crown Prosecution Service 
website, www.cps.gov.uk  and M. Jimeno-Bulnes, ‘The Enforcement of the European Arrest Warrant: 
A Comparison between Spain and the UK’ (2007) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice 263; Council of the European Union, Evaluation Report on the Fourth Round of 
Mutual Evaluations “The Practical Application of the European Arrest Warrant and Corresponding 
Surrender Procedures between Member States”, Report on the United Kingdom, Doc. 9974/2/07 REV 
2 EXT 1, Brussels, 7 December 2007 27. 
149 See A. Jones, A. Doobay, Extradition and Mutual Assistance  supra. 
150 See par. 2 The Extradition Act 2003 (Part 1 Designated Authorities) Order 2003 (SI 2003) No. 
3109) as amended by section 39 of The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (Consequential 
and Supplementary Amendments to Secondary Legislation) Order 2006. The new agency took over 
the relevant functions on 1 April 2006. 
151 On the procedure in England and Wales, see N. Padfield, ‘The European Arrest Warrant: England 
and Wales’ supra. 
152 See section 149 of the UK Act. 
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In Italy the provision of additional grounds for refusal in the implementing statute 
has created a few problems of interpretation. The Italian Corte di Cassazione has 
shown a changing attitude. In particular, concerning the provision of a ground for 
refusal where the law of the requesting Member State does not provide for maximum 
terms of pre-trial detention and preventive custody in general (Article 18(e) of the 
Italian law), the approach was initially very formalistic. The Court held that this is a 
mandatory ground, although it conceded that it cannot be required as a condition for 
the validity of the warrant that the issuing judicial authority (in that case, a Belgian 
authority) transmit the relevant national provisions to the executing judicial 
authority153. The judge recognised that such a ground is not included in the 
Framework Decision and not even in the 1957 Convention; that the European Court 
of Human Rights in its case law has deemed those systems that do not include limits 
to pre-trial detention compatible with Article 5(3) ECHR154; that what counts is that 
the rights of defence are protected. Despite these considerations, the national 
provision had to be respected, because it reflected the principle of the presumption of 
innocence, enshrined in Article 13(5) of the Italian Constitution155. This prevented 
the application of the EU law principle of consistent interpretation, as doing 
otherwise would amount to a contra legem interpretation of national law156. It was 
clearly a dangerous application of the surrender procedures: there was an evident risk 
that Italy could be used as a “State of refuge” for criminals, who might be almost 
                                                 
153 Cassaz., Sez. VI penale n. 16542 8 May 2006  (Cusini), par. 9. As a result, an Italian citizen 
charged with fraud in Belgium was released. 
154 See e.g. ECtHR Letellier v. France 26 June 1991, n. 12369/86; W. v. Switzerland 26 January 1993, 
n. 14379/88. 
155 This provision prescribes that the maximum terms of preventive custody are established by law. In 
Italy the time limits for preventive custody are binding until the final judgement (which only occurs 
once all avenues of appeal have been utilised). See Constitutional Court n. 64 23 April 1970 par. 3, 
which refers to the principle of presumption of innocence established by Article 27 of the 
Constitution. 
156 ECJ C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285. 
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certain that custodial measures adopted in other countries could not be enforced157. 
This is why, in a subsequent judgment, the Court adopted a contrary, more 
“Europhile” view. The case concerned a Serbian citizen, who was suspected by the 
German authorities of attempted murder. The German system does not pre-determine 
once and for all limits to pre-trial detention: its length can be extended after a 
periodical review of the necessary conditions.  The sixth chamber of the Corte di 
Cassazione, to which appeal had been made, referred the question to the Plenum for 
an interpretation of Article 18(e): in its view the high level of trust among Member 
States implies that all systems of pre-trial detention should be considered equivalent. 
The Plenum saved the provision, arguing that the inclusion of such ground for 
refusal, although it is not expressly provided for in the Framework Decision, is in 
line with its ratio, which is the guarantee of a fair trial158. The high level of trust 
existing in the European Union does not exclude a minimum degree of control by the 
executing judicial authority as to the protection of the fundamental rights of the 
defence. On the other hand, the provision of limits to pre-trial detention can be 
interpreted broadly, so as to include also mechanisms of periodical review of the 
conditions for extending such detention. The appeal was therefore rejected159.  
 
In any case, any period of time that the person has spent in custody abroad following 
the issuing of an EAW will have to be taken into account when determining the time 
he has to spend in Italy160.   
                                                 
157 The Supreme Court held in two other cases that it is up to the requested person to produce all the 
evidence that individual rights as provided for by Article 5 ECHR are not protected in the issuing 
State. See Cassaz. Sez. VI 7 April 2006 CED Cassazione n. 233544 (Cellarosi); Cassaz. Sez. VI 3 
March 2006 CED Cassazione n. 233706 (Napoletano). The Supreme Court has taken a different view 
in other cases, holding that it is the duty of the Court of Appeal to request for additional elements 
deemed to be relevant for the decision: see infra, note 165. 
158 However, some scholars believe that Article 18 (e) is unconstitutional as it would violate the 
obligation imposed by Article 117 (1) of the Constitution upon the Italian legislative power to respect 
the limits established by EC and international law. As a result, the “theory of counter-limits” (see 
supra p. 169 note 505) should be readapted. See E. Aprile, ‘Mandato di arresto europeo e presupposti 
per l’accoglimento della richiesta di consegna: alcuni chiarimenti ad ancora qualche dubbio’ (2007) 
Cassazione penale 115. 
159 Cassaz. Sezioni Unite 5 February 2007 n. 4614 (Ramoci) CED Cassazione n. 234272, par. 7-10. 
This also reflects the interpretation of the ECtHR in the cases mentioned above, note 143. The Italian 
Constitutional Court (Case 109/08 18 April 2008) ruled that the question of the compatibility of 
Article 18 (1) (e) of the Italian law with the Constitution (inter alia for breach of the principle of 
“reasonableness”) is inadmissible.  
160 Italian Constitutional Court Case 143/08 7 May 2008, which declared Article 33 of the Italian law 
partially unconstitutional.  
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The two decisions mentioned above (Cusini and Ramoci) also rejected another 
formalistic interpretation of the Framework Decision, according to which only the 
transmission of the original warrant or an authenticated copy would be admissible: 
mutual recognition and free movement of judicial decisions imply that even a 
transmission by fax is allowed161.  
 
Indeed, the Italian legislation requires that the EAW be accompanied by additional 
documents, including a copy of the applicable provisions, the decision of the issuing 
authority on which the EAW is based, all available personal data, and information on 
the sources of evidence. However, the executing judicial authority does not need to 
assess the existence of serious evidence of guilt162: a clear and coherent description 
of the facts (and the indication of any element relating to the conduct) by the 
requesting authority will be sufficient. It cannot request of the foreign authority new 
sources of proof, as this would run contrary to the sovereignty of each State and 
would slow down the whole proceedings163. This interpretation certainly improves 
the relationship between judicial authorities and must be welcomed164. It is sure that 
                                                 
161 Cassaz., sez. VI  (Cusini), supra, par. 6; Cassaz., Sezioni Unite (Ramoci), supra, par. 2. 
162 Indeed, Article 17 (4) of the Italian law prescribes that the Court of Appeal decides the surrender 
where serious evidence of guilt exists. On the face of it, this looks like a very strict prima facie 
requirement. However, case law has apparently “softened” this provision.  
163 See Cassaz., Sez. VI n. 34355 23 September 2005 (Ilie Petre), par. 11; and also e.g. Cassaz., 
Sez.feriale penale, n. 33642 13-14 September 2005 (Hussain); Cassaz., Sez. VI  (Cusini), supra, par. 
8; Cassaz. Sez. VI 13 October 2005 CED Cassazione n. 232584 (Pangrac); Cassaz. Sez. VI 3 April 
2006 n. 7915 (Nocera); Cassaz. Sez. VI 12 June 2006 CED Cassazione n. 234166 (Truppo); Cassaz. 
Sezioni Unite (Ramoci), supra; Cassaz. Sez. feriale penale, 13 September 2007 n. 35000 (Hrita). This 
interpretation is based on the fact that Article 17 (4) of the Italian law, while requiring that “serious 
evidence of guilt” is assessed, must be connected with Article 9 (5), which excludes explicitly those 
provisions of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure prescribing such requirement : see Articles 273 
(1), 273 bis, 274 (1) (a) and (c) and 280. From these provisions it also follows that the Court of 
Appeal (when adopting a coercive measure) and the President of the Court (when he validates an 
arrest performed by the police) do not need to verify either that there is a risk that evidence may be 
altered or that the offender may commit the same or other serious crimes, or that the maximum term 
of imprisonment provided for by Italian law for that specific offence is respected. Of course, the risk 
that the fugitive flees will still have to be assessed: otherwise the person will be released (Cassaz. Sez. 
VI n. 42803 10 November 2005 (Fuso) par. 4). This confirms that, despite the interpretative efforts of 
the Supreme Court, the Italian EAW system is stricter than the domestic extradition procedure, in 
which, when validating the arrest, the President of the Court does not have to assess this element.  
164 Article 17 (4) of the Italian law can be considered one of the most evident signs of the Italian 
“phobia” towards foreign models. While some cautiousness is always necessary when dealing with 
individual rights, a zealous protection of domestic values can lead to distorted results.  It has been 
argued that it is not clear whether the criteria to be used in line with Article 17 (4) must refer to the 
domestic criminal system, the foreign one or both and that the Court’s control is even harder in 
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the notion of “reason behind” a request for surrender does not have to be equivalent 
to what is usually intended under Italian law. It will be enough that the issuing 
authority gives a reasoning that is deemed to be adequately argued by the domestic 
authority165. However, it is not yet clear to what extent this “sufficient control” of the 
contents of the EAW should be effected166. 
 
The issue is indeed rather delicate and should not be overlooked. In one case an 
Italian citizen was sought by the German authorities for the purposes of prosecution 
in relation to a fraud offence (she was accused of having purchased together with her 
husband 16 cars using bad cheques). The Court of Appeal of Venice, after applying a 
precautionary measure (house arrest) decided upon her surrender. She argued on 
appeal that, although the company created by her husband was registered with her 
name, she was not actually managing it and this could be proved by a series of 
documents that had been ignored by the first instance Court (for example, the 
cheques had not be signed by her). The Court of Cassation quashed the decision of 
that Court, as it did not find any relevant evidence against the sought person. This did 
not imply, in its view, an assessment of the quality of the investigations carried out 
by the German authorities, but was merely based on an analysis of the documents. 
Therefore, although reasoning is given here, this is not detailed167. This shows 
however that the idea of a purely formal surrender procedure totally abolishing 
exequatur is illusory, as a minimum level of judicial control will always be 
necessary, provided that this is performed following objective criteria. 
 
The main reference point for this control will necessarily have to be represented by 
the guidelines offered by the ECHR. In the Melina case an Italian citizen had been 
                                                                                                                                          
relation to the offences for which double criminality is lifted. See E. Aprile, ‘Note a margine delle 
prime pronunce della cassazione in tema di mandato d’arresto europeo: dubbi esegetici e tentative di 
interpretazione logico-sistematica della materia’ (2006) Cassazione penale 2515, 2522. 
165 See e.g. Cassaz. sez. VI (Pangrac) supra.  In this view, Articles 18 (1) (t) and 1 (3) of the Italian 
law must not be interpreted as obliging the foreign authority to provide a reasoned account of the 
exact meaning and implications of the evidence collected. The Court of Appeal must however request 
for any additional information when necessary. 
166 The question is whether the control under Articles 18 (t) and 1 (3) should be formal or rather assess 
the facts. See E. Aprile, ‘Note a margine delle prime pronunce della cassazione in tema di mandato 
d’arresto europeo: dubbi esegetici e tentative di interpretazione logico-sistematica della materia’ supra 
2525. 
167 Cassaz. Sez. feriale penale, n. 34999 11 September 2007 (Nonnis). 
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convicted of a drug trafficking offence based inter alia on the statements of a police 
officer who had been informed by another person. Although that person refused to 
repeat those statements during the trial, this did not prevent the surrender, as it is 
enough that the criteria of fair trial as envisaged by Article 6 ECHR are respected168. 
 
In the famous Osman Hussain case one of the authors of the London bombing 
attacks on 21 July 2005 was sought by the British authorities. The defendant argued 
inter alia that he was being persecuted on one of the grounds mentioned by recital 12 
of the Framework Decision (reproduced as grounds for refusal by the Italian law). 
The Court replied that a violation of the fundamental rights of a person must be 
deduced from objective circumstances and the tradition of the requesting State 
excludes the existence thereof. This is a very important judgement. As opposed to the 
Cusini case, mentioned above, it demonstrates that mutual trust can be found at least 
in certain circumstances (where delicate and highly political issues are at stake). 
British authorities were indeed pleased that the surrender procedure could be 
concluded so quickly.169.  
 
Concerning the SIS alert, which is considered equivalent to an EAW provided that 
the elements indicated in Article 6 of the Italian law are contained in it, the Supreme 
Court has specified that these elements are those referred to in the first paragraph 
(i.e. details of the person, classification of the offence etc.) and not also the more 
detailed provisions in the fourth paragraph (i.e. the text of the applicable norm, a 
description of the facts, the indication of the sources of evidence, etc.)170. One case 
concerned the issuing of a SIS alert together with a request for the arrest of a 
Romanian citizen before the accession of Romania to the EU and the entry into force 
of the EAW system ( 1 January 2007). The defendant argued that this should be 
governed by the rules on extradition and the Court of Appeal accepted this view, 
                                                 
168 Cassaz. Sez. VI, n. 17632 3 May 2007 (Melina), recalling Cassaz. sezioni unite (Ramoci), supra.  
169 Cassaz., Sez.feriale penale, 13-14 September 2005  n. 33642 (Hussain).  Hussain was arrested in 
Italy one week after the attempted bombings, lost his appeal on 15 September 2005 and returned to the 
UK on 22 September. See also comment in Bomb suspect arrested on British soil, The Independent, 
22 September 2005, as well as UK House of Lords European Union Committee Report n. 30 
Explanatory Memorandum supra 9-10, which also mentions both terrorist cases in which the 
procedure was slow and the issuing of a UK EAW against a Portuguese national accused of murder, in 
which instead the surrender was very swift (seven days after arrest).  
170 Cassaz., sez. VI, 12 December 2005 n. 46357. 
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annulling the procedure. On appeal by the Procuratore generale171, the Supreme 
Court held that the search of an individual through a SIS alert (as well as through the 
Interpol system) does not yet trigger the surrender procedure, as the actual arrest of 
the fugitive is necessary. As a result, since the EAW was only issued on 16 February 
2007, the new system applied172. 
 
 
5.3.2 United Kindgom 
 
UK courts tend to stress the need to comply with the procedural requirements set out 
in the Framework Decision. The first question of general interest to be brought 
before the House of Lords, was in Cando Armas173. The Lords had to decide whether 
“conduct” under section 65 of the Act constitutes an extraditable offence where the 
offence takes place partly in the issuing State and partly in the UK. Belgian 
authorities had appealed against the decision of the District Judge to discharge the 
defendant and the High Court had argued that section 65(2) to (6) was applicable174. 
The House of Lords did not entirely agree and observed that subsection (2) could not 
be intended as covering the conduct at issue, as the requirement in (2)(a) is that no 
part of the conduct occurs in the UK. By way of contrast, under subsection (3)(a), it 
is enough if some (rather than all) of the conduct complained of or relied on occurs in 
the issuing State, or its effects are intentionally felt there175. In the same case it was 
also decided (adopting a purposive interpretation of the domestic provisions) that the 
statement referred to in subsection (5) that the sought person must be “unlawfully at 
                                                 
171 The Procuratore generale della Repubblica acts as the representative of the prosecuting authority 
in the Court of Appeal. He coordinates the relations between the public prosecutors and the police as 
well as between Italian and foreign authorities. See A. Perrodet, ‘The Italian system’, in M. Delmas-
Marty, J. Spencer (eds.) European Criminal Procedures supra.  
172 Cassaz. Sez. V n. 40526 24 October 2007 (Stuparu). 
173 Office of the King’s Prosecutor, Brussels v. Armas a.o. [2005] UKHL 67. Mr. Cando Armas, an 
Ecuadorian citizen, was sought by the Belgian authorities after conviction in absentia to five years’ 
imprisonment for human trafficking, facilitation of unauthorised entry and residence and forgery of 
administrative documents. 
174 This conclusion was reached through an interpretation of “conduct” as “such of the conduct as 
constitutes a criminal offence (under the law of the category 1 territory)” (par. 30). 
175 Cando Armas, par. 17 per Lord Bingham and par. 35 per Lord Hope. 
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large” does not necessarily have to be included in the warrant (indeed, no such 
requirement is mentioned in Article 8 of the Framework Decision)176.  
 
In Dabas177 a similar issue relating to the form of the warrant was dealt with. The 
appeal was against a decision of the District Judge to surrender Mr. Dabas pursuant 
to a request from the High Court of Justice of Madrid for the purpose of prosecution 
for the crime of complicity in the terrorist bombings of 11 March 2004. One of the 
grounds was that the warrant was invalid because the separate certificate required by 
section 64(2)(b) and (c) was missing. Again, the Lords opted for a purposive 
interpretation of the Act178. Neither Article 8 of the Framework Decision nor the 
Annex to the Framework Decision mention a separate certificate and this cannot be 
said to infringe the right of liberty or the principle of legality as this “would be 
inconsistent with the trust and respect assumed to exist between judicial authorities” 
(par. 8). As a result, the EAW itself can be intended as the “certificate” required by 
the Act. Furthermore, the national judge does not need to examine the foreign law to 
verify whether the requirements of section 64 (3) have been met, as the provisions of 
the Act offer sufficient protection of the defence rights under Articles 5 and 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights179.  In this regard, it seems that, in 
exceptional cases, where the applicant is able to clearly demonstrate that his 
detention is unlawful, he or she may rely on habeas corpus in addition to the 
statutory appeals procedure180.  However, in Hilali an important aspect of mutual 
recognition was addressed on appeal. It was clarified by the House of Lords that an 
application for habeas corpus is not admissible where there is no case to answer. In 
particular, the sought person was accused of participation in a terrorist organisation, 
murder of persons and destroying, damaging or endangering the safety of aircraft, in 
connection with the 9/11 attack. He had argued that the grounds on the basis of 
                                                 
176 Cando Armas, par. 41-48 per Lord Hope, who also refers to R (Bleta) v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2004] EWHC 2034 (Admin) [2005] 1 WLR 3194 (i.e. an extradition case). 
However, see contrary opinion of Lord Scott of Foscote, id., par. 56. See also  infra p.204 for the 
amendments to the 2003 Act. 
177 Dabas v. High Court of Justice, Madrid [2007] UKHL 6 WLR (D) 39.  
178 Dabas, par. 8 per Lord Bingham and par. 44 per Lord Hope. This is the first decision in the UK in 
which the Pupino guidelines are taken into account. Lord Scott (par. 68) believes instead that this 
requirement compensates for the lack of precision of the Framework offences and the removal of 
double criminality. 
179 Dabas, par. 54-55 per Lord Hope. 
180 Hilali v. Governor of HMP Whitemoor a.o. [2007] EWHC 939 (Admin.) par. 38.  
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which a EAW had been issued in Spain were no longer valid181. The Lords did not 
agree and, recalling Armas, concluded that it is not up to the requested State to 
examine the merits of the case182. 
 
Another ground in Dabas relied on the temporal element of double criminality as 
understood in Pinochet183. The offence of conspiracy to support terrorism is provided 
for by section 12 of the UK Terrorism Act 2000, which came into force on 19 
February 2001. The conduct on issue in this instance is said to have been commenced 
some time before 2000 and continued until 12 March 2004. The House of Lords 
however dismissed the ground: the conduct taking place before 2000 was part of a 
separate range of activities not related to the actual preparation of the Madrid 
bombings184.  
 
In Parasiliti-Mollica v. The Deputy Public Prosecutor of Messina Italy185, neither of 
the two options indicated in the warrant, i.e. surrender for the purposes of conducting 
a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order, had been 
deleted by the competent authority. Furthermore, in the box relating to the 
description of the circumstances in which the offence or offences were committed, 
the total number of offences had not been specified. However, from the context of 
the warrant and the rest of the description it was possible to conclude that the warrant 
had been issued for the purposes of prosecuting the sought person. He was not 
merely suspected of an offence but described as the “co-author in complicity with an 
armed organisation for drug trafficking”. The court could not help however but point 
                                                 
181 Indeed, the request for his surrender had included a long description of the circumstances of the 
offence, including a number of intercepted telephone conversations between him and a central 
suspect. However, the latter was acquitted of some crimes, and the Spanish Supreme Court quashed 
the remaining convictions, as the telephone intercept evidence was not relevant and had been in any 
case unlawfully obtained.    
182 In re Hilali (Respondent) (application for a writ of Habeas Corpus) [2008] UKHL 3, in particular 
opinion of Lord Hope of Craighead, par. 13-15, recalling Lord Scott of Foscote in Armas, supra, par. 
50-51. Interestingly, in that case participation in a terrorist organisation was not considered an 
extraditable offence, as not included in the Framework decision list and therefore subject to the dual 
criminality test. 
183 Regina v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (8o.3) [1999] 2 WLR 827. 
See C. Warbrick, ‘Extradition law aspects of Pinochet 3’ (1999) 48 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 958.  
184 Dabas, par. 46-48 per Lord Hope.  
185 Parasiliti-Mollica v. The Deputy Public Prosecutor of Messina Italy, [2005] EWHC 3262 (Admin). 
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out that both “the expense and time” taken for this matter to be investigated before 
the District Judge could have been saved if the words “sought in order to face trial in 
Italy” had been added in the warrant186.  
 
Adopting appropriate terms often proves essential, as the meaning of an expression 
or the relevance of a concept in one legal context can lead to misunderstandings in 
another. This can be observed in two judgements. In the first one (Caldarelli v. The 
Court of 8aples187) an Italian citizen was sought by the Italian authorities for mafia 
and drug offences. He had been tried at first instance in absentia in Italy. Was he 
therefore “unlawfully at large” following conviction or was he simply an accused 
person? The crux of the matter is related to the consequences of an affirmative 
answer to the former question. Indeed, according to Italian law a judgement is not 
final and not enforceable until the appeal process is completed. Where appeal occurs, 
the Court can only deal with the issues that specifically refer to the grounds of 
appeal. It follows that evidence (either obtained in the first instance or new) can only 
be heard or reviewed in the second instance if one of the parties specifically requires 
it: where this occurs, the judge may order the reopening of the trial phase when he 
believes that he is not able to decide on the basis of the available evidence. He may 
do so ex officio if he considers it essential. In this context, a person who has been 
tried in absentia at first instance does not enjoy an unqualified right to a fresh 
hearing on the merits outside those cases188. The main argument of the appellant in 
Caldarelli was therefore that, since no party had requested new evidence to be heard, 
it was entirely left to the discretion of the Court whether or not to reconsider the 
merits: this was clearly a conviction case.  As a result, the EAW should have 
contained the statement provided for by section 2 (5) of the UK Act, rather than the 
                                                 
186 Parasiliti-Mollica, par. 15.  
187 Raffaele Caldarelli v. The Court of 8aples [2007] EWHC 1624 (Admin). 
188 He has to prove that he failed to appear because of a fortuitous event or force majeure or because 
he did not have knowledge of the writ of summons, provided that this is not due to him. If the writ of 
summons for the first instance trial was delivered to his lawyer, he has to prove that he did not 
deliberately refuse to take cognisance of the procedural steps. See Articles 597 and 603, as well as 
159, 161 (4), 169 and 175 (2) and (3) of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure. Interestingly, Italy 
has been repeatedly condemned by the ECtHR in cases where a person convicted par contumace was 
unable to obtain a fresh determination of the merits and it was not possible to ascertain beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he had unequivocally waived his right to appear at the trial. See e.g. ECtHR 
Colozza v. Italy, Application no. 9024/80, 12 February 1985; T v. Italy, Application no. 14104/88, 12 
October 1992. 
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statement included in section 2 (3). It is true that in Migliorelli189 (which was a case 
under Part three of the 1989 Extradition Act) and in La Torre190 (which was under 
Part two of the 2003 Act), dealing with a similar situation, the decision was that the 
person should be considered “accused” rather than “unlawfully at large”. However, 
the choice in both cases was only between these two terms and, as a result, the scope 
of the first had to be extended to cover also “half-way” situations, typically when the 
requesting State was a civil law country. The dilemma is no longer relevant, as the 
2003 Act has been amended to the effect that the alternative is now between 
“accused” and “convicted”191.  
 
Lord Justice Laws instead agreed with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)192 
(acting on behalf of the respondent) that, although, following the amendment 
mentioned above, section 2 (5) (a) of the Act no longer contains a reference to 
“unlawfully at large”193, this only matters as to the statement that should be 
contained in the warrant.  Instead, the role of the judge under section 11 stays the 
same and the distinction is still between “accused” and “unlawfully at large”194. The 
spirit of this judgement closely followed In Re Ismail195, in which it was stated by 
Lord Steyn that “(…) a purposive interpretation of ‘accused’ ought to be adopted in 
order to accommodate the differences between legal systems. In other words, it is 
necessary for our courts to adopt a cosmopolitan approach to the question whether as 
a matter of substance rather than form the requirement of there being an ‘accused’ 
person is satisfied” and this because “(…) there is a transnational interest in the 
achievement of this aim”, namely to facilitate extradition of fugitives. 
 
                                                 
189 Migliorelli v. Italy, unreported, 28 July 2000 CO/4188/99. 
190 Antonio La Torre v. HM Advocate [2006] HC IAC 56. 
191 See par. 1 (1) of Schedule 13 to the 2006 Police and Justice Act.  
192 The CPS represents the requesting judicial authority before the court. 
193 In section 2 (5) (a) the expression “is alleged to be unlawfully at large after conviction” has been 
replaced by “has been convicted”, as opposed to “is accused” in section 2 (3) (a), in order to 
distinguish between conviction cases and accusation cases. The amendment is an effect of what was 
decided in Cando Armas, supra p. 178. 
194 Moreover, section 68A as inserted by the 2006 Act could not be relied on, as the sentence is not 
enforceable. 
195 In Re Ismail [1998] UKHL 32. 
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In the second case (Pilecki196) another question relating to different terminology was 
addressed. This time two EAWs were issued against a Polish citizen for a conviction 
case and, as the requirement is that the custodial sentence to be served must be no 
less than four months, this has to be indicated in the information attached to the 
warrant, under section 2 (6) (e) of the Act, as amended by the Extradition Act 2003 
(Multiple Offences) Order 2003197. Does this mean that, in case of multiple offences, 
where an aggregate sentence has been imposed, the requesting authority must show 
that the sentence imposed for each offence is at least four months or is it enough that 
the cumulo sentence is of at least four months? The appellant argued that the EAWs 
did not comply with the requirements mentioned above and, as a result, the definition 
of “extradition offence” in section 65 (3) of the Act was not satisfied. This is because 
section 10 (2) of the Act, as modified198, requires the judge to verify whether, in 
relation to each of the offences specified in the warrant, the requirements of section 
65 (3), in particular (c)199, are met. Since this was not the case here, the judge should 
have ordered the person’s discharge.  
 
The Lords argued that, while looking at each of the offences separately, in order to 
be satisfied that they can be qualified as extraditable offences, is certainly necessary 
in accusation cases, this is not always true in conviction cases. Once again, following 
Pupino, the House of Lords concluded that mutual recognition does not require the 
national judge to inquire into the sentencing method of other States200. Therefore all 
the provisions at issue must be interpreted in light of the wording and purpose of the 
Framework Decision. In particular this refers to paragraph 5 of the Preamble (which 
                                                 
196 Pilecki v. Circuit Court of Legnica, Poland [2008] UKHL 7. 
197 See Article 2 (2) and Schedule par. 1 (1) of the Extradition Act 2003 (Multiple Offences) Order 
2003 (SI 2003/3150): according to section 2 (6) (e) as modified, the EAW must contain “particulars of 
the sentence which has been imposed under the law of the category 1 territory in respect of the 
offences, if the person has been sentenced for the offences”.  
198 Section 10 (2) of the UK Act provides that “The judge must decide whether any of the offences 
specified in the Part 1 warrant is an extradition offence”.  
199 The condition to be satisfied under this provision is indeed that “a sentence of imprisonment or 
another from of detention for a term of 4 months or a greater punishment has been imposed in the 
category 1 territory in respect of the conduct”. 
200 In Poland, like in other Member States such as, for instance, Italy, in multiple offences cases the 
sentences imposed for each crime are aggregated and an overall sentence is determined by reducing 
the total of the individual sentences. In Italy it has been suggested to subdivide the cumulo sentence 
on which the request for surrender will be based and, if necessary, extend the request once the other 
sentences will have been issued. See minutes of the meeting of Procura generale della Repubblica 
presso la Corte d’Appello di Roma, 5 April 2007 Prot. 124/07 Prot. Gab. at www.giustizia.lazio.it. 
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enshrines the principle of free movement of judicial decisions) and Article 8 (1) (f) 
as well as letter c of the form as included in the Annex, from which it can be deduced 
that the requested State only needs to verify the length of the custodial sentence or 
detention order. 
 
The passage of time issue has been often dealt with by British courts. A landmark 
judgment which they refer to is Kakis (an old extradition case), where the scope of 
the powers of judge when determining that it would be unjust or oppressive to 
extradite the appellant was clarified201. Normally what matters is not passage of time 
itself, but rather the effect that this has on the person, as confirmed for instance in the 
Scottish cases Campbell and Fasola202.  In France v. Welsh (another Scottish case) 
the defendant was sought by French authorities for the offence of possession of LSD: 
he had been acquitted at the first instance in 1992, while one of his accomplices had 
been convicted203. However an appeal was made by the public prosecutor and in 
1993 a domestic warrant had been issued against him, although by then he had 
already moved to Scotland. He argued that the absence of his former co-accused, 
who could testify as defence witnesses, would render the trial unfair. He added that 
no attempt had been made to seek his surrender before 2006 and that he had not tried 
to hide away from the authorities since he moved to Scotland, where he had 
established businesses: as a result, it would be unjust to accede to the EAW request. 
The judge, while dismissing the first argument by pointing out that France is a 
signatory to the ECHR, accepted the second argument, in light of the considerable 




                                                 
201 Kakis v. Government of the Republic of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779 pages 782-783 per Lord 
Diplock. The old discipline has been reproduced in sections 11 (1) (c) and 14 of the 2003 Act. See 
also inter alia Goodyer, Gomes v. Government of Trinidad and Tobago [2007] EWHC 2012 (Admin) 
par. 19 per Sedley LJ.  
202 Alistair Iain Campbell v. HMA [2008] HCJAC 11 par. 42-48 per Lord Nimmo Smith; Dorothy 
May Fasola v. HMA [2009] HCJAC 3 par. 38 per Lord Nimmo Smith. The appeal was dismissed in 
both cases. 
203 France v. Welsh, 15 February 2008 (Edinburgh Sheriff Court).  
204 Ibid. par. 31.  
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5.4 The general attitude of Member States towards the 
Framework Decision and the concept of mutual trust 
 
 
The UK and Italy legal systems have certainly enacted two different pieces of 
legislation and reacted in their own way to the adoption of the new model of 
surrender. However, they present some common features. In both cases the EAW has 
been treated as a form of extradition and a number of guarantees for the protection of 
individual rights have been incorporated in the national Act. This is the result of 
some degree of uneasiness in the actual implementation of the mutual recognition 
scheme, which is why the European instrument met with considerable scepticism at 
the outset. It is noteworthy that criticism, which was expressed by parliamentarians 
and legal experts (as well as NGOs and other non-profit organisations in the UK) and 
reported by newspapers, never actually came from the public opinion at large: 
ordinary people were and are mostly unaware of the main issues related to the EAW 
and have been rather witnessing a media campaign focusing on the negative aspects 
at the expense of clarity and objectivity. Only a few commentators pointed out what 
was really at stake. Some striking divergences between the two countries can be 
highlighted here. 
 
The first relevant difference is linked to the political environment in which the EAW 
was introduced. The UK Government, traditionally stronger than its Italian 
counterpart, succeeded in pushing the Act through by watering it down with some 
compromises in order to make it more acceptable to Parliament. On the other hand, 
the Italian Government showed, perhaps not surprisingly, little interest in transposing 
the Framework Decision into national law. This situation, coupled with the intense 
debate that lasted longer than expected, explains the failure to comply with the 
deadline. In the former case, the outcome was a product which, although labelled 
differently from what would be desirable, is in the substance “surrender”; in the latter 
case, the term “EAW” instead refers to a system which is nothing but a very 
traditional extradition. There is a cultural reason for this: Italian criminal law is very 
concerned with the rights of the defendant at each stage of the proceedings. On a 
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more prosaic tone, a political reason can also be identified: a large part of the Italian 
Parliament at that time was composed of lawyers, who by nature tend to prioritise the 
role of the defence.  
 
The second relevant difference is due to the very high number of grounds for refusal 
and guarantees that are available under the Italian law. This is of hindrance to smooth 
judicial cooperation, by enhancing the discretionary power of the executing judge 
who is therefore able to almost replace his foreign colleague and dictate his own 
standards. One may wonder whether this element of “disharmony” in the functioning 
of the EAW may trigger negative reactions in some delicate cases and exacerbate the 
relationship between judicial authorities (thus producing the exact contrary outcome 
of what initially aimed for). This attitude is rather curious, in light of the high 
number of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights against Italy (indeed 
the highest in Europe in the period 1999-2006)205. On the other hand, the British 
judge has been provided with a less rich panoply but still has some significant 
powers, especially in relation to the assessment of human rights or “national 
security” issues.  
 
A third difference is due to the procedural steps in the executive phase. It seems, at 
least by analysing the time limits and the appeal options, that the British mechanism 
is more in compliance with the requirements of urgency and streamlining. The risk is 
again that a slower surrender paves the way for controversies and possible reprisals 
between States. One of the main type of problems in the UK relates to the passage of 
time: some prosecutors have issued EAWs for old cases, for which extradition could 
have been used before. In these cases, if the person has been residing in the UK for a 
long time, and the issuing State knew it, he is unlikely to be surrendered206. 
 
Concerning the case law, while Italian judicial authorities adopted a very formalistic 
approach at the beginning, a more open attitude has been prescribed by the Supreme 
Court in more recent decisions, in which the national provisions have been 
                                                 
205 Mostly violations of Article 6 ECHR (fair trial). See table on violations by Article and by Country 
1999-2006, at www.echr.coe.int . 
206 Information obtained by interviews with practitioners. See also supra, p. 167. 
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interpreted more in conformity with the European Court of Justice’s guidelines. The 
UK House of Lords, on the other hand, has been rather flexible from the outset and 
its decisions have prompted important legislative changes. 
 
It follows from all this that cooperation in criminal matters, pursued through mutual 
recognition, does not operate uniformly. This is certainly due to the nature of 
Framework Decisions, which have a less binding force than the two classical First 
Pillar instruments, i.e. the Directive and the Regulation207. However, a relevant factor 
stems from the characteristics of criminal law, which is intimately connected to the 
national context in which it has been shaped and developed. This is all the more 
evident if common law and civil law substantive and procedural aspects are 
compared. 
 
More generally, one may observe however that the non-uniform implementation of 
the surrender scheme is not a peculiarity of the United Kingdom and Italy. Similar 
discrepancies exist to different degrees in many, if not all, Member States. This must 
be one of the reasons why a EAW standard form was put on the website on the 
European Judicial Network and may be easily downloaded208. 
 
To begin with, it is curious that Article 1 (2), according to which the EAW must be 
executed on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition, has only been explicitly 
mentioned by six Member States. It seems that this is indicative of the issues coming 
up at the implementation level. This section will highlight a few of them. 
 
Firstly, concerning the double criminality requirement, the Netherlands does not 
extradite a national for the purpose of prosecution for an offence which is not 
punished under Dutch law209. The decisions of the national Constitutional Courts 
(which will be analysed later in this chapter) have not solved all problems. Germany 
has reintroduced double criminality in some specific cases. The new Polish 
                                                 
207 See supra Chapter 2 p. 56-57. 
208 http://www.ejn-crimjust.europa.eu/forms.html (last visited 14 February 2009).  
209 Report from the Commission on the implementation of the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States in 2005, 2006 and 2007, Brussels, 11/07/2007, COM 
(2007) 407 final and Annex to the Report, Brussels, 11/07/2007, SEC (2007) 979 final. 
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legislation has not directly done away with this requirement as far as nationals are 
concerned and has not reproduced in its entirety the Article 2 (2) list. Moreover, 
Ireland applies double criminality whenever it issues an EAW, with reference to the 
return of its own nationals; Estonia adopts it in practice, although it is expected to 
abolish it explicitly soon. The question of whether the Framework Decision list 
includes attempt and complicity has not been entirely solved210. 
 
Secondly, as far as reciprocity is concerned, the consequences of the decision of the 
German Constitutional Court211 are a good example in this regard. The refusal of 
Germany to extradite applied to a German and Syrian national, Darkazanli, who was 
the subject of an EAW issued by Spanish authorities for the crime of membership of 
a terrorist organisation (in particular, he was accused of being a member of Al-
Qaida). As a result, the Criminal Chamber of the Spanish Audiencia 8acional 
(which is the competent authority dealing with EAWs) declared that, as long as a 
change did not occur in the German legislation, it would treat German EAWs as 
traditional requests for extradition, therefore refusing the surrender of Spanish 
nationals to Germany on the basis of the international principle of reciprocity; 
similarly, the Regional Court in Szczecin in Poland refused the surrender of a Polish 
citizen to Germany and an analogous decision was taken by the Greek Areios 
Pagos212. It seems that Hungary too refused to recognise EAWs issued by 
Germany213. One can wonder whether reciprocity might be used again in the future 
in analogous cases with reference to this or other grounds for non-execution, as a sort 
of retaliation. For instance, the Czech Republic applies reciprocity to the surrender of 
nationals in the circumstances provided for by Article 4 (6) and 5 (3)214. 
 
Thirdly, another question refers to the treatment of minors. Article 3 (3) of the 
Framework Decision specifies that minors cannot be held criminally responsible for 
the acts on which the EAW is based under the law of the executing State. However, 
                                                 
210 For all this, see Annex to the Report from the Commission, supra. 
211 See supra, p. 143. 
212 Audiencia 8acional, order of 20 September 2005; Decision of the Greek Supreme Court 
2483/2005, supra; for the Polish decision, see K. Benı, supra 133. 
213 Annex to the Report from the Commission, supra.  
214 Ibid. 
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it is not clear whether this refers to full or limited responsibility. This may create 
difficulties of implementation in those countries in which minors have some form of 
criminal responsibility215.  
 
Fourthly, concerning the grounds for refusal, many Member States put a number of 
barriers to the mutual recognition of an arrest warrant from other Member States. 
Some of them included grounds which were not listed by the Framework Decision or 
turned some or all of the optional into mandatory ones216. Estonian authorities are 
allowed to assess the merits of a case, although not by an explicit provision. The UK 
only applies ne bis in idem if the act is qualified as an offence also in its domestic 
legislation. Fifthly, concerning the time limits, not all the Member States respect in 
their statutes the time limit of ninety days within which the decision to execute the 
EAW must be taken and not all of them included the obligation to inform Eurojust in 
case of delay217.  
 
Furthermore, regarding positive or negative conflicts of jurisdiction, i.e. when, 
respectively, more jurisdictions are asserted or denied simultaneously over the same 
offences, there is no guarantee that the chosen jurisdiction is the most appropriate218. 
 
Concerning the definition of “competent judicial authority”, while the Framework 
Decision left the Member States free to establish it in accordance with their domestic 
law, some of them have interpreted it rather broadly. For instance, Denmark and 
Germany have referred to the Ministry of Justice, while Cyprus has conferred on the 
Office of the Attorney General the power to give consent in writing prior to the EAW 
                                                 
215 For instance, the age of criminal responsibility is 8 in Scotland, 10 in England and Wales, 12 in the 
Netherlands. See G. Maher, ‘Age and Criminal Responsibility’ (2005) 2 Ohio State Journal of 
Criminal Law 493.  
216 One may wonder whether the principle pacta sunt servanda might be applied in this context, in the 
sense of not allowing grounds for refusal which are only provided for in domestic law. This relates to 
the nature of a Framework Decision. 
217 Annex to the Report from the Commission, supra. 
218 There are no clear rules yet and a reference at least to territoriality would be welcome. The “first 
come first served” principle applies. However, see Green Paper on Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the 
Principle of ne bis in idem in Criminal Proceedings, COM (2005) 696 final and the recent Draft 
Framework Decision on prevention and settlement of conflicts of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings, 
Doc. 5208/09, Brussels 20 January 2009. 
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being issued219. In relation to the additional requirements that some States have 
included, it is worth mentioning that not only British but also Irish authorities have 
provided for an additional certification that is necessary in order for the EAW to be 
valid220. 
 
Another problem is that of proportionality in the phase of issuing an EAW. It has 
sometimes occurred that requests have been issued for minor offences such as the 
theft of a piglet221. This reflects the different values that can be accorded to certain 
crimes in less economically developed areas of the EU. A remedy could be that of 
requiring the issuing authority to assess whether the action is proportionate to the 
objective that it intends to achieve (namely, securing the offender to justice for an act 
which is deemed to be particularly harmful)222. However, although this principle 
could be considered a specific application of the more general principle established 
by Article 5 TEU, there is no explicit mention of it in the Framework Decision223. 
 
If compared to the traditional European model of extradition, the surrender scheme 
has therefore in practice a fragmented nature and this raises legitimate doubts as to 
the extent to which it is sustainable. To this end, since mutual trust has been 
identified as the basis of cooperation in criminal matters under the EAW, it may be 
useful to develop a concept at the theoretical level and attempt to verify if it really 
exists. The starting point of the following analysis will be the distinction between 
trust and confidence drawn by Neil Walker: trust should therefore be viewed as an 
“active way of building confidence”224. 
 
                                                 
219 Annex to the Report from the Commission, supra. Information on the competent judicial 
authorities of each State can however be obtained from the European Judicial Network website, 
http://www.ejn-crimjust.europa.eu (last visited 14 February 2009). Some courts apply a flexible 
approach when deciding who the competent authority is. For instance, in Scotland the view is that the 
warrant is not invalid simply because the issuing authority would not be a judicial authority under 
Scottish law. See Goatley v. HMA [2006] SCCR 463 par. 25 per Lord Justice Clerk.  
220 Ibid. See, however, for the UK, supra, p. 179-180. 
221  M.Fichera, C. Janssens, ‘Mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters and the role 
of the national judge’, (2007) 8 ERA Forum 177, 188. Other examples have been detention of small 
amounts of drugs, driving a car under the influence of alcohol, where the limit was not significantly 
exceeded, theft of two car tyres.  
222 This was in fact the proposal of Portugal: see Doc. n. 10975/07 Brussels, 9 July 2007. 
223 On the criticism of this principle, see infra, chapter 6, p. 204-205. 
224 See supra chapter 1, p. 44. 
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There is a host of studies on the definition of (mutual) trust and in particular its 
relation to cooperation225. While some of them argue that cooperation may evolve 
without trust, I subscribe to those models postulating a degree of minimum trust in 
order for cooperation to function effectively, although they also refer to constraints 
(i.e. a set of rules aimed at increasing the predictability of a behaviour) and common 
interests towards achieving a specific goal as concurring factors that enhance 
cooperation between individuals and/or groups of individuals226. This can be also 
expressed in legal terms, as the basis of mutual trust and mutual recognition is to be 
located in the principle of loyal cooperation under Article 10 TEC, which operates in 
the Third Pillar as well227. 
 
Consequently, mutual trust can be intended as the reciprocal belief that others’ 
behaviour will not violate the basic common principles that lay at the heart of the EU 
legal systems. More particularly, as far as cooperation in criminal matters is 
concerned, mutual trust can be further refined in connection with both its subjects 
and its object. The subjects can be Member States or judicial authorities. The object 
will vary accordingly. In the first case, a State must trust another State’s behaviour 
according to the agreed rules and the general principles of the EU. This form of trust 
is more significant in the context of intergovernmental cooperation (and, in 
particular, extradition and mutual legal assistance). In the second case (which is more 
relevant for our purposes), a judicial authority within a State will have to trust a 
foreign legal system and more specifically: a) the product of that legal system, i.e. 
the EAW and all additional information attached to it and, depending on the case, b) 
the capacity of either the issuing or the executing authority and all other competent 
authorities to perform their tasks in line with what is stated in the EAW and not 
radically differently from what would be done in analogous circumstances in its own 
legal system (in other terms, the implementation of the EAW according to the 
Framework Decision).  
                                                 
225 See e.g. in the social sciences J. Elster, Explaining Social Behaviour (Cambridge University Press, 
New York 2007) 344; G. A. Bigley, J. L. Pearce, ‘Straining for Shared Meaning in Organisational 
Science: Problems of Trust and Distrust’ (1998) 23 Academy of Management Review 405; D. 
Gambetta (ed.) Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (Blackwell, Oxford 1988); R. 
Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books, New York 1984). 
226 D. Gambetta, ‘Can We Trust Trust?’ in D. Gambetta (ed.) supra 213. 
227 ECJ C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285. 
 192
 
From this it follows that trust in this case is not blind (“absolute trust”) but 
conditional upon the respect of the rules, such as, for instance, the absence of 
elements which would be deemed so extraneous as to oblige the executing authority 
to reject a request. However, because trust is mutual, it is necessary that the 
conditions are mutually agreed. Moreover, since trust presumes good faith, and its 
level is supposed to be sufficiently high, only exceptional cases would justify 
withdrawing it unilaterally or bilaterally. This implies, for instance, that a detailed 
examination of the facts of the surrender case should not be allowed, because it 
should not be necessary. Moreover, relative (cultural, legal, political) homogeneity 
and shared values are to be considered as preconditions of trust228. 
 
As a result, the main parameters that can be used to assess whether mutual trust 
really exists are: compliance with agreed rules and common interests. I will assume 
as a starting point that the current EU Member States are sufficiently similar to each 
other from the legal, political and cultural point of view, although there are 
differences in relation to some specific aspects (e.g. of substantive criminal law229). 
A common interest in prosecuting certain types of crimes certainly exists, the more 
so in relation to terrorism or organised crime. As far as a set of agreed rules 
(especially at the procedural level) is concerned, as will be seen better in chapter six, 
they are still missing. Obviously, past experience is normally a relevant factor in 
building up trust: episodes of good practice with a particular State will reinforce the 
belief in that State’s trustworthiness and will result in a general improvement of 
cooperation. This is why anecdotal evidence is helpful. Interviews carried out with a 
small sample of practitioners from the United Kingdom and Italy (i.e. the countries 
on which this chapter has focused) have shown that, generally speaking, there is a 
higher degree of trust in the former, although judicial authorities normally expect a 
                                                 
228 Some comparative studies indeed show that trust is much higher in the Nordic European countries, 
i.e. Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland because of  inter alia higher homogeneity. See J. Delhey, 
K. Newton, ‘Predicting Cross-National Levels of Social Trust: Global Pattern or Nordic 
Exceptionalism?’ (2005) 21 European Sociological Review 311. It would be interesting to verify the 
extent to which this may be causally related to the adoption of their special surrender scheme: see 
supra chapter 3, p. 68. 
229 This is why, as argued supra chapter 4, p 130-131 the removal of dual criminality should be 
restricted to those categories of offences in relation to which a stronger common interest of Member 
States is more likely to coagulate.  
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very high standard in respect of EAWs issued by other States, which results in a high 
number of requests for additional information. Italian judges (sometimes regardless 
of past experience) tend to be wary of foreign judicial authorities irrespective of the 
nationality and type of legal system. On the other hand, UK judges tend to regard the 
EAW as a positive development in respect of extradition, although they point out 
frequent problems with Eastern European countries (in particular Poland), which do 
not always include all the required information when issuing a EAW or issue 
requests for trivial offences230.  
 
The comparison of the UK and Italian system and the brief analysis of the legislation 
in the other Member States as conducted above demonstrate that, while a minimum 
degree of mutual trust exists, it is not evenly distributed in at least two States and 
there are elements indicating that the same could be said of the relationship between 
those States and other legal systems. It is therefore possible that repeated negative 
episodes in the implementation of the EAW between countries will prevent trust 
from being strengthened, thus undermining cooperation in criminal matters at a more 
general level. 
 
This shows that despite the undeniable success of the first years of implementation, 
as indicated by the Commission statistics231 a number of flaws can be detected which 
were most probably not expected by the original drafters of the Framework Decision. 
Appropriate solutions can only be found through an intense bottom-up process of 
exchange of information, best practices, training, mutual evaluation, practical 
guidelines, setting up of networks, and similar mechanisms.
                                                 
230 Other problems with Poland arose from the lack of direct flights within a period of three weeks 
after the final decision to surrender was taken. 
231 Report from the Commission, supra. In 2005, 6900 EAWs were issued, mostly through Interpol or 
the SIS; more than 8500 were received; more than 1770 individuals were arrested and almost all of 
them (86%, i.e. 1532 persons) were surrendered. The average time for executing a request is 43 days, 
as opposed to one year in the case of old extradition. According to the Commission, there has been a 
significant improvement in respect of 2004. 
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The balance between the values/principles of freedom, security and justice is 
probably the main challenge facing the development of the Third Pillar. The EAW is 
not immune from this. However, as will be seen in this chapter, the concrete 
application of those principles highlights some tensions and potential conflicts. The 
EAW does not seem to be able to provide a satisfactory solution. On the contrary, it 
is actually the cause of some of those tensions. It is therefore argued that both the 
“prosecution” and the “human rights” sides should be reshaped, not only as far as the 
EAW itself is concerned, but also in relation to the whole Third Pillar context.  
 
 
6.1 Security vs. freedom: the protection of human rights in 
the Framework Decision 
 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, one of the main features of the EAW is the 
abolition or adaptation of a number of classical principles of extradition law, such as 
double criminality, the nationality and political offence exceptions, the rule of 
specialty and double jeopardy. It is not surprising that these fundamental changes 
have caused some criticism in many Member States because of their concern for 
human rights. The reasons for this concern are manifold. First, contrary to previous 
extradition treaties, there is no explicit ground for refusal based on human rights. 
Secondly, the surrender mechanism seems to have been construed with a particular 
focus on speed and efficiency: while this innovation can be praised and, as 
monitoring reports show, has undoubtedly improved cooperation1, on the other hand 
the defence rights scheme is neither coherent nor sufficiently developed. Finally, as 
will be demonstrated in the following pages, there are still too many examples of 
                                                 
1 Report from the Commission on the implementation of the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States in 2005, 2006 and 2007, COM (2007) 407 final and 
Annex to the Report, SEC (2007) 979. 
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failure in the protection of ECHR standards, which means that sometimes a certain 
degree of mistrust between the Member States is actually justified. 
 
A first issue relates to the lack of qualification of human rights as ground for non-
execution. As mentioned in chapter one2, one of the classical features of the 
European extradition model in the second half of the last century was the fair trial 
clause (also known as the non-discrimination or asylum clause). This provision, 
which is still applicable outside the European Union (among the States parties to the 
1957 European Convention) makes refusal possible whenever the requested State has 
substantial grounds for believing that a request relating to an ordinary criminal 
offence is biased by the purpose of prosecution or punishment by reason of race, 
religion, nationality or political opinion3. The Framework Decision drafters have 
kept the clause but have split it in three different recitals of the Preamble: 10, 12 and 
13. According to the first recital, the implementation of the EAW may be suspended 
only in case of persistent and serious breach of the principles established by Article 6 
(1) TEU4; the second makes it clear that nothing in the Framework Decision can be 
interpreted as preventing refusal when it can be objectively proved that an EAW has 
been issued for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing on discriminatory grounds; 
on a similar note, the third adds that no fugitive should be removed, expelled or 
extradited to a State in which he may be subject to the death penalty, torture or other 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. Recital 10 also maintains a 
safeguard for the constitutional rules that each State may have established with 
regard to due process, freedom of association, freedom of the press and freedom of 
expression in other media. These provisions, taken together, suggest that the 
Framework Decision relies on the assumption that the degree of mutual trust at the 
EU level is such that there is no need for raising too many barriers to surrender (i.e. 
explicit grounds for non execution) based on human rights.  
 
                                                 
2 See supra  chapter 1 p. 13-14. 
3 European Convention on Extradition, Paris, 13/12/1957, ETS n. 24, Article 3 (2). 
4 According to Article 6(1) TEU, “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common 
to the Member States”.   
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Obviously this open-ended approach leaves room for discretion and therefore for 
ambiguities. The following example may be useful for a clearer understanding. A 
journalist of one country publishes an editorial which is considered highly and 
unjustifiably offensive towards an individual in another country. Defamation is 
punished in the latter country by a custodial sentence for a maximum of more than 
one year (i.e. the threshold beyond which the EAW mechanism is triggered). 
Moreover, although double criminality applies5, there are no obstacles from this 
point of view, as the offence is punished in both countries. However, despite the fact 
that prosecution is initiated, the issue is more delicate than it appears on the surface, 
because the offended person is actually a prominent politician. Even where there are 
no objective elements supporting the belief that the request is discriminatory on 
grounds of political opinions, a national authority might still decide that its own 
Constitution, protecting freedom of the press, forbids surrender in this specific case. 
One might argue that there is no explicit clause allowing a Member State to deny 
surrender in such cases and that the requested State should trust that the legal system 
of the issuing State will be respectful of the rights of the defence and, in particular, of 
fair trial. Despite these arguments, it is perfectly imaginable that the case would 
generate friction. Additionally, the high profile of the politician might affect the 
“judicial” character of the surrender procedure, despite the spirit of the Framework 
Decision. 
 
This matter is compounded by Article 1 (3) of the Framework Decision, according to 
which the implementation of the EAW does not modify “(…) the obligation to 
respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 
of the Treaty on European Union”. As already mentioned in a previous chapter, this 
non-regression clause could be interpreted in two ways: either as a general principle 
which the judicial authorities must rely on when surrendering or receiving a fugitive; 
or as a specific exception to the mutual recognition principle (which is stated in the 
preceding paragraph of the same Article), as has been done in eleven Member 
States6. Sometimes the human rights exception has been reinforced by reference to 
                                                 
5 The offence of defamation is not included in the “Article 2 list”. See Article 2(4) of the Framework 
Decision and supra, chapter 4 p.  129. 
6 See supra, chapter 3 p. 86. 
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other norms or concepts. For instance, a UK judge must order the person’s discharge 
if his surrender is not compatible with the 1998 Human Rights Act (c. 42); an Irish 
judge will deny surrender also when it is contrary to the Constitution; Greek and 
Cypriot authorities must consider “activities for the cause of freedom” as a ground 
for non-execution in addition to those mentioned in the Framework Decision: this 
last definition could cover cases where the distinction between terrorists and freedom 
fighters is blurred, yet one might wonder whether it is in fact a camouflage of the old 
political offence exception7.  
 
The second issue, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, concerns the extent 
to which human rights are recognised within the EAW mechanism. Given the 
importance of clear procedural rules guaranteeing the fair trial of the accused person 
or a fair execution of the sentence where a judicial decision has already been issued, 
it is striking that there are not many relevant provisions in the Framework Decision. 
Leaving aside the grounds for refusal (which are dealt with elsewhere in this work8), 
one may find some guarantees in Article 5 (1) and (2). First of all, if a decision has 
been made in the absence of the accused person and he has not been summoned or 
informed of the date and place of the hearing, the requested authority may demand 
that appropriate assurance be given by the issuing State that the person will be able to 
apply for a retrial. Secondly, if an offence is punished by custodial life sentence or 
life-time detention order, the requested State may demand that a review of the 
penalty or the application of measures of clemency be provided for by the issuing 
State. However, these provisions leave to the executing judicial authority room for 
discretion; moreover, they have been interpreted as optional by some Member States, 
which do not therefore require such guarantees, or require them only partially or 
impose additional conditions9. Human rights safeguards are also included in the 
provisions on double jeopardy, i.e. Article 3 (2) and Article 4 (2), (3) and (5)10 as 
                                                 
7 See, respectively, section 21 UK Extradition Act 2003, section 37 Irish European Arrest Warrant Act 
2003, Article 11 Greek implementing Law 3251/2004, Article 13 (d) Cypriot Law 5850/2004. 
8 See supra, chapter 5 p. 147 et seq. 
9 See Annex to the Report, supra 16.  For instance, German law requires that the person has not been 
aware of the trial as a result of having fled the country. 
10 On this, see supra, chapter 3 p. 85. 
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well as in Article 3 (3), which forbids surrender of minors. As noted elsewhere11, the 
latter ground for refusal is flawed, as it does not specify the age which excludes 
criminal responsibility. 
 
It has already been pointed out in a previous chapter, when dealing with the decision 
to execute in the EAW procedure, that Articles 11 and 12 provide for a number of 
rights following the arrest of the fugitive12. They are: the right to be informed of the 
EAW, of its content as well as of the possibility of giving consent to surrender13; the 
right to a decision on whether detention should continue; the right to be assisted by 
legal counsel and by an interpreter. The arrested person may be released 
provisionally, as long as all appropriate measures are adopted to prevent escape. It is 
evident that the protection offered by the above mentioned Articles is insufficient 
and fragmented, especially in light of the much more detailed provisions contained, 
for instance, in Article 6 and 5 (4) ECHR or 14 ICCPR, which explicitly mention, 
inter alia, the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty as a matter of 
principle and, in addition, the right to have adequate time and facilities for the 
preparation of the defence and the right to challenge the lawfulness of the detention 
(habeas corpus)14.  
 
The third issue worth considering is the actual level of protection of human rights 
throughout the EU. The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights has had 
the opportunity to single out a few serious flaws not only in the newcomers, but also 
in many traditional Member States. Among these, he mentioned the overcrowding in 
the prisons and the living conditions of detainees (for instance in Latvia, Estonia and 
Poland, but also in Spain, France and Italy)15 and the very low remuneration granted 
                                                 
11 See supra, chapter 5 p. 188-189. 
12 See supra, chapter 3 p. 91-92. 
13 If consent is not expressed, then a hearing is arranged, in accordance with the law of the executing 
Member State (Article 14): in this case, specific conditions are set out in order to ensure that consent 
is expressed voluntarily.  See supra, chapter 3 p.104. 
14 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), Rome, 
4/11/1950, as amended by Protocol n. 11, ETS n. 155; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by GA resolution 2200A 
(XXI), 16/12/1966. The right to be presumed innocent is also envisaged by Article 48 (1) of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 364, 18/12/2000.  
15 See Memorandum to the Estonian Government, Assessment of the progress made in implementing 
the 2004 recommendations of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, 11 July 
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to lawyers providing free legal aid (e.g. in Estonia and Poland)16. While in Poland 
pre-trial detention (which is normally two years before the first instance decision)  
has sometimes lasted for up to six years (thus in breach of Article 5 (3) ECHR), in 
France no legal assistance is given for a period of seventy-two hours in drug 
trafficking and terrorism cases17. In Spain for some offences (such as terrorism) a 
detainee may be held incommunicado for seventy-two hours, with a possible further 
extension of another forty-eight hours and sometimes up to eighteen days18. The 
length of proceedings is another frequently voiced concern of the Commissioner. 
However, here again, the “time limit issue” affects not only younger democracies, 
such as Poland, but also old and established ones, such as Spain and Italy19. In Italy, 
in particular, this is a structural problem that was addressed by the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Ministers as early as 199220. Annual reports of the 
Council of Europe21 and judgements of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR)22 have repeatedly stressed the persistent violation of Article 6 (1) ECHR 
(right to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time) by the Italian courts. 
Although new legislation was passed to provide a solution (following pressure by the 
Council of Europe), there seems to be no improvement at present. For instance, the 
Pinto law was designed to allow victims to apply for compensation to the Italian 
                                                                                                                                          
2007, par. 24 et seq.; Memorandum to the Polish Government, Assessment of the progress made in 
implementing the 2002 recommendations of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, 
20 June 2007, par. 29 et seq.; Report by Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights, on his 
visit to Latvia (12 February 2004, par. 14 et seq.); to Spain (9 November 2005, par. 26 et seq.); to 
France (15 February 2006, par. 70 et seq.); to Italy (14 December 2005, par. 50 et seq.). 
16 Memorandum to the Estonian Government, supra par. 46 et seq.; Memorandum to the Polish 
Government, supra par. 41 et seq. 
17 Memorandum to the Polish Government, supra par. 36 et seq.; Report on France, supra par. 55. 
18 Report on Spain, supra par. 20 et seq. On the seventy-two hours limit in general and, in particular, 
in relation to the EAW (for which the additional extensions would not apply) see M.Jimeno-Bulnes, 
‘Medidas cautelares de carácter personal’ in L.A. Zapatero, A.N. Martín (eds.), La orden de detención 
y entrega europea (Ediciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, Cuenca, 2006) 363, 369. 
19 Memorandum to the Polish Government, supra par. 6 et seq.; Report on Spain, supra par. 56 et seq.; 
Report on Italy, supra par. 10 et seq. In all these countries domestic remedies have been introduced in 
an attempt to reduce the procedural delays, but the outcome has not been entirely satisfactory. 
20 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Resolution DH(92)26, 15 June 1992. 
21 See for instance Council of Europe, Third Annual Report on the excessive length of judicial 
proceedings in Italy, CM/Inf/DH(2004)23 revised, 24 September  2004. 
22 ECtHR Motta v. Italy, 4/1990/195/255, 19 February 1991; ECtHR Mattoccia v. Italy, Application 
no. 23969/94, 25 July 2000. Italy is the country with the highest number of unfavourable decisions in 
Europe in the period 1999-2006, mostly for violations of Article 6 ECHR. See table on violations by 
Article and by Country 1999-2006, at www.echr.coe.int . In 2004 the average length of proceedings, 
up to the appeal level, was eight years in civil cases and five years in criminal cases: Report on Italy, 
supra par. 12. 
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Court of Appeal, thus relieving the European Court of the considerable burden of 
cases that each year came from Italy: however, the source of the problem, which is, 
as already said, the structural deficiencies of the judicial system, has not been 
tackled23.  
 
It is evident that the fact that the Member States of the European Union have signed 
the Convention is not a guarantee of uniform and sufficient standards of protection of 
individual rights. It must be added that, although, whenever a violation occurs, there 
are some remedies, each of them shows limits in its application. First, individuals 
may bring a complaint before national judges. Since national procedural rules 
governing the exercise of rights of action must be interpreted and applied in such a 
way as to allow natural and legal persons to challenge before a national court any 
decision or measure relating to the application to them of an EC act having general 
application (by pleading the invalidity of this act)24, this may be deemed possible for 
Third Pillar acts as well (including the Framework Decision on the EAW). However, 
this only occurs a posteriori and therefore does not prevent a breach of a 
fundamental right; moreover, it may sometimes require a lengthy procedure, as 
previously shown. Secondly, individuals may appeal before the ECtHR. However, 
this option is only available after having exhausted all internal remedies25. Thirdly, 
as will be better seen later in this chapter, the role of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) within the Third Pillar needs to be taken into account, although it is still too 
limited.  
 
From what has been discussed above it follows that a closer analysis of the 
Framework Decision reveals an imbalance between the provisions that emphasise 
effectiveness and those that identify the rights of the defence. This reflects a pattern 
                                                 
23 See Legge “Pinto”, n. 89/2001 and Report on Italy, supra par. 23-25. It is worth mentioning that the 
Commissioner on Human Rights also pointed out that in Italy, contrary to many other member States, 
criminal proceedings may not be reopened as a result of a decision of the ECtHR finding a violation of 
Article 6 ECHR (par. 39 et seq.). Moreover, torture does not yet exist in the Criminal Code, although 
Italy ratified in 1988 both the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Strasbourg 26/11/1987 ETS n. 126), amended by Protocols n. 1 
ETS n. 151 and n. 2 ETS n. 152 and the United Nations Convention Against Torture (GA Res. 39/46 
10/12/1984).  
24 See e.g. ECJ C-50/00, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council, [2002] I-06677 par. 42.  
25 C. Ovey, R. White, Jacobs and White European Convention on Human Rights (4th ed. OUP 2006). 
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which can be observed in the whole area of freedom, security and justice26. 
Obviously, what matters here is only the setting of common minimum standards of 
protection. Achieving the highest possible level of protection (in absolute terms) is 
unrealistic for two reasons. First of all, it is natural that each national legal system 
adopts its own criteria and this feature of State sovereignty cannot certainly (and 
indeed should not) be eroded by the current structure and functioning of the Third 
Pillar. Secondly, the scope of application of the EAW is rather wide, in relation both 
to substantive law (spanning between counterfeiting of products and forgery of 
administrative documents and terrorism and organised crime) and to procedural law 
(covering all offences for which the penalty threshold goes beyond the minimum 
maximum limit of one year): it follows that the degree of protection of individual 
rights will vary according to the seriousness of the offence. The need to facilitate 
prosecution and punishment of crimes must always be kept in mind. The EAW is not 
to be regarded as a punitive measure, but rather as an auxiliary mechanism designed 
to improve inter-State cooperation. This means however that, in balancing the values 
of freedom, security and justice, particular attention should be given to those cases 
where, due to the seriousness of the crime perpetrated, there is a higher risk of 
breaching fundamental rights27. 
 
Strengthening the “defence rights” side of judicial cooperation (rather than 
presuming that sufficient safeguards already exist) is essential to build up mutual 
trust. While the European Commission was already aware of this issue in 1998 (the 
same year in which the debate on mutual recognition started28), when it stated that 
comparable procedural guarantees are necessary to ensure that “(…) greater 
efficiency can be reconciled with respect for human rights”29, a proper analysis was 
                                                 
26 R. Lööf, ‘Shooting From the Hip: Proposed Minimum Rights in Criminal Proceedings throughout 
the EU’ (2006) 12 European Law Journal 421. 
27 On this issue in general, see e.g. S. Douglas-Scott, ‘The Rule of Law in the European Union- 
Putting the Security into the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (2004) 29 European Law Review 
219.  
28 See supra chapter 1 p. 8. 
29 Communication from the Commission: Towards an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
Brussels, 14/07/1998, COM (1998) 459 final, p. 9. Such awareness is also evident in other official 
documents: see e.g. Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999, Presidency Conclusions, par.33 
and 35; Communication from the Commission: Mutual Recognition of Final Decisions in Criminal 
Matters, Brussels, 26/07/2000, COM (2000) 495 final, p. 2; Programme of measures to implement the 
principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters, OJ C 12/02 15/01/2001, 2-3 and  10; 
 202
only conducted in 2003. In that year the Commission, after duly recognising in a 
Green Paper that divergences between the Member States could prevent a full 
development of mutual recognition, decided that action should be taken under Article 
31 TEU30. A proposal for a Council Framework Decision on procedural rights was 
presented one year later31, but a final agreement on the text could not be reached, 
despite attempts by the Presidency of the Council to reduce the scope of the rights 
covered32. The main arguments put forward by several governments during the 
negotiation were that it would have compromised the balance already set up by the 
ECHR, that its adoption was outside the scope of Article 31 TEU and that in any case 
the principle of subsidiarity would not be complied with. This may only be regretted, 
as the proposal was put forward at the end of a long consultation process which 
followed the adoption of the Green Paper. It would have affected the functioning of 
the EAW, as it explicitly required Member States to ensure the provision of legal 
advice to suspected persons who are the subject of an EAW or extradition request or 
any other surrender procedure33. It should be noted however that the safeguards 
envisaged by the proposal, even in its original version, were still largely 
incomplete34, as they did not include, for instance, rules on the presumption of 
                                                                                                                                          
Communication from the Commission on the mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal 
matters and the strengthening of mutual trust between Member States, Brussels, 19/05/2005, COM 
(2005) 195 final, par. 18.  
30 European Commission Green Paper: Procedural Safeguards for Suspects and Defendants in 
Criminal Proceedings throughout the European Union, Brussels, 19/02/2003, COM (2003) 75 final, p. 
9-11. 
31 Draft Framework Decision on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings throughout the 
European Union, Brussels, 28/04/2004, COM (2004) 328 final. See R. Lööf, ‘Shooting From the Hip: 
Proposed Minimum Rights in Criminal Proceedings throughout the EU’ supra; M. Jimeno-Bulnes, 
‘The Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Certain Procedural Rights in Criminal 
Proceedings throughout the European Union’ in E. Guild, F. Geyer (eds.), Security versus Justice? 
Police and Judicial Cooperation in the European Union (Ashgate, Aldershot 2008).  
32 See JHA Council, Luxembourg, 12-13 June 2007, Press release 10267/07 p. 37. It is noteworthy 
that the Brussels European Council, 4-5 November 2004 (which launched the Hague Programme), 
Bulletin of the EU n. 11/2004 9-12 and 15-32, par. 3.3.1, after pointing out that “(…) the further 
realisation of mutual recognition as the cornerstone of judicial cooperation implies the development of 
equivalent standards for procedural rights in criminal proceedings (…)”, had called for the adoption of 
the Framework Decision by the end of 2005.  
33 However, the proposal recognised at the same time the right to refuse legal advice or to represent 
oneself. See Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on certain procedural rights in criminal 
proceedings, supra Article 3.  
34 The original proposal included: right to legal advice, right to free interpretation and translation, 
right to receive appropriate attention if not able to understand or follow the proceedings, right to 
communicate, inter alia, with foreign authorities in the case of foreign suspects, right to be notified of 
one’s own rights by means of a written “Letter of Rights”. Interestingly, during the consultation 
process preceding the adoption of the Green Paper, many more rights were considered. See M. 
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innocence, right to bail, double jeopardy, trials in absentia, admission of evidence35. 
Moreover, as pointed out by the European Union Committee of the House of Lords, 
no continuity in the provision of legal services during the surrender procedure 
(including, for instance, a liaison mechanism between the lawyer of the executing 
State and the lawyer of the issuing State) was ensured36.  
 
This leads us to a fundamental question: to what extent can fair trial concerns affect 
the functioning of the EAW? One may recall the controversy as to whether Article 6 
ECHR37 should apply to extradition proceedings: while, in light of the Soering 
jurisprudence, it seems now accepted that extradition can only be refused “(…) 
where the fugitive has suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the 
requesting country”, this does not exclude cases of unfairness before the national 
court of any Member State38. A similar reasoning may apply to the EAW, although, 
as argued in the past, proving the unfairness of a trial which took place or will take 
place in another State is difficult, especially in the second case39. This means that 
only in exceptional circumstances will such a claim be accepted. However, there is a 
further obstacle to the application of the fair trial principle: the lack of clear 
minimum standards concerning the rights of the defence. This hurdle may seriously 
                                                                                                                                          
Jimeno-Bulnes, ‘The Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Certain Procedural Rights’ supra 
174-175. 
35 The right to bail is supposed to be the subject of a future Green Paper. On the presumption of 
innocence, see European Commission Green Paper: The Presumption of Innocence, Brussels, 
26/04/2006, COM (2006) 174 final. On double jeopardy, see European Commission Green Paper on 
conflicts of jurisdiction and the principle of ne bis in idem in criminal proceedings, Brussels, 
23/12/2005, COM (2005) 696 final. A Green Paper on the handling of evidence and a Proposal on 
minimum standards relating to the taking of evidence were initially envisaged in the Council and 
Commission Action Plan implementing the Hague Programme on strengthening freedom, security and 
justice in the European Union, OJ C 198 12/08/2005. On trials in absentia, see discussion below. 
36 House of Lords, European Union Committee, Report with Evidence, ‘Procedural Rights in Criminal 
Proceedings’, The Stationery Office, HL paper 28, 7 February 2005, 39-40.  
37 According to Article 6 (1), “(…) everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”, whereas Article 6 (2) 
refers to the presumption of innocence and Article 6 (3) list the minimum rights which are to be 
ensured and which roughly correspond to those included in the original Proposal for a Framework 
Decision on procedural rights (although the right to cross-examination has been carefully excluded). 
38 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, Application no. 14038/88, 7 July 1989, par. 113. See C. Van 
Den Wyngaert, ‘Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Extradition: Opening 
Pandora’s Box?’  (1990) 39 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 757, 770-772. 
39 J. Dugard, C. Van Den Wyngaert, ‘Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights’ (1998) 92 
American Journal of International Law 187, 203-204. See also (by the same authors) Reports of the 
Committee on Extradition and Human Rights to the International Law Association, Buenos Aires, 
1994, 214-246 and Helsinki, 1996, 142-170. 
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impair the functioning of the EAW and ultimately be fatal for the future of this 
instrument and for the whole system of mutual recognition which the Commission 
and the Council have been laboriously building up in the last years. The failure to 
adopt the Framework Decision on procedural rights is a warning the importance of 
which should not be underestimated.  It should also not be forgotten that human 
rights standard should not only apply to extradition and surrender, but also to other 
areas, such as mutual assistance, for instance in relation to the obtaining of 
evidence40. 
 
It follows that a silent enemy lurks behind the façade of the “smooth and effective 
cooperation” catch-phrase: the risk of misunderstandings in the application of rules 
on the rights of the accused person, in particular as regards the methods of 
investigation or the collection of evidence. The same trial can be fair according to 
one legal system and detrimental for human rights according to another. This risk is 
not theoretical but very much a practical one, since procedural divergences across 
EU Member States cannot be simply ignored41.  
 
In classic extradition law, the ECHR is utilised to set a high threshold test to justify 
refusal, not only when a violation of fair trial is argued, but in relation to all human 
right matters. For instance, in Launder v. United Kingdom it is said that extradition 
will be deemed disproportionate to the legitimate aim of the “prevention of disorder 
or crime” only in exceptional circumstances42. Within the EAW system, the issue of 
proportionality was taken into account in Jaso, where Lord Justice Dyson refused to 
apply the Launder criteria (following Huang, a decision in the context of 
                                                 
40 On this view, see C. Gane, ‘Human Rights and International Cooperation in Criminal Matters’ in 
P.J. Cullen, W. C. Gilmore (eds.), Crime sans frontières: International and European Legal 
Approaches (Hume Papers on Public Policy: Volume 6 Nos. 1 and 2, Edinburgh University Press 
1998) 161.  
41 See e.g. E. Cape, J. Hodgson, T. Prakken, T. Spronken (eds.) Suspects in Europe, Procedural Rights 
at the Investigative Stage of the Criminal Process in the European Union (Intersentia, Antwerpen-
Oxford 2007). 
42 Eur. Comm. On Human Rights, Launder v. United Kingdom, Application no. 27279/75, 8 
December 1997, par. 3 in relation to the right to respect for family life under Article 8 ECHR. 
Similarly, only a “near certainty” of loss of life can be a ground for denial of extradition on the basis 
of Article 2 ECHR (Ibid. par. 2). In the UK this principle was applied in R (Bermingham a.o.) v. 
Director of the Serious Fraud Office; Bermingham a.o. v. Government of the United States of America 
[2006] EWHC 200 (Admin), par. 118. 
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immigration), although it argued that a disproportionate interference with the right to 
respect for family life would have to be found whenever “striking and unusual facts” 
occur43. One may wonder what the difference between “exceptional circumstances” 
and “striking and unusual facts” is in practical terms. The “proportionality test” (as 
applied by the executing authority) might therefore prove useful in delicate cases. It 
should be noted that this type of proportionality is different from the analogous test 
whose application has been suggested in relation to the issuing authority to prevent 
the issuing of EAWs for minor offences44. In both cases it should be borne in mind 
that the inclusion of clearer legislative guidelines would provide better safeguards 
and avoid conferring too wide a discretionary power on judicial authorities.  
 
It is essential that sufficient legal certainty is fostered: can this objective be achieved 
without altering the very nature of mutual recognition? 
 
The rules governing trial in the absence of the accused are emblematic of this 
tension. As mentioned earlier in this chapter45, where a decision in absentia has been 
issued against the fugitive but the judicial authority has failed to summon him in 
person or inform him of the date or place of the hearing, Article 5 (1) of the 
Framework Decision provides for a guarantee. It allows the executing State to 
subject surrender to the condition that an assurance is given by the issuing State that 
the person, once delivered up to the latter, will be able to apply for a retrial and be 
present at the judgement. This is one of the most important guarantees stemming 
from the fair trial principle. As it happens, it is also a very delicate issue, as rules 
differ throughout the EU. This can be illustrated by the Spanish-Italian troubled 
relationship in extradition matters. The high number of rejected requests from 
Spanish authorities on the grounds that trials by default in Italy did not comply with 
the Spanish Constitution was one of the main reasons leading to the signing of the 
Italy-Spain Treaty on a procedure of fast-track surrender, which removed this ground 
                                                 
43 Jaso, Lopez and Hernandez v. Central Criminal Court 8o. 2, Madrid [2007] EWHC (Admin), par. 
57. See also Kucera v. The District Court of Karvina, Czech Republic [2008] EWHC 414 (Admin) 
and (for the immigration case) Huang v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 
11, par. 20. 
44 See supra chapter 5 p.215. 
45 See supra p. 224. 
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for refusal46. In this context, Italy has been repeatedly condemned by the ECtHR and 
has had to change its legislation accordingly47. This occurred recently in Somogyi v. 
Italy, where the Court found that the national authorities had failed to determine, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person had unequivocally waived his right to 
appear at the trial48. However, problems with the Italian and other legal systems 
remain and this might make refusals more likely, due to the fact that Article 5 (1) 
states that the assurance given by the requesting authority must be “deemed 
adequate” by the requested one49. Furthermore, the normative scheme elaborated for 
similar situations by the other mutual recognition instruments seems to be 
remarkably different, as sometimes it is a sufficient condition for enforcement that 
the person, albeit absent, is represented by his lawyer whereas at some other times it 
is required that he be informed personally or via his representative of the 
proceedings: however, nothing is provided for in relation to the right to apply for a 
retrial50. These issues have been addressed by a group of Member States, which put 
forward an initiative aimed at amending the existing Framework Decisions51.  
 
As far as the EAW is concerned, a new Article 4a replacing Article 5 (1) envisages a 
much more complex mechanism. No “adequate assurance” is required, in order to 
avoid ambiguities. Surrender is either allowed or not. The general rule is that non-
execution is possible where a decision has been rendered in the absence of the sought 
person. This ground for refusal is not absolute, as four exceptions are provided for, 
with a view to balancing the need to ensure effective cooperation in enforcing 
                                                 
46 See supra chapter 3 p. 70. 
47 See e.g. ECtHR Colozza v. Italy, Application No. 9024/80, 12 February 1985. 
48 ECtHR Somogyi v. Italy, Application No. 67972/01, 18 May 2004, par. 73.  
49 Curiously, it has been observed that it may be possible that Italy applies a double standard, 
requiring “adequate assurance” from other States, but not being able to offer them in cases of passive 
surrender. See E. Selvaggi, G. De Amicis, ‘La legge sul mandato d’arresto tra inadeguatezze attuative 
ed incertezze applicative’ (2005) Cassazione Penale 1813. In Cassaz. Sez. VI n. 5400 30 January 
2008 (Salkanovic)  the Court accepted with no particular problems a EAW issued by French 
authorities on the basis of an in absentia judgement.  
50 See e.g. Article 8 (2) (e) Council Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA of 6/10/2006 on the 
application of mutual recognition to confiscation orders, OJ L 328 24/11/2006; Article 7 (2) (g) (ii) 
Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA  of 24/02/2005 on the application of the principle of 
mutual recognition to financial penalties, OJ L 76 22/03/2005.  
51 See, inter alia, Council of the European Union, Addendum to the Initiative presented by the 
Republic of Slovenia, the French Republic, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Sweden, the Slovak 
Republic, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany for a Council Framework 
Decision on the enforcement of judgments in absentia, Brussels, 30 January 2008 Doc. 5213/08 ADD 
1 COPEN 4. 
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judicial decisions and the concerns for fundamental rights and the principle of legal 
certainty52. The first exception is applied where the individual has been summoned in 
person and informed of the date and place of the hearing, or it is otherwise 
unequivocally proved that he was aware of the proceedings against him; moreover, it 
is required that he has been informed that a decision in his absence might be issued. 
This clearly reflects the approach normally followed by the ECtHR. A second 
exception is envisaged whenever the person is aware of the trial and a lawyer has 
been appointed either by him or the State. In a third case, if the person has been 
served with the decision and informed of his right to a retrial or to appeal allowing 
his participation as well as a fresh determination of the merits, surrender will be 
possible as long as he has made it clear that he does not contest the decision or has 
not exercised his right to request retrial or to appeal in due course. A final exception 
is provided for when the person has not been served with the decision nor informed 
of his rights, but this will nevertheless occur immediately after the surrender. Such 
exception relates obviously to a very delicate situation, in which all necessary 
guarantees must be ensured. First of all, if the person has not been informed of the 
trial, he may request, once he has been made aware of the content of the EAW, to 
receive a copy of the decision before the actual surrender takes place. However, this 
operation is not equivalent to a formal service and no time limits to exercise the right 
to request retrial or to appeal start running. It has only an information purpose and 
may not be utilised as a means to delay the surrender procedure53.  
 
Secondly, if, once delivered up to the requesting State, he requests retrial or appeal, it 
is envisaged that his detention will be reviewed pending the request: as a result, his 
detention may be suspended or interrupted, as long as retrial or appeal take place in 
due time54.  
 
                                                 
52 See Article 2 (1) Initiative presented by the Republic of Slovenia, the French Republic, the Czech 
Republic, the Kingdom of Sweden, the Slovak Republic, the United Kingdom and the Federal 
Republic of Germany for a Council Framework Decision on the enforcement of judgments in 
absentia, Brussels, 7 July 2008 Doc. 11429/08 COPEN 136. A general approach on this Framework 
Decision has been reached in the Council on 6 June 2008. The whole provision is reproduced in the 
Annex to the Framework Decision on the EAW and the judicial authority is required to tick the box in 
correspondence with each of the situations described below. 
53 See Article 2 (2) Initiative, supra.  
54 See Article 2 (3) Initiative, supra.  
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The analysis carried out above shows that the tension between the values of security 
and freedom is particularly evident in the context of the EAW, due to the lack of 
sufficient guarantees for the accused or convicted person. It must be added that 
perhaps not enough attention has been paid to the issue of adequate training of 
counsel dealing with new procedural rules and new principles55. Hence the need for a 
thorough reshaping of the procedural rules governing the functioning of the EAW, so 
that they are more clearly focused on the protection of the rights of the sought 
person. Flaws can however also be verified in relation to the coordination of law 
enforcement and prosecution across the EU, as will be seen in the next section. 
 
 
6.2 Security vs. freedom: Europol and Eurojust 
 
 
Europol and Eurojust play a pivotal role in the development of the area of freedom, 
security and justice. The former was created in 1995 with the objective of improving 
police cooperation in the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking and all forms of 
serious transnational organised crime; its tasks include, among others, facilitating the 
exchange of information, collecting and analysing data and assisting member States 
in investigations56.  However, the Commission has recently proposed to extend 
Europol’s remit to all forms of serious cross-border crime, regardless of any 
connection to organised crime and to convert it into a Community agency; it will be 
financed from the Community budget rather than via contributions from the Member 
States and all amendments to its rules will be subject to the Community method57. 
These amendments, aiming at strengthening the powers of this body, confirm its 
importance in the coordination of law enforcement efforts and, as a result, its link 
                                                 
55 This problem seems to be felt in Scotland (as emerges from interviews carried out by the author), 
but it may presumably be evident elsewhere, e.g. in the new Member States. 
56 Convention based on Article K3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the establishment of a 
European Police Office, OJ C 316 27/11/1995.  
57 See Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Council Decision establishing the European 
Police Office (Europol), consolidated text, Brussels, 10 April 2008 Doc. 8296/08 EUROPOL 46. A 
political agreement was reached in April 2008: see JHA Council, Luxembourg, 18 April 2008, Press 
Release 8397/08 13. 
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with the functioning of the EAW: as explicitly recognised by the Commission, 
Europol’s competence, in line with the principle of proportionality, will be limited to 
the categories of offences listed in the Framework Decision on the EAW58.  
 
Eurojust is more directly related to the surrender mechanism. It is more recent than 
its law enforcement counterpart and aims at improving and simplifying cooperation 
between national prosecuting authorities59. It gathers prosecutors, judges and police 
officers of equivalent competence, appointed by their national authorities and has 
competence over a range of serious cross-border offences affecting at least two 
Member States, not necessarily involving organised crime60. As far as the EAW is 
concerned, Eurojust is entrusted with three essential tasks. First of all, it can give 
advice to governments in the case of conflicting warrants, i.e. when the same fugitive 
has been subject to EAWs issued by more than one State. Normally in such cases the 
choice of the most appropriate warrant is left to the discretionary power of the 
executing authority. This power is not entirely arbitrary, as the Framework Decision 
provides some criteria to establish priority: seriousness of the offence, place in which 
the crime was perpetrated, date of issuance, purpose of the EAW (i.e. prosecution or 
execution)61. When the case is particularly delicate, Eurojust may intervene, thus 
performing an important role of mediator62. Secondly, States are required to contact 
Eurojust whenever the time limits set out by the Framework Decision cannot be 
complied with. Moreover, they can report to Eurojust all cases where a particular 
State has repeatedly failed to execute an EAW in due course63. Thirdly, Eurojust may 
                                                 
58 Proposal for a Council Decision establishing the European Police Office (Europol), Brussels, 
20/12/2006, COM (2006) 817 final, 7.  
59 Council Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28/02/2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the 
fight against serious crime, OJ L 63 06/03/2002. This Decision was therefore adopted just a few 
months before the two ‘sisters’ Framework Decisions on terrorism and on the EAW. 
60 N. Thwaites, ‘Eurojust: Beacon in EU Judicial Cooperation’ (2006) 77 Revue internationale de 
droit pénal 293; see also House of Lords, European Union Committee, ‘Judicial Cooperation in the 
EU: the role of Eurojust’, Report with Evidence, HL Paper 138, 21 July 2004. 
61 See Article 16 (1) of the Framework Decision on the EAW. Ad hoc provisions on conflicts of 
jurisdiction can be found in other measures, such as e.g. Article 9 Council Framework Decision of 13 
June 2002 on combating terrorism, OJ L 164 22/06/2002.  
62 See Article 16 (2) of the Framework Decision on the EAW. This occurs relatively rarely: in 2007 
four cases were dealt with by Eurojust under this provision (presentation by Pawel Zeman, CEPS 
Seminar “Still not resolved? Constitutional issues of the European Arrest Warrant”, Brussels, 19 
September 2008). 
63 See Article 17 (7) of the Framework Decision on the EAW. Twenty-five cases were reported to 
Eurojust in 2007 (presentation by Pawel Zeman, supra).  
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be helpful in facilitating contact between judicial authorities and solving potentially 
disrupting issues (language problems, legal disputes, requests for additional 
information)64. 
 
It is evident that Eurojust may be very helpful in resolving potential disputes that 
may arise and in ensuring smooth cooperation. However, each of the provisions 
mentioned above fails to ensure the achievement of the very goal for which it was 
originally designed. Indeed, as regards the time limits issue, although the Framework 
Decision imposes an obligation to report, not all Member States have made this 
activity compulsory in their implementing legislation and only some of them state 
the reasons for the delay65. Concerning the other provision, i.e. multiple requests, it 
must be pointed out that the criteria on the basis of which the selection is made are 
not clear-cut and do not offer a satisfactory and comprehensive solution. National 
authorities enjoy too much discretion and, in addition, there is no obligation to 
consult Eurojust. More legal certainty should be guaranteed through new pieces of 
legislation, not only in relation to internal conflicts, but also to external ones, i.e. 
between a European and a non-European country66. Interestingly, during the 
negotiation of the EU-US Agreement on extradition and mutual legal assistance the 
discussion focused inter alia on the issue whether EAW requests should be 
prioritised over US extradition requests67. Article 10 (2) of the Agreement does not 
establish any precedence, although it was strongly opposed by the French 
government; eventually, it was agreed to allow the requested authority to adopt a 
final decision on the matter and it was suggested to revisit the issue in light of future 
developments of the EU, in particular with regard to the possibility of attributing 
primacy to EAW requests68. 
                                                 
64 See in general Eurojust Annual Report 2007, Doc. 6866/08, Brussels, 29 February 2008. 
65 Annex to the Report, supra  29-30. Some of them do not report all types of breach. Eurojust has 
complained that in 2007 only 8 Member States out of 27 have reported breaches: see Council of the 
European Union, Eurojust Annual Report 2007, Brussels, 29 February 2008, Doc. 6866/08 
EUROJUST 17, 17.  
66 Indeed, Article 16 (3) of the Framework Decision reproduces the same criteria listed by paragraph 1 
of the same article, although Eurojust in this case plays no role. The decision is taken by the 
competent executive authority. 
67 Articles 10 and 21 Agreement on extradition between the European Union and the United States of 
America, OJ L 181/27, 19/07/2003. A non-exhaustive list of criteria is included in Article 10 (3). 
68 The Agreement is supposed to be reviewed within five years of its entry into force. See House of 
Lords Select Committee on the European Union, 38th Report, Session 2002-03, HL Paper 153, 15 July 
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 Furthermore, nothing is provided for in the case of accessory surrender, i.e. when 
the request refers also to offences for which the EAW does not apply69. Similar 
concerns may address the lack of rules on conflicts of jurisdictions, which has been 
addressed by the Commission in a Green Paper, where it noted that Eurojust (or an 
alternative body) could play a significant role in dispute resolutions, although it 
recognised at the same time that its powers should be extended70. On that occasion 
the Commission also observed that the identification of an effective mechanism to 
resolve conflicts of jurisdiction would make it possible to reduce the number of 
grounds for refusal applicable to the EAW and other mutual recognition 
instruments71. Discussions on strengthening the powers of Eurojust and amending its 
legal basis accordingly have also included proposals to confer upon it the power to 
initiate both investigations and prosecutions as well as to issue EAWs and letters 
rogatory72.   
 
There is no doubt that Eurojust is an important key to the effective implementation of 
mutual recognition and that its competence should be widened. It has proved to be 
very active on the operational side in many EAW cases, especially in relation to 
terrorism, organised crime or trafficking in human beings73. Its assistance is 
appreciated by a number of practitioners74. However, the effort towards reviewing its 
scope for action should be accompanied by the establishment of a clear system for 
                                                                                                                                          
2003, 12; V. Mitsilegas, ‘The new EU-USA Cooperation on Extradition, Mutual Legal Assistance and 
the Exchange of Police Data’ (2003) 8 European Foreign Affairs Review 515, 528. 
69 The Commission identifies this problem in Annex to the Report, supra 27-28, pointing out that, 
instead, the 1957 European Convention on Extradition did deal with it in its Article 2.  
70 Annex to the Green Paper on Conflicts of Jurisdictions and the Principle of ne bis in idem in 
Criminal Proceedings, Brussels, 23/12/2005 SEC (2005) 1767  11 and 23. 
71 Annex to the Green Paper on Conflicts of Jurisdictions, supra 63-64.  
72 Council of the European Union, ‘Report of the seminar “A Seminar with 2020 Vision: The Future 
of Eurojust and the European Judicial Network”, Vienna, 25-26 September 2006’, Brussels, 19 
October 2006, Doc. 14123/06, p.11. This has been confirmed in the Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the role of Eurojust and the European 
Judicial Network in the fight against organised crime and terrorism  in the European Union, Brussels, 
23/10/2007, COM (2007) 644 final. See also Initiative of the Kingdom of Belgium etc. on the 
strengthening of Eurojust and amending Decision 2002/187/JHA, OJ C 54 27/02/2008.  
73 Council of the European Union, Eurojust Annual Report 2007 supra 38-48 and in particular the 
reference therein to the Operation “Baltico” against a criminal organisation operating across many 
States, including Estonia, Italy and Germany.  
74 Interviews carried out by the author and information collected at the two ERA Conferences on 
Mutual Recognition of Judicial Decisions in Criminal Matters: The Role of the National Judge, Trier, 
Germany, 23-24 October 2006 and 21-23 November 2007.  
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the resolution of problems relating to jurisdiction and, in general, investigation and 
prosecution. At the same time, the expansion of both Europol and Eurojust has not 
been followed by the development of an equivalent system coordinating defence 
counsels and ensuring minimum rights (such as free legal aid, etc.). It must also be 
observed that there are no specific limits in this sense to the competence of the two 
bodies. While there was no mention to human rights in the Europol Convention, the 
proposed Europol Decision refers to them only in recital 25 of the Preamble and only 
in relation to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is at present not legally 
binding75. The Eurojust Decision contains analogous statements in its Preamble, 
referring to both the Charter and Article 6 (2) TEU76.  
 
In this context, a more incisive control by the European Parliament and the European 
Court of Justice would necessarily have to be enforced. This would be certainly 
made easier in the new landscape of the Lisbon Treaty, in which the Third Pillar 
collapses into the First.  
 
 
6.3 The role of the European Court of Justice in the balance 




As mentioned in a previous chapter, the competence of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) is restricted in the Third Pillar77. Despite this, its role has become more and 
more important in identifying guidelines and in shaping the features of EU initiatives 
in criminal matters78 . This has been confirmed in the context of the EAW, in which 
two decisions have already been issued in relation to both implementation and the 
nature of the surrender mechanism.  
                                                 
75 “This Decision respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular 
by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”: Council of the European Union, 
Proposal for a Council Decision establishing the European Police Office (Europol), consolidated text, 
supra recital 25 of the Preamble. However, many provisions herein refer to data protection.  
76 Council Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust, supra recitals 2 and 18 of the Preamble.   
77 See supra, chapter 2 p. 56. 
78 See e.g. ECJ C-176/03 Commission v. Council (Environmental Pollution case) [2005] ECR I-7879; 
ECJ C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285.  
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A first decision was made on 13 July 2005 following a reference for a preliminary 
ruling by the Belgian Constitutional Court (“Cour d’Arbitrage”)79. The Court was 
asked, in line with Article 35 (1) TEU80, to rule on the validity of the Framework 
Decision. The questions were: a) whether a Framework Decision is the appropriate 
instrument or instead a Convention should have been adopted, in accordance with 
Article 34 (2) (b) and (d) TEU; b) whether Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision, 
which does not require verification of dual criminality for the list of offences 
included in the same article, is compatible with the principles of legality and equality 
under Article 6 (2) TEU. The former argument reflected the view of those who 
believe that, under Article 29, Article 31(e) and Article 34 (2)(b) TEU, Framework 
Decisions only have the purpose of adopting minimum rules relating to the 
constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties (and only in the fields of 
organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking)81. The non-profit association 
Advocaten voor de Wereld, in its recours en annulation82, had pointed out the fact 
that traditional cooperation between the Member States had always taken place 
through conventions that had to be ratified by national parliaments: this allowed 
effective democratic control.  
 
Advocate-General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer argued in his Opinion83 that, although a 
Convention would have also been justified by the principle of subsidiarity, the ratio 
of this instrument is its effectiveness as opposed to international conventions, which 
                                                 
79 ECJ C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld v Leden van de Ministerraad, 3 May 2007. 
80 According to Article 35 TEU: “1. The Court of Justice of the European Communities shall have 
jurisdiction, subject to the conditions laid down in this article, to give preliminary rulings on the 
validity and interpretation of framework decision and decisions, on the interpretation of conventions 
established under this title and on the validity and interpretation of the measures implementing them. 
2. By a declaration made at the time of signature of the Treaty of Amsterdam or at any time thereafter, 
any Member State shall be able to accept the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to give preliminary 
rulings as specified in paragraph 1”. Belgium made the declaration under par. 2, so that all its courts 
have the power to submit questions to the ECJ: see Information concerning the date of entry into force 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam, OJ L 114/56, 01/05/1999. 
81 G. Vermeulen, ‘Where do we currently stand with harmonisation in Europe?’, in A.Klip, H. van der 
Wilt (eds.), Harmonisation and harmonising measures in criminal law (Royal Netherlands Academy 
of Arts and Sciences Amsterdam 2002) 68-70. 
82 Belgian Cour d’arbitrage, arrêt n. 124/2005 13 July 2005. To be sure, the questions asked by 
Advocaten voor de Wereld were five, but two of them were not addressed by the Cour d’Arbitrage and 
another two were merged into one.  
83 Opinion of Advocate-General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, ECJ C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld v 
Leden van de Ministerraad, 12 September 2006.  
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run the risk of not being ratified by all Member States. He added that equality is not 
violated for two reasons. First of all, the differences introduced by the new system 
are based on the nature of the facts (i.e. an objective parameter), rather than on 
individual circumstances. Secondly, they are reasonable because they are motivated 
by the need to combat crime in the area of freedom, security and justice (Article 2 
and 29 TEU). Furthermore, legality is not infringed because this principle applies at 
national level, with reference to the definition of the offences, whereas the 
Framework Decision merely creates a mechanism of assistance between the judicial 
authorities of the Member States: accordingly, it is enough that nullum crimen sine 
lege (certa) is respected by the issuing State (and this is so because all Member 
States are signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights and are bound by 
Article 6 TEU). As the role of the executing State is limited to simple assistance, it 
cannot review the merits of the case, from which it would follow that the arrest and 
surrender procedures do not have a punitive nature.  
 
The Court agreed with the Advocate-General. Concerning the argument sub a), after 
making it clear that the purpose of the Framework Decision is to replace extradition 
with a new system of surrender and that mutual recognition cannot be realised 
without approximation, it analysed the legal basis of the Framework Decision. 
Approximation can also be pursued through the EAW and the instruments that can be 
used in this specific context are either a Convention or a Framework Decision: the 
choice between these two is left to the Council84. As far as the argument sub b) is 
concerned, the Court’s view was that the purpose of the Framework Decision list is 
not to harmonise criminal offences. The categories selected are those that are deemed 
so serious as to affect public order and public safety and this justifies the removal of 
double criminality.85. This judgement leaves a few fundamental questions unsolved. 
The fact that an offence and the corresponding penalty are defined by the issuing 
State does not automatically create trust in the executing State: it risks being an 
imposition on another legal system of a parameter which is external to it. This is the 
case, unless there is a certain degree of compatibility between these two systems, 
which avoids excessive frictions. 
                                                 
84 ECJ C-303/05, supra, par. 28-43. 
85 ECJ C-303/05, supra, par. 48-61. 
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Such compatibility must be both substantive and procedural. The Court does not 
address the question as to whether this condition really exists in the European 
criminal systems. Rather, it presumes the existence thereof and leaves each national 
court with the task of verifying on a case-by-case basis the minimum formal 
prerequisites for the execution of an EAW. As already mentioned, the Court justifies 
the choice of the thirty-two categories of offences for which double criminality does 
not apply in light of their “seriousness”, “in terms of adversely affecting public order 
and public safety”86. As we have previously seen, the existence of a sufficient degree 
of substantive compatibility may in some instances be questioned87. A related issue is 
whether harmonisation in these cases is feasible in the short term (or even 
necessary), in light of the cultural background of national criminal law systems. It is 
said that what matters is territoriality: if X commits an act which is regarded as a 
crime in one Member State, then he must be held responsible for that act, according 
to the law of that State, because he has violated the principles and the values of that 
society. As the Court puts it, “(…) the Framework Decision does not seek to 
harmonise the criminal offences in question in respect of their constituent elements 
or of the penalties which they attract”88. However, it must be observed that at the 
very core of the principle of legality lies the need to protect the individual vis à vis 
the State authority. This is so because of the special relationship between the former 
and the place in which he is born and has lived. The system of mutual recognition 
without harmonisation instead implies that the same individual faces more than one 
State authority, each one with its own criteria of punishment and its own criminal 
policy. We may wonder if this relativisation of crime and punishment is in line with 
the nullum crimen principle.  
 
The Court repeats its arguments elsewhere when it states that Title VI of the TEU 
does not make “the application of the EAW conditional on harmonisation of the 
                                                 
86 ECJ C-303/05, supra, par. 57. 
87 See supra, chapter 4. It is all the more significant that, in the course of the negotiations on the 
Framework Decision on the European Evidence Warrant, Germany insisted on an opt-out for a list of 
6 types of offences, which roughly corresponds to the one mentioned above: racism and xenophobia, 
computer-related crime, sabotage, racketeering and extortion, swindling and terrorism. See supra 
chapter 2 note 22.  
88 ECJ C-303/05, supra, par. 52. 
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criminal laws of the Member States within the area of the offences in question”89. 
This does not take into account the fact that, in any case, a certain degree of 
substantive and procedural approximation is necessary for an effective functioning of 
mutual recognition. The Court itself admits this when it states that Article 34 (2) 
TEU does not limit approximation to the areas mentioned in Article 31 (1) (e) and 
makes it applicable also to the EAW90.  
 
It is interesting to observe that the Advocate-General, in addressing the issue of the 
distinction between extradition and surrender, reached a conclusion similar to the 
ruling of the Czech Constitutional Court on the compatibility between the national 
implementing statute and the Czech Constitution91. He too adopted a teleological 
interpretation and looked at the EAW as the effect not of the “coming together of 
separate interests”, but rather of a “common provision – the Framework Decision- 
which sets out the types of offence in respect of which assistance may be 
requested”92. Therefore, harmonisation does not concern national criminal laws but 
form and content of the decision, transmission and execution, grounds of refusal and 
“the rights which protect the arrested person during the procedure and for the 
purposes of surrender”93. 
 
A second decision was made in the Kozłowski case, as a result of a request for 
interpretation of Article 4 (6) of the Framework Decision at the initiative of a 
German court94. The questions, again raised via the preliminary ruling procedure, 
were two: first, how should the terms “staying” and “resident” used in the 
Framework Decision be interpreted?  Second, is the different treatment provided for 
by the implementing law in the case of nationals of the executing Member State and 
in the case of nationals of another Member State in line with the concept of 
                                                 
89 ECJ C-303/05, supra, par. 59. 
90 ECJ C-303/05, supra, par. 38. Advocate-General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in his Opinion argues that 
“legislative harmonisation is essential” (supra, par. 49).  
91 See supra, chapter 5 p. 164-165. 
92 Opinion of Advocate-General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, supra, par. 45.  
93 Opinion of Advocate-General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, supra, par. 49. The Advocate-General 
concluded that it is not national extradition laws, but the concepts of arrest and surrender which have 
been harmonised (par. 50). The Court of Justice instead excludes any reference to harmonisation. 
94 ECJ C-66/08 Kozłowski, 17 July 2008. See for more details M. Fichera, ‘Case C-66/08, Proceedings 
concerning Szymon Kozlowski’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 241. 
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citizenship as derived from Articles 12 and 17 TEC and the principle of non-
discrimination under Article 6 (1) TEU?  
 
The Court availed itself of the urgent procedure which has been recently introduced 
in the area of freedom, security and justice, even though these new rules could not, 
strictly speaking, apply to the case at issue, because they entered into force after the 
questions were referred for a preliminary ruling: such a move was made upon request 
of the national judicial authority, in line with the new procedure95. The questions 
were referred by a German Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht), which has 
the power under German law to rule on the admissibility of an extradition request96. 
The reason for the referral was that a Polish court had requested a German judicial 
authority the surrender of Mr. Kozłowski, a Polish citizen, for the purposes of 
execution of a sentence of five months’ imprisonment for destruction of property. 
However, the same individual was already serving a sentence of three and a half 
years imprisonment in Stuttgart following conviction for several fraud offences. 
Since, prior to his arrest in Germany, he had been living for most of the time in that 
country, he challenged his surrender before the Stuttgart court (Amtsgericht), which 
in turn requested authorisation from the Oberlandesgericht. Indeed, Article 4 (6) of 
the Framework Decision provides, as noted elsewhere in this work97, for a residual 
element of the nationality exception, in the form of a ground of optional non-
execution, whenever a person is subject to a EAW issued for the purposes of 
execution of a custodial sentence or detention order and he is “staying”, or is a 
national or a resident of the executing State. The applicability of this exception is 
                                                 
95 Ordonnance du Président de la Cour, 22 février 2008 dans l’affaire C-66/08. See also Art. 23a 
Statute of the Court of Justice, as of March 2008, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/en/instit/txtdocfr/txtsenvigueur/statut.pdf  and Art. 104b of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Court of Justice as amended, OJ 2008 L 24/39. The new procedure allows the Court 
to deal with a reference for a preliminary ruling (either at the request of a national court or tribunal or- 
exceptionally- ex officio) more expeditiously, as both statement of case and written observations have 
to submitted within a shorter period. What is more, the written stage of the proceedings and the 
submission of the Advocate General (as it occurred in this case) may in the event of extreme urgency, 
be omitted.  
96 Articles 29-32 German law implementing the Framework Decision (Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 
2006 Teil I 8r. 36 p. 1721  25 Juli 2006), amending paragraphs 78-83k of the Law on international 
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters (Gesetz űber die internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, 
1982 Teil I p. 2071, 23 Dezember 1982). 
97 See supra, chapter 3 p. 83. 
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subject to the condition that the sentence or order is served in the latter State, in line 
with its domestic legal system.  
 
Article 4 (6) was transposed into German law by the 2006 legislation, which, as a 
result of the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court, had modified the 
previous implementing law98. In particular, the new Article 83b (2) (b) included the 
possibility of refusing surrender for the purpose of execution of a sentence in respect 
of a foreign national having habitual residence in Germany, under two conditions: 
first, that he does not consent after being informed of his rights; second, that he has 
an interest in the execution of the sentence in Germany which is worth protecting and 
prevails over the interests of the issuing State to have him surrendered. This 
provision is parallel to Article 80 of the same law, which allows surrender of German 
citizens only if there is evidence of a genuine link between the act and the territory of 
the requesting State, as long as return after sentence is guaranteed upon request of the 
person99.   
 
Concerning the first question raised by the Oberlandesgericht, given that the 
Framework Decision does not offer guidelines to interpret the terms “staying” and 
“resident”, the German court asked the ECJ to clarify whether or not the particular 
situation of Mr. Kozłowski could be described in those terms. Obviously, an answer 
in the positive would entitle the German authorities to deny surrender if they believe 
it appropriate. Such decision would not be automatic, but would have to make sure 
that the interest of the sought person is really worth protecting. This exercise would 
entail a careful balance between the need to guarantee the effective functioning of the 
principle of mutual recognition, on the one hand, and the legitimate interests of the 
individual. What is at stake in this case is the right of the suspect or convicted person 
to be reintegrated into society after extinguishing his debt towards the community. It 
follows that, whenever such right can be better ensured in the executing State, 
surrender must be refused, even where the latter State is not the individual’s State of 
nationality.   
 
                                                 
98 Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2004 Teil I 8r. 38 p. 1748,26 Juli 2004. 
99 See discussion supra, chapter 5 p.  143-144. 
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Hence the importance to define what is meant by “staying” and “resident”. 
Guidelines are necessary for two reasons. Firstly, it is not clear whether the former 
term should be qualified as a discrete criterion or should instead simply “integrate” 
the meaning of the latter; secondly, leaving the interpretation of those concepts to the 
Member States’ discretion carries the risk of a non-uniform application across the 
EU100. The Court was well aware of this. Its starting point was that the terms in 
question relate to autonomous concepts of EU law and Member States are not 
entitled to broaden their meaning101.  
 
As a result, the above referred balance of interests on the one hand will have to avoid 
conferring upon the first term too broad a meaning, which would increase the 
possibility of refusal and on the other hand will have to ensure that the rights of those 
individuals that stay in a Member State for a reasonable period of time are 
adequately recognised102. The Court proceeded by dictating a two-steps procedure 
that the executing judicial authority must follow. First of all, it would have to verify 
whether or not the specific situation of the sought person is covered by those terms 
and only after making this assessment would it be allowed to ascertain that person’s 
legitimate interests to remain in the requested State103. The conclusion of the Court 
was that the sought person is “resident” when he has established his place of 
residence in the executing State; he is “staying” in that State if, after a stable period 
of presence, he has developed connections which are of a similar degree to those 
resulting from residence104. 
 
In regard to this particular case, it could be safely said that Mr. Kozłowski was 
certainly not a resident. Could he be considered as “staying” in Germany? In the 
Court’s view, in order to establish whether his situation still fell within the scope of 
                                                 
100 As the Commission observed, there are linguistic differences in the various versions of Article 4 
(6) FD. For instance, the Spanish version of “staying in” refers to “habite en él (…)”; the French 
version refers to “demeure dans l’Etat membre (…)”. They both seem to identify an autonomous 
concept having the same importance as the criteria of residence and nationality, while, in the 
Commission’s view, it is “(…) a necessary but not sufficient condition for invoking the ground for 
optional non-execution (…)”.  See ECJ C-66/08, supra par. 35.  
101 ECJ C-66/08, supra par. 42-43. 
102 ECJ C-66/08, supra par. 36-37.  
103 ECJ C-66/08, supra par. 44. 
104 ECJ C-66/08, supra par. 46.  
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Article 4 (6), his connections with the hosting State must be assessed in light of a 
number of objective factors, such as the length, nature and conditions of his presence 
and the family and economic ties with that State105. Should all these factors be taken 
into account at once? The ECJ, while making it clear that the final decision should 
not rely simplistically on only one of them, distinguished between two categories of 
factors. On the one hand, the fact that the requested person’s stay was not 
uninterrupted and did not comply with national legislation on residence of foreign 
nationals could be considered relevant for the purpose of deciding whether the 
person is actually “staying” the executing Member State (the first step of the 
procedure indicated above). On the other hand, committing crimes and being 
detained in the requested State are elements that can be useful (although, of course, 
not by themselves) for assessing whether or not the request should be refused (the 
second step)106. 
 
 Mr. Kozłowski’s specific situation, as described by the German court, did not seem 
to comply with those criteria. His presence in Germany was not continuous, his 
German was poor, he did not have any family and, although working occasionally, 
he depended financially mostly on the proceeds deriving from the crimes he 
committed107. Therefore, the term “staying” did not apply in such case. As a result, 
there would be no need to answer the second question referred by the German court, 
i.e. whether the fact that, in transposing Article 4 (6), Germany allows a different 
treatment between the nationals of the executing Member State (who can never be 
extradited against their own will) and the nationals of other Member States (whose 
extradition is decided at the discretion of the competent authority)108. 
 
In this second judgement, the ECJ applies, as seen, the balancing method between 
the interest in the prosecution of offenders and enforcement of sentences and the 
interests of the individual. This is not a unique example in the area of freedom, 
security and justice, as shown in previous cases109. What is worth noting here is that 
                                                 
105 ECJ C-66/08, supra par. 48. 
106 ECJ C-66/08, supra par. 50-51. 
107 ECJ C-66/08, supra par. 25-26. 
108 ECJ C-66/08, supra par. 56.  
109 See e.g. on ne bis in idem ECJ, C-469/03, Miraglia, [2005] ECR I-2009 par. 34.  
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for the first time the Court acts as a sort of third instance court, deciding how a 
particular provision of the Framework Decision must be interpreted with concrete 
reference to a request for surrender. It is however regrettable that the question of 
compliance of an implementing law with the principle of non-discrimination and 
with the concept of EU citizenship has not been analysed. It seems that, whenever 
the real impact of mutual recognition and of the EAW on State sovereignty and 
individual rights is at stake, any evaluation of the merits is carefully neglected. 
 
In addition, it would be important to address the different wording of Article 4 (6) 
and Article 5 (3). The latter refers to the possibility to subject surrender to the 
condition that the person is returned to the executing Member State in order to serve 
there the custodial sentence or detention order. It is not clear why in this case (where 
the EAW is issued for the purposes of prosecution) no mention is made of the term 
“staying”. The Court did not intend to address this issue in this case110: it may be 
presumed that the ratio behind this provision is merely the result of a cost-benefit 
analysis, as returning an individual to the executing State after trial is generally more 
expensive and is thus perceived as not necessary for those who show weaker links 
with that State. 
 
However, behind Kozłowski lies a more fundamental issue. What is at stake is the 
role of Member States in implementing the Framework Decision on the EAW. Since 
there are no legislative guidelines on the terms “staying” and “resident”, the risk is 
that this system might place too heavy a burden upon national judicial authorities’ 
shoulders. The application of the concepts of “staying” and “resident” in different 
contexts and legal systems may be potentially discriminatory. This also raises doubts 
as to whether the Court should be left alone in filling the gaps. 
 
                                                 
110 ECJ C-66/08, supra par. 40. It is worth mentioning that Article 19a and recital 6d of the Preamble 
of the proposed Framework Decision on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to 
judgements in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of 
liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union state that the Framework Decision 
applies also to enforcement of sentences in the cases envisaged by Article 4 (6) and 5 (3), to the extent 
that they are compatible with the Framework Decision on the EAW. See Doc. 9688/07 COPEN 68, 






As shown in this chapter, the human rights perspective is certainly one of the 
mainstays on the basis of which the surrender mechanism works. The EAW is a 
concrete example of balance between the values of freedom, security and justice, 
which highlights the practical challenges facing such a delicate exercise. It is 
submitted that the bodies that are designed, depending on their role, as protectors of 
security or as guarantors of freedom and justice, have not been entrusted with 
sufficient powers to perform their task. For instance, Eurojust and the Court of 
Justice are very much in need of re-adjustment in this sense: the former’s 
competences should be extended and the latter’s control over Member States’ action 
in criminal matters should be made more incisive (as the Lisbon Treaty would do if it 
entered into force). This “deficiency” is probably one of the reasons for the Court’s 
careful approach in the two EAW cases mentioned above. From the analysis of 
Advocaten voor de Wereld and Kozłowski, it can be argued that in not addressing the 
core issues of the EAW and its implications for human rights, the ECJ avoided any 
potential domino effect on the compatibility of the whole mutual recognition agenda 
with the rule of law and with equal treatment. One may only expect that future 
rulings will shed more light on the “dark side” of the surrender mechanism.  
 
At the same time, the Framework Decision should avoid the ambiguities deriving 
from the uncertain definition of the human rights clause. A clear set of rules defining 
the rights of the defence should be envisaged, either separately or by way of 
amendment to the Framework Decision. However, this operation should proceed 
hand in hand with a strengthening of the procedural rights in the whole area of 
freedom, security and justice. In this context, although any exercise of balance 
involving human rights must be carried out on the basis of proportionality criteria, 
the risk is that a lack of legislative guidelines would excessively widen the judicial 
authorities’ discretionary powers. Finally, in order to ensure legal certainty, multiple 
requests, accessory surrender and conflicts of jurisdiction should be regulated.  
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The assessment carried out above is true not only in absolute terms, but also by way 
of a comparison. It is striking that the new system seems to offer a lesser degree of 
protection of fundamental rights than the previous extradition procedure as applied 
within the European Union. An overall analysis of the principles of dual criminality, 
speciality, double jeopardy, as well as the removal of the nationality and political 
offence exception (as seen in the previous chapters111), shows that their adaptation to 
the surrender mechanism, while justified on the basis of effectiveness, has not been 
accompanied by a thorough re-elaboration of the framework within which the EAW 
is supposed to function. These traditional rules were designed as safety nets to 
prevent abuses by governments112: it follows that a complete or partial removal of 
them makes it even more necessary to fill the existing “human rights” gaps. 
 
It is apparent that further steps should be made in the direction of a coherent system 
of cooperation, where efficient prosecution and adequate guarantees are properly 
balanced. This is essential to the very legitimacy of the EAW: failure to ensure 
appropriate standards of protection in this area risks threatening mutual trust, thus 
triggering a self-destructive vicious circle. As mentioned in a previous chapter113, the 
idea that the individual is simply an object of extradition proceedings (which 
revolved around State sovereignty) has been in the second half of the twentieth 
century gradually replaced by a new conception, focusing more and more on the 
individual’s rights and needs.  It is therefore unacceptable that the EAW mechanism 
(which derives from extradition) does not seem to be very concerned about them. On 
the other hand, a general obligation upon the executing State not to surrender should 
be subject to a high threshold (where there is a flagrant violation of human rights, i.e. 
the so-called Soering test). Such obligation should be strengthened by a detailed set 
of rules establishing at the European level which rights the individual is entitled to, in 
order to avoid disputes and uncertainties deriving from a subjective interpretation of 
these rights by the executing State. Taking this into account, a sufficient degree of 
                                                 
111 See supra  chapter 3 p. 82 et seq. 
112 J. Dugard, C. Van Den Wyngaert , Report of the Committee on Extradition and Human Rights to 
the International Law Association, Helsinki, 1996, 142-170.  
113 See supra  chapter 1 p. 14. 
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protection should be ensured by way of the non-discrimination clause, especially in 
all those borderline cases which were once caught by the political offence 
exemption114.
                                                 





7.1 Overview of the findings of the thesis 
 
 
The EAW seems to be a very effective tool for the prosecution and conviction of 
criminals across the EU. The creation of this mechanism of cooperation is to be 
viewed (from a purely theoretical perspective) as a clear improvement when 
compared to traditional extradition. If one looks at it using the standards of 
“effectiveness” adopted by the European Commission, one cannot help but welcome 
this change. Following those standards, the EAW is particularly effective because the 
average time required to surrender an individual upon request is much lower than 
under the earlier system. It must also be recognised that the removal of political 
checks and the establishment of a direct contact between European judicial 
authorities have contributed to the reduction of formalities. However, a less 
superficial analysis (which goes beyond the mere elaboration of statistics published 
in official reports so far) reveals a substantial number of gaps and flaws. They relate 
primarily to the fact that a suitable “safety net” for the defence is missing. This is not 
due simply to the lack of sufficient human rights guarantees in the body of the 
Framework Decision on the EAW. The hasty adoption of the EAW prevented a 
thorough reflection on the consequences of its introduction. Such reflection should 
have gone much deeper and should have been conducted from several viewpoints, 
such as for instance international law, criminal law and EU constitutional law. 
Instead the new mechanism (following a pattern similar to the whole Third Pillar in 
its early years) seems to be mainly modelled on the urge to fight terrorism and all 
main cross-border crimes.  
 
First of all, the modification of classic extradition law principles such as dual 
criminality, nationality and the speciality rule (which can now be applied rather 
flexibly) should have been accompanied by a parallel setting up of an adequate 
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framework of protection of human rights1. Those principles had a sense not only as 
an upshot of the assertion of State sovereignty, but as a fundamental guarantee 
against potential abuses. This was part of the general trend towards conceiving the 
extraditee as a subject rather than an object of the proceedings. Turning to a 
depoliticised system does not absolve Member States from the duty to provide 
individuals with instruments to defend themselves. After all, the principle of 
“equality of arms” (according to which the defendant and the public prosecutor 
should be treated equally) still plays a pivotal role in the trial and an analogous 
reasoning should apply to the EAW, even if strictly speaking the latter cannot be 
considered as a “trial measure”.  It has been shown in this work that the standards of 
protection of human rights within the EU are not uniform. In both new and old 
Member States there are numerous instances where the provisions of the ECHR are 
violated and this should be a warning sign in establishing the area of freedom, 
security and justice. 
 
Second, although the “human rights” side is certainly defective, the “prosecution” 
side is not complete either. As this thesis has pointed out, the relatively weak role of 
Eurojust (despite recent amendments) and the lack of rules on conflicts of 
jurisdiction undermine considerably inter-State cooperation2. This means that even 
the perspective of “effectiveness”, mentioned earlier, has not been properly 
developed.  
 
Third, in the general context of the passage from an international law to a EU law 
cooperation system, one could say that the Third Pillar has acquired a somewhat 
hybrid status, stemming from a combination of intergovernmental and supranational 
features. However, the outcome is not satisfactory, as demonstrated by the weak 
powers of the ECJ and the European Parliament as opposed to the strong influence 
that Member States can still exercise without the fear of sanction by the 
Commission3. One may therefore wonder whether such structure constitutes a fertile 
ground for a suitable European criminal law or if it would be more appropriate not to 
                                                 
1 See chapter 6, p. 194. 
2 See chapter 6, p. 208. 
3 See chapter 2 p. 56. 
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go off the beaten track of inter-State cooperation. Whatever option is chosen, the 
EAW could without doubt be viewed as the cornerstone of an incoherent system, 
which is very much in need of more legislative intervention to foster legitimacy and 
democracy. 
 
It follows that the acclaimed principle of mutual recognition cannot be implemented 
on its own in the area of criminal matters. Approximation should be pursued more 
decisively, in order to make the product of a foreign legal system more 
“recognisable”. Some of the most striking paradoxes that can be observed in the 
functioning of the EAW are identifiable in the substantive law area. In a number of 
cases both penalties and offences can vary significantly4. Concerning penalties, as 
noted in the thesis, even in relation to murder (which is one of the crimes whose 
definition is roughly widely accepted throughout the EU Member States) a different 
criminal “stigma” can be attached depending on the legal system where the trial takes 
place. For instance, in the case of “killing on demand” a German judge may impose 
between six months and five years’ imprisonment whereas an Italian judge may 
establish a sentence of between six years and fifteen years’ imprisonment (as well as 
life imprisonment whenever aggravating circumstances have been determined). 
Concerning the constituent elements of the offences, problems may arise (and on 
some occasions have indeed arisen) in relation to cases of euthanasia, abortion as 
well as possession of drugs, racism and xenophobia, racketeering and extortion, 
swindling, sabotage (to indicate the most prominent examples). The reasons for these 
problems are twofold. First, some of these offences carry a strong value judgement 
and the criteria for criminalising a specific conduct and defining its elements are 
contingent upon various factors (not only legal, but also political, social, economic 
and so on). One of the consequences of this has been that some EAWs have been 
issued for offences which are considered “minor” in richer countries but are viewed 
as sufficiently serious in poorer countries. Second, the lack of definition of those 
offences in the Framework Decision undermines clarity and legal certainty and it 
seems that the potential risks of this approach have not been assessed thoroughly by 
the drafters of the Framework Decision. 
                                                 
4 See chapter 4 p. 98. 
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Moreover, the need for a common platform is essential to reinforce mutual trust, 
which goes hand in hand with legitimacy: if one is legitimate, then one is trusted and, 
at the same time, if one is trusted, then one is legitimate. This thesis has 
demonstrated that it is necessary to strengthen trust not merely through a top-bottom 
approach, but also through a bottom-top approach, which consists of exchange of 
information and best practices, mutual evaluation mechanisms, training, adoption of 
practical guidelines, setting up of networks, etc.5 A step in the direction of 
developing trust and confidence would be to reduce the list of categories of offences 
for which double criminality has been removed to a few “core offences” for which 
approximation can be pursued more effectively6.  
 
A possible scenario is the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. In this case some 
of the obstacles that have been stressed in this thesis would be probably overcome by 
the merging of the First and the Third Pillar (most notably, the role of the European 
Parliament and of the Court of Justice would be enhanced). The Treaty also requires 
that within five years all Framework Decisions are turned into Directives (i.e. their 
equivalent in the First Pillar). Nevertheless, most of the problems mentioned above 
would still be evident and perhaps be even more acute, as there would be a higher 
demand for legitimacy and trust. This is of course a further variable that compounds 
the matter and one may even wonder whether an adequate system of European 
criminal law is feasible in the long term7.  
 
In this regard, this thesis has also focused on the implications of the implementation 
of the EAW for the EU as a whole. This relates to the more general discourse on 
what is to be expected from the new developments of the Third Pillar. It is important 
in this context to define the contours of freedom, security and justice. Are Member 
States required to trust unconditionally each other’s freedom, security and justice? 
Although no clear answer can be obtained from the EU official documents, some 
reflections should be made. 
                                                 
5 See chapter 5 p. 193. 
6 See chapter 4 p. 130-131. 
7 See reflections at the end of these conclusions. 
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First of all, the brief analysis of the mutual recognition instruments carried out in this 
work has shown that the flaws of the EAW scheme have been unfortunately 
reproduced in all of them. None of the Framework Decisions has an adequate 
mechanism for safeguarding individual rights. The list of thirty-two categories of 
offences has been included in all of them and in one case (mutual recognition of 
financial penalties) has even been extended to thirty-nine. Their negotiation has been 
slower than with the EAW and has sometimes seemed to face insurmountable 
obstacles, as was the case for the adoption of the European Evidence Warrant: 
emblematic of this is the German reservation in respect of six offences (including 
swindling or racketeering and extortion)8.  
 
Secondly, from a substantive criminal law point of view, this thesis has explored the 
extent to which mutual recognition and/or harmonisation can be viewed as credible 
options. The question is linked to the issues of identity and sovereignty. When 
mutual recognition operates, there is always at least one element of diversity, 
whereas harmonisation postulates no differences. Can the EU speak a common 
language in terms of crime and punishment? Or, alternatively, could one imagine a 
network-like system of reciprocal exchanges of rights and obligations between equal 
sovereigns, with no overarching authority and a plurality of monopolies on the use of 
force?9 The latter option seems more realistic in the short term and would imply 
adapting principles of international law for the purposes of a unique experiment of 
integration within the EU. However, the two options are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive: one may argue even intuitively that a long-established practice of mutual 
recognition can eventually lead to harmonisation. As mentioned earlier, an essential 
condition for this is the combined development of mutual recognition and 
approximation, i.e. a step-by-step approach. 
 
This work has sought to demonstrate that the EAW was instead introduced as a result 
of a strong political pressure deriving from 9/11 and that those circumstances have 
been exploited to push for a more radical approach (combining a limited number of 
                                                 
8 See chapter 2 p. 46-53.  
9 See chapter 2 p. 60-67.  
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grounds for refusal with a more extensive abolition of dual criminality)10. This would 
suggest that the ratio underlying the expansion of the Third Pillar has been the need 
to enhance security at the EU level, on the assumption that Member States are not 
able to achieve effective results on their own. There are indeed reasons for upholding 
this. It is commonly believed that, as a consequence of globalisation, growing 
interdependence and porous borders within the EU territory, classic nation-States are 
no longer able to guarantee a sufficient degree of security to their citizens. This may 
be true in the case of immigration, drug trafficking, terrorism and other cross-border 
offences, as well as in serious cases of murder or theft. However, is this enough to 
justify the building up of a procedural and substantive criminal law system?  
 
It is argued here that the issues of identity, legitimacy, sovereignty should be taken 
much more seriously. The move from mere cooperation to effective integration needs 
to be supported by a constitutional discourse flowing from several areas (institutions, 
citizens, informal networks etc.). In this context, key concepts such as mutual 
recognition and mutual trust need to be more strongly associated with the rule of law, 
regardless of whether or not the ultimate aim is to achieve full harmonisation. This is 
why this thesis has also attempted to provide a definition of mutual trust as a starting 
point for future debate11. A fundamental assumption is that it is not useful to 
elaborate a concept of mutual trust from a purely legal perspective (which is the path 
followed by the Court of Justice). Instead, a sociological approach should be 
adopted. The notion and scope of mutual trust have therefore been analysed in line 
with the studies on the attitudes and behaviour of people in inter-personal 
relationships. Part of the social sciences literature has indeed identified a link 
between trust and cooperation and it is argued here that understanding the essence of 
trust will help to clarify the purpose and benefits of the EAW mechanism and 
European Criminal Law. Mutual trust is therefore viewed as the reciprocal belief that 
the common principles lying at the heart of the EU legal systems will not be 
breached. Its subjects can be Member States or judicial authorities. Moreover, trust 
will always be conditional on other factors, such as the lack of serious reasons that 
would justify refusal to cooperate. The definition of mutual trust has been used to 
                                                 
10 See chapter 3 p. 71-80. 
11 See chapter 5 p. 190-193.  
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verify, through a series of interviews conducted with practitioners, the extent to 
which it can be deemed to exist in two countries belonging to the common law and 
the civil law tradition: the United Kingdom and Italy. The conclusion has been that 




7.2 Policy recommendations 
 
 
In the light of what has been said above, the following suggestions are made: 
 
• Adopting a new Framework Decision on the rights of the defence, or 
(alternatively) incorporating a substantial number of provisions in the body of 
the Framework Decision on the EAW (and, similarly, of the other mutual 
recognition instruments) 
• Strengthening the role of Eurojust in the context of the EAW, for instance by 
providing a system of sanctions for States that fail to cooperate 
• Adopting clear rules on conflicts of jurisdiction: one of the relevant criteria 
could be territoriality (i.e. the place where the offence has been committed, 
unless its serious adverse effects are felt elsewhere) 
• Restricting Article 2 (2) list to a few “core offences” for which an agreement 
on the definition of the act and the penalty to be imposed can be more easily 
found 
• Further approximating both the substantive and procedural rules (i.e. on one 
hand the constituent elements of offences and penalties when this is possible 
and on the other hand rules ensuring adequate guarantees for the individual) 
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• Increasing the use of informal methods of evaluation, exchange of best 
practices and, more generally, adopting guidelines and soft law measures to 
promote awareness and mutual understanding 
 
 
7.3 Areas of future research 
 
 
It is important to clarify what the benefits of European Criminal Law are (if any). It 
is also necessary to find its justification and telos.   Do we need more integration of 
our criminal legal systems and what are the normative claims of the emerging 
model? Is the main purpose of the EAW and all other mutual recognition instruments 
to facilitate cooperation or do they also constitute the basis for a more organic 
legislation which will be built up in the near future? The recent case law of the ECJ, 
the official documents of the Commission and the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty 
seem to show a trend in the second direction. It has been argued however by some 
scholars that the issues raised by the development of European Criminal Law (such 
as legitimacy, consensus, common public sphere etc.) are ethical and as such cannot 
be dealt with properly by the EU institutions12. The debate must therefore refer to the 
broader picture of the EU legal order, so as to assess the extent to which the EU 
should acquire the features of a State and whether our analysis of the future of EU 
criminal law should still be made on the basis of the classical State-centred paradigm 
of sovereignty13. 
 
A further question is then what model of integration is being pursued. An essential 
condition for the legitimacy and the credibility of the European Criminal Law project 
of integration (if this is really the path that the EU is willing to follow) is the 
                                                 
12 K. Nuotio, ‘Criminal law of a transnational polity’ in H. Müller-Dietz et al. (eds.), Festschrift für 
Heike Jung (Nomos 2007) 685, 698. 
13 The relevant literature is remarkably large. See e.g. J. Habermas, ‘The Constitutionalisation of 
International Law and the Legitimation Problems of a Constitution for World Society’ (2008) 15 
Constellations 444; N. MacCormick, ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’ (1993) 56 The Modern Law 
Review 1. 
 233
guarantee of common standards. After all, this does not differ greatly from the real 
purpose of modern criminal law, which is to avoid abuses and distortion. A surrender 
scheme which is implemented in different ways across Europe is certainly not an 
ideal move in that direction. It is also necessary to clarify what we mean by freedom, 
security and justice. Do they matter as values, as general principles, as aspirations? 
Who are their beneficiaries and should they  include the notion of freedom as self-
determination, in the sense that there must be as little interference as possible in the 
constitutional sphere of Member States? 
 
This shows that there are a few definitional issues within the EU that remain 
unresolved. Does the EU have a common notion of rule of law? Further research 
should be carried out in order to establish what the boundaries of crime and 
punishment are and whether it is possible or desirable to confer upon the EU a right 
to punish. Related to this, the concept of mutual trust should be further explored to 
verify whether it can apply not only to the area of judicial cooperation, but also to 
police cooperation and EU criminal law as a whole.  
 
In this context, it would be of value to analyse the coordination between the 
emerging system of criminal law and procedure in the EU and the general principles 
of international law. It would also be interesting to ascertain how the EU model 
relates to other regional or institutional models, such as the US or the International 
Criminal Court, which inter alia rely on peculiar mechanisms of surrender (called 
“interstate rendition” or “interstate extradition” in the US14).  
 
One final consideration at the end of this excursus is that there is something 
disquieting when even the slightest suspicion emerges that a polity seeks to enhance 
security in order to hide its weaknesses and failures.
                                                 
14 On this, see e.g. R.J.Hardy, ‘Continuity or Change in Interstate Extradition? Assessing Puerto Rico 
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